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To my parents 
 
May the world become a ground of peace; the recognition of cultural differences 
becomes the power of understanding like Buddha cast his glance at a flower,  
the flower and Buddha smile for the moment of apprehension.  
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 7 Preface
Preface
The aim of this research is to provide an outline to address questions with regard to the 
transformation of planning in China that has occurred after the 1980s. The research 
is using “planning evolution” as the main research skeleton. The starting point is to 
investigate to what extent Chinese urban planning has developed after the opening 
up and other reforms under the state-led and market-driven modes of Chinese 
reformation, and to investigate how the different modes and various actors have 
influenced urban planning, based on the investigation of the respective political and 
economic changes within the initial reformation in general, and planning in particular. 
In recent years, China has undeniably undergone a dramatic process of urban growth 
and transformation. Apart from its speed and scope, it is less recognized that these 
processes are confronting the Chinese planning institutions with new and unexpected 
demands almost on a daily basis. In reference to the increasing importance of private 
investments and developments within the Chinese urbanization process, a new 
balance between public planning and private developments, and between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches is required to be able to generate both a reliable and 
responsible framework for long-term urban development and a flexible system of 
implementation that meets the needs of changing conditions and new demands. 
Flexibility and reliability become the new demands for planning practice.
Based on the theory of planning culture, planning traditions, concepts, systems and 
decision-making processes are always related to the cultural context and cultural 
background of the people and societies involved. Investigating the contemporary urban 
transformation and urban development processes in China can allow us to outline 
the new planning culture of contemporary China in relation to its historical roots and 
traditional characteristics in a long term framework. I argue that the changing role of 
urban planning is strongly embedded in the political, economic, and social domains 
and is a part of cultural innovation.
The research opens a general debate on the circumstances of the contemporary Chinese 
transformation after the 1980s. After introducing the idea of planning culture and 
elaborating to what extent the idea of planning culture is applied in this research, I argue 
that the “soft” characteristics of planning emphasized by the idea of planning culture are 
crucial to understand Chinese planning evolution. The idea of planning culture is applied 
to build up the theoretical framework needed in order to approach the research subject: 
the contemporary Chinese transformation, based on a systematic structure. 
Overall, this research states the following. 1). The reversal of Chinese policies in 1978 
and the opening up of the country to foreign investments and technology were taking 
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up the job that had been left unfinished in 1949. The momentum is regarded as a part 
of the long-term evolution of Chinese modernization, for which the term of “critical-
modernization” is introduced, situating the changes within the broader context of 
the globalization. It cannot be disconnected from the roots of Chinese history and 
tradition and as such is an alternative to Western paradigms. 2). The dissection of the 
specific Chinese historical evolution results in a sequence of layered modes of hybrid 
development. 3) Situating the political-economic momentum of the 80s in a longer time 
span and exploring it beyond the political status of the time by making the contextual 
linkage to the cultural and traditional consensus of Chinese history, it is seen as a 
“cultural turn” of Chinese society. 4). This study applies the idea of “planning culture”—
to compare different periods in one country and to analyze the changes that have taken 
place with regard to both the planning system and the cultural context; and to approach 
urban planning transitions from political, social, and economic aspects by investigating 
the conditions, approaches, and results of current spatial planning in China. 
According to the application of the idea of planning culture as a systematic framework, 
the research comprises three major research themes: the transformation of society, the 
transformation of the planning system and the implementation of planning in practice. 
The Transformation of the Society comprises two parts. The first reviews the philosophical 
roots of the Chinese norm and value system and the second part introduces the contextual 
background of the emerged evolution of Chinese modernization. The purpose is on the 
one hand to anchor the contemporary Chinese transformation within the Chinese context, 
and on the other hand to argue that the transformation of contemporary China in the 
1980s is a new turn that is part of the evolution of modernization.
The Transformation of the Planning System offers the specific information about the 
transformation that took place in the 1980s, in particular in relation to the reforms 
initiated by the central government. The focus is in on the re-modification of the 
urban planning system after 1978; special attention is given to the political structure, 
planning organization, and plan forms. It is the analysis of the top–down system.  
The Implementation of Planning System in Practice zooms further in on the micro-
scale of planning evolution by analyzing the planning implementation in practice in 
one of the fastest growing cities of the country: Shenzhen, located in the Pearl River 
Delta, which can be regarded as an almost newly constructed city with approximately 
300.000 inhabitants in 1980 and reaching 10.47 million in 2011. During a relatively 
short period of development the degree of acceleration and the scope of an entirely 
unexpected growth forced local planning authorities to constantly readapt to changing 
conditions and new demands. In this framework, different planning documents and 
the process of decision-making are analyzed, with special attention to the coordination 
and fine-tuning between planning intervention and planning implementation. 
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These three clusters of research themes serve to answer a series of research questions 
respectively. The main research question is: How does urban planning in contemporary 
China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution within the current world 
society? This research argues that planning strategies have to be developed, on the one 
hand under the circumstances of inevitably increasing uncertainties in China society 
generating the flexibility for new and unexpected developments, and on the other 
hand to confront the unpredictability and uncertainty of initiatives from diverse public 
and private actors by generating and building up a reliable framework for sustainable 
long-term developments. Planning embodiment (ideology, aim, system etc.) must be 
understood and used not only for political-economical interventions but, furthermore, 
as a spatial agent in order to mediate the changing confrontations of socio–spatial 
demands embedded in the cultural domain, instead of being used only as a top–down 
dominating intervention tool.
China enters a critical era of modernity, a society in which to retrieve the socio-spatial 
meaning for people is a much more powerful force than only focusing on economic 
success and political stability. This reflection shall be based on the revival of Chinese 
traditions and values and the re-evaluation of those values in a systematical manner. 
However, in comparison with drawing a concrete conclusion, this study’s intention is 
to inspire reflection, to provoke further debate and to disclose and dissect the context 
of Chinese planning culture. It is by the same consideration that I found the idea of 
planning culture a useful and valuable framework to access urban development and 
planning evolution in non-Occidental countries. The “soft” core of planning culture 
has the same essential cultural value everywhere, and for countries like China who 
share the similar hybridity of evolutional history, the processes of industrialization, 
urbanization, decolonization, Westernization, post-industrialization and globalization 
are affecting the country not in a linear–subsequent manner, but on different layers 
simultaneously and sometimes with contradicting demands. 
Being embedded in this unique Chinese political–socio–economic environment, 
urban planning is used by the state as a powerful instrument providing a vision for the 
country’s future in the transitional process between the rules of both extreme modes 
of top-down and bottom-up approaches, balanced by involving the governmental and 
public sectors simultaneously. 
I am convinced that the idea of planning culture can trigger a new wave of discourse 
leading to a completely new insight in and understanding of cultural differences, not 
only in an abstract sense for Chinese culture but also in general for everybody whose live 
is strongly influenced by planning decisions and whose daily activities are interactively 
incorporated in the socio-spatial domain. 
i
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Voorwoord
Het doel van dit onderzoek is een kader te verschaffen voor vragen die betrekking 
hebben op de Chinese transformatie sinds de jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw.  
Het begrip “planning evolution” levert hierbij het belangrijkste onderzoekskader.  
Het uitgangspunt is om te onderzoeken in hoeverre de stedelijke ontwikkeling is 
geëvolueerd sinds China zich heeft opengesteld voor de rest van de wereld en sinds 
de hervormingen die hebben plaatsgevonden, met zowel de door de staat geleide 
als de door de markt gedreven aspecten daarvan: hoe de verschillende modi en de 
verschillende actoren de stedelijke ontwikkeling hebben beïnvloed. Het onderzoek richt 
zich daarbij op de politieke en economische veranderingen in het algemeen, als op 
planning in het bijzonder. 
In het recente verleden heeft China onmiskenbaar een dramatisch proces van stedelijke 
groei en verandering doorgemaakt. Hoewel de snelheid waarmee die verandering 
plaatsvond en de omvang ervan algemeen worden erkend, realiseert men zich niet 
altijd dat deze processen de Chinese instellingen die belast zijn met planning bijna 
dagelijks voor nieuwe en onverwachte vragen stellen. In relatie tot het toenemende 
belang van private investeringen en projecten voor de Chinese stedelijke ontwikkeling, 
is er een nieuwe balans nodig tussen planning van overheidswege en private 
projecten, en tussen ‘top-down’ en ‘bottom-up’ benaderingen om een betrouwbaar 
en verantwoord kader voor lange-termijn stedelijke ontwikkeling te creëren, en 
daarnaast een flexibel implementatie-systeem dat kan voldoen aan de eisen van 
steeds veranderende voorwaarden en vraagstellingen.  Flexibiliteit en betrouwbaarheid 
worden de nieuwe vereisten voor de praktijk van de planning.
Uitgaande van de theorie van “planning culture”, zijn de in de planning gehanteerde 
tradities, concepten, systemen, en besluitvormingsprocessen onderdeel van 
de culturele context en de culturele achtergrond van de betrokken mensen en 
gemeenschappen.  Onderzoek van de huidige stedelijke transformaties en van de 
stedelijke ontwikkelingsprocessen in China stelt ons in staat om een nieuwe plannings-
cultuur voor het hedendaagse China te schetsen, gerelateerd aan haar historische 
wortels en traditionele kenmerken, gezien op de lange termijn. Ik beargumenteer dat 
de veranderende rol van de stedelijke ontwikkeling diep is ingebed in de politieke, 
economische en sociale domeinen, en dat het een onderdeel is van de culturele 
vernieuwing.
Dit onderzoek opent een algemeen debat over de omstandigheden van de huidige 
Chinese transformatie die begon in de jaren 80 van de twintigste eeuw. Na de 
introductie van het idee van een “planning culture” beargumenteren we dat dit idee 
van cruciaal belang is voor het onderzoek. Ik benadruk dat de ‘zachte’ karakteristieken 
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van planning, die in het idee van ‘planning culture’ besloten liggen, essentieel zijn om 
de ontwikkeling van de planning in China te begrijpen. Het idee van een “planning 
culture” wordt gebruikt om het theoretisch kader voor het onderzoek op te bouwen.  
Samenvattend stelt dit onderzoek het volgende. 1) De ommekeer in de Chinese 
politiek in 1978 en het openstellen van het land voor buitenlandse investeringen en 
technologie moeten worden gezien als het afmaken van wat in 1949 onaf was gebleven. 
De veranderingen worden gezien als deel van de evolutie van de Chinese modernisering 
op de lange-termijn.  Het momentum wordt gezien als een onderdeel van de evolutie 
van de modernisering van China op de lange termijn. Hiervoor wordt de term “critical 
modernization” geïntroduceerd, en worden de veranderingen gesitueerd in de bredere 
context van de globalisering. Het kan niet los worden gezien van de wortels van de 
Chinese geschiedenis en traditie en is als zodanig een alternatief voor de Westerse 
paradigmata. 2) De ontleding van de specifiek Chinese historische ontwikkelingen toont 
de gelaagdheid van een hybride ontwikkeling. 3) Het politiek-economisch momentum 
van de jaren 80 wordt beschouwd in een langere tijdspanne en in een ruimer kader 
dan de politieke situatie van die tijd, door het verband te leggen met de culturele en 
traditionele  consensus uit de Chinese geschiedenis. Ten opzichte daarvan is er sprake 
van een culturele verschuiving (“cultural turn”). 4) Deze studie past het begrip “planning 
culture” toe door verschillende historische perioden binnen 1 land te vergelijken en de 
veranderingen te analyseren die hebben plaatsgevonden in het planningssysteem en in 
de culturele context; en door de transities in de stedelijke planning te benaderen vanuit 
politiek, sociaal, en economisch perspectief. Zo worden de voorwaarden, benaderingen 
en resultaten van de huidige ruimtelijke ordening in China onderzocht. 
Met het idee van de “planning culture” als systematisch kader, richt dit onderzoek zich 
op drie belangrijke thema’s: de transformatie van de maatschappij, de transformatie 
van het planningssysteem, en de implementatie van de planning in de praktijk.
The Transformation of the Society omvat twee onderdelen. Het eerste onderzoekt de 
filosofische wortels van het Chinese systeem van normen en waarden en het tweede 
introduceert de context waarbinnen de Chinese modernisering zich voordeed. Het doel 
daarvan is aan de ene kant om de huidige Chinese transformatie te verankeren binnen 
de specifiek Chinese context, en aan de andere kant om de transformatie van het 
hedendaagse China als een nieuwe ontwikkeling te tonen, onderdeel van de evolutie 
van de modernisering.
The Transformation of the Planning System geeft de specifieke informatie over de 
omwenteling die plaats vond in de jaren tachtig, in het bijzonder met betrekking 
tot de hervormingen die in gang zijn gezet door de centrale regering. De focus ligt 
op de verandering van het systeem van de stedelijke ontwikkeling na 1978, met 
speciale aandacht voor de politieke structuur, de organisatie van de planning, en de 
verschillende planvormen. Dit is de analyse van het top-down systeem. 
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The Implementation of Planning System in Practice zoomt nog verder in op het 
micro-niveau van de veranderingen in de planning door de implementatie van de 
planning in een van de snelst groeiende steden te analyseren: Shenzhen in de Pearl 
River Delta, dat beschouwd kan worden als een bijna geheel nieuw gebouwde stad 
met ongeveer 300.000 inwoners in 1980 en bijna 10,47 miljoen in 2011. In relatief 
korte tijd hebben de mate van versnelling en de omvang van de totaal onverwachte 
groei de lokale met de planning belaste autoriteiten gedwongen om zich continu 
aan te passen aan de veranderende omstandigheden en nieuwe vragen. Binnen dit 
kader worden verschillende planningsdocumenten en ook het besluitvormingsproces 
zelf geanalyseerd, met speciale aandacht voor de coördinatie en afstemming tussen 
geplande interventies en de implementatie daarvan.   
Deze drie groepen van onderzoeksthema’s zijn bedoeld om een reeks van 
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden.  De hoofd-onderzoeksvraag luidt: “Hoe biedt de 
stedelijke planning in het hedendaagse China het hoofd aan de uitdagingen van de 
stedelijke evolutie zoals die zich voordoet binnen de huidige wereldgemeenschap?”  Dit 
onderzoek beargumenteert dat er nieuwe strategieën voor planning moeten worden 
ontwikkeld.  Deze moeten enerzijds in reactie op de onvermijdelijk toenemende 
onzekerheden in de Chinese maatschappij de flexibiliteit genereren die nodig is om 
om te kunnen gaan met nieuwe en onverwachte initiatieven van publieke en private 
actoren, en anderzijds een betrouwbaar kader bieden voor duurzame ontwikkelingen 
op de lange termijn. De verwezenlijking van de planning in termen van ideologie, 
doelstellingen en systemen moet begrepen en ingezet worden niet alleen voor politiek-
economische ingrepen, maar ook als ruimtelijk instrument dat bemiddelt in de 
voortdurend veranderende confrontaties van sociaal-ruimtelijke eisen in het culturele 
domein, in plaats van het top-down opleggen van interventies.  
China gaat een kritiek tijdperk van moderniteit binnen, een gemeenschap waarin het 
vinden van sociaal-ruimtelijke betekenissen voor mensen een veel belangrijker kracht 
is dan de beperkte focus op economisch succes en politieke stabiliteit. Dit besef is 
gebaseerd op de herleving van Chinese tradities en op een systematische her-evaluatie 
van de daarin besloten normen en waarden. 
In plaats van een concrete conclusie te trekken, heeft deze studie tot doel om aan 
te zetten tot reflectie, om verder debat uit te lokken, en de context van de Chinese 
planningscultuur te ontsluiten en te ontleden. Het is op basis van dezelfde afweging 
dat ik het idee van de “planning culture” een waardevol en nuttig kader vind om 
de stedelijke ontwikkeling in niet-Westerse landen te benaderen en te evalueren. 
De “zachte” kern van de planning-cultuur heeft overal dezelfde culture waarde. In 
landen met een vergelijkbare hybride geschiedenis als China zijn de invloeden van de 
processen van industrialisatie, verstedelijking, dekolonisatie, verwestlijking, post-
industrialisatie en globalisering niet opeenvolgend, maar simultaan en op meerdere 
niveaus tegelijk werkzaam en stellen deze soms tegenstrijdige eisen. 
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Hoewel ingebed in de unieke Chinese politieke, sociale, en economische context, wordt 
stedelijke planning door de staat vanuit een visie op de toekomst gebruikt als een 
krachtig instrument in de processen van transitie tussen de regels van beide extreme 
benaderingen top-down en bottom-up, in evenwicht gebracht door zowel de overheid 
als de particuliere sector bij de ontwikkelingen te betrekken.
Ik ben er van overtuigd dat het idee van “planning culture” een nieuw discours op gang 
kan brengen dat leidt tot een totaal nieuw inzicht en begrip van culturele verschillen, 
niet alleen met betrekking tot de Chinese cultuur maar ook in het algemeen, maar ook 
voor iedereen van wie het leven wordt beïnvloed door planningsbeslissingen en wiens 
dagelijkse activiteiten deel uitmaken van het sociaal-ruimtelijke domein.  
i
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Part 1 Introduction, Theories and the 
Research Outline
The aim of this research is to provide an alternative outline 
to address questions with regard to the transformation of 
planning in China that has occurred after the 1980s. 
Chapter 1 opens the debate on the circumstances of contemporary Chinese 
transformation after the 1980s. It argues according to the theory of planning culture, 
planning traditions, concepts, systems and decision-making processes are always 
related to the cultural context and cultural background of the people and societies 
involved. Following this argumentation, the aim of the study is set to decode the 
contemporary Chinese planning culture. The idea of planning culture is applied to 
build up the theoretical framework in order to approach the research subject: the 
contemporary Chinese transformation, based on a systematic structure.
Chapter 2 elaborates further the idea of planning culture and the way that it is 
applied in the research. Being embedded into the theoretical framework of planning 
culture, relevant theories are elaborated in order to guide the direction of the 
research and research hypotheses and research questions are proposed. In the end of 
Chapter 2, a detail description of the research including methodological framework 
and approaches are given. 
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1 Introduction
The transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s is a spectacular 
phenomenon, a miracle one might add. To what extent this miracle is made still 
remains in constant debate among scholars nationally and internationally. The efforts 
that have been made from different angles dedicated to dissect this extraordinary 
transformation have proposed permanently new denominations for interpretation and 
have competed in redefinitions of the circumstances. In general, researches cover three 
fields. First, scholars who focus on the political-institutional transformation imply 
that the political development is facing the crucial dilemma between attempting for 
economic revival and maintaining political authoritarity. Second, a few are concerned 
with distinguishing the future direction of ideology, as influenced by the foreseen 
increase of economic liberalization. Third, others explore the social phenomena by 
anticipating the degree of democracy that China is heading to. These researches 
have contributed, within a few decades, to an abundant accumulation at the level of 
practical fact-finding as well as theoretical mapping. 
Based on the benefits from earlier research, this research has set a course from 
the beginning to decode the Chinese reformation from a single subject matter: the 
planning evolution of contemporary China. 
In this chapter, the introduction opens and links to the central research inquiry: how 
does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the emergent urban 
evolution within the current world society? It argues that the changing role of urban 
planning is strongly embedded into the political, economic, and social domains and is a 
part of the cultural innovation of society. The main aim of the research is set to outline 
the planning culture of contemporary China and illustrates how internal and external 
forces influence it simultaneously. At the end of the chapter, the overall research design 
and the composition of the parts and chapters is explained.
§ 1.1 Opening the Debate 
Since the late 1970s, China has undergone a dramatic process of transformation 
and societal change. During the last decennia’s the country experienced one of the 
fastest process of urbanization in human history, generating urban agglomerations 
of unknown dimensions and unknown dynamics. The radical change from a mainly 
rural society to a society, whose economy, societal system and lifestyles became more 
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and more dominated by urban conditions, resulted both in growing welfare and in 
increasing social contradictions - contradictions within the cities, contradictions 
between cities and surrounding former rural areas and contradictions between the 
underdeveloped west of the country and the more developed, more urbanized east.
The radical change has been both enabled and accompanied by a major reversal of 
Chinese policy that started in 1978 and slowly led to an opening of the country for 
private entrepreneurship as well as foreign investments and technologies. The existing 
society, which used to embody the planned-economy, traditional communist ideology, 
and top–down political organization, was forced to change. It was challenged by 
newly arising interests in favor of an entrepreneur-oriented society, in combination 
with the emerging new policy of open-market practices. Consequently, the internal 
transformation took place at many different levels and in many different aspects.
Firstly, the supposed certainty of the planned-economy has been replaced by the increasing 
complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability of the recent transformation processes. 
New parties, such as private investors and developers, have become involved in urban 
development, while bringing in their own interests and following their own logic. New 
user groups are demanding spaces for their own initiatives, resulting in an increasing 
importance of private investments and private developments within Chinese urbanization.
Secondly, the concept of an open society was gradually introduced during this time. A 
comparatively open society and environment after the Maoist period introduced a new 
urban paradigm that includes changes in urban governance, urban layout, and urban 
form—mostly, this involved introduction of the new urban mindset to society. Thus, 
the city has become less controlled by top–down interventions and more open to public 
involvement. As a result, the spatial sphere has become a collective arena bringing 
together the public and private domains, and often both forces confront and contradict 
each other. 
In addition, the emphasis on the overwhelming reformation of the economy, the 
politics, and society in general has often undermined the ethics and the traditional 
Chinese norms and values, and therefore has created a break with its historical 
and cultural context. The growing social contradiction, as a result, is leading to an 
increasing segregation and, in many cases, to a concentration of poverty in certain 
parts of cities and regions.
Furthermore, rising environmental problems have become key issues for the development 
of Chinese cities. For example, the energy consumption of buildings is much too high 
and must be reduced profoundly. The increasing motorization and, in particular, the fast 
growing number of private cars not only generates daily traffic jams, but also has become 
one of the main causes for air pollution in most of the cities in China.
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In the domain of planning practices it is less recognized that these processes are 
confronting the Chinese planning institutions almost on a daily basis with new and 
unexpected demands, in view of the increasing diversity of actors who are intervening 
and interacting in the urban development process. Not only the Chinese cities, 
but the planning approaches and methods are in transition as well. A new balance 
between public planning and private development, and between top–down and 
bottom–up approaches is required, a balance that is able to generate both a reliable 
and responsible framework for long-term urban development and a flexible system 
of implementation to meet the challenges of changing conditions and new demands. 
This requires the former blue-print urban planning of the Maoist period to be modified 
and complemented by an approach that can give space to private initiatives, on the one 
hand, and give the capacity to public planning to guide private initiatives and to adapt 
them to the general aims of urban development on the other.
Flexibility and reliability became the new demands for a planning practice that 
traditionally was used to act within the strict top-down order of the Maoist period, 
framed by the 5-years planning scheme of the communist system. The planning 
administrations on different levels had to learn how to integrate private developers and 
other parties involved into the planning process, how to take into account the mood 
of the market and the interests of private investors, how to adapt plans to changing 
conditions and new demands. However, they also had to avoid the new flexibility to end 
up in unclarity and chaos. The newly demanded type of urban plans not only has to be 
flexible, it still has to generate too a reliable framework for future development, giving 
planning security to private investors as well as future users. 
To find a balance between the contradictory demands of reliability and flexibility, 
between top-down and bottom-up, between public planning and private development, 
is a big challenge for the Chinese planning administration since the political opening 
up in 1978. It still is an ongoing process, triggering a huge amount of new regulations 
and an even bigger amount of approaches and experiences. From a certain point of 
view it can be seen as a catching-up process taken from developments in Western 
countries, where the traditional blueprint planning has been replaced by more 
flexible approaches such as negotiation planning, participatory planning and strategic 
planning. On the other hand we should not expect that the transformation of the 
Chinese planning system will result in a copy of Western approaches. Considering the 
political differences, the dimension and dynamics of the urbanization process in China, 
and last but not least the specific Chinese value systems and social manners, it will be 
(and has to be) a specific Chinese approach, embedded in the Chinese culture as well 
as in the specific political conditions of the country, facing urban challenges that are 
unprecedented in human history.
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§ 1.2 Specific Conditions 
The dynamics of the globalization and urban transformation processes in Europe 
and North America have been documented and analyzed extensively. Compared to 
this body of knowledge, the number of studies on the recent urban transformation 
processes in China is rather limited. Only a few studies place the current changes in 
reference to the Chinese history of the last centuries. Hou Youbin (2003) argues that, 
in comparison to Western industrialized countries, the modernization of China had a 
delay of 160 to 200 years. In addition, the development was interrupted by political 
turmoil, civil wars, foreign invasions, and occupations. As a result, China is confronted 
by a double challenge: to catch up to the delay of the past and to simultaneously deal 
with the current challenges of globalization and global economic transformation. 
This situation is generating a special mode of development: the processes of 
industrialization, urbanization, decolonization, Westernization, post-industrialization 
and globalization are affecting the country not in a linear–subsequent manner, but 
on different layers simultaneously and sometimes with contradicting demands. The 
discourse between the effects of this layered development on the systems and on the 
approaches of spatial planning in China requires a better understanding of its particular 
cultural context.
In a sociological sense, China is a special case, particularly at this moment in history 
(Logan 2002). The weight of transition and the promise of changes combine to make 
this remarkable moment. Many transformation processes that are interactively taking 
place in China are not unique to China—globalization, urbanization, and a market 
economy are not country-specific phenomena—however, it appears to be distinctive 
in the Chinese case, because of the long history of self-imposed isolation and the 
evidence that it has propelled itself so quickly within the past four decades from a third 
world country toward becoming a first rank world power, while making a transition from 
a centrally planned to a market economy.
China’s economic trajectory since the beginning of the reform has been profoundly 
different from developments in Central Europe and in the post-Soviet republics of 
Central Asia, including Russia. In contrast with the sudden demise of the entire system, 
China engaged in much more gradual economic reform while clinging to its political 
framework of Communist one-party rule. As a matter of fact, a Communist leadership 
that is successfully, to a certain degree, controlling the speed and scope of market 
reform, is turning into a new capitalist oligarchy: a leadership that maintains political 
supremacy during this process “while still maintaining a critical level of stability and, 
presumably, generating sufficient legitimacy for its regime through good economic 
performance, national zeal, and a good deal of tolerance, with respect to political 
decentralization and local voice”. (Heberer and Schubert 2006: 10)
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The challenges lying ahead for China are certainly manifold—despite the influence 
of globalization, in general, and urbanization, in particular, China still is one of the 
most state-controlled countries in the world. The core problem for the Chinese 
Communist Party, since the beginning of the reform era, has always been how to 
keep the balance between steady market transformations on the one hand, and 
persistent authoritarianism without endangering one-party rule on the other. Such an 
integrationist (or state-hegemonic) tendency, as Michael Leaf (2005) defined, is in fact 
deeply rooted in Chinese ancient history, instead of just deriving from the history of 
Communist China.
Among further issues, the crucial lesson that the Chinese have to learn is that the 
market can do little to transform an economy without a parallel shift in its class 
relationships, private property, and all other institutional structures that typically 
ground a thriving capitalist economy (Harvey 2005). It indicates that planning is and 
has to be more than a mere instrument to serve certain demands, in reference to the 
functioning of society and the intention to alter the existing course of events.
In recent years, abundant research regarding the Chinese urban transformation after 
the open-door policy era has been accumulated. In fact, the debate on where China 
is headed—and how fast—is the core question for most scholars. The issue of market 
reform arises in China in a unique way, as the concrete choices made at every step of 
the way are marked by the state’s continuing intervention. However, it is important 
to understand the new perspectives that the Republican era introduced, and that, as 
Marie-Claire Bergère (2000: 55) emphasized, “was more and more perceived as the 
starting point of a forceful modernization drive, as a time of economic and cultural 
innovation and creativity to which contemporaries should turn for inspiration.” A rigid 
challenge lies right in front of Chinese transformation, as the need for a modernization 
theory, postulated by Lowell Dittmer (2003: 904):
That a political regime must open up in the long run in order to master the 
rising complexities of economic and social development by establishing 
responsive political institutions, feedback channels of communication 
between the state and its citizens, and inclusive modes of participation. At 
a minimum, a non-democratic state must foster continued and equitable 
economic growth by ensuring sufficient degrees of (extractive, regulative 
and redistributive) state capacity; and liberalize the political system for the 
institution of at least some participation considered meaningful by the people.
Being embedded in this unique Chinese political–socio–economic context, urban 
planning is used by the state as a powerful instrument and political–economic 
mechanism in the transitional process, keeping the rules of both extreme modes in 
balance by involving the governmental and public sectors simultaneously and providing 
a vision for the country’s future. It may, however, be accompanied by new faults and 
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mistakes within its own political and societal limits. One may argue, based on the 
historical development of Western democratic societies, that spatial interventions in 
China still serve mainly political and economic goals, without giving enough space to all 
types of civil organizations. However, it is debatable if this is also an occidental value, as 
it ignores the cultural evolution of China.
§ 1.3 General Aims and Concerns
To investigate the “cultural turn” in recent urban planning approaches in China is the 
major aim of this study. In which way (and to what extend) the traditional top-down 
approach of the Maoist period has been changed and adapted to the plurality of a more 
open society? How have the demands of flexibility and reliability been solved? To what 
extend was public planning in practice able to integrate private initiatives, investments 
and developments into the planning process? In which way have the planning 
regulations and its legal framework have been adapted to the new challenges?
Of course these questions cannot be answered completely for China as a whole. The 
recent transformation processes in China are characterized by diversity, dissimilarity, 
and inequality and are by no means simultaneous. For that reason the research 
is focusing on the changing conditions and regulations for urban planning on the 
national level, and—with regard to the planning practice—on the case of Shenzhen 
as one of the fastest developing cities in China and in the same time as one of the 
most experimental cases for new planning approaches. In this way the research does 
not reflect the average planning practice in China, but focuses on more advanced 
approaches, indicating the direction in which China is moving.
Decoding the urban planning transition in China helps to outline a possible 
interpretation of the special mode of Chinese contemporary urban development. 
However, planning evolution is not just a technical mechanism. It is by nature part of 
the political, economic, and social decisions that are made interactively and of which 
new values and cultures for civil society are evolving simultaneously. I argue it is a part 
of the unfinished modernization that China is still undergoing, a continuing process 
in which external and internal forces are inevitably interacting. All these aspects are 
associated with the idea of Planning Culture.
The idea of Planning Culture has been developed in Europe in the 1990’s as an 
analytical framework to compare the planning systems in different European 
countries.$1 It became clear that the analyses of differences and similarities of planning 
systems cannot be reduced to the comparison of technical and procedural regulations. 
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The concept of Planning Culture is based on the idea that planning approaches and 
related decision-making processes are always embedded in and defined by the cultural 
context and the cultural background of the people and societies involved. Only within 
this context planning systems become understandable and comparable.
This study makes use of the idea of Planning Culture in a different and until now 
unsusual way. The aim is not to compare planning systems and their cultural context 
in different countries, but to compare different periods in one country and to analyse 
the changes that have been taking place with regard to both the planning system and 
the cultural context. The research wants to elaborate further interpretations of the 
evolution of Chinese urban planning in contemporary China by anchoring it into the 
Chinese social and historical context, and in addition, to build up first a systematic 
accumulation of the relevant material, which is regarded as an important research 
in itself. The main aim is to provide a cultural-contextual foundation for a broader 
international debate and a better understanding of the current and future Chinese 
transformation.
It is impossible to achieve such observations completely within a limited timeframe; 
neither is it possible to build up entirely comprehensive results that allow for a finite 
interpretation of the overall aspects. With this constraint in mind, the research skeleton 
focuses on the evolution of urban planning and its development in relation to the 
political, economic, and social momentum, and at the same time it is underpinned by 
studying the relevant stages of Chinese society that are related to its modernization 
over a longer time span. I agree with John Friedmann (2005a: 187) that China’s current 
system of physical planning is still “under construction”. However, one could also argue 
that it represents one of the most extreme cases of “pre”-modernization, rather than 
“post”-modernization within contemporary urban development, where everything 
is changing in front of our eyes through strong socio-political interventions. Many 
presumptions about Chinese economic and political reform still remain unknown. One 
can see that Chinese contemporary urban development demonstrates one of the most 
dynamic frontier conditions in the evolution of urban planning, permanently shifting 
between modes of flexibility and reliability. Studying Chinese urban development 
and its planning evolution provides new evidence for urban development debates; 
thus, building a discourse on the evolution of Chinese urban development and urban 
planning is very much needed.
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§ 1.4 Outline of the Study
The study is divided into five parts, each of them including two chapters. The following 
text gives an overview of these parts and their main contents.
Part I Introduction, Theories and the Research Outline contains the Chapter 1 
Introduction and Chapter 2 dedicated to the theoretical framework, the research 
hypotheses, questions and the methodology of the study. In this framework the idea 
of planning culture and the application of planning culture in this research are further 
elaborated, based on which, relevant theories are reviewed and converted into a 
thematic framework of investigation in three aspects: the transformation of the society, 
the transformation of the planning system, and the implementation of the planning 
system in practice.
Part II Cultural and Historical Review starts with providing the general contextual 
background. The major relevant aspects dwell in two parts: reviewing the philosophical 
roots of the Chinese norm and value system as well as the contextual background of 
the emerged Chinese modernization. The purpose is on the one hand to anchor the 
contemporary Chinese transformation within the Chinese context, and on the other 
hand to argue that the transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s is a new 
turn as part of Chinese modernization.
Part III Initial Reformations and the Modification of the Planning System offers 
the specific information about the transformation of the turn in the 1980s, in 
particular relating to the planning formation. The focus is in on the transformation of 
contemporary China after 1987 in the four initial aspects of political, economic, social, 
and spatial reformations. Special attention is given to the political structure, planning 
organization, and planning system.
Part IV Planning Practice and the Emerged Socio-Spatial Challenges zooms further in 
on the micro-scale of planning execution by analyzing the planning implementation 
and this is done by a case study: Shenzhen, one of the fastest growing cities in China. 
It investigates the recent planning history of Shenzhen and provides a comparison 
between the planning interventions and the process of realization that the local 
planning administration is encountering. In this framework, different planning 
documents and the process of decision-making are analyzed, with special attention 
to the coordination and fine-tuning between the planning intervention and planning 
implementation. Three projects on three scales and of three different planning modes 
are chosen to demonstrate the interactions between the state-led and market-driven 
planning modes in local practice. 
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Part V Outline of the Chinese Planning Culture is dedicates to drawing a conclusion 
and reflections. It responses to the research questions, extracted from the research 
investigation and analyses, and demonstrates how the new urban development in 
China is finding a dynamical balance between flexibility and reliability. At the end, 
suggestions are given for further research. 
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2 Theoretical Framework, Research 
Hypotheses and Questions, and 
Methodological Approach 
In this chapter, relevant theories are framed based on the idea of Planning Culture.
The idea of Planning Culture lays the foundation of a thematic framework, following 
which relevant theories are further elaborated and composed following three research 
entrances: the transformation of the society, the transformation of the planning 
system, and the implementation of the planning system in practice. Each research 
entrance comprises three parts of review on phenomena, challenges and solutions. 
Each research entrance guides the research and leads to research hypotheses and 
questions that are proposed in accordance with the same line of inquiry, reflecting 
on the transformation of China. The hypotheses and questions cover aspects from 
the macro-scale of the historical context to the micro-scale of planning adoption on 
the execution level, and interrelations between the planning vision and the planning 
outcome. 
The idea of planning culture is transferred from a thematic framework into an analytical 
structure, based on which the methodological structure of the research is framed and 
explained. 
At the end of the chapter, the contents of the analytical aspects, viewpoints of 
observation, and the selection of case studies are composed into the overall research 
design.
§ 2.1 The Idea of Planning Culture
The relationship between planning and society was a major issue in the work of the 
Hungarian-German sociologist Karl Mannheim already in the 1930’s. For Mannheim 
planning is a necessary and inevitable condition for a democratic society to control 
irrationality. In his book Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus (Mannheim 
1935), published 1940 in the English language under the title Man and Society in an 
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Age of Reconstruction, he distinguished four types of societies resulting from variations 
in the participation and centralization of the societal decision-making processes$1:
• Dictatorship is the result of low levels of participation and high levels of 
centralization.
• Anarchy results from high levels of participation and low levels of centralization.
• Anomie results from low levels of both participation and centralization.
• The “democratically planned society” is a result of high levels of both participation 
and centralization. 
Mannheim’s book was a fundamental attack against both the top–down approach of 
the fascist dictatorship and the laissez-faire attitude of the liberal capitalism. Seeing 
the upcoming totalitarian societies in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union he 
strongly argued for a shift from a liberal order to a planned and planning democracy, 
based on rational decision-making processes.
After World War II, Mannheim’s argumentation played an important role in the 
political debates about the future of democracy in different Western countries. It 
triggered what became known as the Great Debate on planning and society that deeply 
affected both the USA and post-war Europe. While first focusing on the desirability 
and feasibility of public planning in general, the debate shifted from the 1950’s on to 
more concrete questions concerning particular planning techniques and alternative 
institutional structures: who are the actors of planning, which (democratic) institutions 
should be involved in planning decisions, and what are the rights of citizens in planning 
processes. The debate had a strong influence on planning practices and on planning 
legislation in almost all Western countries, resulting in highly formalized procedures 
for public planning, including the obligation for citizen participation, or at least 
information.
In the 1990s, the debate on planning and society arose anew, particularly in Europe. 
An important reason for this revival was the process of European unification with its 
growing demand to harmonize planning procedures and planning legislations and 
to understand the divergences and dynamics of planning approaches in different 
European countries. In addition, the rapid and fundamental changes of planning 
approaches and planning paradigms—caused by political changes in Europe and 
by newly arising actors, constellations, attitudes, modes of action, and planning 
instruments—induced the recognition of the high relevance of “soft” and culturally 
driven orientations by planning researchers.
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Within this framework, a new term was introduced, subsuming all perceived and 
interrelated differences and changes of style and notion of spatial planning: the idea 
of “Planning Culture” (Planungskultur) (Brech 1993). Based on the idea of planning 
culture, a research project, regarding the comparative studies on different planning 
approaches, was undertaken by three European experts: Donald A. Keller, the Director 
of the Zurich Regional Planning Association, Michael Koch of the Department of the 
School of Orts-, Regional- und Landesplanung at the Eidgenössische Technische 
Hochschule in Zürich, and Klaus Selle, a social planner at the University of Hannover 
(Keller et al. 1993). The project was titled: “Journey into the planning cultures of four 
countries: Switzerland, Germany, Italy and France”. There was an urgency to initiate 
this project, as exchanges on planning across Europe were steadily increasing, while 
the European Union was posing more and more new challenges for cities. It had 
become inevitable for European countries and cities to reposition themselves from 
an exclusively national to a Europe-wide context of projects, priorities, administrative 
regulations, and legislations.
During this period, while not necessarily categorized under the term planning culture, 
comparative researches focusing on planning approaches in different political and 
economic contexts were becoming increasingly important issues to study (Newman 
and Thornely 1996). Despite the growing volume of international communication 
within the profession, while the notion of planning practice is more or less the 
same regardless of where it is practiced, the researches have proven that the major 
differences in planning exist in the ways that planning is conceived, institutionalized, 
and carried out within the contexts of different cultures. Planning gains its power 
through its embodiment in legislation and regulations that are part of the legal 
apparatuses of a particular country.
More precisely, according to John Friedmann (2005b: 30), “a universal planning 
discourse must proceed by way of an acknowledgement of local, regional, and national 
differences in planning institutions and practices; I shall call them cultures.”
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§ 2.1.1 Globalization and the Emergence of Planning Culture
The term planning culture has received a broad response, in particular within the 
context of globalization. This is not just coincidental. Globalization is bringing major 
changes in institutional structures, procedures and scale and scope of planning at 
all levels of governance, as well as economic, social, and environmental issues. Even 
though much has been written about the homogenizing effects on culture, resulting 
from the increasing global connectivity, it is not necessarily a negative perspective. On 
the contrary, the push-back effect between global homogenization and national/local 
cultural resistance provides us an opportunity to link the effects of the global economy 
to the daily lives of common people and localities, in which the local planning ideas and 
spatial appropriations are simultaneously fertilized and interwoven.
Saskia Sassen (2006) has forced scholars of globalization to take seriously the ways in 
which global influences are constructed through multiple institutions, technologies, and 
infrastructures, rather than existing as an independent, singular process. She has argued 
that the national scale is far more important in globalization than many have realized. 
In this perspective, “globalization is actually a process of denationalization, in which 
the apparatuses constructed to support the role of the national-state in the past are 
reconstructed to support global institutions and frameworks in the present” (Hubbard and 
Kitchin 2011: 349).
On the other hand, the urban impacts of globalization may be most obvious in those cities 
that have been “successful”—those cities that have captured the high-level functions 
of the global economy. In order to mediate global economic forces, different countries 
have different traditions and practices in the organization and financing of property 
markets. This means that globalization has penetrated, to a certain degree, from the 
national level down to urban governance and planning (Newman 1996). Thus, from the 
socio-spatial point of view, as Manuel Castells (1989) emphasized in his idea of “space of 
places”, the avoidance of meaningless spaces and the flattening towards identical cultural 
environments, in the process of shaping spatial forms, is critical in our time.
The abovementioned statements have underlined the changing roles of planning in its 
relation to politics, social exchange, and spatial production in the emerged global-local 
dialectic context. Planning is becoming part of the cultural activities.
Earlier, Friedmann (1988) advocated a preference for the cultural autonomy of regions 
over their functional integration for market expansion. The “Life Space,” as he argued, 
would be defended by civil society as the resistance from below to efforts at economic 
integration from the top, and he coined the term “radical planning” to legitimize this 
form of resistance that is mobilized to preserve cultural autonomy and self-governance 
as another type of planning aimed, ultimately, at the empowerment of civil society. 
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Which means, “the slate of history cannot be wiped clean and the diversity of national 
and even local planning cultures will continue to flourish” (Friedmann 2005b: 43)1.
One could argue that studying the interrelation between planning practices in certain 
political, societal, and cultural contexts is not new. However, in comparison with 
mainstream planning theorists, who tend to debate as if planning is a universal 
concept, the idea of planning culture challenges Western-centered conventions 
(Shibata 2008).
On the one hand, throughout different planning approaches, and within different 
contextual backgrounds, what makes the application of planning culture significant 
is the increased interest in using the idea of “culture” as an important criterion in 
the planning domain. It enhances understanding of different planning traditions by 
defining their own planning characteristics that are rooted in individual historical 
contexts. On the other hand, as Bishwapriya Sanyal (2005) argues, planning styles 
and concerns in each context have been shaped by not only endogenous, but also 
exogenous factors. Planning cultures appear to be complex responses to important 
social changes, both within and outside the national states. It proves that the related 
issues of a changing planning culture require us to explore the specific context of an 
individual case before ideas, norms, and philosophies of certain planning modes can 
be extracted and integrated into spatial construction through the process of planning 
intervention.
Following a growing interest in planning culture, an international symposium—held 
in Hamburg in 2007 with the title “Planning Cultures in Europe—Exploring Cultural 
Differences as Resources and Restrictions for Interregional Cooperation”—focused 
particularly on cultural variety and cultural differences regarding specific occurrences 
within the development of urban and regional planning. The aim of the symposium was 
to encourage the analysis of the relations between different perceptions and meanings 
of space, specific planning traditions, and philosophies, as well as societal rules and 
values (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009).
One step further than the project of Donald A. Keller c.s., this symposium invited 
broader audiences to participate in the debates on broader themes. It focused on all 
aspects of urban, regional, and community planning and development, while requiring 
the paper submissions of the symposium to be from an international or a comparative 
1 Friedmann emphasizes that even as the economy becomes ever more global, it would be wrong to conclude 
that, the reach of the American empire notwithstanding, the world is about to become a mirror of the United 
States or that a universal planning discourse based on the American model is about to emerge.
i
 40 Between Flexibility and Reliability
perspective. The symposium tackled issues in planning practices, with regard to the 
planning system, organization, judicial, and administrative structures, as well as tasks 
and objects of planning, respective of their individual perceptions. Special attention 
was given to the importance and influences of fundamental beliefs, values, and 
orientations. Since the symposium was conducted in English, it gave the advantage and 
opportunity for non-European audiences to access and to participate in the debates, 
even though the main theme was still limited to the European context.
§ 2.1.2 “Soft” Characteristics of Planning 
In 2002, Bishwapriya Sanyal invited a group of distinguished scholars with knowledge 
of planning from nations on four different continents to participate in a semester-long 
symposium on “Comparative Planning Cultures” at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Sanyal underpinned the “soft” characteristics of planning as a broader set 
of social activities not limited to traditional city planning efforts.
This broader concept of planning was summarized in several strong statements that 
are necessary to highlight here. According to Sanyal (2005: 15), planning culture is 
declared as the ways, both formal and informal, that spatial planning in a given multi-
national region, country, or city is conceived, institutionalized, and enacted. “It evolves 
with social, political, and economic influences, both internal and external, creating 
hybrid cultures and spatial outcomes whose complexity can only be understood 
through deep historical analyses”. Friedmann (2005a: 184) elaborated that the 
link between planning, political culture, and history is important, because planning 
“continues to be primarily a responsibility of the state, even as it draws upon the 
contributions of other societal actors. It is deeply embedded in the political culture of 
the country and/or individual cities and, as such, is always historically grounded.” 
Several questions were posed to the participants during the symposium. Firstly, 
emphasis was laid upon the linkage between the formation of society, including 
its distinctive social attitudes, geographical features, historical conjunctures, and 
religious beliefs, and public policy influences. Secondly, the participants discussed to 
what extent the state, market, and civil society can claim their roles in the planning 
domains and to what extent the formation of society is able to reinforce the giving 
portion of participation between the state, market, and civil society within the planning 
constitution. In addition, they were asked to what extent the response of certain 
planning cultures is able to deal with the intensification of global interconnection in 
trade and new developments of dominant technologies.
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In retrospect the initial emphases of the symposium were apparently stemming 
from Sanyal’s intention to access the planning discourse by accumulating inquiries 
of circumstanced debates from the invited scholars who actually shared a common 
ground of understanding on the issue of planning culture and, at the same time, tried 
to provoke divergences through significant cases. Especially from the obvious shift of 
interests of the symposium, one conclusion can be drawn: from the very beginning, 
the idea of planning culture has the advantage of being developed as a cultural 
phenomenon that is related to specific historical, political, and social environments of 
countries, regions, and cities. It proves to be an interesting inquiry into the other side 
of planning, which is described as the core “cultural nucleus” by Paul Ricoeur (1965: 
319). He further elaborated (1965: 278): 
The only way to reach the nucleus of a culture is to go deep down into its soul. 
The ethic-mythical nucleus shapes a people’s cultural background. (…) The 
structure of this subconscious or unconscious shelters the very mystery of 
human diversity. Cultural identity and diversity need to be preserved because 
culture structures and orders everyday life (…) imbues personal experience 
with meaning and significance.
By culture is meant the complex of values and evaluations emerging in a people’s 
concrete attitude towards everyday life: e.g. towards tradition, change, fellow-citizens, 
foreigners, and technology. It is that something specific to a culture that does not 
repeat itself, but always re-invents itself, thereby perpetuating the culture it defines 
(Popenici and Tat 2008).
In addition, this dimension of understanding the soft and cultural-driven orientation of 
planning makes the idea of planning culture valuable and gives a refreshing insight into 
the term of planning in the globalization era. An important aspect to emphasize is that 
cultural identity is often viewed as comprising core cultural traits that are indigenous, 
inherited, and immutable. Planning practices must be characterized by unique socio-
political formations and institutional arrangements by which the planning culture 
can be shaped, and have to acknowledge this fundamental criterion in which people 
formulate their own identities. Conclusion is that planning culture “like the large social 
culture in which it is embedded, is in constant flux.” (Sanyal 2005: 22) 
Dominic Stead and Vincent Nadin (2009a: 283) have elaborated that the link between 
the “models of society” and the “models of planning” can prove that the characteristics 
of spatial planning systems are embedded in wider models of society. The notion of 
planning cultures sits between the two. According to them, “the form or ‘model’ of 
spatial planning and the prevailing planning culture is likely to be interconnected with 
the model of society.” With regard to the close links between the models of society and 
the models of planning, Stead and Nadin (2009b: 71) pointed out in their research of 
European Spatial Planning and Welfare Systems, that:
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Models of welfare systems help to generalize about the diverse values and 
practices that shape relationships between the state, the market and citizens 
in particular places. Models of planning systems tend to follow a similar 
typology because they are rooted in the same “model of society”.
This reveals another crucial epistemological question of debate: Even within the European 
Union there is no common meaning or interpretation of terms like “urban planning”, “urban 
design”, and “urbanism” that allows a smooth translation from one language into the 
other.$1 This issue often arises in the field when determining how the planning disciplines 
and the mode of the planning are taught in different planning educations, and under which 
circumstances of political, social, and spatial consensus the body of knowledge in the 
planning domain has been interpreted and transferred by planners into the practical skills 
or tools for spatial interventions. Thus, diverse notions, definitions, interpretations, and 
realizations of planning applications in different countries can produce varied findings from 
debates on urban planning practices. This stresses the idea that planning is part of a culture.
Another caveat is that the discipline of planning has inherently a modernist genealogy 
in the Western liberal tradition. Theories of planning seek more often to reconcile the 
differences between three basic sectors of a liberal, democratic policy—state, market, 
and civil society. However, the planning practices and planning concepts in China are 
embedded in a different ground. Under the state hegemony, the basic practices of 
governance do not derive from an acknowledged separation between state and society. 
Such a state hegemonic tendency is deeply rooted in the older Confucian conception of 
statecraft. Further elaboration on this theme is given later in the Chapters 3 and 6.
Therefore, importantly as Michael Leaf (2005: 95) argues, “the lack of a culturally 
embedded body of planning theory (…), thus presents challenges to the adoption and 
local adaptation of planning practice, which all too often is still presented to the world 
as a modern, and thus universalistic, undertaking”.
To bare this in mind, the idea of planning culture is used—as a term similar to 
urbanism indicating the “unity of the urbanistic work” —in our attempt to understand 
and interpret how the political, economic, social and cultural characteristics of place 
are interacting with each other, and simultaneously influencing the urban form and 
social life, which is also the concern of urban design.
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§ 2.1.3 Confronting Planning Culture in Transition
Overall, the idea of planning culture assembles interpretations of understanding in the 
new aspects of the planning discourse. To what extent can these interpretations make 
contributions to planners while they have to deal with the trouble of losing manageable 
skills in planning practice, confronted with the ever more complex planning context? 
“Planning Cultures in Transition”, posed by Friedmann (2005b) gives us some hints. 
Fundamentally, Friedmann argues that, within any given setting, planning must 
continuously reinvent itself as circumstances change. In the professional field, without 
a doubt, urban planning is an institutionally embedded practice. It is also a practice 
that is inevitably interwoven with the politics and on-going conflicts over the allocation 
and use of public and private resources. In the information age, on the one hand, the 
tasks of planners are considered similar globally, with regard to the new emergence of 
unexpected meta-metropolitan regions, new cross-border collaborations in politics 
and economy, and hybrid models of urbanization. Nevertheless, daily planning 
procedures are still very much embedded in the specific local contexts.
Not only is the planning system in transition, planners must adapt their mindsets to 
the ability to take challenging positions in the dynamic overall planning conditions. 
Never in human history have we had such comprehensive and advanced technologies 
available; consequently, we have never had such good opportunities to initiate 
collaborative exchanges of knowledge. It is a privilege of the discipline in our time that, 
in fact, any individual planning of significance can impact others beyond its geographic 
boundary.
A convincing example is the climate and environmental issue. Worldwide planning 
can do very little to deal with this crisis, not to mention the failure of planning on the 
issue of social justice, e.g. shelter provision and bridging the enormous gap between 
richness and poverty in those areas where public resources are distributed unjustly. It 
is not the era of globalization that we are entering that should be blamed, nor a lack of 
knowledge of the relevant matters; on the contrary, to a certain degree it is the failure of 
planning mechanisms that are not able to respond dynamically and collaboratively to 
these critical issues as they emerge. “Planning mechanisms” as referred to here include 
governments and their governances, planning institutes, private actors, and the civil 
society that are involved in human-built and natural environments, as well as ordinary 
individuals who appropriate and participate, whether in the private or public spatial 
domains of their daily lives. It is our collective responsibility to address what eventually 
will happen in our surroundings.
The urgent issue that confronts scholars, like Donald A. Keller and many others who 
share the same concerns, is reaching out to broader audiences. In general, both 
industrialized countries and industrializing countries are confronted with a planning 
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culture in transition. In most industrialized countries, such as in North America and 
Western Europe, the interactive planning and bottom–up planning processes gained 
a lot of attention after the 1980’s, which led to the responsibilities being handed 
over to lower policy levels and to the citizens themselves. Friedmann states “cities 
are encouraged to become entrepreneurial, to market themselves, and to compete 
against each other for inbound capital” (Friedmann 2005b: 33). On the other hand, 
in industrializing countries, the understanding of the planning discourse is still in the 
stage of exploration, in the awareness of the necessity to manage themselves to be 
inserted into the competitive world market. Despite the fact that the cause-and-effect 
structures of planning transitions in both industrialized countries and industrializing 
countries are diverse, what they now have in common is an understanding of the 
planning discourse as becoming a mechanism of local diversification and production. 
Especially in countries where the establishment of a planning system is still “under 
construction”, learning from the Western mode of planning is not yet a proper 
way to face the new phenomena of globalization, urbanization, and rapid societal 
transformation that appeared simultaneously and that are conflicting with each other. 
During a long period planning systems in Western liberal economies have been evolved 
in response to the ill effects of industrialization and urbanization (Cherry 1972; Hall 
1996; Sutcliffe 1980; Shibata 2007). In other words: Planning policies in the Western 
countries have been developed over time to solve upcoming urban problems, such as 
the concentration of poverty, housing shortage, and environmental degradation. This 
process made Western planning mitigate the externalities of the market economy, and 
eventually serve the needs of the urban working class.
Compared to the long-term development of planning systems in Western countries, 
planning systems in non-Western, mostly developing countries emerged and 
transformed in a much shorter time. In many cases the establishment of a system for 
spatial planning was needed in the process of national-state building to defy Western 
hegemony and promote national independency through industrialization (Chatterjee 
1993; Madanipour 2006). The origin of this contextual background inevitably affected 
the development of planning culture in the non-Western world and led to planning 
priorities different from the Western approaches, in many cases being associated with 
building the national state and assembling the national economy (Shibata 2008).
The need for a debate about specific planning demands and approaches in non-
Western domains is underpinned by Kuniko Shibata (2008). In her research “The 
Origin of Japanese Planning Culture” she emphasizes that applying the idea of planning 
culture is a good start to become aware of the divergence of planning traditions and 
origins far beyond the dominant Western-centered ones.
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§ 2.1.4 “Cultural Turn” and the Application of Planning Culture as Analytical Frame 
The original idea of planning culture, as developed in the European context, aimed to 
make planning approaches, planning institutions and planning systems of different 
countries comparable by interpreting them within the specific social, economic and 
political “cultures” of these countries. However, in this research planning culture is 
used as analytical frame in a different way. In stead of comparing planning systems 
and their cultural environment in different countries, in this study the idea of planning 
culture is used as analytical frame to investigate the dramatic changes within one 
country and within one cultural environment - the changes of system and approaches 
of urban planning in China, caused by the political opening of the country for private 
entrepreneurship and foreign investment that started around 1980, accompanied 
by a fast process of urbanization and a radical transformation of a mostly rural into a 
mostly urbanized society. These changes I will call a “cultural turn”, because they are 
related to fundamental changes of the political culture, societal system, and the living 
conditions and lifestyles of the people. They are not rootless; they are grounded in the 
social-spatial tradition of China, and in this way are specific for the Chinese society and 
distinctive from the development in other (Asian) countries.
The idea of the cultural turn as a means of investigation of changing planning cultures 
has been stimulated by the research of Heng Chye Kiang (1999), who analyzed the 
differences in the development and lay-out of two capital cities in Chinese history 
as a result of changing conditions and demands of the society: the city of Chan ‘an, 
capital of the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), and the (later developed) city of Kaifeng, 
capital of the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1125 A.D.). Heng illustrates that more 
than a thousand years ago, the planning system of the city of Kaifeng already realized 
an optimal balance between a top–down and bottom–up approach by integrating a 
reliable, long-term framework for urban development (general zoning, transportation 
network, locations for public institutions) with a flexible (open) system “for initiatives 
of the common people” (residential buildings, commercial activities, non-hazardous 
industries, and open space). His research indicated how planning culture could be 
used analytically to interpret consistently the interrelations between all factors within 
the planning context when a “cultural turn” is taking place in one specific context. 
Therefore, it is relevant to review Chinese historical and philosophical elements in 
relation to socio-spatial experiences before entering the debate of contemporary urban 
development. Further elaborations are given in Chapter 3.
In other words, the idea of planning culture can be applied in a new dimension, 
although the extent of contemporary urbanization and transformation is a unique 
phenomenon within the history of China. Historically, it is not the first time that 
Chinese society has undergone a vast urban transformation. A relatively comparable 
and adaptive planning approach was once already introduced within ancient 
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Chinese urban practices. The character of this ancient urban transformation allows 
one to understand contemporary demands better, as it shows that the adaptive 
planning approach is generally based on Chinese tradition. The assumption is 
that the understanding of planning culture can help to retrieve the balance within 
the conditions of current urban development in China, in a society that is again in 
transition.
This research uses the idea of planning culture to build up a thematic analytical 
framework to approach the research subject. There are two major reasons to do so: 
firstly, it allows us to approach the recent changes of urban development in China in a 
more cultural-orientated framework; secondly, it helps us to decode in an systematic 
structure the on-going changes in Chinese society and the changing planning modes 
within the last 30 years of transformation after the reform policy had been launched. 
Based on the essential value of using planning culture as a common conceptual 
framework for discussion, the divergences between different forms of planning in 
their cultural context do not necessarily require a tightly defined parameter in order 
to interpret the divergent characteristics comparatively. Nevertheless, it is the “soft” 
element, added into the contextual embedding of planning that provides us a new 
analytical framework in the planning culture approach that becomes more creative and 
innovative in establishing new planning discourses.
It is also the dimension of the “soft” and culture-driven orientation dwelling within 
the divergent planning domains that stimulates our interests and studies on diverse 
planning modes. In other words, it is the dynamic transformation of society evidenced 
by its specific values, norms, traditions, philosophies, and ways of living in specific 
political embodiments that creates a dynamic planning transition. This allows the 
concept of planning culture to be applied to any individual case, in relation to its own 
causes of transformation in time.
The driving forces behind the development of planning concepts, theories and practices 
are societal change, in its turn caused by social, political and economic developments. 
Furthermore, a philosophical approach to understanding social, political and economic 
changes provides us with a basic tool at the abstract level by emphasing on context and 
history in analyzing social issues, including planning, rather than imposing a simple 
“universal” solution. In other words, the importance of changing formations of certain 
societies requires a better understanding and interpretation of the transformation 
of the society, economy, and culture, as well as the consensus of people in their 
norms and traditions. Especially in the case of a society with an overwhelmingly rapid 
transformation, the discourse between the changing space, society, economy, and 
politics needs to be elaborated.
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Within this research the multiple aspects of planning culture will be divided into three 
interrelated research entrances.
• The transformation of the society
 This entrance is focusing on the societal context of changing planning cultures. It  
deals with the major social, economic and political changes, the spatial transformation 
as well as the historical cultural roots that are related to the planning culture.
• The transformation of the planning system 
The second entrance is zooming in on the changes of the planning system itself. In this 
framework the changing conditions and demands for urban planning will be analyzed 
as well as the transformation of the legal and institutional framework.
• Space and Society: The implementation of the planning system in practice Space 
The third entrance is focusing on the implementation and the outcomes of the 
changing planning system. It deals with new planning approaches and procedures,  
the involvement of new participants, and the generation of new urban spaces and 
structures.
In the following three sub-chapters the above-mentioned research entrances will 
be elaborated as far as they are reflected in the mainly Western centered urbanism 
debate. Each sub-chapter deals with the following issues: 1) a description of the main 
phenomena and ideas, 2) a description of the main challenges, 3) a description of the 
main solutions. At the end of the theoretical review, research hypotheses and questions 
are proposed with regard to the situation in China. These questions are used to guide 
the research.
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§ 2.2 The Transformation of Society
A technology revolution of historic proportions is transforming the 
fundamental dimensions of human life: time and space. (Castells 1989: 1) 
From the perspective of a macro-scale and a bigger scope of transformation, we are 
situated at a local-global conjunction. Since the opening-up of Chinese society in 
the late 1970s, many researches have been enthusiastically carried out to interpret 
the significant transformation of contemporary Chinese society. Without a doubt, no 
matter what internal forces have triggered the rigid transformation of Chinese society, 
one of the most influential external forces that have massive impact in our time is 
“globality.” Ulrich Beck (2000: 10) pointed out that “globality” means, “that we have 
been living for a long time in a world society, in the sense that the notion of closed 
spaces has become illusory.” Beck inferred that no country or group could shut itself 
off from others. Various economic, cultural, and political forms, therefore, collide with 
one another. Beck elaborates “world” in the combination “world society” thus means 
difference or multiplicity, and society means non-integration. “World society” then, 
denotes the totality of social relationships as multiplicity without unity. This notion of 
world society that Beck regarded as the external context, is further elaborated below. 
§ 2.2.1 Phenomena: Urbanization, Globalization and the Information Age
Without a doubt, internally, urbanization is one of the most important and most 
influencing societal changes in China and in most of the other Asian countries (and in 
Africa as well). Asia at the moment is experiencing the fastest urbanization process in 
the history of mankind. Half of the world’s urban population now lives in Asia. Since 
the beginning of the 21st century this region has accounted for about 65 % of the 
demographic expansion of all urban areas across the world (UN-Habitat 2012: 28). 
Today 7 out of 10 most populous cities in the world are located in Asia. In the recent 
past, Delhi and Shanghai have joined the league of “meta-cities” with more than 20 
million people. It is expected that by 2020, another three Asian cities—Beijing, Dhaka 
and Mumbai—will have reached this mark. According to the “State of the World’s 
Cities 2012/13” report of UN-Habitat the 21st century undoubtly is the “Asian Urban 
Century”.
All over the world most of the new super-agglomerations are situated in so-called 
developing countries, in particular in Asia, but also in Africa and in Latin-America. “The 
process of urbanization in these countries is accompanied by fundamental economical, 
cultural and social changes; impoverished farmers and land workers try to find a new 
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livelihood in the fast developing economy, and a growing number of refugees seek to 
escape from the escalating conflicts worldwide. As a result the new mega-cities are 
faced with an unprecedented stream of mostly poor and unschooled rural migrants 
that threatens to undermine the conditions of economical development as well as 
social life.” (Rosemann 2005:1)
The process of urbanization is strongly connected with a new mode of globality, when 
sovereign states are crisscrossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying 
prospects of power, orientations, identities, and networks—this dynamic process is 
called globalization, the most widely used—and misused—keyword in disputes of 
recent years. It is also, as Beck (2000:19) emphasized, “one of the most rarely defined, 
the most nebulous and misunderstood, and the most politically effective terms.”
Globalization, as a process of economic transformation, has been defined by Giddens 
(1990: 64) as “an increase in the geographical range of locally consequential social 
interactions, especially when the increase stretches a significant proportion of all 
interactions across international or intercontinental limits.” Beck (2000: 11) further 
concluded that globality means that “from now on nothing that happens on our planet 
is only a limited local event—all inventions, victories, and catastrophes affect the whole 
world, and we must reorient and reorganize our lives and actions, our organizations, 
and our institutions along a local–global axis.” 
Raymond Dezzani (2010) emphasized that these processes involve the movement 
of capital, goods, labor, information, and services across country borders, usually by 
transnational or multinational corporations. However, it is also a social process that 
transforms current social conditions into a situation where international connections of 
economy, production, capital flows, and perspective are commonplace. A comparable 
notion has been given by Castells (1996; 1997; 1998). He states that we are entering 
the phenomenon of a new age: The Information Age. The information age creates the 
network society that, through the technology revolution, triggers enormous socio-
economic changes.
The most obvious impacts of these changes are on the physical form of our cities. 
As Peter Hall (1991) remarks, the traditional pattern of urban land use, in which 
residential activities are clustered around nodes of employment that maximize 
accessibility, is increasingly replaced, in combination with more rapid and cheaper 
forms of telecommunications, by patterns that depend on economies that transcend 
the nation-state, thus enabling—and necessitating—local-to-global communications 
that had hitherto been unimagined.
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In his much earlier work The Informational City Castells (1989) revealed his concern 
about the change of societal formations, in combination with a technological 
revolution of historic proportions that is transforming the fundamental dimensions 
of human life in terms of “space” and “time”. Castells advocates a new theory of 
urbanism with regard to the study of new relationships between time and space in 
the Information Age. Castells (2005: 57) proposes the following hypothesis: “In the 
network society, space structures time, in contrast to the time-dominated constitution 
of the industrial society (…) In our society-the network society-where you live 
determines your time frame of reference.” 
To Castells (2005), despite the emerged electronic networks that provide a new 
notion of communication protocol, public space, as the site of spontaneous social 
interaction is the communicative device of our society. Therefore, in the practice of the 
city, its public spaces, including the social exchanges or communication nodes of its 
transportation networks, become the communicative devices of city life. Further he 
emphasized (2005: 60) that, “the establishment of meaning in the physical notion of 
communication is a crucial social practice, which requires a socio-spatial treatment of 
urban forms, a process we know as urban design”—it must be an urban design able of 
connecting local life, individuals, communes, and instrumental global flow through the 
sharing of public spaces.
If the warnings for a “Risk Society” from Beck are an alert to the darker dimension 
of such development in modernity, then Castells sees our time of the Information 
Age as situated within a longer time span. Optimistically, he sees the unfolding 
promise of information technology of opening up unlimited horizons of creativity and 
communication, inviting us to the exploration of new domains of experience from 
our inner selves to the outer universe, challenging our societies to engage in a process 
of structural change (Castells 2005). Hall (1991) shared the same vision—he also 
saw that not only do these technologies enable existing processes and practices to be 
executed more efficiently and often at lower cost, they also generate new opportunities.
The emergence of the information society has heralded new ways of communicating, 
which allow a much wider section of the urban population to interact purposefully over 
unlimited distances. In this sense, both Beck and Castells suggest that the massive 
transformation of our time requires the understanding that the transformation of 
society is a long and dynamic process. Therefore, the process of social change is a 
learning process as well. This understanding can be applied perfectly to the extreme 
transformation of contemporary Chinese urban society. It suggests that the debate 
shall examine carefully the extent to which the revolutionary global context will impact 
Chinese political domains and to what extent it will trigger the evolution of the internal 
opening-up. Can global impacts be a threat to local autonomy or vice versa? Firstly, we 
shall review what impacts can be recognized within the local–global context.
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§ 2.2.2 Challenges: Competition, Political Accountability and the Risk Society
One of the most recognizable impacts of globalization in the political domain is the 
reducing power of national governments over transnational actors (corporations), 
especially in terms of global economic force. Due to the fact that flows of information 
and power are global, the major players of the global economy are limited to those who 
have the power to control, access, and sometimes, even to manipulate the information 
flows. These global economic powers are accumulated inside their own logic of shelters, 
where the most low-cost-effective productions can be realized efficiently in optimally 
chosen locations. Consequently, as notions that are closely linked to transnational 
networks as strategic nodes in the dynamic inter-city flows that are generated by 
financial transactions and trade, migration and information are becoming significantly 
more important than any other factors. A new category of cities rises: the “world cities” 
or “global cities” (Sassen 1991; 2001; Taylor et al. 2002).
The main characteristic of a global city, as defined by Sassen (1991), is its significant 
role as a new system of “coordination”, which focuses on the development of specific 
geographic control sites in the international economic order, and sites that can provide 
production with specialized services, such as complex organizations for running a 
spatially dispersed network of factories, offices, and service outlets. It has to be able to 
perform at a high level of specialized services and financial goods. Therefore, a global 
city is a city deemed to be an important node in the global economic system, whereby 
the linkages between the global cities have a direct and tangible effect on global affairs 
through socio-economic means.
If industrialization gives birth to megacities, it is the revolution of technology that 
redefines the position of global cities in the process of globalization because of the 
progressive shift of advanced economies from goods production to information 
handling, whereby the great majority of the workforce no longer deals with material 
outputs (Hall 1996).
While politicians are embracing the power of globalization and cities are competing 
to (re-)gain a dominant position worldwide, there is to a certain degree a delayed 
political response to the negative side effects of globalization, such as the warning of 
Beck (2000: 3): “Politicians from various parties do not realize that the very substance 
of politics and the state, as well as of the trade unions, is at stake in the globalization 
campaign.” 
Due to the computer-generation of worldwide, transnational actors, globally active 
corporations can play a key role in shaping not only the economy but also society 
as a whole, because they have it in their power to withdraw the material resources 
(capital, taxes, jobs) from society and to decide for themselves their optimal sites for 
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investment, production, taxes, and even residence. They can simply punish particular 
countries that appear too “investment-unfriendly,” and easily break down and disperse 
goods and services. The battle of confrontation seems to easily turn sour and become a 
one-side winning story (Beck 2000). Beck warns that an attack has been launched upon 
the material lifelines of modern national societies. The call for free markets, without 
policy makers even noticing, threatens a society’s very own lifeblood and the very 
source of its money and power.
This is to say that, once the competition between cities begins to evolve in the global 
economic system to only focus on attracting transnational actors who are able to export 
jobs to parts of the world by following the global logic; the arising competition in global 
city rankings could weaken the mechanism of political accountability. The ongoing 
globalization is in many dimensions undermining the importance of the national state.
The weaknesses of the national state and the lack of accountability are accompanied by 
a global threat that Ulrich Beck already in 1986 expressed in the idea of the risk society. 
In his book Risikogesellschaft (Risk Society) he not only warned against the destruction 
of the environment and the exploitation of natural resources. He, in particular, 
emphasized the dependency of a world society that is mutually connected by global 
risks that no longer can be shifted onto nature, other continents, or future generations.
In essence, Beck referred to a three-stage periodization of social changes: first 
pre-modernity, then simple modernity, and finally reflexive modernity. In his view, 
“modernity is still very much coextensive with the industrial society and the new 
reflexive modernity with the risk society” (Beck 1992: 2). He argued that both forms 
are distinctly related to social aspects, as the principle of the industrial society is 
the distribution of goods, and that of the risk society is the distribution of “bads” or 
dangers. “Risk”, as he emphasized, becomes an intellectual and political web across 
which many discourses relating to the slow crisis of modernity and industrial society 
are thread. From his point of view, “in advanced modernity, the social production of 
wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks.” (Beck 1992: 3)
Even though the contextual background that stimulates Beck’s work dwells in his 
observation of Germany and other advanced industrialized countries, impacts and 
crises are worldwide. If the industrial revolution was taking advantage of efficiency in 
manufacturing production, then globalization has the features to take advantage of 
the on-going revolutions in information and communication technology, resulting in 
the geographical expansion and ever greater density of international trade, as well as 
simultaneous increases in the global networks of financial markets and the growing 
power of transnational corporations.
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§ 2.2.3 Solutions: Reflexive Modernization and Citizen Participation
The dynamic articulation between metropolitan planning, architecture, and urban 
design is still in the domain of urban policy. Castells (2005) reminds us that urban 
policy, which starts with a strategic vision of the desirable evolution of metropolitan 
spaces, in its double relationship to the global space of flows and to the local space 
of places has to be transferred into a guiding tool. Furthermore, he concludes that 
innovative urban policy does not result from great urbanists (although they are indeed 
needed), but from courageous urban politicians who are able to mobilize citizens 
around the meaning of their environments.
At the first glance, cities seem to embody all threats of modern civilization. They are 
using more energy, producing more environmental pollution and generate more social 
contradictions than all the rest of the world together. However, the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) already in 2007 pointed out, that “the protection of rural 
ecosystems ultimately requires that population be concentrated in non-primary 
sector activities and in densely populated areas” (UNFPA 2007). Moreover, further 
urbanization not only is inevitable, it also “(...) offers significant opportunities to reduce 
poverty and gender inequality, as well as to promote sustainable development.” Under 
these conditions the questions about further urbanization become reduced to how to 
shape and how to plan the cities in a more sustainable way. A proactive planning for the 
urban growth is necessary.
In this framework the global risks have to be faced as a new phenomenon of our time. 
Beck underpins the necessity to conquer these risks on the global level; otherwise, 
the world society as a whole will not survive. For its survival—in the words of Beck—a 
reflexive modernization is necessary, i.e. a self-transformation of the modern society 
that continuously reflects on its own conditions. In this framework a special obligation 
is allocated to planning: planning must become “reflexive”—it must reflect all possible 
impacts in the most circumspect manner (Beck 1992).
The transformation of society in the Information Age has to lead to a new stage 
of reflexive modernization and reflexive civil society. The process of societal 
transformation has to re-fertilize the soil in which the changing culture can be 
transformed anew. The new culture of the city is not that of the end of history. As 
Castells (2005) emphasizes, to restore communication may open the way to restoring 
the meaning of conflicts. What he refers to is the existence of cities as communication 
artifacts; thus the new culture of the city is not only the culture of assimilation into the 
values of a single dominant culture, but also the culture of communication between 
diverse local societies connected to global flows of wealth, power and information. In 
his opinion, a dominant culture no longer exists, because in the Information Age, only 
the global media have the power to send dominant messages.
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In order to combat the global cultural dominance, the crucial factor of dynamic 
societal transformation is to revitalize and regain the meaning of shared identity, both 
collectively and consistently. Valuable historical continuity, as mentioned by Bekkering 
(2007) as the choice to design with attention for the context, can only be derived from 
the specific local characteristics and forces of the context.
The collective meaning of individuals and their shared identity is simultaneously 
formulated by collective norms of “individualization” and “communalism”. Castells 
(2005: 62) encourages planners, architects and urban designers to find inspiration 
from social theory and to be concerned citizens of their societies—“they must do their 
jobs as providers of meaning by the cultural shaping of spatial forms, even though their 
traditional functions in society are more critical than ever in the Information Age”.
We, by all means, need the support of innovative urban policy and democratic politics. 
Castells states that cities are made by citizens and should be governed on their own 
behalves. In his words (Castells 2005: 58): 
Only when democracy is lost can technology and the economy determine the way we 
live. Only when the market overwhelms culture and when bureaucracies ignore citizens 
can spatial conurbations supersede cities as living systems of multidimensional 
communication.
In our time social relationships are characterized simultaneously by “individualization” 
and “communalism”, while virtual communities and physical communities are 
developed in close interaction, and both processes of aggregation are challenged by 
the increasing individualization of work, social relationships, and residential habits 
(Braham and Hale 2006: 420). Therefore, even a developed democratic society needs 
to become reflexive—finding the balance and collaboration of “individuation” on the 
one hand, and “communalism,” on the other.
There is a shared insight in Beck’s ideal of socio-politics, Castells’ citizen society, 
and that of Karl Mannheim. In Beck’s idea of reflexive modernization, the process of 
individualization is conceptualized theoretically as a reflexive product. Mannheim, who 
as mentioned before distinguished four types of societies resulting from variations 
in participation and centralization of the societal decision making processes, defined 
the “democratically planned society” as a result of high levels of both participation 
and centralization2. Without a doubt, to deal with the challenges of the confrontation 
2 See Chapter 2.1. 
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between “individuation” and “communalism” of our time requires the development 
of a reflexive mechanism within the modernization process of both cultural and 
political domains. In order to fulfill the demands of societal balance dynamically, both 
the reflexive society and political accountability of reflexive network-governance are 
indispensible.
§ 2.3 The Transformation of the Planning System
Making (and building) a city goes beyond the understanding of spatial characteristics. 
Without a doubt, the formation of society, with its different political, economic, and 
cultural developments, redefines the discourse of planning through time. The common 
birth of modern planning theories goes back to the first days of our profession. Planning 
theories are tools for professional practitioners to apply in spatial development. 
Therefore, planning theories are highly related to the demands of the profession in 
urban management both economically and politically in the beginning, and later 
are also extended to social and ecological concerns. Because of the characteristics 
of being used as a tool and instrument in the domain of urban management, it has 
been devoted to the idea that twentieth-century city planning, as an intellectual and 
professional movement, essentially represents a reaction to the evils of the nineteenth-
century city. From this origin, urban planning develops a split into two trails: of those 
who define it according to its object (land use pattern) and of those who do so by its 
method (planning process of decision making).
However, the domain of planning is to transform visions into actions. The concerns of 
the planning movement are different from conceptualized ideas—it has to attempt 
to realize the building of a city, in reality. Therefore, the practical demands of a city’s 
functions are to assure that the basic demands of urban living are sustained: that is, 
to enhance a healthy civil life as well as to facilitate the city’s regularity, such as street 
layout, urban sanitation, and other services of civil convenience. Deliberately planned 
and managed cities have to deal with urban form and spatial configuration by providing 
a regulatory urban structure and a reliable system of urban management.
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§ 2.3.1 Phenomena: The Idea of the Functional City and the Concept of Modern Urban  
Planning
In his book Cities of Tomorrow, Peter Hall (1988) provides us with a synthesis of 
the process of realization of the planning practice during the modern epoch. His 
exploration focused on the development of the planning movement from its roots 
in the anarchist movement. He argued that many of the early visions of the planning 
movement stemmed from the anarchist movement, which flourished in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth. This research 
does not at all attempt to follow this standpoint, but rather, to use his elaborative 
work to understand our history, especially the history of the planning movement, and 
his ideas echo Mannheim’s debate on the discourse between urban planning and the 
changing formation of society. Simultaneously, besides extracting from the abundant 
insights of Hall, additional shifting ideas of planning theories in relation to the planning 
instruments that had been invented and practiced in different periods are highlighted 
below.
In fact, the planning movement does not represent a coherent, identifiable unity but 
covers a wide variety of trends with different approaches, depending on individual 
opinions, political climate, social and cultural context, and time. Yet the various 
individual approaches do have a common purpose of exploration, to try and understand 
the chaotic complexity of urban constitution by the possible logics that can be grasped 
and transformed into useful tools. In the late nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century, most big cities in the industrialized countries had comparable 
destinies, and cities became unpleasant living environments. The many problems were 
manifest in every corner of the city. In this period, urban utopias became desirable 
concepts in the modern movement, regarding the consensus of many people dreaming 
of a better world.
What would be the ideal city for the twentieth century? Three notable visionaries took 
initiatives between 1890 and 1930, tried to answer this question, and went a step 
further to envision one: Ebenezer Howard in England, Frank Lloyd Wright in the United 
States, and Le Corbusier in France. Each began his work by himself, preparing hundreds 
of models and drawings specifying every aspect of the new city: the ideal city that best 
expresses the power and beauty of modern technology and the most enlightened ideas 
of social justice. As Robert Fishman (1977) emphasized, the very completeness of their 
ideal cities expresses their convictions that the moment had come for comprehensive 
programs. They consistently rejected the idea that a planner’s imagination must 
work within the system. Instead, they regarded the physical structure of the cities in 
which they lived, and the economic structure of the society in which they worked, as 
temporary aberrations that mankind would soon overcome. In the three ideal cities, 
the physical environment of their ideal type represented a world in which their political 
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and economic goals had already been achieved, not in reality, but in the reality of their 
own ideals. In the three ideal cities the transformation of the physical environment is 
the outward sign of an inner transformation in the social structure; therefore, they were 
both architectural and social.
As an interesting insight, as Fishman (1977) concluded, the three planners worked 
beyond their own troubled times to a new age that each believed was imminent, a new 
age each labored to define and to build. Their plans, when compared, offer us not a 
single blueprint for the future but three sets of choices—moderate decentralization, 
extreme decentralization or the great metropolis—each with its corresponding 
political and social implications analogous to the classical political triad of monarchy–
aristocracy–democracy.
Howard, Wright, and Le Corbusier proposed three ideal cities in a unique scope and 
fervor, but this uniqueness had its dangers. They had created plans that were based on 
their single point of view. As Fishman (2003: 29) phrased the question: “How can an 
individual, even a man of genius, hope to comprehend the interwoven city structure, 
which is the product of thousands of minds and thousands of individual decisions?” 
This question is perhaps the most perplexing question for any planner. Is there any 
ideal city? Can we impose one by planning one? However, we have to acknowledge that 
their influences are enormous in the development of the idea of modernism in building 
cities and in urbanism, even though their ideal cities remained utopias.
Among them, the Radiant City (Ville Radieuse) envisioned by Le Corbusier put forward 
the most important principle of the contemporary city: the juxtaposition of a collective 
realm of order and administration and an individualistic realm of family life, which 
became the key to Le Corbusier’s attempt to resolve the syndicalist dilemma of 
authority and participation. The concept of the Radiant City strongly influenced the 
Athens Charter (Charte d’Athène, 1933) of CIAM, which had a huge impact on urban 
planning all over the world after World War II.
CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne) was the name of a series of 
international conferences about modern architecture and urbanism that have been 
organized on different locations between 1928 and 1959. CIAM became a place of 
debate for leading architects and urban planners from all over the world to discuss 
(and promote) the idea of modern architecture and the modern city. Already the first 
meeting in the castle of La Sarraz in Switzerland resulted in a manifest that emphasized 
the functionality of architecture and defined it as a social and economic intervention—
not an esthetic one. The following meetings in Frankfurt and Brussels were dedicated 
to the housing problem: how to overcome the serious housing shortage that appeared 
in the cities as the legacy of the 19th century and World War I? In this framework the 
mass production and standardization in housing as well as design principles for new 
(social) housing settlements have been discussed.
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The meeting in 1933, that took place on the steamship Patris sailing from Marseille 
to Athens, had as its theme “The Functional City”. This meeting became the most 
influencial and most important session of CIAM. Based on preliminary research on 34 
cities the basic principles of the functional, the modern city were defined and published 
in the Athens Charter:
The Athens Charter was a strong rejection of the city of industrialization with its 
unhealthy and overcrowded housing conditions, the absence of unusable green spaces 
and the neglected maintenance of buildings. “The advent of the machine age has 
caused immense disturbances to man’s habit, place of dwelling and type of work; an 
uncontrolled concentration in cities, caused by mechanical transportation, has resulted 
in brutal and universal changes without precedent in history. Chaos has entered 
the cities.” (The Athens Charter 1943). To overcome this chaos, the Athens Charter 
recommended a strict separation of the urban functions in different zones, where 
residential areas should occupy the best places in the city and should be separated 
from the industrial zones by areas of open green spaces. On the other hand distances 
between work places and dwelling places should be reduced to a minimum; industrial 
zones should be contiguous with railroads, canals and highways.
The principles of the Athens Charter as a model of the functional city and at the same 
time a concept for modern urban planning strongly influenced the redevelopment and 
extension of cities after World War II and still is influencing urban planning in many 
developing countries, particularly in Asia. The simplicity of the monofunctional zoning 
seems to be easy to understand and easy to apply, in particular in fast growing cities.
On the other hand, very soon the principles of the Charter became criticized as too 
limiting and too technocratic. The critics organized themself in Team X, operating 
within CIAM, but distancing themself from the principles of the charter. They 
demanded the reflection on new values and new approaches for modern town planning 
matching better the requirements of complexity and livability of the modern city. 
The conflict within CIAM increased in severity and finally resulted in abolishing the 
organization in the 1959 meeting in Otterloo. A new chapter in the debate about the 
modern city and adequate approaches for urban planning was opened.
§ 2.3.2 Challenges: Inhospitality of the Modern City and Inconsistency of Planning  
Approaches
The end of CIAM in the 1959 meeting in Otterloo only was one indicator of the growing 
critique of the functional, rational city, based on the top-down zoning planning that 
was recommended by the Athens Charter. From 1960 on a whole range of publications 
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appeared that denounced the inhumanity of the new cities and the failure of modern 
planning approaches. The striking book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
by Jane Jacobs (1961), was a real eye-opener. It is the author’s reflection on the urban 
crisis of the United States in the 1960s. She shared her view of cities as organisms that 
are sustained optimally through organic interventions, rather than master planning 
and social engineering. In this framework, the best way to learn from a place is by 
observing and participating in its processes. Also Lewis Mumford (1962) argues that 
urban planning should emphasize an organic relationship between people and their 
living spaces and strongly criticizes the urban sprawl of the modern city of his time. 
The German psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich (1965) blamed in his book Die 
Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte (The Inhospitability of our Cities) that the modern city 
makes its inhabitants ill by generating estrangement and isolation.
In his book The City is not a Tree Christopher Alexander attacked the structure of the 
new cities as not matching with the conditions of society. “Too many designers today 
seem to be yearning for the physical characteristics of the past, instead of searching 
for the abstract ordering principle which the towns of the past happened to have, 
and which our modern conceptions of the city have not yet found” (Alexander 1965: 
30). He showed that most of the modern planned cities have a tree structure, while 
historically grown cities in general have a semi-lattice structure which fits much more 
the networks generated by human behavior and relationships.
For the human mind, the tree is the easiest vehicle for complex thoughts. But 
the city is not, cannot and must not be a tree. The city is a receptacle for life. 
If the receptacle severs the overlap of the strands of life within it, (…) it will be 
like a bowl full of razor blades on edge, ready to cut whatever is entrusted to it. 
In such a receptacle life will be cut to pieces. If we make cities, which are trees 
they will cut our life within to pieces. (Alexander 1965)
Beside these critiques on the functional city and the results of top-down master 
planning, a second line of critique arose, focusing on the role of the urban planner in 
society and his position in the decision-making process. Already by the late 1950s, 
Charles Lindblom (1959) argued that political leaders could not agree on goals in 
advance, as the rational model of planning requires. They prefer to choose policies and 
goals at the same time. He suggested, under these conditions, that the relationship 
between planners and the community changed dramatically, as citizen participation 
became more important and a new pluralism of values was taken into account in 
a more multi-cultural society. He proposed the term “incrementalism”. The theory 
claimed that public policy is actually accomplished through decentralized bargaining in 
a free market and a democratic political economy.
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 However, other critics argued that incremental planning only addresses a small range 
of alternatives and with its limited consideration of variables it offers nothing to guide 
the accumulation of small steps that could lead to significant change. In his critique on 
how useful models of urban development are, Tomas Sieverts (2008) stated that the 
city of today has, by its nature, become basically intangible; thus, how can models or 
images serve as guides? 
He points out that the true characteristic of today is, in his view, a loss of visibility. 
Cities have, for a long time, been too big for even the most basic characteristics and 
circumstances to be perceived through direct observation or personal contact. The 
dividing line between city and countryside has become blurred. Residents and workers 
enter into different spatial and social relationships and experience the city only 
partially, in bits. As a result, in comparison to the early stage before the nineteenth 
century, urban planning models in any direct sense, i.e. as visual images capable of 
providing guidance with regard to the city, become impossible. However, unless we 
develop a common goal for urban planning and urban space, the domination of the 
market will lead to the decline and decay of the city. It is inevitable that, in an age in 
which the communal and political aspects are being suppressed in favor of the market, 
an urban planning model is a utopia—but without such a utopia, urban policy has no 
foundation.
The reality is that no single tradition of planning can do everything. Each of these 
theories and ideas actually describe only parts of the planning picture—some create an 
ideal model, and others provide a realistic insight into a part or aspect of the real world. 
In practice, planners make repetitive attempts to solve problems, starting from the 
outside inward or vice versa, as well as from an incremental approach toward a more 
comprehensive solution. The shortcomings of planning practice, whether building 
an ideal utopia or modeling were becoming recognized among planners. By the late 
1970s, planners recognized that the completeness with which they had embraced 
notions of science in their work had exacerbated their isolation from political decision-
makers. The critical position of planners was that, if planners want to influence 
decisions, they have to make arguments in a manner that the dominant regimes will 
understand and be responsive to. A series of new planning theories emerged that 
directed focus on planners’ facilitative roles in shaping decisions (Lauria 1997).
The crisis began with the planners’ lack of representation in the planning process. 
Paul Davidoff’s article in 1965, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning”, resonated with 
the frustration of many planners in their inability to meaningfully address the social 
and economic issues tearing at the fabric of American cities. Davidoff called for the 
distribution of planning services into low-income, minority neighborhoods through a 
cadre of advocacy planners who would be physically located in those neighborhoods 
and would represent the interests of neighborhood residents in city-level planning 
processes. In his own words (Davidoff 1965: 545): 
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Moreover, planners should be able to engage in the political process as 
advocates of the interest both of government and of such other groups, 
organizations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the 
future development of the community.
Furthermore, according to Davidoff’s point of view, appropriate policy in a democracy is 
determined through a process of political debate, in which the right course of action is 
always a matter of choice, never of fact.
It was to be the duty of the city government to appoint advocates to represent the 
neighborhood. Following the experiences with advocacy planning, planning theorists 
began diverging in many directions—one of the major reasons was that the diverging 
subjects in societal development became impossible to address comprehensively. As 
a result, the tendency in planning by the early 1970s was to distinguish theories on 
planning processes from theories on the growth and development of cities (Faludi 
1973). In this framework, a series of new directions emerged, such as social learning 
theories and communicative planning, which emphasized the planners’ roles in 
bringing stakeholders together, gathering and sharing information, and helping social 
structures to learn from their exchange experiences. A separate movement, called the 
“The New Urbanism” emerged in the 1970s and 80s3, promoting a revitalized vision of 
high-density, transit- and pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods as an antidote to faceless 
suburban sprawl, which has influenced planning practice toward the more direct 
engagement with land use, design, real estate development, and environmentalism 
(Fainstein and Campbell 2001). The progressive planning movement, on the 
other hand, promoted incremental changes within the planning structural system 
and encouraged leveraging of public resources through partnerships with private 
organizations that would agree to serve public purposes (Friedmann 1987).
Planning approaches were becoming more incoherent and fragmented, and the 
direction that planning approaches headed depended upon which aspects of the 
societal constraints they were attempting to solve. Old problems emerged anew, 
and aspects of planning were defined by a wide range of diverse issues: urban 
aesthetics, urban decay and slums, urban reconstruction and urban renewal, regional 
3 Although The New Urbanism as an organized movement would only arise later, a number of activists and 
thinkers soon began to criticize the modernist planning techniques being put into practice. Social philosopher 
and historian Lewis Mumford criticized the “anti-urban” development of post-war America. The Death and Life 
of Great American Cities, written by Jane Jacobs in the early 1960s, called for planners to reconsider the single-
use housing projects, large car-dependent thoroughfares, and segregated commercial centers that had become 
the “norm.”
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development and the urban mobility question, and suburbanization and the shrinking 
of the city, as well as environmental aspects, in terms of sustainability and other 
factors.
The classic modes of the urban spatial model can no longer be implemented easily 
into a blueprint plan, while new spatial claims and social demands require new urban 
shelters, to accommodate the new socio-spatial constitution and structure. The 
(new) urban questions are diverse and un-answerable, if we are not able to recognize 
and explicitly acknowledge change as a fundamental condition of our time. As far as 
designers and planners are concerned today, the lesson may be one of understanding 
the problems in terms of a less superficial, less pictorial, perhaps less object-oriented, 
and certainly more process-oriented understanding of the condition of the urban 
space. The other concern is that spatial transformation often focuses on the interaction 
between the local and the global. To an extreme, one may argue as Stephen Read did 
(2005: 9), “there is hardly a place—certainly no urban place—in our world that is not 
touched by the global.”
However, these concerns evoke new questions: How to generate planning security in 
the framework of changing conditions, contradictory demands, fragmentation and 
incoherency? How to find a new balance between the demand of flexibility that is 
needed to adapt urban plans to changing conditions and unexpected events, and the 
demand of reliability that is needed to generate consensus between different parties 
involved and to produce accountability with regard to long term developments? Which 
theoretical concepts and practical approaches have been developed to solve these 
problems?
§ 2.3.3 Solutions: Adaption of the Planning System
Reviewing the evolution of planning theories, approaches and practices in the Western 
context, planning is essentially an institutional arrangement between the government, 
the market and the society in response to social and economic changes in a particular 
society and a particular period of time. Therefore, it explains the multiple directions 
and non-linear nature of the evolution of the planning discourse.
It is to argue, and it is the approach of this research, that the modification of the 
planning mechanism requires responding—in reality or in ideology—to the analytical-
structural level, rather than a fixed method of arriving at a prescription. The tension 
between the actual parameters and the complementary narratives creates a dynamic 
looping system that enables us to define and redefine the emerged urban issues. In 
this framework, the distinguished division between the courses devoted to either the 
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process of planning (planning theory, planning method, instruments, and approach) 
or to the context (structure of cities and regions, development of city history, and 
philosophical perspective) and the objects of planning (e.g. policy, and aspects of a 
diversity of issues) have to be redefined.
In other words, as the idea of planning culture suggests, planning mechanisms are 
the way that approaches are used to access urban questions, urban phenomena, 
and urban explorations by providing analytical interpretations that are able to guide 
us through the maze of complexity—at least partially. Often, questions of planning 
theory are posed in relation to two clusters of debates: “parameters” are built to 
provoke debates starting with questions of “how”, and narratives provoke questions 
directed towards “what”. For example, to compare questions like, “How do planners 
do their job?” to “What do planners do?” the concern of the former question is in the 
level of operation of planning (realization, method, approach, etc.), while the later 
one dwells in the domain of planning justification, such as to what extent planning, 
as an intention to alter the existing course of events, should intervene. Therefore, the 
timing and legitimacy of planned interventions become central questions to planning 
theory. However, we cannot build one parameter without consulting these narratives 
contextually. This is the reason that both criteria contribute to the dynamically looping 
normative system. It is not the individual components of question and answer; it is 
the mechanism that leads to synthesis, in which the interaction between impulse and 
cause can be formulated.
We recall the aforementioned argumentation: planning in practice as a procedural 
force employs, on the one hand, a philosophical orientation toward laying out the 
correct way to plan in an ethical sense, as well as in an ideal sense; on the other hand, 
a scientific orientation towards the possible implications of undertaking various 
planning aspects in which a narrative can be confined. Both the philosophical and the 
scientific aspects coexist within planning mechanisms. This dualistic characteristic of 
planning mechanisms also allows for diversification of the research directions; often, 
written literature on planning theory is structuralized either to one cluster or the other.
For example, Campbell’s and Fainstein’s (1996: 5-9) approach to planning debates 
explores two major questions: “What is planning theory?” and “Why do planning 
theory?” They posed five clusters of questions, which they found to be the most 
important usable to define the debate of planning theory. The five questions are: What 
are the historical roots of planning? What is the justification for planning? What values 
are incorporated within planning? What ethical dilemmas do planners face? How 
can planning be effective within a mixed economy? And what do planners do? Their 
intentional works provide the evidence that to build planning theory is a collective 
work of continual evolution. Similar evidence can be found in other, earlier works, such 
as Hall (1988) and Sennett (1969). Therefore, I agree with Friedmann (1993) that 
planning is a professional practice that specifically seeks to connect forms of knowledge 
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with forms of action in the public domain. In this sense, planning mechanisms shall be 
able to respond both to the formation of knowledge as well as action.
In addition, as the evolutionary process is continually taking place, planning has to 
be able to absorb the changing consensus of the public sphere that it is responding to 
and perform its responsibilitiy simultaneously. Friedmann (1993) finds five criteria to 
result in a clear and sharp underpinning of what planning mechanisms should possess 
within their systems. First, planning should be normative—this can reflect what was 
mentioned above, in relation to the parameters and the narrative. Second, planning 
should be innovative—this refers to the dynamic looping system that planning 
mechanisms should create. Third, planning should be political, due to its original 
function of origin—it is defined to serve the public domain, where policies often have 
to be addressed in advance. The fourth criterion is that planning should be transactive, 
that is, it should be a situation-specific mechanism in which planning seeks to find a 
diversity of solutions at different levels of scale. Last but not least, as I think this is the 
most important criterion: planning should be based on social learning.
Friedmann argues for the social learning model of planning as an open process with 
two main characteristics: critical feedback and a strong institutional memory. The 
openness requires democratic procedures, recalling Mannheim’s favored outcome: the 
“democratically planned society”, which is a result of high levels of participation and 
centralization. Consciousness of and admitting to mistakes is what an accountable, 
confident government leadership should possess. Such accountability of governance 
does not rely on a mandate of intervention to satisfy fixed-ideal and one-sided 
expectations, but on establishing an open and reliable institutional structure that can 
be accessed democratically. Planning mechanisms have to be built to replace Euclidian 
planning, which Friedmann (1993) defined as either dead or impaired. On the other 
hand, planners have to take proactive roles as responsible professionals as well. In 
this entrepreneurial role, planners must be publicly accountable, as they preside over 
processes that are radically open to public inquiry. 
However, we cannot neglect the fact that to modify the planning mechanism is as 
tricky as attempting to compile a reader in planning theory. Campbell and Fainstein 
(2003) argued, first, many of the fundamental questions concerning planning 
belong to a much broader inquiry concerning the role of the state in social and spatial 
transformation. Consequently, planning theory appears to overlap with theories in 
all social science disciplines, and it has become hard to limit its scope or to stake out 
a turf specific to planning. Second, the boundaries between planners and related 
professionals (such as real estate developers, urbanists and architects) are not mutually 
exclusive: planners don’t just plan, and non-planners also plan. These argumentations 
from Campbell and Fainstein tackled the simplest dilemma of planning but failed 
to distinguish adequately the specific task of planning in the broader forces of 
urbanization—this makes it harder to recognize what planners can actually do. As a 
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result, planning as a practical endeavor claims, to a certain degree, to be able to predict 
the consequences of its actions by providing reliable framework, and this endeavor of 
reliability is still appreciated and necessary to be made.
As a consequence, planners need to recognize the constraints of what they cannot do 
before they do what they think they can, and this must be done consciously, prior to 
practicing their day-to-day work. Theories help us to allow for both professional and 
intellectual self-reflection. No single paradigm defines the foundation of planning 
theory. How dangerous can misguided theories be? It is a real situation—much of 
what planners do today reflects their understanding of practices and their aspirations, 
melding the planning theories they have read or heard about, or the ideas of others, 
which in turn were melded theories (Beauregard 1995; Sandercock 1998). The danger 
of this convenience that we take for granted can be found in practice, in educational 
textbooks, or even in planning theory—cities that were built are, more or less, clones 
of one another. This phenomenon is especially recognized in most developing 
countries. I argue that the core of planning is context-defined instead of fixed—
cultural development in different contexts requires planners to define their core work 
differently. This colonized duplication of planning is the first area that this research will 
attack.
Furthermore, planning mechanisms cannot be guaranteed only by their political 
mandate. They also rely on justice and the morals of public consensus. These are 
fundamental values that a society shares collectively—what planning should do to us 
and our environment and why, especially in the epoch where we finally realize and accept 
that we all share a delicate sphere in which everything either seems possible to achieve 
in a short term or to fail in the next minute. The collective consensus of awareness of our 
own existence, at this very special moment in human history, cannot be written into a 
statute of law, regulations, or policy, if our total spiritual level is not yet promoted. Then, 
there is no longer any meaningful reason for us to continue our task and to claim that 
we have ideas to make our man-made environment sustainable. Individual awareness 
of collective consensus is the key to establish the wellbeing for all in our time. Without a 
doubt, the same spirit should be applied to the domain of planning.
§ 2.4 Space and Society: The Implementation of the Planning Practice 
New social relationships call for new spaces and vice versa. The word “space” has 
had different meanings through time in the domains of philosophy, mathematics, 
and science. Not so many years ago, as Henri Lefebvre (1991) pointed out, the word 
“space” had a strictly geometrical meaning: the idea it evoked was simply that of an 
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empty area. However, from a philosophical point of view, the modern field of inquiry 
known as epistemology has adopted the notion that the status of space is that of a 
“mental thing” or “mental place”. (Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set 
of operations, while space also continually reproduces society. Such interaction implies 
that spatial and social conditions influence and evolve together. In addition, being 
embedded into the abovementioned global-local context, socio-spatial interaction is 
manifold and its constitution is becoming more complex. Understanding the socio-
spatial dialectic interactions is one of the crucial criteria for spatial planning.
§ 2.4.1 Phenomena: The Idea of Space and its Transformation
Edward Soja (1996), with his contribution to spatial theory and the field of cultural 
geography, has updated Lefebvre’s concept of the spatial triad with his own concept 
of spatial trialectics. Soja clarified the fugue of Lefebvre’s writing of The Production of 
Space by observing that there are three different kinds of spaces: the perceived space of 
materialized spatial practice; the conceived space which is defined as representations 
of space; and the lived spaces of representation4 (Lefebvre 1991: 32-33). Soja saw, in 
the late 1960s, a more general spatial crisis spreading all over the world and another 
form of spatial awareness that began to emerge. In comparison with Lefebvre’s notion 
of spaces, Soja defines a Firstspace as fixed on the concrete materiality of spatial 
forms, on things that can be empirically mapped; and a Secondspace as conceived 
in ideas about space in thoughtful re-presentations of human spatiality in mental or 
cognitive forms (these coincide, more or less, with Lefebvre’s perceived and conceived 
spaces, with the first often thought of as “real” and the second as “imagined”). Soja 
then defines a Thirdspace as another way of understanding and acting to change the 
spatiality of human life, a distinct mode of critical spatial awareness that is appropriate 
to the new scope and significance being brought about in the re-balanced trialectics of 
spatiality–historicality–sociality, as well as of spatiality, of spatial thinking, and of the 
spatial imagination that echoes from Lefebvre’s lived space—a “real-and-imagined” 
place. Soja challenges us to explore the spaces that such a difference makes and to 
4 The materialized spatial practices refer to physical and material factors, transfers and interactions that occur in 
and through space in the way they provide production and social reproduction. Representations of space include 
all the signs and significations, codes and meanings that allow such material factors and deeds to be spoken of 
and understood by the discursive terminology of academic spatial disciplines. Finally, spaces of representation 
are understood as: codes, signs, “spatial discourses”, utopian plans, imaginary landscapes or even material 
constructions like symbolic spaces, specially designed environments, or places of culture that conceive new 
meanings and possibilities for spatial disciplines.
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avoid falling into the traditional dualism of Firstspace-Secondspace. However, spaces 
of representation contain all other real and imagined spaces simultaneously. Hence, 
the notion of “space” here is referring to that which is defined within the domain of the 
recreation of social production: both “real” and “imagined” social spaces.
The recognition of humanity, with its consciousness, in Lefebvre’s (1991) point of 
view, has properties that can be adequately summed up by three terms: energy, space, 
and time, which can be neither conflated nor separated from one another. In order to 
understand the original argumentation and to elaborate the interrelations between the 
three terms, herewith I quote Lefebvre.
When we evoke “energy”, we must immediately note that energy has to be 
deployed within a space. When we evoke “space”, we must immediately 
indicate what occupies that space and how it does so: the deployment of 
energy in relation to “points” and within a time frame. When we evoke “time”, 
we must immediately say what it is that moves or changes therein. Space 
considered in isolation is an empty abstraction; likewise energy and time. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 12) 
(Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations; therefore, in the view 
of Lefebvre, social spaces cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object, because social 
spaces are the outcome of past actions; they subsume things that are produced and 
encompass their interrelationships in their coexistences and, simultaneously, order and/
or disorder. The major contribution, among others, of Lefebvre is that he claims “space” is 
the production of society; it is the result of social production. He emphasized that “space” 
is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced. 
“Space” is a social relationship, and it includes both the formal and the material reality. 
This means that space as social production, produced as such, cannot be separated from 
either the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, from the social division 
of labor which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society.
Therefore, while “space” is produced, the society and the space begin to influence each 
other. In other words, space also continually reproduces society. The link between space 
and society, which has been highlighted by Lefebvre (1991), leads us to the understanding 
that “space” is the product of any activities that involve the economic and technical 
realms of the society, while at the same time also dwelling in the realm of politics. Thus, it 
is never a dead end; it is more akin to a dynamic producing and re-producing process.
The dialectic socio-spatiality is consistently developing within its own constitution of 
the time-space framework. As long as human evolution continues, the socio-spatial 
dialectic will continue to evolve as well. Therefore, (social) “space”, as the (physical and 
virtual) body of society is asked to respond permanently, within its own system, to the 
requirements of societal changes.
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In the present Information Age, and with the consequences of globalization, the 
socio-spatial question arises in cities in a significant new dimension. If social 
relationships are characterized simultaneously by individualization and communalism, 
can we conclude in the socio-spatial discourse that (social) space is appropriated 
simultaneously by both the forces of individualization and of communalism? What 
socio-spatial characteristics of this interrelationship can be found while both forces 
interactively claim their roles in the process of spatial transformation? Two notions of 
space that have been distinguished by Castells (2005) provide us with a constructive 
interpretation on how the above-mentioned interrelations of spatial transformation 
can be characterized.
According to Castells (2005: 50), it is necessary to distinguish “space” using two 
notions: “space of flows” and “space of places.” In order to take the advantage of his 
original idea, herewith I give his definitions.
The space of flows links up electronically separate locations in an interactive 
network that connects activities and people in distinct geographical contexts. 
The space of places organizes experience and activity around the confines of 
locality.
He underpins that cities are simultaneously structured and unstructured by the 
competing logics of the space of flows and the space of places. He emphasizes that 
cities do not disappear into virtual networks, but they are transformed by the interface 
between electronic communication and physical interaction by the combination of 
networks and places. Therefore, the spatial transformation evokes the transformation 
made up within the notion of flows and places and of their relationships.
Let us straighten out the parameters that make up the key elements of socio-spatial 
changes at a more analytical level. If one parameter is made up of the social integration 
between individualization and communalism, the second parameter shall be made up 
of the spatial encounter in our urban experiences of places and flows in both physical 
and virtual ways. This is to say that spatial transformation has a specific, introverted 
mode of changing processes that involves both the interaction and participation of 
participants/actors (individualization and communalism) and their related recreation 
of space (of places and flows), simultaneously and dynamically.
It is these multiple layers of responding and the interactive process that generate 
unexpected new socio-spatial constitutions of spatial form and spatial transformation. 
This new dimension of spatial transformation has unprecedented spatial and social 
representations in the actual forms and the virtual networks that force us to redefine 
our behaviors, as well as the ways in which we interact with others.
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§ 2.4.2 Challenges: Facing Complexity and Uncertainty 
While in the arena of our time, it is the dilemma of our discipline that urbanists can 
easily fall into the narrative of our own, one-sided view; at the same time, unavoidably, 
we are forced to integrate the insights of other disciplines, especially when the 
complexity of present spatial issues requires more integration of multi-disciplinary 
knowledge. However, we should be aware that by integrating other knowledge, we 
might also lose our main focus. Therefore, it is the priority of this research to focus 
on the actual appearance of spatial transformation in the real, rather than in the 
“imagined” world. But this does not mean that to understand and to investigate the 
driving forces behind the actual spatial performance is less important. On the contrary, 
it is crucial to investigate and to outline socio-spatial constitutions, in combination 
with new spatial claims and social demands, as well as the possible tentative and 
flexible terms that allow us to understand not only the meanings and rapid changes in 
all dimensions. It is also important, as Soja (1996) emphasizes, to be able to capture 
what is actually and constantly shifting and changing in the milieu of ideas, events, 
appearances, and meanings.
This research argues that new social transformations are producing new spatial 
structures; unexpected, surprising, and illogical spatial formations are emerging on 
an unprecedented scale. Those unexpected urban formations are constituted within 
their own mega structures by a livable, self-operational mechanism that is constantly 
producing new social confrontations and social challenges that are beyond what 
human logic can follow and urban planning interventions can fully control.
The search for an alternative to overrule the controlling system of master planning, which, 
ironically, tends to generate fragmented cities without soul or character, is becoming 
tangible. Another cluster of urban parlances inherits their applications from science and 
physics, even though they can barely be measured by using traditional urban spatial 
instruments and be included as one of the indexes in the system of master planning.
For example, Nan Ellin (2006) demonstrated five qualities in her approach of integral 
urbanism: hybridity, connectivity, porosity, authenticity, and vulnerability. Her 
intension is to overrule the rational mechanistic approach of the master-planned 
functionally zoned city and instead, to heal the wounds by expressing and allowing for 
the soft elements of urbanism.
The idea of “complexity” has been employed to describe the uncertainty characteristics 
of social spatiality. Even though ideas of complexity have been expressed elsewhere 
in other ways, a general definition given by Edmonds (1999) is fairly sufficient to 
summarize “complexity” as “that property of a language expression which makes it 
difficult to formulate its overall behavior even when given almost complete information 
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about its atomic components and their inter-relations. Complexity is posited as a 
mid-point between order and disorder.” (Edmonds 1999: 1) The related but extended 
insights of “complexity” are called “chaos theory”, which for the last 20 years has 
been rippling through different scientific disciplines. Later, in the form of so-called 
“emergence”, they impact radical political theory as well. Comparative theory is also 
applied through the terms “networks” and “fluid”—these terms have been used as 
metaphors or as states in which things exist or as processes through which things are 
transformed (Edmonds 1999; Boudourides 2001).
At the same time, derived from the abovementioned parlances, new urban forms of 
social spatiality are named and analyzed. Castells (1996; 2009) emphasizes the power 
of the network society, a society whose social structure is made around networks 
activated by digitally processed information and communication technologies. Sassen 
(2002) also indicates how global cities enhance their involvement in globalization by 
embedding themselves into global networks. Based on the information networks, a 
comparative approach of analysis can be found by examining the influences in our daily 
lives. Mitchell (1995) elaborates that we are entering an era of electronically extended 
bodies living at the intersection points of the physical and virtual world: Cyberspace. 
Another term that reflects the characteristics of complexity is that of “self-organizing 
cities”. Such cities are characterized by unpredictable and chaotic behavior, which 
poses dilemmas to planning, often referring to the confrontation of urban agents and 
actors involved in the planning process.
Based on the idea of the emerged dynamic forms of socio-spatiality, Juval Portugali 
(2000) questions whether, in the absence of predictability and control, there can be a 
meaning to planning. I assume that the answer is still positive. Even though planning 
is not able to accommodate the demands of the diverse forms of socio-spatiality all at 
once, yet it is an important criterion to establish an evolutionary planning mechanism 
that is able to respond to the attempts of understanding unknown social spatiality.
§ 2.4.3 Solutions: Generic City versus Citizen’s City
Are we able to outline a critical, but practical urban discourse that provides, as 
Sennett (1970: 99) suggests, “for the fact of history, for the understanding, for the 
contradictory, for the unknown” ?
Indeed, new contemporary urban parlances are employed and invented in our 
discipline to express, understand, and interpret the unknown emergent urban 
characteristics of social spatiality of our time. These have triggered the development of 
possible scientific perspectives in order to apply them in design and planning practices. 
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Christine Boyer’s critique in her study of three “big” books of architecture by Rem 
Koolhaas (S.M.L.XL. 1995), Winny Maas and Jocob Van Rijs (FARMAX 1998), and Ben 
Van Berkel and Caroline Bos (Move: Liquid Politic 1999) demonstrates that the return 
of architects to the urban field, after decades of absence, implies a major restructuring 
of architectural thinking—shifting away from philosophical inquiry towards questions 
of performance and reception, the design process, and experimentation (Boyer 2005).
Among them, with the use of statistics and equations the leading figure is Koolhaas. 
He establishes an alternative argument of urbanism. Explanations of the architectural 
projects of his Office for Metropolitan Architecture are seldom given; instead, the 
reader is taught to visually explore a wide array of imaginations and texts in an open-
ended, questioning manner. Boyer (2005: 158) emphasized that:
With the use of these statistics and equations, in spite of the random and 
ironical manner in which they are presented, Koolhaas begins to outline 
an approach for an alternative urbanism of data, graphs and hidden logics. 
Hoping to understand how information is a form (an in-formation) he 
therein returns architecture to an intricate play between graphic elements 
and thinking, symbol manipulation and imagination. The concern is not the 
reproduction of an exact record of reality, (…) it is a question about the visibility 
of the argument, how to represent the data according to the rules of graphic 
specification and how to transform sets of data into planar mappings.
As the privilege of advanced techniques that these advocates of datascapes support, 
planning with information is a form of abstract thinking. Maas and Van Rijs (1998:123) 
explained they are looking within the chaos of events for the hidden logic that allow 
gravities to emerge.
Cities can no longer be described as if they are divided into zones, the center or the 
periphery (…) They have become polynucleated, and built containers of density 
can erupt at any point in their extended field. Processes shape cities, and cities 
should be seen as indeterminate soft bodies whose form changes, depending on 
the gravitational field they occupy and the information they receive.
Their experiences in studying non-Western cities can indicate, to a certain degree 
analytically, the phenomena that are happening in reality. As Koolhaas (1995: 1016) 
argued, contrary to William Gibson’s5 remark about Singapore that Singapore stands 
5 William Gibson, a cyber-fiction author who referred to Singapore as “Disneyland with the Death Penalty”.
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for something that Westerners can neither imagine nor interpret: it is an effect of the 
“operational”, of the ability “to make city”—something Western architects have long 
forgotten.
If there is to be a ‘new urbanism’ it will not be based on the twin fantasies of 
order and omnipotence; it will be the staging of uncertainty; it will no longer 
be concerned with the arrangement of the more or less permanent objects 
but with the irrigation of territories with potential; it will no longer aim for 
stable configurations but for the creation of enabling fields that accommodate 
processes that refuse to be crystallized into definitive form. (Koolhaas 
1995:969)
The model for the new urbanism according to Koolhaas is the generic city, the city of 
sprawl, sameness and repetition, the city without history, in every case as much as 
possible stripped by the decaying historical artifacts. In place of history, continuity 
and stability generic city emphasizes potentiality, uncertainty and permanent change. 
Historic places are transformed into ‘enabling fields’, open for changing demands and 
new appropriation.
The skyscraper looks as if it will be the final, definitive typology. It has 
swallowed everything else. It can exist everywhere: in a rice field, or downtown 
– it makes no difference any more. The towers no longer stand together; they 
are spaced so that they don’t interact.  
Density in isolation is the ideal. (Koolhaas 1995:970)
A main argument for generic city is according to Koolhaas its success all over the world. 
“Generic city, the general urban condition, is happening everywhere, and just the fact 
that it occurs in such enormous quantities must mean that it’s habitable (...) Maybe 
their very characterlessness provides the best context for living” (Wired 1996:7).
The question is, to what extend habitability is a sufficient condition to provide the best 
context for living. The attractiveness of generic city at least seems to be contradictory, 
as Rosemann emphasized:
Generic city may be characterless, but in most cases it shows the strong 
characteristics of a highly segregated urban society.... Of course it is attractive 
for the ‘happy few’, the new rich who can afford any luxury and who find in 
generic city the optimal conditions to live it up. It is habitable, but less and less 
affordable for the huge army of employees in the offices, shopping malls and 
other services, who have to extend their working time to the limits to be able 
to pay their small and bad equipped apartments. It became the ‘only hope’ for 
those who no longer can survive in the impoverished rural areas, where they 
come from. For them generic city offers the opportunity to participate at least 
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on the lowest level in the economic development and to feed their families. For 
that aim they accept even the most miserable living (and working) conditions. 
(Rosemann 2012:18)
Considerating the rapid changes of our urban society, there is the fundamental value 
of human interrelationships that cannot be replaced by the digital bits of computer 
intelligence: the collective sense of memory. Christine Boyer defined this as a sense 
of tangible face-to-face daily contacts and the city of collective memory should focus 
on creating meaning and imaginative public space to serve that purpose—“including 
places for public assemblage and public debates, as well as private memory walks and 
personal retreats” (Boyer 1994: 9). Also Bekkering (2007:44) argued that memories 
result in a social and culturally meaningful feeling of belonging:
(…) belonging to a place and a community that shares its surroundings and 
that  feeling. If all goes well, with this comes a shared feeling of responsibility 
for the state of those surroundings. Neglecting this and breaking down 
essential parts of the urban environment at some moment will lead to social 
unrest.
According to Castells the lack of shared meaning and cultural communication is—
beside social inequality—the most important reason for disintegration of the city. His 
argumentation looks like a basic attack on the idea of generic city, although he does not 
mention it (2005:57).
The great urban paradox of the twenty-first century is that we could be living 
in a predominantly urban world without cities - that is, without spatially based 
systems of cultural communication and sharing of meaning, even conflictive 
sharing. Signs of the social, symbolic, and functional disintegration of the 
urban fabric multiply around the world as do the warnings from analysts and 
observers from a variety of perspectives.  
To overcome this paradox Castells allocates major tasks both to urban planners and 
to architects. On the one hand planning in his view has to deal with the ability of the 
region to operate in the space of flows, to ensure the connectivity both on intra- and 
on intermetropolitan level. On the other hand it has “to structure the space of places 
as living space and to ensure the connection and the complementarity between the 
economy of the metropolitan region and the quality of life of its dwellers” (Castells 
2005:59).
Architects (and urban designers) in this framework have the task to generate 
meaningful places.
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Restoring symbolic meaning is a fundamental task in a metropolitan world in 
a crisis of communication. This is the role that architecture has traditionally 
assumed. It is more important than ever. Architecture of all kinds must be 
called to rescue in order to recreate symbolic meaning in the metropolitan 
region, marking places in the space of flows. (...) architecture per se cannot 
change the function, or even the meaning, of a whole metropolitan area. 
Symbolic meaning has to be inserted in the whole fabric of the city, and this is, 
as I will argue shortly, the key role of urban design. (Castells 2005: 59)
In an article about the formation of the West Coast Metropolitan Region of Taiwan 
also Hsia emphasizes the importance of local cultures and meaningful places. Against 
the idea of generic city as the urban condition of a globalized economy, giving space 
to almost unlimited flexibility, he developed the idea of citizen’s city, the city of the 
democratic society. “In the trend of political democratization, the birth of a citizen’s 
city has advanced the time for a dependent city in a developing country. One could 
argue that any significant urban reform must react based on the initiative of citizen 
participation through policy and institutional responses.” (Hsia 2009: 76)
Like Castells Hsia (2009:76) underpins the necessity to connect the local conditions 
with the global demands.
There is an opportunity to match the contesting urban meanings between 
the “use value” pursuit of a citizen’s city and the “innovative value” pursuit of 
the technological upgrade as an innovative node in a learning region. (...) The 
use value of urban space and urban fascination of space would support the 
function of a node for the milieu of innovation. This is one of the conditions of 
a competitive home base.
However, according to Hsia the home base still is a place of permanency and 
sustainability, providing the fascination of the space of places, and empowered citizens 
and cities are the major attractions to reconstitute the urbanity.
I would like to make a tentative conclusion. Although notions and discussions 
elaborated in this chapter partly are related to the new urban conditions in China (and 
Taiwan), they are mainly originated from the Western context. The debate about the 
practice of urban planning and design ends up in two contradictory concepts: the idea 
of generic city as the expression of the globalized economy, offering seamless flexibility 
and adaptability, and the idea of citizen’s city, where the demands of global flows are 
bridged with local conditions, where symbolic meaning becomes recreated, based on 
local identity and citizen participation. We have to investigate to what extend these two 
concepts are reflected in the recent planning culture in China.
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§ 2.5 Hypotheses and Research Questions.
In the previous chapter, the idea of planning culture and the relevant theories are 
elaborated, which defines the major content of the themes that planning culture 
comprises, namely 1) the transformation of the society, 2) the transformation of the 
planning system and 3) the implementation of the planning system in practice. In the 
following chapter this trinity of research entrances is used to develop the hypothesis 
and research questions with regard to the investigation of the changes in the planning 
culture in China.
§ 2.5.1 Main Hypothesis and Sub-Hypotheses
Main hypothesis: 
The recent changes in Chinese society are demonstrating a fundamental change 
in planning culture, integrating the specific perceptions and meanings of space 
in China, as well as the Chinese planning traditions and philosophies. The new 
planning culture re-defines the role of the state, the market, and civil society in 
the planning process in order to generate a new balance between centralization 
and participation (Mannheim, 1935) and between flexibility and reliability.
In replacing the top–down approach of the Maoist period, the new planning culture has 
to fulfill contradictory demands:
• to generate a reliable framework for sustainable long-term development;
• to guide the initiatives of different public and private actors;
• to generate flexibility for new and unexpected developments;
• to allow for influence of private initiatives and civil participation.
In this framework, planning strategies have to be developed, on the one hand under 
the circumstances of inevitably increasing uncertainties in society, to generate the 
flexibility for new and unexpected developments in order to cope with the emerging 
complexity; on the other hand, to confront the unpredictability and uncertainty of 
initiatives from diverse public and private actors by generating and building up a 
reliable framework for sustainable long-term developments.
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Further, this research argues, with respect to the transformation of the society in 
countries like contemporary China, that planning embodiments (method, ideology, 
aim, instruments, etc.) must be understood and used as not only political-economic 
intervention instruments for intervention, but also as spatial agents in order to mediate 
the changing confrontations of socio–spatial demands embedded in the cultural 
domain, instead of being used only as a top–down dominating intervention tool in the 
political-economical domain.
In order to understand the rapid transformation of the contemporary urban 
development in China, the research is reaching in two main directions.
• To outline the new planning culture within the embodiment of Chinese political, 
societal and cultural context.
• To explore to what extend the new Chinese transformation is adapting to fulfill 
the demand of planning between reliability and flexibility in contemporary spatial 
intervention processes. 
The main hypothesis leads to the following sub-hypotheses.
Sub-hypothesis 1: The transformation of the Chinese society under the conditions of 
urbanization and globalization triggers the emergence of a new societal culture. This 
transformation cannot break off the evolution of modernization in relation to the 
historical roots, traditional norms and value systems of Chinese society.
The interactions between the emergence of global forces and local cultural roots are 
dynamically influencing and transforming Chinese society. This involute involvement is 
defined in the research as the “cultural turn” of the society. The specific characteristics 
of the cultural turn of Chinese society result in a more layered and hybrid mode of urban 
development in comparison to Western countries. In its modern history China experienced 
in rather short time a number of fundamental changes of the political system: from the 
ancient empire via colonial occupation, the development of the Republic, the civil war and 
the People’s republic in 1949. However, the societal system, the living conditions and 
lifestyles of the majority of the people, although heavily affected by the political changes, 
are much more characterized by continuity with the cultural roots and traditions of Chinese 
society. The cultural turn of the last decennia is a fast catching-up of social, economic and 
political developments on diverse levels, generating simultaneous changes in different 
layers in place of consecutive developments over time.
Sub-hypothesis 2: The transformation of the Chinese society—defined as the “cultural 
turn”—is an on-going process that is leading the country towards a society in which 
urban development and spatial planning are confronted with the increasing tension 
between the public and private claims.
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The planning formation, including planning system, structure and procedures, has 
to be adjusted. The demands for change are not limited to a technical adaption of 
the planning system, its legal status and the related regulations. They include the 
redefinition of the role of the public and private realm in urban development, and the 
involvement of the different participants as well. In this way, Chinese urban planning 
will change its role from a top-down regulation system to an arena of negotiation.
Sub-hypothesis 3: The implementation of planning in practice in China now is facing 
the challenge to keep a balance between political and societal demands in relation to 
the planning outcome.
Space as a social product is becoming the embodiment of the collective ethos of 
actions from both “individuation” and “communalism” in the society. Both actors 
take initiatives to (re-)shape the spatial environment, sometimes in a contradictory 
way. Planning intervention, where policies are taking in consideration how the 
aims, concerns, methods, and enactment are enforced from top down, is asked to 
mediate the spatial demands of the collective actions of the “individuation” and 
“communalism” from bottom up. Both agents interact within the transformation of 
Chinese society and influence the planning outcome. The tension of the interaction 
creates the Chinese planning culture in transition, in which a new type of urbanism is 
emerging.
Sub-hypothesis 4: In order to combat the uncertainty of the transitional stage, planning 
between flexibility and reliability may sound like an ambiguous concept but is instead a 
tangible approach for China to pursue further development. In particular, it originates 
from the state-of-the-art of Chinese philosophical thinking, the wisdom that already 
existed for thousands of years in Chinese culture. 
Due to the fact that the Chinese society is still under construction, faults and risks can 
only be attempted to overcome by collective participations between the diverse actors 
involved in a more transparent, reflexive-democratic planning process. The ideas like 
generic city and citizen’s city are practiced in Chinese urban development like a socio-
political project, which is still strongly embedded into the specific political formation 
of China. To what extent social interaction and integration can be managed in balance 
by the political supervision (and planning intervention) is the most critical challenge 
awaiting Chinese modernity. At this stage, the tailor-made reflexive modernity of 
Chinese urban development necessarily remains undefined.
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§ 2.5.2 Main Research Question and Sub Questions: 
Following the hypotheses, this study’s main research question is: 
How does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the 
emergent urban evolution within the current world society? 
Additional sub questions related to the main questions are: 
The transformation of the society: 
1. What is the characteristic of the recent “cultural turn” in contemporary China? 
2. How is it related to the historical development of China? 
The transformation of the planning system:
3. Which changes and challenges have the “cultural turn” generated for Chinese urban 
development and planning? 
4. How has the planning system been adapted to the new situation?  
- What kinds of planning institution have been installed? 
- What are the responsibilities and tasks?  
- What kinds of plan have been developed? 
The implementation of the planning system in practice:
5. Which new challenges have the implementation of the planning system confronted 
on the level of local execution? 
6. How does the planning intervention contribute to the reshaping of the social-spatial 
urban development between different spatial demands of actors?  
- What kind of constraints and shortcomings can be recognized? 
- To what extent should the planning intervention allow for changing 
circumstances?
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§ 2.6 Methodological Framework and Research Design 
Extracting from the thematic framework and the understanding of the planning 
culture, corresponding to the research questions and relative hypotheses that are 
elaborated, hereby the analytical framework of the research structure is built. By using 
the idea of “planning culture” as central to building up the analytical framework, this 
structure is used to guide the research and to avoid distraction. Within the analytical 
framework of the research, the main research object focuses on the Chinese planning 
evolution. It concerns in relation to the idea of planning culture three research clusters: 
1) the transformation of the society. 2) The transformation of the planning system. 
3) The implementation of the planning system in practice. These three clusters of 
research entrance are defined as three parameters: societal context, the planning 
formation, and the planning outcome. These parameters are placed within the 
methodological framework sequentially and interactively. They are used to guide the 
research directions and define the composition of the following chapters.
The first parameter the societal context includes two components: the first is the 
elaboration of ancient roots and philosophies in China. The purpose is to shed light 
upon the political and societal disputation of the current situation, based on Chinese 
tradition from the angle of norms and values of thoughts (Chapter 3). The second 
component is embedded in the evolution of the Chinese modernization movement. 
Given how, throughout the evolution of Chinese modernization, the cultural turn is 
triggered by the momentum of political–economic interests (in a short-term time 
span) and accommodated by the evolution of the society (in a long-term time span), 
the importance is to link the interaction between these two forces in Chinese history to 
the extension of the contemporary development (Chapter 4).
The second parameter the planning formation explores the formation of the planning 
of contemporary China. It includes two components as well: the first component gives 
the context of transformation after the 1980s, with the initial political-economic-social 
and spatial aspects (Chapter 5). Then we zoom in on the planning formation (Chapter 
6). It includes, firstly, the planning structure: the aims and concerns of planning in its 
ideological and visionary aspects. Secondly, the planning system includes legal system 
and spatial policy that are used to realize the abovementioned aims and concerns. 
Thirdly, the establishment of statutory planning includes the illustration of the 
execution of the planning procedure and the implementation.
Based on the third parameter the planning outcome, the focus is on planning practice 
for reality and comes down to the execution level. The purpose is to explore following 
the contextual background elaborated in parameter one: societal context and the 
top–down new planning formation elaborated in parameter two; how the emerged 
spatial appropriation of users, with respect to their new spatial claims and demands, 
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are transforming in reality. Chapter 7 sheds light on how the planning implementation 
in Shenzhen has to respond in parallel to the national scope and at the same time can 
contribute to adapting the emerging local demands. To achieve the analysis on the 
micro-execution level, three cases studies are selected with the criteria that they tackle 
the interaction between the planned the emergent attitudes. In the three case studies, 
the mode of planning intervention, the participation of citizens and stakeholders, 
between agents and actors who are involved in the planning process, their interactions 
within the planning system, and their roles within the decision making of planning are 
explored (Chapter 8). 
§ 2.6.1 Setting the Analytical Framework 
Even though the abovementioned three parameters, in correspondence with the 
respective research questions, define the major analytical framework of this research, 
they are inevitably interacting with each other, regarding the unalienable relationship 
between them. They do not provide an enclosed and linear structure.
The three major parameters together create the connection that shapes the conceptual 
outline of the Chinese planning culture. In addition, there are constraints to be 
overcome. For example, when the transformation of a society begins, according to 
the statistic data it is easy to define the new role of the actors through their various 
involvements in the planning process and the process of transformation of society; 
however, the idea of how their identifies evolve and establish themselves in spatial 
domains is much more hidden and blurred.
Another example: once a farmer becomes a citizen, his social status can be clearly 
defined, including his right of citizenship, his occupation, his status in his living 
environment, etc. However, it is much more difficult to draw a clear picture of how and 
in which way his urban spatial behavior is different from his non-urban spatial behavior 
because human behavior is a more complex process of evolution than changes of 
identity on official documents. It is a learning process that involves a complex and 
emotional self-reflection. The same process of reflection can also be applied in the case 
of planners. The reason is very often that they separate themselves from the plans they 
made as well as their participation in the planning process and planning realization. 
However, these subjects are not the main concerns of this research, even though they 
are also important in the urban transformation processes.
In order to provide a consistent contextual background, a chronological order is used to 
make connections between the evolution of the Chinese modernization movement and 
the transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), 
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and between the initial reformations of contemporary China after the 1980s and the 
birth of Shenzhen as an base for experiments (Chapter 5 and Chapter 7)6.
At the same time, it is important to mention that, between the context and the 
outcome in treatment of each parameter, a looping and clustering system is applied. 
This means, content-wise, that different components based on the three parameters 
also re-modify new clusters within the analytical framework. Therefore, processing 
the setting of the overall analytical framework of the research based on the idea of 
planning culture, from the very beginning, is used to provide linkage and sequential 
and interactive relations between the individual components of the parameters. The 
analytical framework zooms in from the broader scope and scale to the case under 
study.
In order to set up the analytical framework of planning culture, the three parameters 
are integrated into the looping and cluster system within the overall analytical 
framework. The description of their interactions is highlighted below: 
As mentioned in the conceptual characteristics of the content of the analytical 
framework, the three parameters interact with each other sequentially in a loop, and 
the relationship within each parameter is composed by a different cluster system.
Looping system: The first parameter: the societal context (the forces that trigger a 
cultural turn) and the second parameter: the new planning formation (the changing 
planning system) are continually interactive in a loop. The same is the case with the 
second parameter: the planning formation (the changing planning system) and the 
third parameter: the planning outcome (the socio-spatial outcome of planning).
Joint-cluster: The first parameter, the societal context (the forces that trigger cultural 
turn), is embedded in a broader cluster of Chinese traditional and historical values, 
norms, and philosophies that defines the embodiment of “cultural turn.” The second 
parameter, the new planning formation (the changing planning system), is embedded 
in a broader scope of the overall initial reformation in socio-political and economic 
aspects. The third parameter, the planning outcome (the socio-spatial outcome of 
planning) evolves within the local planning execution. Each parameter is dealt with in 
two chapters: one is giving a broader contextual disclosure (Chapter 3, 5 and 7) while a 
paired chapter reflects on a specific subject (Chapter 4, 6 and 8).
6 These contextual backgrounds provide framework of narratives, as mentioned in Chapter 2.3.3. 
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§ 2.6.2 Methodological Approaches and Concerns
In accordance with the analytical framework of planning culture, the overall research 
design comprises five components: next to Part I Introduction and Part V Conclusion, 
Part II, Part III and Part IV apply methodological approaches.
Part II: Cultural and Historical Review is focused on the spatial themes that are related 
to the Chinese traditions and the historical momentum of Chinese modernization. In 
this framework, the following topics are elaborated:
• Historical spatial discourse in China, its traditions and philosophies;
• The evolution of modernization in China; 
• Societal changes and urban developments in historical Chinese evolution.
Part III: Initial Reformations and the Re-modification of the Planning Formation is 
focused on the planning transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s. In this 
framework, we are concerned with the following topics: 
• Initial reformations in multi-dimensional aspects after the transformation of the 
1980s;
• The planning transformation of China including the changing role of planning, the 
mode of governance and the planning formation; 
• Planning mechanism and planning system.
Part IV Planning Practice and the emerged Socio-Spatial Challenges is given to the 
case study of the city of Shenzhen city in the Pearl River Delta. The following topics are 
elaborated:
• The history of Shenzhen and its establishment related to the opening-up of China; 
• The planning procedures and planning documents in a time-line;
• Comparison between intended and realized development, related to urban 
development and public participation;
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Based on the outcomes of the general research of the Shenzhen development, three 
projects are selected for in-depth analyses of the planning realization, the different 
actors involved, the fine-tuning between different public planning institutions and 
between public and private planning, the intended and realized spatial qualities, and 
the weaknesses, constraints, and contradictions of the planning process.
The scheme of the methodological approach and the composition of the assembling 
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Figure 2.1 The overall methodological framework and the analytical framework of the research.  
Constructed by author.
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§ 2.6.3 Review of other Analytical Models of Planning Culture
The analytical framework of this research is based on the specific research questions 
in the specific case of China and structured by the idea of planning culture. Inspiration 
has come from the input of the other two diagrammatic schemes that were proposed 
by Ng Mee Kam (1999) and by Joerg Knieling and Frank Othengrafen (2007). Herewith, 
it is necessary to review their original analytical schemes that help give the research its 
specific approach.
Firstly, in a comparative study of the political economies and urban planning systems 
of Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore, Ng (1999) argues that legacies of world history, 
globalization, and technological development interact with domestic histories and 
culture to shape the local socio-economic and spatial development. She translates the 
idea of planning culture into a tentative theoretical framework, which is useful to make 
comparative studies between the different urban regions under an analytical structure 
of planning (Figure 2.2). In her tentative theoretical framework, she underlines the fact 
that changing planning formations have to deal with the different social formations, 
in which the powers and resources within and among the different agents/actors are 
accumulated.
In comparison to her analytical scheme, in this research, in order to outline the 
planning culture of China, the analytical framework is organized by the parameters 
of investigation that associate with the research questions. In addition, as a new 
application of the idea of planning culture, this analytical framework focuses on 
the consistency of building up the overall interpretation more than to provide a 
methodology for comparison. Therefore, the research has to go through each step 
of planning scale—not only on the level of interaction between the political–social 
environment and the planning mechanism, but also to focus on a specific region and 
elaborated cases. To explore how the shift of the preferable governmental planning 
has given its impact comes down to the spatial performance of planning in reality. 
This is also the reason why the research is concerned, beside the individual research 
questions, with the three mentioned parameters, to outline the planning culture by 
using one case in one region and in a specific, limited time span.
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Issues of accountability, participation,professionalism and the role of the development industry 
Figure 2.2 Political economy and urban planning: A tentative theoretical framework.  
Source: Modified from NG (1999), Figure 1.
Secondly, Knieling and Othergrafen (2007) have built an analytical model in order 
to translate the idea of planning culture into a scheme of what concerns planning 
achievement in relation to their different focuses (Figure 2.3). In their model, three 
layers of planning concerns were distinguished as to their scale, with different focuses. 
Different issues and concerns are clustered into three scales, from the micro- to 
macro-planning environments. The concerns of actors, instruments and mandating 
are situated in the micro scale together with concerned issues of more specific focus 
on project-oriented. At the other extreme contrary, the issues about the significance 
of society such as basic values and norms are situated in the macro-scales of societal 
environment and with more concerns of context-oriented achievement. Their model 
shares coherent insights with the previously mentioned debates in the division 
between planning process and planning context and other aspects. However, their 
proposed model remains on a conceptual level. Instead of a model that leads to a 
methodological approach they emphasize the sequence of issues that emerge in the 
domain of planning culture.
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Figure 3. The three levels of understanding cultural influences in INTERREG projects, with respect to 
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Figure 4: relations/connections between cooperation, planning culture and cultural differences 
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Figure 2.3 Analytical model of Planning Culture of Knieling and Othergrafen 
Source: Knieling and Othergrafen (2007).
These two analytical models both evaluate the contextual characteristics and describe 
the themes chosen to be related. The essential idea of planning culture is to unfold 
the contextual consequences, and to place a planning discourse into a broader 
contextual picture. The contextual revelation is the state-of-the–art of the idea of 
planning culture. It is not used to measure any quantity, but the measure of capacity 
to disclose—particularly— the cultural perspective. In this research, this clarification 
is a crucial explanation to regard why the nit-picking contextual materials in different 
chapters are tenaciously presented.
§ 2.6.4 Highlights of the Major Contents of the Research 
Before we proceed further into the main research body, in each chapter, some 
important accents need to be underlined in advance.
The societal context: The transformation of China 
In Part II, the general contextual background of the Chinese modern movement reflects 
on how Chinese urban development was affected by the emergence of modernization, 
industrialization, urbanization, and (post)-colonization. This layered development is 
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my primary standpoint to regard the period of transformation after the opening-door 
in 1978, which I defined as a “cultural turn”—a transitional momentum in Chinese 
modern history. The reason to include Chinese ancient roots and philosophies is to 
lay out the ground for understanding the ethos of Chinese tradition, which has been 
undermined due to a variety of historical matters during the last two centuries. The 
result is that much valuable wisdom and thought, in particular linked to the authentic 
spatiality, had no opportunities to develop under the constraints of these historical 
matters into modern use as systematic knowledge, In order that society can be 
modernized. It explains why those ideas are barely applied in the spatial interventions 
of the cases that are elaborated later. However, this does not mean they have been 
completely forgotten, on the contrary, they are hidden in the veins of society and the 
people. Further, we can find many current political-societal characteristics are strongly 
rooted in Chinese tradition.
These cultural and historical backgrounds are crucial clues in this research because 
the hybrid characteristic of Chinese historical evolution—although they come from 
different aspects of the past, to access and to dissect the dynamic contemporary 
transformation. No matter how we try to interpret this transformation by following a 
logic structure and wish to grope for evidence and proof, I suggest the readers to put 
away the anxiety of fact-finding, and instead to maneuver through materials that are 
provided, without any kind of prejudices, to recognize a non-occidental evolution of 
Chinese planning culture. 
The Planning Formation: The Planning System in China
In Part III, the intention is to provide a portrait of the initial reformations in a 
comprehensive scope. The focus is on the essential consequence of the contemporary 
spatial development. Initial political, economic, social and spatial reformations give 
the clues as to how the role of the planning system in China has been (re-) defined and 
(re-) modified.
Following the general contextual background, the second part of the analysis is 
devoted to exploring the Chinese planning system in transition. This part of research 
emphasizes the planning formation, including the planning systems, planning 
approaches, planning mechanisms, planning methods, and so on. Special focus is 
given to the illustration of how the re-modification of planning formation took place 
after the Maoist period. What planning mechanisms were built? What planning 
institutes were installed? What planning methods were applied? What had the new 
planning mode introduced between the decision-making, participation of actors, and 
planning implementation? 
This part of study reveals the reformation from the top–down initiatives, and explores 
what kind of planning ideology the government applies. The content is used in this 
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research for two purposes: to relate the transformation after 1980s to the broader 
historical evolution, and to lay out the ground for the later discussion of case studies in 
Shenzhen, in both contextual and planning implementation aspects.
The Planning Outcome: The Application of Chinese Planning Systems in Shenzhen 
Project Analyses 
 I chose to use the city of Shenzhen as a case study. By no means is Shenzhen a 
standard example for the recent processes of urban transformation in China. On the 
contrary, in fact, the city is a rather extreme example of Chinese urbanization. Below I 
will explain the reason for this choice.
Shenzhen was built up following the market-liberation policies of the early 1980s. 
It represents an experiment to implement and test the effects of market-economy 
principles that, till that time, had been barely recognized and never applied during 
the planned-economy era of the communist regime. In the context of these special 
circumstances, many new strategies and approaches for urban development were 
introduced that were driven by the dynamics of a free market. The result was that 
new institutions for spatial planning had to be established in order to meet the new 
demands of urban development, as well as to adapt the older existing planning 
system during the transitional phase. Shenzhen’s experience demonstrates that 
the role of spatial planners and planning institutions, as well as the approaches and 
methodologies in spatial planning, have been transformed.
It is crucial to understand that without the societal changes from planned to market-
economy Shenzhen would not have been built. Recently, for various reasons, many 
other Chinese cities have been appointed as experimental bases for new principles in 
spatial planning, following the Shenzhen model. So the case of Shenzhen to a certain 
level shows the rise of a new Chinese society in general. A society in which, on the 
one hand, the traditional top–down structure is crumbling, and, on the other hand, 
a more open society is demanded. Spatial planning must reflect the changes within 
a society, and therefore it must promote the continuous redefinition of itself. In this 
sense, Shenzhen can be described as a highly relevant case for tackling the question 
of transforming the spatial planning culture in China. The major purpose is to analyze 
under which conditions the Shenzhen experience has demonstrated a new planning 
culture for China on the implementation level.
Three thematic projects were chosen to show the range from the top-down to the 
bottom-up initiatives with regard to their effects on planning (design control) and 
design outcome. They represent the different relations between the planned approach 
and emergent approach and, furthermore, to demonstrate how the planned approach 
is confronting the emergent approach in the spatial dimension, what result is 
reflected in the spatial performance, and what is the interaction between the spatial 
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performance and the social status. They demonstrate a common characteristic of how 
the top-down planning ideology is asked to adjust, coordinate, and compromise on the 
execution level in accordance with emerging bottom-up conditions.
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Part 2 Cultural and Historical Review
The culture and the historical evolution interactively 
shape the thinking of a society and from this derive 
the soci-political formation, of which planning culture 
is a part.
What constitutes a socio-political formation? Culture, which contains elements of 
persistence and changes in various relations, lays the ground for a society to evolve. 
With regard to the Chinese civilization, historically, but not too long ago, the country 
has suffered many vicissitudes, yet, associated cultural evolution continued. 
This part reveals that Chinese philosophies are basically intended to draw the 
consonance between the moral order and the political order. Thus the way that Chinese 
civilization evolves in its modernization is different from that of the Western, liberal 
countries. As spatial development is strongly influenced by the cultural determinants 
of the specific Chinese socio-political formation, this legitimizes the state-society 
integration as its essential socio-cultural system. 
The crucial notion in this part following the setting of the first parameter societal 
context is to access and to dissect the roots of Chinese socio-political sector through 
the philosophical and historical contextual investigations in its culture.
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3 Ancient Roots and Philosophies 
Each country has its own special historical background, cultural heritage, political 
system, and level of economic development, in which the cities are built. Together, 
these lead people to different realizations and different standards, as conditions differ 
greatly between developed and developing countries and the people’s understanding, 
needs, and attitudes. Therefore, the embodiment of ancient roots and philosophies 
should not be underestimated. 
Even though for many the pursuit of modernization may emphasize the significance of 
economic development and take modernization as industrialization with a high level 
of science and technology, others attach more importance to changes in socio-political 
systems and connect modernization with their reform. Compared with economics, 
sociology, law and other humanities, as well as natural sciences and technology, 
philosophy may at first seem far from the realities of people’s practical social life, 
and therefore far from the real movement of modernization. But on the contrary, this 
heritage of a value system does not fade out with time.
This chapter reveals the ancient Chinese philosophies, embedded between the two 
extreme poles of the value system: on the one hand, the ritual principle—based on 
moral ontology, and on the other, the state hegemony—based on the routinization of 
charisma, which is supported by emphasizing on social orders and regulations. 
The evolution of Chinese civilization is derived both from the Chinese ancient 
spiritual and ethical values, and from the emphasis on the political and social orders. 
Interactively these values also were used to steer the spatial norms for building cities.
Further, the chapter underlines a profound difference of cultural evolution in Chinese 
history in comparison to Western-democratic countries, also in the spatial domain. 
This Chinese ancient specialty of spatial paradigm can still be recognized in Chinese 
society now, however, due to the break of historical matters, they have never been 
established into a systematic discourse for modern use.
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§ 3.1 Cosmology: Spatial Conception and Environmental Harmony 
人法地, 地法天,天法道, 道法自然.
Man follows the Earth, the Earth follows Heaven, Heaven follows Dao, and Dao 
follows Nature7 (Lao Tzu 600 B.C.).
In Chinese civilization, like in many other great civilizations, the birth of the city heralds 
the might of the states and empires, marks the boundary between history and pre-
history, and announces the arrival of higher religion. Indeed, the great divide between 
civilization and savagery is in the constitution of urban settlements, in which most 
human inventions are born.
As a centuries-old civilization, China has accumulated abundant ideas and 
philosophies to interpret, define, and evolve the way in which humans perceive their 
surroundings. Not only have these comprehensions been applied to define the spiritual 
and ethical values of the society, they have also been used to steer the spatial norms to 
build cities.
§ 3.1.1 Man and Nature 
Cosmology starts with the question of how people perceive the world around them. 
In every culture the people must first of all deal with their natural environment. Their 
daily basic confrontation is between “Man and Nature”. That people should form a 
community or a society arises from the primary need of man to cope with nature, 
so as to protect and develop them. Man has to find the specific meaning of his very 
own existence, in order to develop his being in the vast cosmological environment. 
Therefore, social ethics are derived from the relation between “Man and Nature”. 
The diverse behavioral responses to the essential definition of “Man and Nature” 
influence the features of particular cultures, especially their modes of thinking, basic 
philosophical hypotheses, and value systems.
7 Lao Tzu (Chinese: 老子) (ca. 600 B.C.) was a philosopher of ancient China, best known as the author of the Tao Te 
Ching (simplified Chinese: 道德经; Traditional Chinese: 道德經). His association with the Tao Te Ching has led him 
to be traditionally considered the founder of philosophical Taoism (pronounced as “Daoism”).
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According to Chen Kuide (1989: 131), referring to ancient Greek civilization, the 
basic hypotheses, values systems, and modes of thinking that dominated the various 
cultures were approximately established during the so-called “classical times”8 (about 
500 B.C.). He pointed out that a correlation between the natural environment and 
culture seems undeniable and that ancient Greek civilization, one of the sources of 
Western culture, supports this point of view. His theory is that the human awareness 
of the relationship between “Man and Nature” is among the essential elements that 
form early civilization. Even though one cannot simply imply the same logic to other 
cultures, his emphasis on the hostility of natural circumstances nevertheless seems, to 
a certain degree, to reflect also the natural circumstances in which Chinese civilization 
came into being.
Chinese ancient philosophies flourished for the first time from 770 to 221 B.C. after 
the decline of royal power, the disintegration of slavery, and the aristocratic culture 
of monopoly was broken in the Western Zhou Dynasty (1100–771 B.C.) while a large 
numbers of newly established powers came into being. This is an era of great cultural 
and intellectual expansion in China. Even though this period—known in its earlier part 
as the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period9—in its latter part was 
fraught with chaotic and bloody battles between the divided kingdoms, it is also known 
as the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy, because a broad range of thoughts and ideas 
were developed and discussed liberally. The fundamental philosophies that influence 
Chinese culture from the past to the present mostly emerged in this period.
This was an era of harsh contention between the divided kingdoms and it was full 
of great social changes. These social changes spread culture among the people. 
The intellectual society of this era was characterized by itinerant scholars, who were 
often employed by various state rulers as advisers on the methods of government, war, 
and diplomacy. Intellectuals of this period had to face the reality of social problems, 
life issues, and proposed solutions developing new ideas. With a result unconventional 
theories and ideas emerged. Numerous thinkers constantly provided their own 
strategies for governing the state. Those ambitious enough took the salvation of the 
world as their responsibility and offered their political propositions, one after another. 
Some of them set of journeys among different states to offer advice to the rulers; 
8 Chen Kuide referred to ancient Greek civilization, for the Greeks attached great importance to the natural 
environment and its influence. 
9 The Eastern Zhou (770 up to 256 B.C.) period, characterized by a breakup of Zhou territory into states that were 
essentially independent, is further divided into two sub-periods. The first, from 770 to 476 B.C., is called the 
Spring and Autumn Period; the second is known as the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.).
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some opened private schools and devoted themselves to writing books; some were 
unconventional and unrestrained and showed their concerns for worldly life in the form 
of criticism; some assisted the rulers in governing the states.
In this way, the term of “contention of a hundred schools of thought”10 (Paichiachengming 
or “hundred schools contend”) has emerged. This period of history is called the “Pre-Qin” 
period11—the hundred schools of thought (Chu Tzu Pai Chia, literally “all philosophers 
hundred schools”). Important scholars were Lao Tzu, Confucius, Chuang Tzu, Mo Tzu, 
Mencius, Xun Tzu, and others; different academic schools were formed, including 
Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and Legalism. The Spring and Autumn–Warring 
States Period was a time of great liberation of mind and people of talent emerged in 
rapid succession. The thoughts and ideas discussed and refined during this period have 
profoundly influenced lifestyles and social consciousness in China up to the present day.
During this period, different schools of thought had built up their hypotheses regarding 
the issue of the relationship between “Man and Nature.” The relationship between 
“Heaven and Man” has been explained by different theories in traditional Chinese 
philosophy. Most ancient Chinese thinkers believed that the little cosmos of man and 
the great cosmos of Tian-Di share the same natural feature: the two are correlative, 
as is expressed by the term: Unity of Man with Nature. Tian in Chinese means Nature, 
Heaven, and laws of Nature, and Di refers to Earth.
What is called “Heaven” (Tian) in ancient China had various implications, but after 
the middle period of the Warring States (453–221 B.C.), most thinkers meant mainly 
Nature by Heaven. In general, what most thinkers refer to as “Heaven” is the vast 
objective world and its vast nature; “Man” refers to mankind or human society. The 
best principle for man to follow is nothing other than Nature, or Tian-Di. Doctrines 
that concern the relationship between “Heaven and Man” in Chinese philosophy can 
be divided into two types—one type comparatively stresses the unity of “Heaven and 
Man,” while the other stresses the separation of the two.
Among these, the idea of Lao Tzu’s basic hypothesis has strongly influenced 
Chinese ideas on how human beings should regard their positions in relation to the 
cosmological environment. Lao Tzu founded his philological system centering on Tao 
(Way)—an absolute, overriding spirit transcending time and space and encompassing 
the whole universe. He advocated “Wu Wei,” literally “non-action” or “not acting”—
10 Paichiachengming (simplifies Chinese: 百家争鸣 ;Traditional Chinese: 百家爭鳴).
11 This period ended with the rise of the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.–206 B.C.) and the subsequent purge of dissent.
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letting things take their own course—and suggested defeating the strong with suavity, 
conquering the firm with gentleness. He phrased “the highest excellence is like (that of) 
water”12. These are central concepts of the Tao. The concept of Wu Wei is very complex 
and reflected in the words’ multiple meanings. Even in English translation, it can mean 
“not doing anything”, “not forcing”, “not acting” in the theatrical sense, “creating 
nothingness”, “acting spontaneously”, and “flowing with the moment”.
Chuang Tzu (369–286 B.C.), as the most recognized successor of Lao Tzu, advocated that 
nature was originally harmonious and perfect, but after man acquired knowledge and 
invented their techniques, nature’s harmonious and perfect state of being was destroyed. 
Hence, the basic principle of life is to follow the course of nature, instead of adding 
anything to it artificially. His skeptical philosophy and advocacy of what we now might call 
“anarchism” may extremely underestimate the meaning of man’s initiative. Nevertheless, 
the Taoist demand that no damage be made blindly to nature and that no destruction be 
inflicted upon things is a significant warning to civilized society (Zhang Dainian 1989).
Confucianism presents a watershed of philosophical thinking on how man perceives the 
world surrounding him/her and the attitude towards Nature, different from that of Taoism. 
According to Mencius (ca. 372–289 B.C.), another Chinese philosopher, and arguably the 
most famous Confucian after Confucius himself, human nature is given by Heaven. “The 
union of Heaven and Earth gives birth to all things” comes from Mencius, who put forward 
the proposition that “to know (human) nature is to know Heaven.” Heaven, in Mencius’ 
sense, has a double meaning: both the supreme ruler and the supreme law of necessity.
In opposition to, and critical of, Chuang Tzu, Hsun Tzu (ca. 312–235 B.C.) stressed 
the importance of transforming Nature, and believed the meaning of man’s initiative 
to be the ability to comprehend the transformation of Nature. It is his belief that the 
idea of human life should be “to form an overview of both Heaven and Earth and make 
full use of all things there”; “to utilize to the fullest all things covered by Heaven and 
carried by Earth”, in order to transform Nature and make use of everything in order to 
improve human life (Zhang Dainian 1989). Hsun Tzu distinguishes what is born in 
Man and what must be learned through rigorous education. He rejects Mencius’ notion 
that Heaven has a moral will. Instead, he asserts that Heaven is simply the natural 
world; thus, people should focus on the human social realm, rather than dealing 
with heavenly ideas. He also emphasizes the discussion of Ritual Propriety (Li)13 and 
enumerates the rules of individual and social conduct (decorum).
12 Tao Te Ching (simplified Chinese: 道德经; Traditional Chinese: 道德經), chapter 8. 
13 Li, Ritual Propriety (simplified Chinese: 礼; traditional Chinese: 禮） 
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In general, different thinkers share quite a few basic elements: Man is born of Heaven 
and Earth and enjoys an outstanding position between Heaven and Earth. For example, 
Yi Zhuan14, a theoretical work of the Confucian school, also illustrated that the Tao 
of Man, by means of the Tao of Tian, regarded Heaven, Earth, and Man as “the three 
gifts”, clearly affirming man’s significant position between Heaven and Earth. Xiao 
Jing15 thus recorded the remarks of Confucius: “Man is the most valuable according 
to the nature of Heaven and Earth.” Hsun Tzu illustrated man’s value: Fire and water 
have energy but no life; grass and trees have life but no sense; birds and beasts have 
sense but no righteousness. Man however, has all of them: energy, life, sense and also 
righteousness. On the basis of the theory of Yi Jing Ba Gua16, Chang Tsia (1020–1077 
A.D.), a Chinese Neo-Confucian moral philosopher and cosmologist, emphasized “Qian 
(Heaven) is father while Kun (Earth) is mother. People are born of the same parents as 
mine; and things are my companions.”17
The idea that Man has his outstanding position between Heaven and Earth (Tian-Di) also 
brings up the idea of what attitude Man should take towards Nature. Zhang Dainian (1989) 
emphasized that, in the primitive society, people did not possess self-consciousness and 
perceived no distinction or opposition between Man and Nature. Only after the dawn 
of civilization was Man distinguished from Nature, and only then was the distinction 
and opposition between the two fully realized. This is the important watershed in the 
development of human civilization, resulting in what is called human self-consciousness. 
How does this development of self-consciousness enhance human value in the entire 
cosmos—between Heaven and Earth (Tian-Di)—and generate the special mode of ancient 
Chinese consensus toward the establishment of social order in man’s society? 
14 Yi Zhuan (simplified Chinese: 易传; traditional Chinese: 易傳). 
15 Xiao Jing or Classic of Filial Piety (simplified Chinese: 孝经; traditional Chinese: 孝經) is a Confucian classic 
treatise giving advice on filial piety; that is, how to behave towards a senior (such as a father, an elder brother, or 
ruler). This document probably dates to about 400 B.C. It is not known who actually wrote the document. It is 
attributed to a conversation between Confucius and a disciple named Zeng Zi.
16 Yi Jing or The Book of Changes (simplified Chinese: 易经; traditional Chinese: 易經）. According to Yi Jing, Ba 
Gua or eights trigrams (Chinese: 八卦), were conceived as images of all that happens in Heaven and on Earth. 
Qian (Heave) and Kun (Earth) are two trigrams of the eight trigrams (Ba Gua) presented in the Fu Xi diagram 
(Fu Xi, mid 29th century B.C., in Chinese mythology was the first of the Three Sovereigns of ancient China). Qian 
(Heaven) and Kun (Earth) are positioned; the Gen (mountain) and the Dui (marsh) exchange breath; the Zhen 
(thunder) and the Xue (wind) approach each other, while Kan (water) and Li (fire) don’t deft each other; eight 
trigrams inter-mate one with another wherein they coexist and form sixty-four hexagrams. 
17 Chang Tsai elucidates the relationship between Heaven, Earth and Man in more figurative language. He writes 
in Xi Ming or West Inscription (simplified Chinese: 西铭; traditional Chinese: 西銘). He compares the relationship 
between Heaven and Man to that between parents and children, vividly illustrating the fact that Man is born of 
Heaven and Earth. See Zhang Dainian (1989: 7). 
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§ 3.1.2 The Recognition of Subjectivity 
The history of the development of human ideology is, first and foremost, a history of the 
separation of man from the ranks of the animals—a history of development from lack 
of subjectivity to the attainment of subjectivity18.
Zhang Shiying (1989) emphasized in his article “The development of the principle of 
subjectivity in Western philosophy and of the theory of man in Chinese philosophy” 
that the difference between man and animal, in a sense, is that animals cannot tell the 
difference between the subject and the object but man can. Zhang Shiying illustrates 
some interesting debates, especially in comparing the development of the principle 
of subjectivity in the history of Western philosophy with that of the Chinese within the 
Chinese ancient political development.
Zhang Shiying (1989) elaborates that the development of subjectivity as it emerged in 
Western philosophy is an evolution first from the unity of subject and object, second 
through the recognition of the separation of the two and third, to the demand for the 
unity of subject and object. According to his observation, this evolutionary process can 
be summarized in three different stages: first, that human rights were emancipated 
from the yoke of theocracy; second, the importance of the study of nature is the 
discovery of object, making it directly useful to man in the Renaissance; finally, the 
great achievements that were made in all fields of historical dialectics during the 18th 
century French Revolution and in natural sciences during the period from the late 18th 
to the early 19th centuries, especially in the theory of evolution.
These achievements enabled modern Western philosophy to reach its highest stage. 
In Western historical development the subjectivity of man is enhanced. Zhang Shiying 
(1989) emphasized that the first step in the process of development of subjectivity in 
the history of Western philosophy was to separate and distinguish between subject 
and object in order to realize self-awareness. However, the evolution of distinguishing 
between subject and object continues until the discovery of nature and the subjectivity 
of man as a two-sided coin.
18 Subjectivity (the German word Subjektivität) in classical German philosophy refers mainly to independence, 
self-decision, freedom, initiative, self, self-awareness, the particularity of the individual, the display of the 
wisdom and ability of the individual, with the free will and ability of the individual as a basis, etc. 
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To value pure knowledge and theoretical knowledge is the result of discovering the object 
and regarding it as important. Only by doing so is the substance of man enriched and can 
the subjectivity of man be developed. Western historical development of philosophical 
thinking regarding the continuous evolution of human self-consciousness and subjectivity 
and the enriched efforts of natural and technological sciences have decisively contributed 
to its dominating success, especially after the 17th century till present. What was the 
comparable evolution as it developed in Chinese history? 
In reviewing the ancient history of Chinese philosophies and their ideas about Nature and 
Man, it is not difficult to find the ideas of self-consciousness and subjectivity of man that 
had been expounded and rather advanced during the Pre-Qin period; however, they had 
never been developed into a systematic manner in the way Western philosophy did.
Confucius (551–479 BC) was the first great thinker in the history of Chinese philosophy 
to establish the societal system of life disciplines. In Chinese history, the structure 
of morality results from the Confucian ethical spirit in the deep level of the Chinese 
civilization through the long process of historical evolution and cultural integration, 
which had become the mainstream in feudal China and to a certain degree, hampered 
the establishment of the principle of subjectivity in the development of Chinese 
philosophy. Of course, there are historical reasons why and how Confucius’s advocacy 
has become the core philosophy in Chinese history.
The influence of Confucianism on the Chinese philosophical establishment can be seen 
both in a positive and a negative way—naturally, as any advocacy in human history that 
has emerged in any specific culture—especially within the specific historical-political 
Chinese background. But it is not the concern of this research to extend this debate; 
rather, it is to present the relevant factors in order to understand how the historical-
contextual roots of Chinese philosophy are continually contributing to the forming of 
consensus in Chinese tradition from the past to the present.
In general, Confucius’s philosophy of life, indeed, emphasized to subdue one’s self 
and return to propriety. He seldom spoke of the Tao of Heaven like that is emphasized 
by Lao Tzu; he was more concerned with the Tao of Man. The ethics of humanism 
constitute the core of Confucianism, which is grounded in the patriarchal society of 
ancient China. Social life and individual conduct are regulated by the ethical codes that 
formulate a basic system of Chinese social behavior.
Confucius’s thoughts highlighted social order and valued the power of knowledge at 
the same time. In the view of Confucius, it is important to build up the social order in 
society based on the Li (principle, propriety, formalities and rites)—a philosophy that, 
in fact, constitutes the moral principle of feudal society. For Confucius, Li contains 
the norms for behavior and the rules for social etiquette under the direction of Ren 
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(benevolence)19. Ren is the prevailing moral principle of the Confucian ethic. Confucius 
advocated the idea that “the benevolent should hold love for others,” and proposed 
“virtuous rule.” He emphasized that Ren and Li should supplement each other and 
“rites and formalities” should be based on “benevolence.” The nature of “formalities” 
was to maintain the social order, keeping every subject under control according to the 
principle of benevolence.
Obedience to Li is likewise commitment to Ren, the unity of which causes both 
personal relationships to be harmonious and the social order to be stable. Social 
harmony is the great goal of Confucianism and results in part from every individual 
knowing his or her place in the social order, and playing his or her part well.
His idea of Li especially refers to the unity between Man and Heaven under the 
obedience of the Tian Li20 (the principle of Heaven). Tian Li holds that Heaven and 
Man are in accord with each other, and that the “Way (Tao) of Man” coincides with 
that of Heaven. In addition, he also attached great importance to education and 
music. Confucius maintained that, in education, there should be no distinction of 
social status; that is, education should be open to everyone. He thought music could 
help to edify people’s spirit. In this sense, he proposed “formalities” for the external 
attainment and “music” for the “internal accomplishment”.
Being rooted in the influence of Confucianism, Chinese philosophy in its core 
emphasizes that Man should be independent and should be his own master, 
yet the self-awareness in the acquisition of knowledge depends rather on moral 
training, which is referring to Ren and Li, than on the recognition of subjectivity. This 
mainstream of considering the way of Heaven is the way of Man that should follow 
continues to influence and support the feudal society of which some characteristics 
prevail even today and fettered how man’s subjectivity and self-consciousness 
developed in the Chinese context.
Especially, the name of “emperor” in Chinese means Tian Tzu—the son of Heaven, as 
the highest authority to conduct the way of Heaven in man’s society. This fundamental 
charismatic quality of the emperor—and his legitimate right of Tian Ming (the Mandate 
of Heaven)—explains why the feudal system has never been really overthrown in 
Chinese history, until the anti-feudal movement began in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. An emperor can forfeit his Mandate of Heaven, if he fails to fulfill his duty 
19 Ren (Chinese: 仁).
20 Tian Li (Chinese: 天理).
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by providing Li and Ren to people, such forfeit implied the “legitimate” right to rebel 
against and overthrow the reigning monarch by the new replacement (Baum 2004).
From the observation of Zhang Shiying (1989), some points can be concluded. 
First, under the constraint and the sophisticated political principle of feudalism, the 
idea of unity between man and heaven was predominant in the history of Chinese 
philosophy, while the idea of separation and opposition between subject and object 
never dominated. The evolutional process in Chinese history lacked the stage of 
transformation into a complete system like what had happened in Western history. 
In the West the anti-feudal force has been strong and the development was much 
smoother and lasted for a longer period, while in the Chinese context the combined 
forces of imperialism, feudalism and capitalism caused the development of subjectivity 
to be even more arduous.
Second, due to the unstable replacement of new emergent feudal powers from time to 
time, most philosophers regarded the attainment of virtue to be of primary importance, 
emphasizing the idea that man should become immortal in this world. The concept 
of immortality reflected that subject and object were not regarded as separate and 
opposed to each other, while Chinese philosophy attached too much importance to the 
unity of Man and Heaven, and neglected the distinction between, and opposition of, 
subject and object. In other words, the completeness of the history of separation and 
opposition of subject and object and the long period of time during which it dominated 
the history of Western philosophy are absent from the history of Chinese philosophy.
Third, as the history of Chinese philosophy was dominated by the emphasis on 
man and his establishment of immortality, epistemology, methodology and its 
understanding of thinking were less emphasized. This also results in the lack of a 
philosophy based upon the principle of subjectivity.
In this sense, the road China took regarding the recognition of subjectivity was 
different. Aforementioned facts explain that, to a certain degree in China there was no 
comparable long-lasting movement in Chinese modernization movement resembling 
the Renaissance in Europe21. In the West, the overthrow and weakening of religious 
power brought about a relatively high development of the rights and subjectivity of 
man in the movement of the Renaissance. Differently, in China the prevailing idea 
was that the monarch was the supreme power and the ethical code, feudal patriarchal 
21 Although, during the late 19th and early 20th century the period of modernization movement begins with 
rejecting imperialism and to liberate China from the yoke of the feudal ethical code, hierarchical system and 
patriarchal clan system, yet the real census of subjectivity has not really been established in Chinese society. 
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clan system and hierarchical system all served to support the monarch. Therefore, the 
idea of man’s subjectivity could not be established unless the monarchical power was 
overthrown. As Zhang Shiying (1989: 166) stated: “only after the discovery of nature 
could people begin to pay attention to science, and only after the discovery of man 
could people start to respect democracy.” Maybe this can indicate the tip of the iceberg 
of change that Chinese society is going through at this moment.
Chen Kuide’s observation (1989: 140) of the debate took another angle: 
There are many excellent propositions in the works of Pre-Qin period 
philosophers. As the ancient Chinese language is highly inclusive and 
condensed, it is rich in meaning and deep in thought; but as it lacks complete 
logical form it is often polysemous and metaphoric, and thus relatively 
ambiguous in meaning. The merit of this concise language lies in its self-
protection from questioning and negation by logical argument. On the other 
hand, the lack of logical forms makes it difficult to establish the objective 
criterion of its truth and falsehood, its truth or error, and to certify this by facts 
and deductive reasoning.
Both observations of Zhang Shiying and Chen Kuide can be seen to elaborate, to a 
certain degree, an interesting cultural contextual definition that is based on historical 
understanding. The fundamental contrast between Chinese and Western cultures is 
that of “monism” and “dualism,” “combination” and “separation,” “immanence” and 
“transcendence.”(Chen Kuide 1989: 136) The former, with subjectivity as its basic 
feature and the latter submitting to ironclad scientific law, with objectivity as its basic 
feature; their attitudes toward the cosmos are divided as well, the former is only the 
audience and the latter observes, recognizes, studies, and conquers.
I argue this observation provokes another interpretation with regard to the cultural 
specialty of Chinese language and thinking. Due to the ambiguous and polysemous 
natures, the aesthetic intent of ancient Chinese philosophical propositions and 
theories is more important than their logical intent. It is very hard for Chinese culture 
to totally falsify or reject any proposition due to it is more contextual embedded than 
subjective oriented. This specialty of Chinese culture could also allow for unexpected 
creative results and inclusion of associative thinking. I am convinced this is one of the 
cultural characteristics why Chinese civilization can survive through time. I assume 
this cultural foundation also enable the different stage of reformation through time 
till present.
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§ 3.1.3 The Integration of Knowledge with Practice 
The ancient philosophical proposition of cosmology regarding the subjectivity of man 
and man’s attitude towards nature also deeply influenced the relationship between 
obtaining knowledge and how to transform that into practice. In traditional Chinese 
philosophy, without a doubt, the basic argumentation of the idea of “Heaven and 
Man” is to bring harmonious integration between Heaven and Man. The concept of 
“integration of Heaven with Man” in Chinese philosophy is more a direct description 
than a detailed analysis. According to the abovementioned interpretation, it indicates 
that the ancient Chinese philosophical ideal was rather that of humanism, which 
is related to Ren and the ethical value that promotes a social order based on Li. It 
explains why the natural sciences found difficulties growing on the soil of dominant, 
ancient Chinese philosophical propositions, because the philosophical concepts 
were developed to guide the human morality intrinsically, especially in order to fulfill 
the Way of Heaven ethically. By following the ethical concept of the Way of Heaven, 
although the concern for the Way of Man was strongly related to the dedication of 
knowledge into practice, nevertheless it was used for ethical purposes instead of for the 
pursuit of scientific analysis, discovery and knowledge.
Indeed, in ancient Chinese history, several outstanding ideas and elements of 
knowledge had emerged and were even more advanced than that of any other culture 
of the same period. However, to integrate the knowledge with practice had a different 
ethical meaning in the Chinese development in comparison with that in Western 
society. Confucius emphasized to distinguish the gentleman and villain based on the 
ethical criterion: “A gentleman feels it is shame not to be able to match his words 
with action.”22 
It refers to the necessity for gentleman to be able to follow the requirements of 
five criteria that had already become the moral codes of ancient Chinese society: 
benevolence, righteousness and justice, rites propriety, wisdom, and promises (Ren, Yi, 
Li, Zhi, Xin). In general, like a saint, to integrate knowledge with practice refers to moral 
practice, which means to foster and enhance, as Mencius advocated, the cultivation 
of “a noble spirit” that combines his intelligence with sincerity. By doing so, man 
22 Zhong Yong or The Doctrine of the Mean (Chinese: 中庸), The Doctrine of the Mean was preserved as a chapter of 
the Li Ji, Book of Rites (simplified Chinese: 礼记；traditional Chinese: 禮記), a large compendium of discussions 
of ritual that was completed during the Former Han Dynasty (202 - 9 B.C.), incorporating texts dating back 
significantly earlier. See translation text in English, http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Doctrine_of_the_Mean.
pdf.
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practices what he knows and what he practices becomes his knowledge. A wise man is 
one who knows the rites. A man of ritual is one who practices knowledge. In practicing 
knowledge, all rituals will be properly performed; in knowing the rites all essentials 
will go to the mind. Here, mind is not only the power of recognition, but also the moral 
power to transcend oneself.
In the early period of the North Song Dynasty (960–1127 A.D.), philosopher and 
cosmologist Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073 A.D.), in the course of his denunciation of 
Buddhism and Taoism and his promotion of Confucianism, established his own 
ideological system of cosmology, known as Neo-Confucianism. He put forward the 
idea that all tangible material things came from the absolute substance, while “the 
absolute” was just the intangible “ultimate”. Cheng Hao (1032–1085 A.D.) and Cheng 
Yi (1033–1107 A.D.), known to later generations as the “Cheng Brothers,” contributed 
much to the development of Neo-Confucianism. Both studied under Zhou Dunyi and 
advanced the idea of “reason” as the source of all material things and the essence of 
the universe, which had existed before anything else and would last forever. According 
to them, the broader masses must resign themselves to reality and place themselves at 
the disposal of feudal order. They distinguished the difference between the knowledge 
of the virtual and the knowledge of seeing and hearing, while the knowledge of seeing 
and hearing is from perceptual experience, and the knowledge of the virtual arises from 
intrinsic intuition and they depreciated seeing and hearing, and hence valued morale. 
Their advocacy that “knowledge precedes practice” was argued in terms of morality 
and self-cultivation, as “one who knows but cannot practice is one who does not truly 
know.” (Cheng Weili 1992) 
Later, Zhu Xi (1130–1200 A.D.) of the South Song Dynasty (1127–1279 A.D.) 
inherited Cheng Yi’s theory that “knowledge precedes practice” but he stressed in 
particular “knowledge and practice are mutually dependent”. He epitomized the 
thinking of Neo-Confucianism. He believed that there existed reason and spirit in the 
universe, with the former the essence and the latter the implementation of all material 
things. Things in the world came from reasons and reasons from heavenly principles, 
and heavenly principles (Tian Li) were exactly the public orders in which the monarch 
was the heart. This order and the universal breath (Qi) of dense or scattered matter are 
able to give shape to every being. Every being has the same amount and character of 
Order, but every being is characterized by a different amount and character of Breath, 
thus making for individual differences.
For example, Zhu Xi used a metaphorical example to explain that: “taking water out 
of a river with a bowl or a bucket, you obtain different measures of water”, but it is 
still water, only different amounts and in different environments. Zhu Xi is the most 
important person of Confucianism after Confucius and Mencius. He accumulated 
the whole new cosmological and metaphysical interpretations of the Song Dynasty 
and incorporated them into a new school of Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism, 
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compared with traditional Confucianism, was a great change. Neo-Confucianism 
consolidated the feudal system and the power of the monarch as Confucianism had 
emphasized that; additionally, it integrated the notions of the Li23 (reason of Heaven 
or Tian Li) by Buddhism and Taoism. Its influence profoundly penetrated in and deeply 
influenced Chinese ontology through the centuries afterwards.
The social changes in the middle era of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.) made 
some scholars feel the constraints of the Neo-Confucianism pioneered by the Cheng 
Brothers and Zhu Xi. Therefore, these scholars desired to explore the path to a new 
ideology. Chen Xianzhang (1428–1500 A.D.) was one of the first Ming Neo-Confucian 
philosophers. He thought it was not necessary to study the endless number of theories 
and objects but that the truth of the universal principle is laid down in one’s own heart 
and can be found there in one-self “look for the truth in my own mind; obtain the truth 
from yourself”.
Chen Xianzhang also stressed on self-awareness and self-value as well as subjective 
perception. Facing the orthodox school of Neo-Confucianism in the early years of the 
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.), he advocated a new learning style, which regarded it 
as commendable to question authoritative works and to be self-confident about one’s 
own views. His theory caused a sensation in the ideological and academic world of 
that time and thus broke a path for “The Theory of Mind.”24 The Theory of Mind of the 
Ming Dynasty was developed and spread widely. Wang Shouren (1472–1528 A.D.), 
whose alias was Wang Bo’an, was also referred to as Master Yang Ming, advocated the 
theory of “there is no object, no word, no reason, no righteousness, and no benevolence 
beyond the mind.” The gist of this school of philosophy is the theory of “innate 
knowledge” (Liangzhi) and that “mind is reason.” While Zhu Xi emphasized that 
knowledge comes before action, Wang Shouren brings up the concept that knowledge 
and action are one inseparable unit (Zhi Xing He Yi)25.
Although Confucianism had been adopted as “orthodox” state doctrine since the Han 
Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), including the renaissance of Confucianism during late 
Tang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.), and Neo-Confucianism was effective since the early 
Song Dynasty (960–1279 A.D.) and lasted to the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368 A.D.), 
it shows that many liberal and oppositional ways of thoughts developed during the 
23 Li (of Heaven) or Tian Li (Chinese: 天理).
24 Xin Xue or The Theory of Mind (simplified Chinese: 心学；traditional Chinese: 心學).
25 Zhi Xing He Yi (Chinese: 知行合一).
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Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.). (Neo-) Confucian scholars retired from official posts 
and developed quietism philosophies that were more oriented to the own person and 
the place of humans in the universe than to construct and ideal state like the pre-Han 
(206 B.C.–9 A.D.) philosophers had done. This was strengthened by the integration of 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. This integration of cosmological philosophy—
from Way of Heaven to Way of Man in reality—constituted the basic principle of 
Chinese ontology and this basic root and philosophy were transformed into the spatial 
arrangements as well as Chinese planning culture.
In my opinion, traditional Chinese philosophy that bears the value centered the Way 
of Man—evolving from the moral principle in harmony with nature, society and other 
people, is valuable for society today. They closely evolved in the past Chinese social 
development and we should and can develop these values further for appreciation 
under the new impact of today. We should reexamine its logic and theory of knowledge 
with renewable innovation for the modern Chinese society, in which the way of man is 
profoundly undermined by the pursuit of utilitarianism. 
§ 3.2 From Moral Ontology to Authentic Spatiality
All political systems need some way of assuring social order. (…) Only if some 
measures of social order are assured will it be possible to interpret the world 
coherently, to plan and to act rationally. (Ringmar 1980: 1)
Chinese cosmological philosophy indicates that ritual principles inherent in the 
traditional thinking of moral ontology can also be reflected in the social order and in the 
spatial domain. The ethical rite of ancient Chinese philosophy suggested how the social 
order should be established, based on the moral ontology and with a long tradition, 
using architecture and urban space as spatial tools for reflecting, representing and 
regulating the social order. The relation between the moral ontology-ritual principle, 
the social order and spatial arrangements is clearly recognizable in Chinese ancient 
cities. To understand the effects, it is necessary to reveal how the socio-spatiality was 
transformed based on the moral ontology of the Chinese cosmological principle.
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§ 3.2.1 Ritual Principles and Social Orders 
Rituals obviate disorder as dikes prevent inundation.26
Primarily, ancient philosophers valued the ritual principle. The ritual principle was 
developed based on the idea of the “Way of Heaven” which enhanced the feudal 
system and defined social relationships. Furthermore, through the system of 
social relationships, visible and real spatial organizing principles were applied. This 
interrelation between ritual principle and social order gave guidance to the way cities 
should be built and the architectural layout should be composed, down to the small 
scale of the arrangement of the seats around the dinner table. The emphasis on ritual 
principle (Li) can be dated back to an ancient document Zhou Li (Rites of Zhou) of the 
early Zhou period (ca. 900 B.C.).
Zhou Li was compiled during the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.) and was know 
under the name of “Zhou Guan—Offices of the Zhou.” The final editing of this book 
took place during the Former Han period (206 B.C.–8 A.D.) and it was given the name 
Zhou Li.27 The obscure book Zhou Li consists of a long listing of the officials that the 
Zhou kings theoretically engaged to run the empire. The offices were divided into six 
groups that became the foundation for the later six ministries that according to ancient 
cosmology are correlated to Heaven, Earth, and the four seasons28.
Charles M. Nelson (1988: 19) provided an explicit insight of the interaction between 
the ritual principle and the social order. He concluded that in the Han Dynasty (206 
B.C.–220 A.D.), the idea of Zhou Li had been synthesized into four principles: archaism, 
centralism, organicism, and moralism. First, Archaism sought to trace heaven’s 
mandate through the succession of previous dynasties, using ancestor worship, ancient 
26 Li Ji, Book of Rites (ca. 1050–256 B.C.), translated by James Legge, 1885. 
27 During the last decades of the Later Han period (25-220 A.D.) the three books Yi Li (simplified Chinese: 仪礼； 
traditional Chinese: 儀禮）, Li Ji (simplified Chinese: 礼记； traditional Chinese: 禮記) and Zhou Li (simplified 
Chinese: 周礼 traditional Chinese: 周禮）were canonized as the three ritual books.
28  The six ministries of Zhou Li are: Tianguan Zhouzai (Chinese: 天官冢宰), Celestial Ministry, headed by the Prime 
Minister is in charge of the royal palace and its administration; Diguan Situ (Chinese: 地官司徒), Terrestrial 
Ministry is in charge of the local administration; Chunguan Zongbo (春官宗伯), Spring Ministry is responsible for 
ritual affairs; Xiaguan Sima (simplifies Chinese: 夏官司马; traditional Chinese: 夏官司馬), Summer Ministry as the 
overseer of military affairs; Qiuguan Sikou (Chinese: 秋官司寇), Autumn Ministry is responsible for jurisdiction 
and Dongguan Sikong (Chinese: 冬官司空) or Dongguan Kao Gong (simplified Chinese: 冬官考工纪; traditional 
Chinese: 冬官考工紀), Winter Ministry is responsible for public works and construction. 
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architectural forms, and principles of spatial and administrative organization to justify 
the imperial state. Second, Centralism held that China was the Central Kingdom in 
the universe, the capital was the center of the empire as a geo-cosmic entity, and the 
emperor was the animating pivot around which the activities of the empire revolved. 
Hence, the imperial capital was linked to the empire through an urban hierarchy 
of state capitals, provincial capitals, county capitals, district seats, communes and 
hamlets. Third, Organicism elaborated how the theory Tao (The Way) was applied into 
the organization of the administrative functions and especially the Theory of Yin-Yang 
(feminine and masculine) and Wu Xing29. Fourth, Moralism established the moral right 
of the emperor to rule and utilized the classic propositions of ancient Chinese scholars 
to interpret the moral value of the universe that justified the organization of Chinese 
society.
Besides the ritual principle based on Zhou Li, the second dimension of ancient Chinese 
ritual principle dwells in religious roots and heavily relies upon the emotional security 
and social supports provided by familial and clan relationships. Richard Baum (2004), 
in his article “Ritual and Rationality: Religious Roots of the Bureaucratic State in 
Ancient China”, underpinned the relevant analyses. He examines the religious origins 
and evolution of the instruments of political legitimation in ancient China by linking 
the relationship between primitive spiritualism and the emergence of the institution 
of kingship. He also examined how the routinization of charismatic political power of 
kingship can be sustained due to the practice and believes of the ritual associated with 
the idea of Tian Ming—the “Mandate of Heaven” 30.
“Routinization of charisma” is defined by the German sociologist Max Weber (1947) 
with regard to the classic sociology of religion. It refers to a prophetic leader who 
attracts followers to his anti-traditional message by his personal magnetism or force 
29 The theories of Yin-Yang (simplified Chinese: 阴阳, traditional Chinese: 陰陽) and Wu Xing or the Five Elements 
(Chinese:五行) are fundamental principles of Chinese science to establish the cosmic elements of Chinese 
cosmology. These theories explain the dynamic recognition of processes, objects, and their function in nature. 
According to Yin-Yang, all living objects, as well as their parts, can be identified as Yin or Yang. Any scientific 
analysis requires Yin or Yang designation be given to aspects of processes or objects. Each element is symbolic 
of qualities in nature: Water, cold: flows downward, Fire: flares upward, Wood: germinates, spreads its leaves, 
Metal: purification and solidity and Earth: promotion of growth, nourishment. These five elements interactively 
formed the cycle of Sheng (creation) and Ke (destruction). Every entity has its opposite. In the cycle of Sheng 
(creation): Water nourishes Wood, Wood feeds Fire, Fire creates Earth (ash), Earth bears Metal and Metal carries 
Water. In the cycle of Ke (destruction): Water is opposite to Fire, Fire is opposite to Metal, Metal is opposite to 
Wood, Wood is opposite to Earth and Earth is opposite to Water. 
30 The path of routinization is fraught with danger since it by definition results in a formalization of the meanings 
of the original movement, involving institutionalization, and the formation of a new “tradition” resulting in a 
potential for schism and new “charismatic leaders” to emerge. See more in Weber (1947: 358-392).
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of personality, in short, his “charisma”. To keep a movement going after the death of 
the original founder, however, that charisma must be “routinized”, or redirected to the 
continuing leadership and meaning of the organization. As Weber noted, routinized 
charisma is a powerful force that can be used to legitimize not just the activities of 
priests and other professional spiritual communicants, but political institutions and 
elites, ideologies, and economic property relations as well.
Baum (2004: 60) concluded, first, in general, that the intimate and powerful 
connection in ancient China between ritual leadership and the emergence of the 
institution of kingship were strongly bound together. Second, Chinese social and 
political institutions initially came to mirror the proto-rational spiritual logic of archaic 
religious practice and the key structural ingredient in this modeling process provided 
a paradigm for the proto-bureaucratic stratification of Chinese society. Third, through 
a combination of charismatic routinization of power and Confucian cooptation, 
Tian Ming—the “Mandate of Heaven”— became politically moralized and ritually 
formalized, which also was embedded “in the principle of patrilineal kinship and 
ancestral genealogy.”
Further, Baum (2004: 60) emphasized that the impact of ancient religion upon the 
formation and articulation of the dynastic Chinese state has been underestimated, 
because “primordial Chinese religious sentiments and rituals were cloaked in the 
profane garb of the worldly Confucian propriety and piety.” His propositions provide 
us, to a certain degree, valuable interlocking clues of the connection between 
the development of charismatic routinization, ritual secularization and dynastic 
legitimation, pointing to the essence of the evolution of China’s uniquely enduring 
bureaucratic political order.
All political systems need some way of assuring social order, as Erik Ringmar (1980: 1) 
emphasized:
For order to be established a way must be found of dealing with diversity, with 
the coexistence of potentially conflicting ideas, projects and goals. Working 
out such conflicts, power will come to be distributed in a particular fashion. 
The problem of social order will thus presuppose certain ways of setting a 
public agenda, certain ways of determining rules and reaching decisions, and a 
certain distribution of legitimate authority.
Ringmar pointed out that in imperial China people were typically seen as connected 
to each other through long chains of hierarchical relationships stretching from the 
bottom of society to its very top. If everyone only maintained his or her respective parts 
of the great network, which is the society, the country would be at peace. Within this 
framework, the Confucian moralization of power, rooted in the imperatives of propriety 
and filial piety, extended the legitimizing principle of general hierarchy downward 
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from Heaven through the imperial bureaucracy to the individual clan and family. This 
explains how the root of Chinese ritual principles and the social orders are embedded 
in society. 
I would conclude, in Chinese tradition, the ritual principle was used to organize 
the world in a particular manner and to ensure social order is well preserved. 
Ritual principle and social order are two poles of value system in the traditional 
Chinese society. In order to sustain the political superiority of kinship through the 
establishment of the social order, conceptualized spatial structure becomes a powerful 
instrument, and at the same time, the representation of the ritual meaning.
§ 3.2.2 Feudal Control, Economic Organization, and Spatial Paradigms
As part of Zhou Li, the most famous guidebook of the ideal spatial paradigm was well 
illustrated by incorporating one of the oldest manuscripts to survive in China, Kao 
Gong Ji (The Artificer’s Record)31. This remarkable document is a guidance for laying 
out cities, outlining general principles that hold true in large measure for modest 
residential compounds as well as for the sprawling complex of the imperial household 
and governmental center (Figure 3.1). In the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), 
in the reinterpretation of the Zhou Li, the synthesis of the abovementioned ritual 
principles led to the pursuit of urban planning and established an elaborate structural 
and organizational ideal which has been a major influence in the development of all 
subsequent ancient cities in China. The ancient Chinese concept of the city-state is a 
rigid administrative hierarchy modeled into the structure of the city according to the 
specific needs of its rulers.
31 Kao Gong Ji or The Artificer’s Record (simplified Chinese:考工纪; traditional Chinese: 考工紀) is a classic work 
on science and technology in Ancient China, complied during the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.), the 
original author is unknown. In Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), it had been edited as the sixth chapter of Zhou 
Li, due to the original sixth chapter of Zhou Li had been destroyed. 
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Figure 3.1 Diagram of Wang Cheng (Capital City) in Kao Gong Ji  
Source: Kao Gong Ji 
The binding between bureaucratic control and the spatial paradigm is clearly revealed 
in the description of Kao Gong Ji (The Artificer’s Record) 32: 
The ideal capital city is a perfect square, each nine li33 on a side, oriented to 
the cardinal direction, with three gates to a side. The main gate should face 
south, and the principal street runs north south, leads to the governmental 
center. Each of the cardinal axes and directions is associated with one of the 
Five Elements, with attributes and colors associated with each of the cardinal 
directions. East is linked with Spring, Wood, and the color green. South is 
associated with Summer, Fire, and red. West is associated with Autumn, 
Metal (gold), and white. North is connected with Winter, Water and the color 
black. Where the axes of the city intersect in the center, Zhong (center) is the 
location of the ruler’s residence and place of administration, associated with 
a vertical axis mundi, Earth, and the royal color yellow. There, in a room facing 
southward towards a court sat the emperor, likewise facing south, at the center 
of all things.
The palace city is at the center, surrounded by an administrative complex and 
finally the outer city, mirroring the division of the universe into three levels as 
well as symbolizing the moralist division of Chinese society into the emperor, 
32 Translated from the Chinese by C. M. Nelson (1988: 19). 
33 li (Chinese: 里) is a traditional Chinese unit of distance which has varied considerably over time. In general, the li 
was approximately set at 300 “paces” or Bu (Chinese: 步). See Wang Gui Xiang (2007). 
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scholar-administrators, and the commoners. The outer city was divided in four 
quarters along the cardinal axes. Each quarter was subdivided into wards with 
enclosing walls and gates, and each ward was divided into four quarters again. 
There were twelve city gates, representing the twelve months of the year.
Palaces, administrative buildings, temples, ancestral halls, cemeteries, living quarters, 
parks and other functions are assigned specific spaces within the city in accordance 
with their religious and political meaning within the structural cosmology as described 
in the Zhou Li. The correspondence between architectural space, social status, and 
social role is so close that royal and civil titles often reflect the geometry of the city, 
as much as they do the function of the official, e.g. gentleman of the left palace, 
major of the seventh gate, assistant secretariat supervisor of the right, bureau for 
superintending guests of south and north, director of the yellow gates (Nelson 1988).
The other important fact based on Zhou Li, in the Han (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) system of 
urban planning and the special judicial code of ancient China, is the ethical principle 
that commercial and financial operations for private gain were suppressed, because 
they were seen as inherently immoral and were only tolerated to the extent that they 
were considered necessary to the functioning of the state. Thus, although in the 
Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) commercial markets were accepted as necessary 
institutes in the city and the state, they were relegated to the north side of the outer 
city, the least important area in the Taoist interpretation of spatial opposites. Moreover, 
important commercial activities, such as trade and the use of iron and salt, were held 
as government monopolies, with the result that merchants were just tolerated as a 
necessary anomaly in the structure of human society. They were treated as second-
class citizens and their sons were prohibited from achieving an administrative or 
scholarly rank in the civil service (Nelson 1988).
In the Tang dynasty (618–907 A.D.), one of the most flourishing eras in Chinese 
history, due to the strength of incorporating elements from diverse cultures, the capital 
city Chang’an was the biggest cosmopolis in the world and a link between Western 
and Eastern economies and cultures. The whole city covered 84 square kilometers, 
made up of the City of the Emperor, the City of Palaces and the Outer City. The City of 
the Emperor was the administrative center and core of Chang’an City and The City of 
Palaces was an area full of palaces. In the Outer City, there were 108 residential areas, 
made up of 11 streets running north to south, and 14 streets east to west.
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Nevertheless, the market activities were confined within the ward structure and 
situated in specific locations in the west called West City and in the east called East 
City34 and were not allowed to intrude on traditionally sacred and political space and 
were still strictly controlled by the government. The East City and West City were 
situated symmetrically to the southeast and southwest of the City of the Emperor, 
the former of which mainly dealt with the locally produced products; the latter 
was a trading ground for foreign merchants.35 The feudal control over the civilian 
economic activities does not only reflect on cities of small scale, it is found in the 
highly populated cities as well. Even though Chang’an of the Tang Dynasty (618–907 
A.D.) was a society open to the world, with an estimated population upwards of a 
million people, the close regulation of commercial activities can still be seen. Here, 
the main administrative center and the palace were moved to the block backing on the 
north wall. The city structure was more complex both in layout and in scale than the 
diagram of Wangcheng. However, the ideal spatial paradigm still dictated the proper 
numerological formula and buildings with religious functions are correctly placed.
We can conclude, the bureaucratic control and spatial organization can be recognized 
in the application of the hierarchical social diagram, which is strongly related to 
the isomorphic mode of orientation, the geometrical setting and the cosmological 
representation of the paradigm of Taoism and Buddhism as well as the spatial 
representation based on the social order and propriety of manners of Confucianism. 
The ideal Chinese spatial structure is the representation of both the ritual principle 
and the political function in order to ensure the propriety of the social order, instead of 
being the social outcome as the Western defined for the civilian and the people. I argue 
this traditional characteristic regarding the spatial recognition and the establishment 
of the spatial paradigm shall be considered as one of the cultural elements to 
reflect today’s urban development in China. Further spatial principles in detail are 
discussed below.
34 West City (Chinese: 西市) and East City (simplified Chinese: 东市; traditional Chinese: 東市). 
35 See more elaborations about the East City and West City of Chang’an in Heng Chye Kiang (1999: 19-20). 
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§ 3.2.3 Principles for Building the Actual City and Human Settlement 
The city as symbol of “Cosmic Order and Harmony” is the fundamental principle of 
Chinese spatial organization. From time to time, within the ancient philosophical 
development, different principles that are related to the emergent societies have been 
accumulated and integrated in the ancient Chinese roots. Chinese people always were 
proud that their culture enables the creation of an inclusive coherence instead of 
provoking conflict of exclusion36. This inclusion also reflected on how the different ideas 
and principles were extracted and applied in order to contribute to building the actual 
cities and spatial environments. Below, three principles are highlighted and elaborated 
in order to understand the basic roots that have been embedded in the daily life of 
Chinese people: the integration of landscape, the idea of Feng Shui and orientation, 
and the hierarchical and isomorphic spatial mode. They are each explained in the 
following paragraphs.
§ 3.2.3.1 The Integration of Landscape 
One of the most important principles emphasized in the ancient Chinese roots 
concerns environmental integration as one of the most important criteria for building 
a human settlement. Unfortunately, this principle is often forgotten in the fast 
urbanization of today and the neglect of environmental sustainability during the brutal 
transformation of modernization. As mentioned before, Lao Tsu’s idea of Tao: “Man 
follows Di (Earth), Di follows Tian (Heaven, law of Nature), Tian follows Tao (Way), 
Tao follows Nature” is a fundamental concept of how the “Way of Man” should follow 
Nature - the world and all things are seen as a living presence.
“Harmony” and “Balance” form the basic value orientation of Chinese philosophy. 
Harmony refers to the complementation and coordination of various factors. Harmony 
includes dealing with diversities, differences, contradictions and even conflicts. But 
on a certain higher level, the diversities can eventually reach the unity of coordination 
that results in harmony. The emphasis on ecological thinking is also strongly related 
to the idea of natural changes that have their own dynamics. This means, even though 
Man, human society and Nature constitutes in certain ways independent systems, they 
36 Partially discussion has been mentioned in Chapter 3.1.2. 
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also form together a closely connected whole. The attitude to pursue harmony means 
keeping the balance, and the power of balance requires the process of coordination 
between various factors. As aforementioned, the natural changes driven by inner forces 
can be interpreted through the idea of Tao - Yin and Yang (feminine and masculine). 
The process of development of “change” is reflected by the shift of the imbalance 
between Yin and Yang, and the process of development of “change” shall continue until 
a new equilibrium between Yin and Yang is found again.
Yin originally meant, “hidden, secret, dark, mysterious, cold.” It thus could mean the 
shade, moon and north side—the shaded side of the mountain. Yang meant, “clear, 
bright, the sun, heat,” the opposite of Yin. However, Yin and Yang is not opposed 
to each other, because within the system of Yin, Yang is embedded and vice versa. 
According to Chinese philosophy, everything in the world can be identified with either 
Yin or Yang. Such as Earth is the ultimate Yin object; Heaven is the ultimate Yang object.
The implication of the traditional concept of Harmony and Balance, Yin and Yang can be 
recognized in many different aspects.
First, gardens were considered more difficult to design than houses in Chinese 
tradition. The Chinese philosophy of garden design was to imitate the layout of nature. 
In contrast to the order of regularity that was applied to houses, the garden was seen 
as space of Yin, the spiritual place for enlightenment and offering places for social and 
family integration. The house is arranged according to the social order and is thus a 
place that represents social hierarchy. It was seen as a space of Yang. The courtyard 
house structure is based on the concept of bringing harmony, balance and alignment 
between Yin and Yang, as well as integrating man and nature. It illustrated how the 
two basic Chinese “Ways”— Confucianism and Taoism—were integrated coherently in 
space, while Confucianism is identified with the Yang aspect and Taoism with the Yin 
aspect.
The implication of the traditional concept of Harmony and Balance can also be 
recognized in Chinese landscape painting: Shan-Shui-Hua. Shan-Shui-Hua is a 
work of art in Chinese landscape painting including three characters standing for 
respectively mountain, water and painting. Shan-Shui worship also is one of the 
unique spatial concepts in Chinese history, which is rooted in the Chinese idea of 
humbleness. Chinese landscape painting usually includes small human figures that 
blend harmoniously into the vast world around them; man and nature interact and 
complement each other to reach a state of balance and harmony. It combines urban 
construction and the natural environment and is composed of the integration of the 
mountain (Shan) and the water (Shui).
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The concept of Shan-Shui worship can be found almost in all the ancient towns and 
villages. ChiCheng, a well-preserved ancient town, presents the optimal philosophy of 
the Chinese concept of Shan-Shui worship. As it is illustrated in the ancient drawing 
(Figure 3.2), ChiCheng town is surrounded by mountains on three sides, north, 
west and east, facing the Yaojiang River and the Cijiang River on the south side. The 
town’s layout is crisscrossed by a network of canals and ditches. It also reflects the 
feudal patriarchal codes of ethics and aesthetics of traditional Chinese architecture. 
The strategic location combines urban construction and the natural environment, 
composing the integration of the mountain (Shan) and the water (Shui) (Wang Chiu-
yuan 2011).
Figure 3.2 Ancient drawing of ChiCheng Ancient Town and aerial photo around 2008.  
Source: ChiCheng Ancient Town, Ningbo City Development Co. Ltd
.The idea of locating cities by observing the earth and examining the water can be dated 
back to the ancient times. The integration of the mountain (Shan) and the water (Shui) 
can enhance the strategic location of a city, not only for the natural resources for living 
but also for defense.
Chen Yulin (2010) concludes that the characteristic of the “Shan-Shui-City” pattern 
in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei North Region can be summarized as a majestic beauty 
composed of endless mountains, open plans and cities at the convergence of the 
mountains and the water. There are many rivers running through the mountains in 
this region. The city needs, on the one hand, to be close to the water to ease drainage 
and catch the clean water sources for drinking, and on the other hand to avoid locating 
in the direct exit of the mountains due to the sudden changes in typography which 
could cause flooding. The ancient urban planners set the city centrally on an upland 
surrounded by water that avoids flooding and provides enough space for urban 
construction, and also provides farmland for agriculture (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 The Characteristic of the “Shan-Shui-City” pattern in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei North Region.  
Source: Chen Yulin (2010): Figure 8
In ancient times, one of the most important criteria to define the location of human 
settlements was easy access to natural resources. Normally, mountains provide 
a microclimate, and run-of water can provide resources for agriculture and food 
provision. These two very important natural resources are logically chosen as the first 
important criteria to locate both the village of small scale and the bigger scale City of 
the Emperor. The emphasis on the combination of mountain and water also strongly 
shapes the diversity of Chinese culture—including the diversity of living styles, the 
creative norms and languages and meaningful artistic and aesthetic traditions. The 
integration of “landscape-city-architecture” is the core of traditional Chinese city 
design theory and method, which has its roots in the integration of landscape in 
ancient China. Fortunately, the concept of “Shan-Shui-City” has been slowly re-
discovered and advocated by scholars in contemporary urban studies and planning37 
(Figure 3.4)(Wu Liangyong 1996; Fu Shulan 2009; Chen Yulin 2010).
37 The concept of Shan-Shui-City was put forward by Professor Qian Xuesen in his letter to Professor Wu Liangyong 
of Tsinghua University on 31st July, 1990. It is suggested that landscape architects should combine landscape 
architecture into Shan-Shui-City planning by inheriting Chinese classical garden art and forming characteristic 
Shan-Shui-City patterns, which introduce the traditional idea of Shan-Shui in poetry, painting, and gardening 
into urban planning, and to make the city ‘a big garden’. This idea led to an extensive discussion and became 
influential in the field of urban planning in China.
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Figure 3.4 Sketches by Wu Liangyong and the application of Shan-Shui Worship in his design for the Red 
Chamber Museum in Nanjing 
Source: Wu Liangyong (2011: 50). 
Tao Yuanming38 (365–427 A.D.), a Chinese scholar and poet, portrayed an idyllic 
pastoral life in his famous poem “Peach Blossom Shangri-la: Tao Hua Yuan Ji”. In this 
poetic story the picture of the fairy land of Peach Blossom Village was described: 
A fisherman, once while following a stream he forgot how far he had gone. (…) 
The fisherman came into a mountain with a small opening through which it 
suddenly opened up to reveal a broad, flat area with imposing houses, good 
fields, beautiful ponds, mulberry trees, bamboo, and the like. The fisherman 
saw paths extending among the fields in all directions, and could hear the 
sounds of chickens and dogs. Men and women working in the fields all wore 
clothing that looked like that of foreign lands. The elderly and children all 
seemed to be happy and enjoying themselves.39
The story is about a beautiful, idyllic land where people live together happily and 
peacefully in order to avoid the chaos of war. Since then, Tao Hua Yuan, which means 
peach blossom land, has been used to indicate Chinese utopian society where people 
can pursue their dreams, protected from the harsh realities of the outside world. 
38 Tao Yuanming was born during the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420), which was a time of military uncertainty and 
political infighting. This background urges him to drop out of official life, reflecting his back-to-basics lifestyle.
39 Translated from the Chinese by R. Davis and D. Steelman. Available at LittleNex.com.
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We can conclude, in addition to the application of the Yin-Yang system, the 
revitalization of the Shang-Shui-City or the utopian settlement of Tao Hua Yuan show 
that the idea of the integration of landscape has its origin deep in Chinese history. 
There is wisdom in learning from Nature with humble attitude, meaning also learning 
from the thousands of years of trials and errors of our agricultural ancestors. Natural 
disasters, including floods, droughts, earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, as well as 
the experience of field making, irrigation, and food production, taught our ancestors to 
create and maintain such lands as the land of peach blossoms. As Yu Kongjian (2006) 
emphasizes it was the skill and art of survival that rendered our landscape productive, 
safe, beautiful, and meaningful. The ancient Chinese wisdom is still very update 
facing today’s conditions and challenges. In thousands years ago, Chinese civilization 
had already accumulated abundant advanced ideas and principles for the spatial 
development, it is inconceivable why they are barely applied in current modern society.
§ 3.2.3.2 The idea of Feng Shui and Orientation
Following the idea of the integration of landscape the first step is to define the location. 
To choose the location for the City of the Emperor is equally important to choosing the 
location for a vernacular settlement. In the first chapter of Zhou Li (Rites of Zhou), The 
Celestial Ministry with the Prime Minister40, this is emphasized: 
惟王建國， 辯方正位， 體國經野，設官分職，以為民民極。 
The only person that constitutes the empire is the King. He determines the [four] 
regions and fixes the governmental positions; he embodies the cities and measures the 
countryside; he creates the ministries and separates their respective functions; this all 
to make a fixed pole for the people.  
Therewith, he institutes the “Heavenly ministry” and the office of prime minister, he 
charges the prime minister to head his subordinates and to take into his hands the 
administration of the state, to help the king to regulate the fiefdoms and the state 41.
40 The Celestial Ministry with the Prime Minister or Tiangguan Zhouzai (Chinese: 天官冢宰) defines there are 63 
officials for the royal palace and its administration, as well as the core of the central government. 
41 Translated by Ulrich Theobald, according to the translation of Edouard Biot (1951). Available at http://www.
chinaknowledge.de/Literature/Classics/zhouli.html.
i
 120 Between Flexibility and Reliability
“惟王建國， 辯方正位”42, means it is the responsibility of the King to determine the 
four regions and fix the position of the empire. The orientation of the city is the first 
important criterion for building the City of the Emperor. Only when the location and 
orientation of the city are defined properly, the administrative structure and the 
respective functions can be embedded and placed accordingly by the division of the 
hierarchical social order. The purposeful orientation of the urban structure is a very 
important principle for city building. Most buildings are oriented towards a certain 
direction and are located with respect to the supply of water, a river crossing, a strategic 
position, and safeguarding from flooding and other environmental factors, rarely 
just one of these. The deliberate alignment of settlements, individual buildings and 
architectural features, down to the layout of interiors and furnishings, is all-pervasive 
and persist to the present day. Such alignment extends even to the “dwellings” for 
the dead in cemeteries and tombs (Ali and Hill 2005: 27). Alignments at all scales are 
controlled by the principles of Feng Shui; literally “wind and water.”
Feng Shui, also known as Kanyu43, is the art of placing and situating a building so that 
it is in harmony with its surroundings. According to Feng Shui, cultural and social 
issues are influenced by natural, metaphysical and cosmological factors. To practically 
use Feng Shui, one needs to understand the influence of cosmology on the earth, 
have knowledge of how astronomy and astrology influence the placing of buildings, 
understand classic Confucian philosophy, and understand the forces of nature and the 
weather on buildings and their surroundings. It is also essential to have knowledge 
of the magnetic fields in the earth and how they influence man, knowledge on how 
to place buildings in order to tap “Qi” or the energy of the earth, understand the 
geographical land forms like hills, valleys, flat land etc. The Chinese people in their 
daily life have broadly applied the idea of Feng Shui. Often, in the West, it is seen 
as a superstitious belief and a non-scientific idea. However, originally, in order to 
fully understand and apply the knowledge of Feng Shui, one must understand how 
environmental factors influence buildings externally and internally and how to place 
buildings so that the building has a comfortable physical environment. Therefore, the 
idea of Feng Shui in the end shows a large concern for environmental integration and a 
coherent knowledge of psychological and physical factors. Water and Wind are the two 
fundamental forms of life energy as well as the two major elements of environmental 
integration and represent the basic geographic science of Feng Shui.
42 惟王建國， 辯方正位（wei wang jian guo, bian fang zheng wei) means, “the only person that constitutes the 
empire is the King. He determines the four regions and fixes the governmental positions”.
43 Kanyu (simplified Chinese: 堪舆; traditional Chinese: 堪輿). 
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For example, in ancient China, a city was planned in concentric rectangles surrounded 
by walls surrounded by lakes, hills, valleys, gardens, courtyards and parks. The Chinese 
tried to ensure that both the natural and the built environment were planned to 
enhance positive energy. These were then landscaped according to the Taoist ideas 
of Yin and Yang, void and solid, water and hill. Many still-remaining vernacular 
settlements show how the courtyard typology has taken into account their orientation 
toward the south in order to receive optimal sunshine in the daytime as well as to 
ensure the natural ventilation by the wind flow in the courts and inside the house, and 
to reduce the heat in the house in the daytime, to retain the heat for interior use in the 
evening and even more so in the winter.
Besides the practical reasons for applying the idea of Feng Shui and orientation, 
Charles Nelson (1988) elaborated how the application of Feng Shui is coherent with 
the cosmological idea that the supreme God ruled in the center of Heaven, animating 
the universe with Qi-the heavenly breath, and sanctioning the rule of worthy Kings 
with Heaven’s mandate. The center of Heaven was marked by the pole star, so Qi 
was distributed to earth along the polar meridians. Hence, ancient Chinese cities 
were laid out along the polar meridian, with walls and gates spread to face the 
cardinal directions, encompassing the social world of Man even as the bow of Heaven 
encompassed the greater Universe (Nelson 1988).
I would argue, the principles of Feng Shui applied in practice, especially in relation to 
settlements and their structural components, have been described by workers in a 
number of fields: geography, history, anthropology and architecture. Most important 
of its value system is that it is strongly embedded in the daily life and use in Chinese 
civilization. Misunderstanding of Feng Shui has often occurred as a result of the lack 
of scientific accessibility of its abundant body of knowledge. Therefore, the systematic 
studying on ancient Chinese wisdom should be enhanced and open for discussion in 
order to adapt it to the modern society.
§ 3.2.3.3 The Hierarchical and Isomorphic Spatial Mode 
The aforementioned highlights of the interrelation between feudal control, social 
order and spatial organization elaborate, according to Zhou Li and Confucianism, 
the hierarchical and isomorphic spatial mode that are highly charged with social 
meanings and values; it is supposed to instill a sense of the equivalence between the 
physical space and social space. Eric Reinders (1997), in his research on the ritual 
topography elaborated how physical distinction is transformed into spatial distinction. 
He used the analysis of the vertical space in Buddhist Monastic practice to represent 
the hierarchical and isomorphic mode of social behavior and spatial organization. He 
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took the example of “bowing practice” as the ritual placement of bodies serves to both 
represent and embody the hierarchical distinctions between different social statuses, 
which in a sense define the conceptual structure of traditional Chinese society. For 
example, in general, seniority is one determinant of ritual status, which is expressed in 
directly physical terms as “senior”, equals to “higher” and “junior”, equals to “lower”.
The explicit correlation of certain sets of categories (e.g. seniority to heiger, younger to 
lower; male to heigher and female to lower) represents the basic metaphor of vertical 
distinction in physical, spatial and social modes, at the same time it is applied as the 
notion of hierarchical strategy for retaining social order and social control.
For example, the link between the hierarchical physical, spatial and social modes can 
be recognized clearly in the traditional Chinese courtyard house structure. Normally, 
the layout of the courtyard house is defined by the family structure and is thus a 
hierarchical structure. In the layout of a courtyard house, the main building where the 
parents live is normally situated on the north (the optimal orientation of the house 
normally is with its back oriented north and the front south), and the elder son (who 
normally inherits the main family property) lives in the house to the east side, and 
the younger son to the west. Unmarried daughters have no space opening into the 
main courtyard and live in the back courtyard. The servants live in separation from the 
main courtyard and to the south with a gated wall. The description can be found in the 
original text of Kao Gong Ji (The Artificer’s Record) as follows: 
Residences were walled family compounds, ruled by the male master, with 
lesser authority associated with his wife and several consorts. The walled 
house was made up of a series of inward-focused courtyards, and the “good 
wife” was one who never ventured outside the walls. Ideally laid out on north-
south axis, the house had a simple door opening to the street, leading to a 
first inner service court, lined by kitchen and service rooms to the south, with 
children’s and guest rooms east and west. A door in the north wall of this court 
led to a second inner court, lined with children’s suites east and west, but on 
the axis on the north side of this court would be the parents’ suite of rooms, 
often in the very center of which was a large room, the ancestral hall, with an 
altar on its north side for the veneration of ancestors and the gods.
The research of Sheng Qiang (2010), based on the research of Chang Yongho (1997), 
illustrates how the interrelation between social hierarchy and the principles of spatial 
organization are transferred into an isomorphic mode. Chang points out that the seat 
arrangement around a dinner table in Chinese custom follows the same principles of 
the arrangement of buildings in the layout of the courtyard house. The dinner table 
represents symbolically the inner courtyard of the courtyard house and the courtyard-
housing compound represents the Outer City of the underclass in relation to the Inner 
City of the Emperor (Figure 3.5).
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Following the requirements of Feng Shui or Li, seating arrangements around 
the dinner table in a traditional family normally obey the following order: 
parents to the north, the elder son to the east, the youngest son to the west 
and grandchildren to the south, where there was also a gap for servants to 
bring in the dishes. 44 
Figure 3.5 The Isomorphic structure existing at various scales and in different historical periods.  
Source: Sheng Qiang (2010), Figure 4.2.
The dominant idea of Confucianism that emphasized the propriety of manners 
enhanced the hierarchical social status from the ruler class to the underclass on 
the one hand and on the other hand, the idea of Taoism-following the Way of 
Nature enhanced the attitude towards the environment through the promotion of 
natural integration. It proved that within Chinese tradition there was already a very 
comprehensive and systematic discourse transferring the philosophic ideas into the 
practical spatial organization with its accumulated body of knowledge continually, not 
only in social, but also in spatial organization.
44 See Sheng Qiang (2010: 63). In this framework, un-married daughters are not allowed to seat as the brothers 
around the main table. Normally, unmarried daughters and female family members are eating in the kitchen. 
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In general, the mode of orientation, the geometrical setting and the cosmological 
philosophy had their common roots in the thoughts of Taoism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism and many other philosophies. These differed in detail but shared 
cosmological concepts that were translated into principles of city planning that also 
supported the aims and organization of the state. In this cosmology, the capital city 
was the embodiment of the state itself, and the link that unified heaven, man and 
earth, the three intelligible components of the universe. In this sense, Chinese culture 
is a culture of inclusive alignment and coherent accumulation of ideas. This special 
characteristic of Chinese culture can also be recognized in the way Chinese philosophy 
emphasized learning from the natural environment. However, the aforementioned 
ideas and philosophies had in common the lack of criticism of feudalism and rather 
supported it.
We should take into account these special characteristics of Chinese culture when 
we reflect today’s Chinese reformation, particularly debating on how China can step 
toward a civil society, which may not retain the same meaning that has been defined 
according to the Western historical evolution. In next paragraph, I elaborate two types 
of Chinese city, which represets two types of urban culture emerged in ancient China; 
however, they are built under the same system of feudalism. Nevertheless, they provide 
different reference to decode the contemporary transformation based on more Chinese 
cultural-context origin.
§ 3.3 The Emergence of Chinese Cities and Urban Planning 
Following the main argumentation of this research, planning approach has to be 
regarded as the product of a certain society and a specific urban culture that is 
embedded in the demands of the transformation of the society and the sequent 
changes of that urban culture. Like in any other civilization, the emergence of Chinese 
cities is strongly related to the specifically Chinese political and societal modes that 
contribute to the accumulation of the various urban cultures. I illustrate different 
cultural, historical and philosophical elements related to ancient Chinese socio-
political-spatial characteristics. In the following paragraph, the linkage between the 
emergence of Chinese cities and their urban planning approach is shown as it emerged 
through time, based on societal change and the emergence of a new urban culture. 
They are used as reference to reflect on the comparable transitional reformation of 
contemporary China, and how the cultural turn is defined in this research.
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§ 3.3.1 The Emergence of Chinese Cities
In general, there is no coherent definition among scholars regarding the question of 
the emergence of Chinese cities. However, the majority holds that the Chinese city was 
formed as the product of the feudal system, especially to serve the purpose of control of 
society by the ruling class and to make a clear distinction of social classes between the 
Emperor and the various other classes. Within this framework, the first ancient city can 
be dated to the Xia Dynasty (ca. 2070–1600 B.C.), when the first Chinese civilization 
emerged. The Shang Dynasty (ca. 1766–1111 B.C.) is the first documented era of 
ancient China. The highly developed hierarchy consisted of a king, nobles, commoners, 
and slaves. However, not until the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring 
States Period (770–221 B.C.) the formation of cities became formally established.
Indeed, in Chinese history the ancient word “city” is Yi (Figure 3.6), which means 
“urban center” or “capital” during the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1766–1111 B.C.). The Shang 
ideograph for Yi is a man kneeling beneath an enclosure. Charles M. Nelson (1988) 
elaborated that the enclosure represents the wall of the city, the power of the capital 
as the center of the state and the moral authority of the state religion; the kneeling 
man represents the submission of all people to the temporal and spiritual authority 
of the state as personified in the creation of the city. Notice that during this period 
the ideograph for Yi appears to exclude the concept of the city as a commercial center, 
rather it focuses on serving the political, administrative and religious purposes. Nelson 
emphasized that this is evidently deliberate. When China was unified under the Qin 
Dynasty (221–206 B.C.) and the resulting empire elaborated and expanded under 
the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), the hierarchical structure of urban centers, city 
planning, and administrative and transportation networks between population centers 
were carefully developed to extend the principles used to organize the traditional 
capital (Yi) as the administrative hub of the state.
Figure 3.6 Archaic and Modern Forms of Yi, the Ancient Word for City. 
Source: Charles M. Nelson (1988), Figure 1. 
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The first imperial capital that fully integrated and promoted the development of 
commercial activities was Kaifeng (618–906 A.D.), center of the Liang and Northern 
Song dynasties. By 955 A.D., Kaifeng had grown into the largest and most complicated 
urban center in the world, while both public and private commercial enterprises 
were pursued throughout the administrative and outer cities. From the moment 
the commercial cities arose in China, the concept of the city itself changed. Du, the 
modern word for capital, linguistically reflected in the modern ideograph for capital, 
the combination of two symbols: on the left side for “market” and on the right side for 
“walled city” (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7 Du, the modern Word for Capital, in its archaic and modern forms. 
Source: Charles M. Nelson (1988), Figure 4. 
Zhang Quanming (1998) elaborated that three stages of urban development can be 
defined in Chinese urban history, depending on the emergence of different urban 
functions. In general, Chinese ancient urban development had been transformed from 
the primary stage of defense and political function to the separation of political and 
commercial functions, then to the stage of integration of the political and commercial 
elements. The formations of urban political, urban economic, and urban cultural 
should not be seen as fixed and absolute. Rather they show a dynamic evolution and 
simultaneously lead to the emergence of diverse spatial planning approaches, resulting 
in different planning cultures for different periods.
In the late 10th century, during the transitional period from the Tang (618–906 A.D.) 
to the Song Dynasty (960–1125 A.D.), China experienced a shift from a dominant top–
down approach in urban planning to a more flexible system that would give space to 
citizen’s initiatives. Interestingly, this is comparable to what is needed and happening 
now. The transformation from the Tang to the Song Dynasty illustrates how new urban 
planning ideas and concepts are required under the condition of the new society and 
how a time of change introduces a new planning idea and approach that enables to 
reshape the urban form in which a new urban space is able to accommodate a new way 
of living in a new civil society. 
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§ 3.3.2 The Emergence of a new Urban Culture: the City of Aristocrats and the 
City of Bureaucrats
In his book Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats, Heng Chye Kiang (1999) presents 
two cases that are representative for this transition: the city of Chang’an—the ancient 
capital of the Tang Dynasty (618–906 A.D.)—as an example of imperial top down 
planning order (Figure 3.8), and the city of Kaifeng—the capital of the Northern 
Song Dynasty (960–1125 A.D.)—as an example of a city developed in the context of 
free trade (Figure 3.9). The Tang and the Song capitals represent two stages in the 
development of the Chinese medieval city.
Chan’an was a city built from scratch, tailored to the needs of a new dynasty. In 
contrast, Kaifeng grew towards being an important entrepôt and prosperous city. 
The two capital cities, each with its own urban structure and cityscape, reflected the 
respective periods that produced them. Chang’an was the result of a strong aristocratic 
power with a highly hierarchical social structure, while Kaifeng was shaped by a diverse 
and mercantile society and managed by pragmatic professional bureaucrats. This new 
urban paradigm was introduced in the context of a demand for political reform as 
well as important social and economic changes of which the transformation of urban 
institutions and rapid urbanization were integral parts. This transformation took place 
during the collapse of the regulative power over commercial activities within the late 
Tang Dynasty (618–906 A.D.). At this time, a new social order was built. It replaced 
the old ruling aristocracy with a professional bureaucracy that was recruited through 
open civil examinations. This had a significant impact on the official attitude toward 
commercial activities and later was followed, during the Song Dynasty (960–1125 
A.D.), by an increase in agricultural productivity, rapid growth in population, the 
development of an extensive communication network and a more efficient method of 
transporting goods for the rapidly growing urban consumer population.
A new urban paradigm and the concept of an open city were introduced. It included a 
change in the urban form, layout, and skyline as well as in governance. The city became 
less controlled and more open to public involvement. It also changed its scale and 
density. As described by Heng (1999):
The breakdown of the residential wards and their walls and the proliferations 
of multi-functional streets throughout the city were probably the most obvious 
manifestations of the popularization of the city. (…) Not only were the streets 
made available to the urban dwellers at all times of the day and night, business 
were conducted in them round the clock. Spatially, too, the restrictions were 
lifted. (Heng 1999: 156) 
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Physically, the open city was significantly different from its predecessors. 
Driven by increasing congestion and economic considerations, there was a 
tendency, slight thought it might be, to vertical expansion. (…) Rapid urban 
population growth also led to the emergence of suburbs at strategic locations 
around the city. Within the walls the gridiron plan eroded to a subtler network 
filled with T-junctions, cranked intersections, and oblique streets over a 
complex urban fabric. Toward the end of the North Song, a new kind of city was 
born. (Heng 1999: 202) 
Figure 3.8 Plan of Chang’an.   
Source: Heng Chye Kiang (1999), Figure 6.   
Figure 3.9 Schematic Reconstruction of Kaifeng. 
Source: Heng Chye Kiang (1999), Figure 28.
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§ 3.3.3 The Transformation of Planning Approaches between Flexibility and Reliability 
 In Heng’s interpretation, the “Cities of Aristocrats” were based on the manner in 
which the planning system operates. This operation is dominated by strict top–down 
regulation and control, while the “Cities of Bureaucrats” were introduced as adaptive 
apparatuses capable of responding to diverse bottom–up initiatives.
Heng (1999:7) illustrated this in his book in the description of the capital Chan’an: 
The Imperial City was the administrative heart of the empire. Within its large 
walled enclosure were government offices of both civil and military functions, 
headquarters of imperial guards and the residence and offices of the crown 
prince. It was also here that the emperor came to conduct ritual sacrifices at 
the imperial ancestral temple and at the imperial heavenly altar. Basically, the 
separation of official functions and state machinery from the other functions 
of the city was very clearly defined, although a few of the less critical official 
departments were located in the wards close to the major N-S thoroughfare. 
No one without good reasons was allowed into the Imperial City, much less the 
Palace Cities.
The comparative description of the capital Kaifeng (Heng 1999: 89) is: 
The central authorities seem content to be involved only in general zoning, in 
the transportation network, and in the selection of sites for critical government 
functions. Installations that were detrimental to health, such as cemeteries 
and kilns, were relegated to areas distant from the city. (…) The rest of city 
building—residential, commercial activities, and non-hazardous industries, 
and perhaps open space—seems to have been left to the initiative of the 
common people.
The Tang-Song transition period, important in many aspects for Chinese social, 
cultural, and economic history, is equally critical in the history of Chinese cities. 
The transformation from one to the other was long and tortuous. The reasons for 
such a development were equally complex and multifaceted. As Heng (1999: 208) 
emphasized, “Instead the evolution of city forms was affected, as we have seen, not 
only by political events, but also by the wider social, economic, and cultural contexts.” 
When disregarding the causes for change in the social structure, one can conclude that 
in the spatial and structural dimension in which the transition was taking place the city 
was forced to adapt a new urban paradigm—the open city that Heng describes, was the 
result of a transformation in order to dynamically enable spontaneous multifunctional 
street activities. The transition from one to the other was a nonlinear process 
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influenced by many factors. However, even today, within the domain of research of 
urban change and urban transformation, there are urgent demands to explore in depth 
the reasons behind the transformation, how cities were perceived and what they meant 
to their founders, planners and inhabitants based on an extension of Heng’s research.
In other words: more than a thousand years ago, the planning system of the Tang-Song 
transition period already realized an optimal balance between a top down and bottom 
up approach by integrating a reliable long term framework for urban development 
(general zoning, transportation network, locations for public institutions) with a 
flexible (open) system—for initiatives of the common people’ (residential buildings, 
commercial activities, non-hazardous industries and open space). The question is to 
what extent this balance can be retrieved under the conditions of the current urban 
development in China and within a society that is again in transition? 
Before we proceed further, a few points can be underlined for reflection. First, in view 
of the very different evolution of Chinese civilization, the political formation of ancient 
China has never understood socio-political interaction in the way it is constituted 
in Western-democratic societies. In the Western liberal tradition, the basic practice 
of governance derives from an acknowledged separation between state and society, 
while in Chinese tradition these were effectively conterminous under state hegemony. 
Second, based on the evolution of Chinese civilization, the spatial meaning derived 
either from the implicative ritual principle or from the socio-political functional 
integration, spaces (and places) are not regarded in the liberal way they are defined in 
the Western-democratic societies. Third, the case of the Tang-Song transition shows, 
to a certain degree, the phenomenon of a more open society with less political control 
allowing for more spatial initiatives. Yet, inherent is still the overall political order that 
Chinese society reigned by aged-old feudalism. These three notions help to understand 
what happened when this old country was forced to change by external matters, how 
the internal and external conflicts were generated, and to what extend we can learn 
from this condition for assessing the later transformation of the 1980s. In the next 
chapter, first the recent Chinese modernization is reviewed, which provides further 
insights in the transformation of the 1980s from the recent historical perspective.
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4 Modernization and the 
Contextual Background of Urban 
Development in China 
In the previous chapter, Chinese ancient philosophies are elaborated and linked to the 
political-social-spatial context. A general cultural foundation is laid out. To discern 
further, in this chapter, a more recent contextual background helps to dissect and 
understand Chinese modernization and its initial conditions. Within this framework, 
four major socio-political systems and their emerged urban cultures are illustrated 
in order to build up the interrelations between the hybrid layers evolution of Chinese 
modernity and the external impetuous development. 
This chapter argues, first, the reason why China took so long to undertake a real 
process of modernization. Imperialism could be one obvious reason; however, the 
main reason was that the Chinese were suffering from a profound malaise: nihilism 
and self-imposed isolation for centuries. Second, although the sequential Chinese 
modernization resulted in a painful transformation, at the same time an awakening 
society, facing the reality of Chinese backward development emerged accompanied by 
a series of initial movements. Those initial movements play important roles in the early 
stages of modernity in Chinese society, although the initial intentions were given to 
Chinese resulting in colonization.
The evolution of Chinese modernization was rooted in a very different soil from the 
Western context. It is necessary to re-trace the important steps of China through 
the unknown to evolve and pursue modernity in the contemporary era. The issues 
to be broached in this chapter are structured to provide useful historical facts for 
understanding of the evolution of the contemporary development after the 1980s.
§ 4.1 Modernization and the Break of National Identity in Chinese Civilization 
Modernization proceeded with a special mode in the Chinese context. It has not been 
appreciated by Chinese civilization as in Western countries. The modern history of 
China began with the Opium War (1840–1842), yet China did not undergo its real 
process of modernization until the reformation began in the late 1970s. Before then, 
in general, in the early stage of modern history, both the negation of Chinese tradition 
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and the Westernization of Chinese culture went through three steps, namely, the 
Westernization Movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Reform 
Movement of 1898, and the May 4th Culture Movement of 1919. All three movements 
began with initiatives to attempt to overcome serious national crisis, such as increasing 
financial deficits, corruption and incompetence of officialdom, decline in armaments, 
and the resulting serious gap between the poor and the rich, and the annexation of its 
territory by foreign powers. The failure of the modernization movements in the earlier 
stages destroyed not parts of the Chinese territory, but above all the great confidence 
of this old civilization: its identity. On the other hand, underneath the national crises, a 
new enlightened consciousness was rising gradually.
§ 4.1.1 The Evolution of Modernization Movements 
The concept of “modernization” has various meanings across different processes of 
evolution. Modernization as originating from the root of Western societal evolution 
emphasizes the significance of economic development and takes modernization 
as industrialization with a high level of science and technology. In addition, 
modernization attached more importance to changes in socio-political systems and 
their reforms. This evolution was occurring in a natural way under the condition of the 
Western tradition, in which it had slowly become comprehensible as part of the growth 
of democratic consciousness.
This democratic consciousness included not only the advanced material development 
of science and technology but also the moral and axiological principles and the full 
range of spiritual and cultural elements. By nature, modernization is the result of 
human civilization, the progress of which lies in the transformation of humankind 
from a slash-burn culture to the utilization of modern science and technology. It 
indicates the rapid progress in the ability to control nature and improve man’s material 
and spiritual conditions, which is a concept of evolution resulting from a harmonic 
relationship between human activities and nature as an external force. Modernization, 
as a product of human progress, should include thoughts and ideas and should be 
an unceasing evolution. This condition of evolution was not incorporated in Chinese 
civilization. As an agricultural country with a less developed economy, the original 
revolutionary elements of modernization—e.g., science-technology, democracy, 
and industrial revolution—cannot be created homogenously but must be imported 
heterogeneously in Chinese history (Mo Weimin 1992).
Looking back at Chinese history, efforts at modernization have travelled a very long and 
tortuous road. In ancient times, especially in the Song dynasty (960–1270 A.D.), China 
has an outstanding history of leading the world in science and technology, typified 
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by the “four inventions”: printing, gunpowder, paper-making, and the compass. 
However, at the end of the 18th century, the ruling class of the last feudal dynasty of 
Qing (1644–1911 A.D.) closed the country to international exchange, being blindly 
and arrogantly opposed to everything foreign due to its parochialism. It discriminated 
against any who held different views. Yet it tried to retain its superior position through 
absolutism and obscurantism—to remain the monarchy power of the government 
as well as to withhold knowledge from the public. As a result, a large number of its 
working class lived in an abyss of misery. It gave opportunities to Western powers for 
annexation. A massive import of foreign opium at great cost not only poisoned many 
people but also further aggravated the Qing dynasty’s financial difficulties.
Before the Opium War, for centuries a prominent feature of Chinese civilization was 
isolation from the outside world. Because of such isolation, feudal China had been 
left far behind. The Chinese believed their civilization to be superior to all others. They 
referred to their country as the Middle Kingdom because they thought of themselves 
as living in the center of the world. In the West, modernization began with the period 
of bourgeois revolution, which sought to provide a certain condition of human life that 
could transcend that of medieval society and strengthen a nation’s ability to exist. 
Yet the problem of modernization in the Asian world was the crisis of the existence of 
nations. Hence, the goal of modernization was to free the Eastern nations from the 
predicament of conflict with the West (Wang Xinsheng and Wang Ping 1992).
The first modernization movement took place in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. After the first Opium War (1840-1842), many Chinese intellectuals 
recognized that Western civilization had an advantage over Chinese civilization through 
their possession of powerful armaments and advanced technologies. Intellectuals 
such as Lin Zexu (1785-1850) and Wei Yuan (1794-1856) advocated learning from 
advanced foreign technology to resist or even control the West. After the second 
Opium War (1856-1860), Feng Guifen (1809-1874) realized not only that Chinese 
technology was inferior to the West’s, but more importantly, that China could not 
even compare to the West in the following ways: the employment of human resources 
and territory, the close relationship between the ruler and the people, and the 
correspondence between idea and reality.
However, Feng Guifen advocated that Chinese modernization should retain Chinese 
feudal ranking as a matter of substance, with Western methods and powers playing a 
subsidiary or functional role. At this stage, even though the clearest response among 
Chinese intellectuals was insistence upon studying the Western capitalist world, 
the ruling class of the Qing dynasty still denied that Western civilization was more 
advanced than the isolated Middle Kingdom and refused to accept Western democracy 
and civilization. This idea was supported by bureaucrats such as Zeng Guofan (1811-
1872), Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), and Zhang Zhidong 
(1837-1909). The ruling class of the Qing dynasty obstinately clung to the creed of 
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“Tian (Heaven) does not change, nor does Tao (Way)” to preserve the feudal rule of the 
Qing government. This was the first stage of China’s modernization, insisting that the 
Chinese factors remain fundamental, while Western factors play a subsidiary role (Mo 
Weimin 1992).
Within the framework of the first stage of modernization in the later nineteenth 
century, albeit with many negative effects under the imperialism invasion and by 
the pedantocracy45 of the feudal government, the first stage of industrialization was 
triggered and slowly awakened the hibernated Chinese society. The Self-Strengthening 
Movement46 (1861-1895 A.D.) created a period of institutional reforms and was 
initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and 
concessions to foreign powers. During the Self-Strengthening Movement, the focus 
was on enhancing military strength and modernizing the military organization, 
mobilizing the merchant capital under government protection and to establishing 
profit-oriented basic industries in support of the production for the national defense. 
Guandu shangban47 was promoted. The most well-known, government-supervised 
merchant firms were the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (1872), the 
Kaiping Coal Mines (1877), the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill (1878), the Imperial 
Telegraph Administration (1881), the Moho Gold Mines (1887), the Hanyang 
Ironworks (1890), the Daye Iron Mines (1890), the Pingxiang Coal Mines (1890), and 
the Imperial Bank of China (1896)48.
Although the founders of government-supervised merchant industries hoped to 
ward off foreign domination of China’s basic industries and to realize profits through 
reliance on domestic rather than foreign capital, the industries developed problems 
that undermined these goals. Their profit-oriented operations under grants of 
government protection discouraged the establishment of competing private firms. 
Private shareholders generally invested their profits in land or in traditional economic 
enterprises, thereby eschewing reinvestment and updating obsolete equipment. 
45 Fu ru zheng zhi (Chinese: 腐儒政治) means government by pedents. 
46  Self-Strengthening Movement or Ziqiang yundong (simplified Chinese: 自强运动; traditional Chinese: 自強運動). 
Also called Westernization Movement (simplified Chinese: 洋务运动; traditional Chinese: 洋務運動).
47 Guandu shangban (simplified Chinese: 官督商办; traditional Chinese: 官督商辦) means, “government-supervised, 
merchant operated enterprises” or “officially supervised merchant undertakings”.
48 China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC) was the most important enterprise of Guandu 
shangban, founded as a competitor to western shipping in China and became the hub of a great number of 
enterprises in mining, manufacturing and communications,all enjoying the protection of the principal official Li 
Hongzhang, who became the most ardent proponent of the Self-Strengthening Movement. 
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Official managers tolerated bureaucratic abuses such as nepotism and corruption; they 
hired foreign personnel to staff key positions and accepted foreign loans, resulting in 
foreign dependence and possible foreign control (Zhang 1992; Bai Shouyi 2002; Wang 
Haoyu 2003).
The failure of the government-supervised merchant industries to strengthen China’s 
economy led Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) to establish Guanshang heban49, but the 
bureaucratic control and low rate of reinvestment that undermined the government-
supervised merchant-operated firms and the joint government merchant firms by 
1900 led to the initiation of privately financed and managed (shangban) business firms 
in a further manifestation of economic nationalism (Chan 1977; Bai Shouyi 2002 and 
Ji Zhaojin 2003).
On the surface, the Qing seemed to have begun its modernization. On the contrary, 
the early reformists neither established any systematic theories nor brought about 
any political movement, showing that the Chinese national bourgeoisie was still very 
weak. One of the main reasons is that these government officials were not proponents 
of launching an industrial revolution or a modern economy in China; on the contrary, 
they wanted to restore the traditional economy and were not planning on enhancing 
the strength and wealth of the country at the cost of its traditional institutions (Wright 
1957). Therefore, when Qing dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
1895; the loss of this war was considered to be the first failure of the modernization 
movement. Nevertheless, the fact that the grand Middle Kingdom was defeated had 
awakened more Chinese, and they began to realize that Western civilization included 
not only material civilization, but also political and economic systems.
As a result, the second modernization movement was initiated by such intellectuals as 
Kang Youwei (1858-1927), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Yan Fu (1854-1921), and Tan 
Sitong (1865-1898) and was called the Reform Movement of 189850. They represented 
the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords and sharply 
criticized the weakness and failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement. Kang Youwei 
as the protagonist of the reformists urged the Qing government to avert national 
crisis by replacing feudal autocracy with constitutional monarchy. He also encouraged 
49 Guanshang heban (simplified Chinese: 官商合办; traditional Chinese: 官商合辦) means, “official-merchant 
managed enterprises” or “joint government-merchant”, as a result of cooperation between government and 
enterprises. Zhang Zhidong insisted on a method of relatively conservative reform, summarized in his phrase, 
“Chinese learning for fundamental principles and Western learning for practical application.”
50 Reform Movement or Weixin yundong (simplified Chinese: 维新运动; traditional Chinese: 維新運動). 
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civilians to establish modern industries, develop national capitalism, abrogate the 
civil service examination system that was regarded as a symbol of backwardness and 
corruption51, and encourages the study of Western bourgeoisie culture (Elman 2000). 
Both the diehard clique in the court headed by Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1835-1908) 
and the Westernization group resolutely upheld the feudal order in opposition to 
any other political reform. Kang Youwei’s petitions were intercepted by the national 
conservatism and failed to reach the emperor. Even though Kang Youwei’s advocacy 
lacked effective political power, his activities had a great impact on the society at large; 
his petitions appeared in printed pamphlets and were widely read by the public.
In August 1895, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao published in Beijing the World Bulletin 
(Zhongwaijiwen)52, a paper published every other day reporting on court affairs and 
calling for reform. They also formed the Society for the Study of National Strengthening 
(Qiangxuehui)53 that gave regular lectures and published and distributed books 
and periodicals recommending Western learning, including European bourgeoisie 
democratic culture, ideology, science, and technology—all new to China. In this way, 
they molded public opinion and accumulated strength for reform. From 1896 to 1898, 
more than 300 study societies, modern schools, and newspapers mushroomed in big 
cities. Even though the Reform Movement only lasted for 103 days, different from 
modernization in the later nineteenth century, the tide of reform was surging forward 
irreversibly after the this (Bai Shouyi 2002).
The bourgeois reformists were progressive in the given historic conditions of their time. 
Unfortunately, they believed that reform from the top down through the authority 
of a feudal emperor would make China a strong capitalist country. Yan Fu (1854-
1921 A.D.), a scholar who promoted the idea of Darwin’s natural selection in the late 
nineteenth century and criticized feudal monarchy on the basis of Western concepts 
of popular rights, pointed out that according to the principle of the social division of 
labor, the king should be elected by the entire populace. Tan Sitong (1865-1898 A.D.) 
51 Civil service examination system or Keju (simplified Chinese: 科举; traditional Chinese:科舉), a method of 
recruiting civil officials based on merit rather than family or political connections, played an especially central 
role in Chinese social and intellectual life which was established in 605 A.D. during the Sui Dynasty. This system 
was used only on a small scale during the Tang Dynasty and has been expanded under the Song Dynasty. Passing 
the rigorous exams, which were based on classical literature and philosophy, conferred a highly sought-after 
status, and a rich literati culture in imperial China ensued. In the late Qing period in particular, corruption was 
widespread and examiners could be bribed which undermined public morale. 
52 Zhongwaijiwen (simplified Chinese: 中外纪闻; traditional Chinese: 中外紀聞).
53 Qiangxuehui (simplified Chinese: 强学会; traditional Chinese: 強學會).
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called for breaking off of the feudal constraints. Nonetheless, neither Yan Fu nor Tan 
Sitong called for the abrogation of monarchism, still believing in the establishment 
of a constitutional monarchy. Moreover, they were under the illusion that if China 
would only learn from the West, the imperialist powers would give up their aggressive 
schemes. All this determined their inevitable defeat.
After signing the unequal International Protocol in 1901, people in every part of 
the country staged an unremitting resistance. The movement to restore rights and 
oppose imperialist control of railways and mines developed gradually after 1903. This 
movement was different from the beginning of the bourgeois reformists; it was not 
only initiated by the national bourgeoisie but was also supported by workers, peasants, 
students, and other urban residents. The records show that in 1909, there were more 
than 130 outbreaks of popular resistance in different regions, and the figures rose to 
over 290 in 1910 (Bai Shouyi 2002).
At that moment, the reform movement was at the point of breaking through, and 
in a strict sense the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal Chinese bourgeois democratic 
revolution was initiated by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). After the first Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1895) broke out, Sun Yat-sen came to the conclusion that under 
Qing rule it would be impossible to make the country rich and powerful. The only 
way for national salvation was to take the path of revolution and overthrow Qing 
feudal rule. A bourgeois republican regime came into being in 1912 after the 
Wuchang Uprising. The Provisional Government, headed by Sun Yat-sen, was 
founded at Nanjing. Unfortunately, owing to the weakness and compromise of the 
bourgeois revolutionaries, it was actually a coalition government of revolutionaries, 
constitutionalists, and former officials. Although the revolutionaries predominated 
in the government, the constitutionalists and former officials headed the ministries 
of internal affairs, industry and communications; the Provisional Government in fact 
could not exercise central government authority over them, so China was still a semi-
colonial, semi-feudal society.
However, the victory after the Wuchang Uprising aroused a high tide of revolutionary 
enthusiasm throughout the entire country. By early November of 1912, thirteen 
provinces had declared independence from the Qing court, and the disintegration of 
Qing rule was underway.
On May 4th, 1919, an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal demonstration was held by 
students in Beijing, which grew into a large-scale and nation-wide movement of 
students and workers. The May 4th Movement took place as a result of deepening 
contradictions between the Chinese people on the one hand and imperialism and 
feudal warlords on the other. The triple yoke of imperialist, feudal, and capitalist 
exploitation and oppression of the Chinese proletariat became heavier. Beside 
i
 138 Between Flexibility and Reliability
the patriotic movement of students, the working class held political strikes as an 
independent force instead of following the bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes.
In general, the May 4th Movement gave the Chinese people a new awakening which 
was at once a patriotic political movement as well as a new cultural movement. The 
new Chinese intellectuals, armed with rudimentary ideas of communism after the 
October Revolution in Russia, played a leading role in the movement. This led to a rising 
wave of resistance and paved the way for the spread of Marxism-Leninism in China.
§ 4.1.2 The Confusion of National Identity
In the past two centuries, the evolution of modernization in China was triggered 
mainly by the changes in the political and economic interests. The self-confidence as 
a cultivated civilization in the world had diminished due to the backward development 
and the confusion of national identity. The confusion of the break of identity occurred 
in many different aspects. Historical development indicated how the lack of self-
identity had undermined Chinese traditional values and the norms of the culture that 
had permanently generated confusion and conflict54.
In the old cultural mode, the highest political goal was to deal with the confrontation 
between unity and diversity, which had always been related to the shift between 
different political favorites of the ruling class through time. In Chinese tradition, even 
in political terms, the ruling class searched for unity as opposed to variety to ensure its 
superior position. Yet in philosophical terms, in the Pre-Qin period of the Spring and 
Autumn and Warring States Periods, the idea of “Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a 
hundred schools of thought contend” gave birth to the coexistence of varieties in which 
the fundamental philosophical root of Chinese tradition was founded. At that time, 
there was no dominant political power. The exploration and debate between different 
advocacies for a better social order and political essence were very dynamic. I would 
argue, despite any short-term breaks resulting from changes from one political favorite 
to another, undeniably this original inclusive mode is deeply embedded in the value 
system of Chinese civilization.
54 See also the background of the Chinese philosophical roots in Chapter 3. 
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Yet, inevitably the political dominance at the same time did have a very strong 
influence on the devaluation of variety. For example, in the Han dynasty, Confucianism 
became the overpowering monopoly. The Han Emperor Liou Che (156-187 B.C.) 
advanced the slogan “to dismiss a hundred schools from office, to have a monopoly of 
Confucianism”55 and regarded unity as the highest goal to suit the needs of the feudal 
system and to pursue the totalitarianism of the ruling superior. Obviously, for the 
purpose of the ruling power, the emphasis on totalitarianism was always applied by the 
ruling class to secure its political position. This can also explain why political revolution 
has been triggered much later in Chinese civilization in comparison to Western 
societies, because the emphasis on totalitarianism was strongly embedded in the 
foundation of the feudal system, in which the Chinese political mode had devaluated 
the development of individuality.
Within this framework, the second reflection is that in ancient society a person was 
regarded only as a son or brother, not as an independent personality—the country is a 
great family and the family is a small country. If the individual in a clan is of no account, 
then a clan also does not count in relation to the country. This was also supported 
by Confucian filial piety and fraternal duty. The confrontation between the mode of 
totalitarianism and individualism became one of the most dynamic oppositions by 
which the civilian’s identity against the feudal control was shaped and defined. This 
confrontation often is the essential core of debate between the different philosophical 
advocacies that can be revealed vividly by reviewing the historical development of 
Chinese philosophies56.
In general, under the dominance of the feudal political influence, the control over 
individuality is immense. Yet initiatives of individuality always emerged within the 
Chinese civilization. In the reality, the mode and the value of the collective behavior of 
the society are shaped by the collective behavior of the individuality consistently. The 
cultural values of the Chinese civilization could be undermined, but had never been 
halted by the once-emerged interest of political autocracy, and under the dominance 
of totalitarianism. That is to say, individuality and totality are not two extremes of an 
abstract antagonism. There is no real unity without a rich variety.
55 Ba chu ba ijia, Du zun ru shu (simplified Chinese: 罢黜百家，独尊儒术； traditional Chinese: 罷黜百家， 獨尊儒術).
56 See also the background of the Chinese philosophical roots in Chapter 3.2.1.
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The second confusion occurred from the conflict between the value of political 
embodiment and the civilian economic initiatives. Traditionally, political embodiment 
was highly valued by the elite while commercial variety was undermined57. This 
devalued position of commercial variety initiated by civilians also defined the 
hierarchies in social status. For example, under the emperor there were four 
categories of social status of civilians, defined by their occupations. In descending 
order they were Shi, Nong, Gong, and Shang58. Shi refers to gentry, scholars, elites, 
or low-level aristocrats. Nong refers to peasant farmers; Gong refers to artisans and 
craftsman. Shang, as the lowest status of the four hierarchical social distinctions refers 
to merchants and traders. This system postulated that commercial and financial 
operation for private gain is immoral. Under the feudal system, the scholars in their 
attitudes towards commerce and business almost universally denounced in their 
writings the merchant class as greedy and lacking in moral character. This fundamental 
devaluation of commercial initiatives by civilians strongly influenced social status 
in Chinese society and even influences it in the present. Within this framework, 
the direct link between the cultural traits of the enterprise and the political need to 
control enterprise is inevitable. Enterprise activities must be supported by the political 
concepts and institutions that can guarantee putting the individual constructive 
abilities into operation. Traditionally, promotion of private initiative of enterprise was 
heavily controlled by the ruling class.
It also explains why the early modernization movements had failed to overthrow the 
feudal system, because political embodiment was valued far higher than any other 
activities by the elites. And they supported the ruling class as long as they believed 
that the power of the emperor was inherently given by the mandate of Heaven. The 
confusion between political embodiment and commercial initiative also influenced 
urban development, guiding purpose and function. Cities that serve a political purpose 
and have a political function are different from those built for civilians. Especially, 
in comparison with Western urban development, the root of Chinese philosophy 
emphasizes the political urban mode—in its relation to the feudal system—and almost 
becomes an inviolable command.
The third conflict stems from the confusion between the ethical and the legal spirit. 
Chapter 4, reviewing the Chinese philosophical roots, provided us with the general idea 
that Chinese philosophy emphasized ethical value. The primitive ethical spirit based 
upon blood relationship was adapted in traditional Chinese society. While the legal 
57 See also the background of the Chinese philosophical roots in Chapter 3.2.2.
58 Shi, Nong, Gong, and Shang (simplified Chinese: 士农工商；traditional Chinese: 士農工商).
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spirit is a characteristic of modern civil society, the ethical spirit promotes the mode 
of social hierarchy and undermines individuality. It also creates unequal social status 
while the legal spirit promotes independent equity of persons. This ethical spirit also 
undermined the development of modern civil society in Chinese history. The legal spirit 
based on independent persons and political equality forms the basis of the new society 
and the new culture. Within the Chinese context, the formation of the independent 
individuality and the democratization of society that emphasizes totality and legal 
spirit shall be synchronous in the process of the modernization.
The fourth conflict is the result of the confusion generated by the misunderstanding 
of science-technology and the lack of scientific spirit. Traditional Chinese culture 
centered on politics and ethics. Even though historically there were many inventions 
in Chinese civilization, unfortunately, most of them were used in superstitious ways 
rather than for the development of a truly scientific spirit. The lack of scientific spirit 
in combination with the emphasis on the ethical spirit devaluated the development 
of science and technology. For example, traditional Chinese medicine was rooted in 
ancient knowledge; however, it was often applied by non-scientific approaches and 
Feng Shui was often used as a superstitious belief and non-scientific idea.
On the other hand, despite the prosperous history of Chinese inventions, the main 
problem of Chinese modernization was avoiding scientific spirit by only emphasizing 
the matter of scientific-technological results. For example, in the framework of 
modernization, the lack of scientific spirit in the ruling class was one of the main 
reasons why the reform movement failed (Yu Wujing 1992). Furthermore, the Chinese 
efforts at modernization, indulging in the material aspect while neglecting the scientific 
spirit, made no real progress. The confusion is due to the lack of understanding of the 
difference between material science-technology and the scientific spirit or mindset for 
guidance. Mo Weimin (1992) emphasizes the importance of the thoughts and ideas 
and that the scientific spirit should be applied to management and administration as 
well. On the other hand, the essential characteristic of the Western factory or enterprise 
is not the equipment employed but the combination of the labor and the power 
resources. All these factors have to be embedded into the enhancement of the scientific 
spirit. The gap between the promotion of science-technological solutions and the 
development of a scientific spirit created confusion within the Chinese tradition only 
later to be overcome by modernization.
The above-elaborated reflections show confusions for the Chinese identity during 
the past two centuries and continually influenced the Chinese cultural mode till the 
present. The evolution of modernization became an inevitable process of reshaping 
the superannuated Chinese society—an unpleasant experience. On the other hand, 
the confusion also provided new opportunities to create a new fusion between 
modernization and tradition.
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For such a century-old civilization, the evolution of Chinese modernization definitely 
has to be embedded in its own tradition. Hence, tradition should cope with the 
evolution of modernization as well as meeting the needs of human existence at a 
high level. The impetus of the confusion between modernization and tradition is the 
inevitable process to overcome the break of the national identity. Furthermore, in the 
physical form, it greatly impacted Chinese urban development.
§ 4.1.3 The Fusion of Urban Development 
Urban development reflects the evolutionary history of society. In human history, 
most of the features identifying a city in the standard references have been extracted 
from the European and, for the modern period, North American evidence. Traditional 
Chinese cities and most of their modern counterparts, as Rudolf G. Wagner (2010: 
452) pointed out, “fit only awkwardly into this pattern.” The reason is obvious, as urban 
development is embedded in the specific history of any urban society within its unique 
geo-political and socio-political conditions. Urban development in Western tradition 
was based on the Greek and Italian city-states, with their citizens endowed with special 
rights, privileges, and duties under a body of laws valid only for that specific city. The 
idea of “the city air makes you free”59 defines a civilian society that gives citizens a 
superior position over peasants and villagers.
The evolution of a society and its urban characteristics can be relatively identified in 
Western urban history: Venice was the major center for commerce and trade during 
the fourteenth century; the histories of London and Paris began with the Industrial 
Revolution’s creation of a network of railways that brought an unprecedented flow of 
migrants to these capitals in the nineteenth century. New York City is considered by 
most historians to have been a far-reaching and visionary urban plan in the nineteenth 
century in the application of a regular grid of streets and property lines without 
regard to the topography of the island itself. In the last two centuries, most of the 
urban revolutions in Western history began with the adoption of political and societal 
transformations internally, while Chinese civilization was imprisoned between the 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial reluctances. The Chinese experience of modernization 
had to result in the sacrifice of backwardness and stagnation of urban development.
59 “Stadtluft macht Frei”: the city air makes you free is a famous German quotation from the Middle Ages. It refers 
the city is the place where the great advances occur – artistic, intellectual, technological and also organizational.
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In general, three categories of urban formations emerged in this period directly by 
Western influence: colonial, industrial and transportation cities.
The first category is the emergence of “semi-feudal and semi-colonial cities.” Within 
this framework, there are three types within this category.
The first type is controlled directly by imperialist power. It includes cities ceded, 
leased, and occupied by foreign powers. Normally, these cities are situated at strategic 
locations, historically developed with important political functions in the feudal 
system. They were built under colonial initiative and designed directly by importing the 
spatial mode from the imperial countries. The ceded cities included Hong Kong (1842 
by England), Macau (1887 by Portugal), Kowloon (1860 by England), and Taiwan 
(1895 by Japan); also included are leased cities such as Qingdao (1898) and Dalian 
(1898 by Russia and 1905 by Japan).
The second type is that of the “Concessions in China”. Concessions in China were 
parts or extensions of cities governed and occupied by foreign powers. In these 
concessions, the citizens of each foreign power were given the right to freely settle, 
trade, convert, and travel. They developed their own cultures distinct from the rest 
of China because each administration would try to make its concessions look “like 
home”. Churches, public houses, and various other western commercial institutions 
sprung up in the concessions (Table 4.1).
Overview of Concessions in China 
Colonist City Period City Period 
England Shanghai 1845-1863 Zhenjiang 1861-1927
Tianjin 1860-1945 Guangzhou 1861-1945
Hankou 1861-1927 Xiamen 1878-1930
Jiujiang 1861-1927
France Shanghai 1849-1945 Guangzhou 1861-1945
Tianjin 1860-1945 Hankou 1896-1945
Japan Hangzhou 1896-1945 Tianjin 1898-1945
Xuzhou 1897-1945 Fuzhou 1899-
Hankou 1898-1945 Xiamen 1899-
Shashi 1898-1945 Chongqing 1901-1937
America Shanghai 1848-1863 Tianjin 1860-1902
Germany Tianjin 1895-1917 Hankou 1895-1917
Russia Hankou 1896-1925 Tianjin 1900-1924
Italy Tianjin 1902-1945
Table 4.1.Semi-feudal and Semi-colonial Cities 
Source: Chinese Literature and History Press 1992. Constructed by author.
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Overview of Concessions in China 
Austria Tianjin 1903-1917
Belgium Tianjin 1902-1931
International  Settlement Shanghai 1863-1945
Table 4.1.Semi-feudal and Semi-colonial Cities 
Source: Chinese Literature and History Press 1992. Constructed by author.
The third type is the treaty port, which was open to foreign trade through unequal 
treaties60. Jia Ruixue (2011) illustrated in his research the growth of the treaty port 
system, which historians usually categorize in four waves according to the timing 
of opening: wave one is from 1842; wave two is from 1858 to 1864; wave three is 
from the 1870s to the 1880s and wave four is from the 1890s to 1910 (Figure 3.1). 
Even though opening the market to foreign trade enhanced the connection of the 
Chinese economy to the outside world, the main purpose of treaty port cities was to 
serve foreign imperial countries in exploiting Chinese raw materials. In the first wave 
of 1842, this type of city was concentrated in the coastal areas. Later this has been 
extended to the areas of the river basins, which had good connections through the 
rivers to the inland. Urban development here focused mainly on building facilities such 
as factories, harbors, warehouses, stations, and piers (Twitchett et al. 1978; Jia Ruixue 
2011; So, et al. 2011). .
60 The treaty of Nanjing in 1842 established the concept of treaty port. The treaty named five-cities: Guangzhou, 
Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai.
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Figure 4.1 Growth and locations of Treaty Ports System. 
Source: Jia Ruixue (2010): Figure 1. 
The second category is the emergence of industrial cities, including mining cities. 
These were built under the force of the modernization movement. The promotion 
of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895) was a period of institutional 
reform initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and 
concessions to foreign powers61. Within this framework, both the textile industries and 
mining industries were promoted to support military modernization.
61 See Chapter 4.1.1.
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Characteristic of these cities was typically that they established a hybrid of 
entrepreneurial practices of capitalism and government supervised semi-feudalism. 
In general, the emergence of the industrial cities was concentrated in the south, such 
as Wuxi and Nantong in the Yangtze River Delta; in the north, such as Tianjin and 
Qingdao; and in the northeast, such as Dalian and Shenyang. The typical condition of 
the inner city area of this type was contradictory. Even though they developed during 
modernization, they still preserved the urban layout of the feudal structure and lacked 
public facilities and green structures. 
The third category is the emergence of cities with a strategic location for the 
development of transport. The new railways and highways had changed profoundly the 
layout of the urban geography. Because the connections of the railway and highway 
network were expanded, cities such as Zhengzhou, Xuzhou, Shijiazhuang, Shenyang, 
Harbin, and Bengbu acquired a position of centrality. On the other hand, due to the lack 
of colonial functions, for cities previously known for their water networks, their strategic 
positions had been decreased and indirectly this resulted in the decline of their political 
importance (such as Yangzhou and Huaiyang). At the same time, the expansion of the 
railway and highway systems had also changed the layout of urban features in the inner 
city areas of existing large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing.
In the past, Chinese cities had a clear division of function. However, under the colonial 
influences, the characteristics of urban functions had been diversified from the division 
of the political and the commercial center into the multiple urban developments with 
mixed functions. This emergence of diversification and spread of urban functions also 
changed the entire urban geopolitical map. For example, firstly, the imbalance between 
the coastal cities and the inland cities was increasing, such as the concentration of 
different conurbations in the northeast where many cities had been ceded, leased, 
or occupied as well as in the coastal areas and areas alongside the rivers. The second 
phenomenon was the emergence of new urban features. Many modern public facilities 
that were built in cities, such as new commercial and business districts that had 
been developed outside the old city’s central area, had replaced the function of the 
old political center. Banks, shopping malls, and markets introduced the new spatial 
function of trade of foreign imperial products. However, behind the prosperous façade, 
those new urban facilities represented a complex capitalist mechanism that did not 
enhance the urban development of Chinese modernization; instead, it increased 
class discrimination and social conflict. The third phenomenon is the collage of urban 
heterogeneity. The urban collage of feudal structure interwoven with the import of 
foreign colonial urban styles resulted in the typical colonial characteristic of urban 
fusion. The fourth phenomenon is based on the reorganization of the administrative 
structures. New laws and a special administrative hierarchy were installed, and within 
this framework, the management of the city and the rural areas became independent 
from each other.
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Regarding urban development, it is also important to review during this period, 
what kind of urban planning methods had been applied? In general, there was a 
rigid breakdown of the application of the ancient urban planning theory during 
colonialism. The ancient urban planning had not been further developed and applied to 
modernization because it was regarded outdated and its development had stagnated. 
From the late nineteenth century, urban development of Chinese cities relied upon 
ideas from the West. They were either designed to follow Western concepts completely 
or built based on Chinese self-explored initiatives imitating Western types and forms. 
Under colonial dominance, most cities applied Western ideas.
The urban planning of these cities originated from foreign imperial powers applying 
two approaches. One approach was to apply a planning concept only in a confined area. 
This approach was typically applied to the areas of Concession in China. As a result, in 
most cases, those confined areas became isolated islands within the city. Short-term 
colonial interests disconnected planning implementations from the rest of the urban 
areas. This created a fragmented urban layout (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Street plan of the English, French and American Settlements in Shanghai. 
Source: Fu Si Niam Museum (http://ms1.fhsh.tp.edu.tw/~linghsun/class.htm).
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The second approach was applied to the cities that had been ceded, leased, and 
occupied. In general, those cities had a more systematic urban structure and followed 
a comprehensive planning concept that originally was copied from the ideas of the 
Western Classical style. The positive dimension was that most cities had an integral 
plan for a green system and a well-planned underground sewage system. Those 
facilities became the basic urban foundation, still existing today (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3 Master Plan of Qingdao under German Colonization 1901.  
Source: Zhuang Lin De et al. (eds.) (2002, Figure 7.10)
The second type of city was built based on Chinese self-explored initiatives. Most were 
built during the period of the establishment of the Provisional Government of Nanjing. 
The typical example is the master plan of capital Nanjing itself in 1929. The entire plan 
applied Western concepts and neglected the old urban structure of ancient Nanjing. 
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Regardless of its primitive urban practice, the urban plan of Nanjing was seen as the 
first planning document conducted by the self-exploring approach of the first nation-
state in modern China (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Master Plan of Nanjing 1929  
Source: Su Ze Min (2008, Figure 12-8). 
In general, reviewing the historical urban development of modern Chinese cities shows 
that the urban planning of the early modern period was immature and confused. It 
was the result of a fusion between diverse social-political influences of imperialism, 
colonization, and semi-feudalism, which all had been infused into the divided 
geopolitical localities of modernization. Both negative and positive urban interventions 
had been installed forcedly by external foreign initiatives or had emerged dynamically 
within the fusion of nation-state explorations. Critiques from historians ascribed the 
stagnation of urban phenomena in this period to foreign invasion, seeing it as the 
insolent nature of imperialism and colonization. However, this standpoint may be 
regarded as rather one-sided.
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To get a rundown of the history of urban development of early modern China, historians 
were confronted with a critical point: the point of view in looking at history, including 
the value system and systematic approach to accessing and evaluating historical 
materials. “Restore and Prospect: Speech at the International Symposium for the 
Research on China’s Modern Architectural Academia in the 20th Century,” a critical 
reflection of Hou Youbin (2003), provides insight into Chinese architectural history 
and reflects how Chinese urban development can be engraved in modern history. As 
the co-author of the Chinese textbook History of Chinese Architecture, published in 
the 1960s, Hou Youbin recalled that when he was involved in editing the book, he 
and his colleagues could not avoid emotional hatred for foreign intervention in urban 
construction, especially under the political bias of communism.
He mentioned disdain towards the foreign interventions; the history of Chinese 
architecture and urban development was interpreted based on a general parameter 
of political history, so it was seen as part of the shame of national failure. While under 
foreign direct influence, the few cities that had applied Western-planning concepts 
had advanced urban development and were seen as the products of deformation of the 
foreign imperialism. Modern facilities such as banks, factories, and schools were seen 
as tools of exploitation of Western capitalism to destroy the Chinese national identity. 
In general, the essential value of the history of urban (architectural) development was 
strongly embedded into the communist principle of class struggle.
Instead, Hou Youbin (2003) proposed later “modern transformation” as a term to 
interpret the early modern period. He emphasized that even though the early modern 
period of China was triggered by the external force of foreign invasion, it was also 
embedded in the natural evolution of the modernization process, which had to be 
undertaken one way or the other. In Chinese experience, because of the political 
turmoil, the process of urban and architectural modernization was slow and was 
influenced by external forces with unavoidable internal countrywide convulsion. Due 
to the delay of modern evolution in China, Chinese modernization had to confront 
advanced Western concepts. On the other hand, in combination with political failure 
and confusion of national identity, it generated heterogeneity of traditional and 
modern urban and architectural systems. Furthermore, the modern transformation 
of Chinese architecture experienced changes in types, technologies, education, 
architectural styles, architectural theories, and the entire building industry from low to 
high. In this framework, modernity as well as nationality was the two main pursuits of 
Chinese architects and the two basic themes in this history.
Hou Youbin’s reflection is particularly important for a country like China, which had 
been suffering from different political interests. Political influence might be powerful, 
yet history can only be engraved in a society in which the continual evolution of cultural 
development can be sustained.
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Never the less, political influence and socio-cultural evolution are not separated 
matters of antagonism; the abovementioned phenomena of urban development 
revealed that the launch of different political systems had a critical influence on 
the establishment of urban culture. This interlink can be recognized in the case of 
China’s evolution of modernization. Within the Chinese context and evolution of 
modernization before 1970, four decisive social-political systems had emerged—the 
decline of feudalism, the influence of colonization, the establishment of republicanism 
and the emergence of communism. The focus of the next paragraph is given to the four 
decisive socio-political systems and their connections to the particular evolutions of 
the urban culture. 
§ 4.2 The Major Socio-Political Systems and the Emerged Urban Cultures 
before 1970
In this section, relationships between the different political stages and their urban 
cultures are underpinned chronologically. Even though historically, in the early period 
of modernization from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the breaks 
between different political systems were vague and they almost overlapped, in general, 
there were four stages of political embodiment that have embedded characteristics 
into the urban culture of the feudal localities. These stages are critical as well as crucial. 
In the critical sense, it shows that the political instability had resulted in hitherto 
unknown and unpleasant damages to Chinese civilization for decades that has to 
be overcome; crucially, the high awakenings of the people during the first half of the 
twentieth century also had helped to trigger further modernization and paved the path 
for the later reformation of the 1970. In this sense, without the sequential socio-
political impetuses, it was almost impossible for Chinese civilization to escape from the 
yoke of feudalism.
§ 4.2.1 Decline of Feudalism and the Sprout of Capitalism 
What kind of social-urban phenomenon emerged in the last period of the decay 
of feudalism? One well-known case during Qian Long’s reign (1711–1796 A.D.) 
is indicative. The emperor lived a corrupt life of self-indulgence. Like members of 
the ruling class of other dynasties, the officials of the Qing Dynasty used a variety of 
methods, including blackmail, to extort money from the people, and greedy landlords 
exploited peasants to enrich themselves. One of the favorite henchmen of Qian Long, 
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Heshen, a Grand Minister of the Privy Council, amassed a huge fortune at the end 
of Qian Long’s reign; his total property was ultimately estimated at around 1,100 
million taels62 of silver, reputedly an amount equivalent to the imperial revenue of the 
Qing government for fifteen years. The case of Heshen was just the straw that broke the 
camel’s back, indicating the seriousness of the financial difficulties in the government, 
and the widespread corruption among the officials indicated utter rottenness of the 
ruling oligarchy.
Corruption among officials reduced the government’s income. From the historical 
archives, it is apparent that at the end of Qian long’s reign (1711-1796 A.D.), the 
government had only about two million taels of silver at its disposal after payment of 
the salaries of officials and administrative expenses annually. Towards the end of Jian 
Qing’s reign (1796-1820 A.D.), only five provinces were able to fulfill their tax quotas 
and hand over the receipts to the national treasure. As a result, the total revenue could 
not match the huge expenditure. To solve the financial deficit, the Qing government 
again had to introduce miscellaneous and oppressive taxes. A so-called tribute 
system was installed. Not only offices but also nominal titles, such as the degree of 
Jinshi (imperial college degree)63, could be bought and sold. Those who had bought 
such titles could enjoy higher social positions that enabled them to bully others. This 
social custom existed at all administrative levels. Taking advantage of the disgraced 
government, much of the revenue, which should have gone to the national treasury, 
was intercepted for personal use by officials at various levels. Within this framework, 
the ordinary people lived a life of slavery (Bai Shouyi 2002).
On the other hand, people’s resistance activities did not stop after Qing had unified 
China, and there were numerous armed uprisings against the Qing authority 
towards the end of Qian Long’s reign. As for cultural activities, there were a number 
of outstanding scholars during the latter part of the Qian Long period, but fearful of 
antagonizing the ruling elite, they avoided reality as much as possible.
Gong Zizhen (1792-1841 A.D.), an essayist, poet, historian, and philosopher, compared 
the society of his day to a sick body covered with scabs and scars, stating that its sickness 
was so advanced as to be beyond cure. He pointed out the corruption of officials at all levels, 
the shamelessness of those who exploited others through blackmail and oppression to 
live a more enjoyable life. He believed that there was no law that could not be changed or 
62  A measure of the Chinese system of weights and currency. 
63 Jinshi (simplified Chinese: 进士; traditional Chinese: 進士) who were ranked first class in the palace examination 
within the Civil service examination system (or Keju).
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no precedent that could not be broken. Like many others who took compassion on an ill 
civilization, he believed that sooner or later, changes had to be made. He wrote a poem, 
which reads as follows (Bai Shouyi 2002: 365).
 – The vitality of China cannot come about
 – Until storm sweeps and thunder roars.
 – Ten thousand horses are mute:
 – How tragic it is!
 – May Heaven arouse itself—I plead:
 – Send us talents—all kinds of talents!
The poet felt sad due to the deathly situation he faced. He called for storm and 
thunder so that necessary changes could be made and a new situation be created, 
metaphorically changing the heavens to override the ruling power. One year before his 
death, the Opium War broke out and China entered a new historical period. However, 
the decline of the feudal system did not have an immediate effect; the impetus of 
rebellion accumulated only gradually.
The Ming-Qing period was marked by the decline of feudalism. Even though politically, 
the decay of the feudal system created a chaotic and divided society, the social 
economy continued to develop; the nature of labor power underwent a considerable 
change. The trade based on capitalism slowly emerged in certain areas and in certain 
industries. For example, in terms of agriculture, the production of paddy rice and new 
varieties of crops were promoted. During the Ming dynasty, the most productive areas 
were the provinces of Jiangsu, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and areas along the southeast 
coast. The cultivation of crops increased as planting skills continued to improve. Several 
plant types were imported to China, such as tobacco, maize, and sweet potatoes, which 
were first grown experimentally in confined areas and could expand later over large 
areas. Such cash crops had a direct bearing on the rural economy. In terms of handicraft 
industry, spinning and weaving remained a major vocation among the peasants in a 
self-sufficient economy.
After the middle decades of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.), the industry created 
solely for the manufacture of marketable textiles slowly developed and thrived as 
independent enterprises in several regions. The porcelain industry reached a high stage 
of development; Jingdezhen and Jiangxi Province were the most famous porcelain 
producers. The blue vase and the multi-colored vase were then among the industry’s 
most famous products. Others such as the shipbuilding industry and the building 
industry had also a long tradition. Commerce thrived in the Ming-Qing period as well, 
and Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Hankou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou were its major centers. 
Trade and commerce were particularly brisk in the lower valley of the Yang-tze River. 
Within this region, because of commercial prosperity, many places developed quickly 
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from small hamlets of several hundred households to towns or cities of thousands 
of households. During the Qing Dynasty, the newly developed and nationally known 
centers of commerce included Foshan in Guangdong Province, Hankou in Hubei 
Province, Zhuxian in Henan Province, and Jingde in Jiangxi Province. Jointly, they were 
referred to as the four famous towns of China.
Early during the Ming Dynasty, the sprout of capitalism first appeared in the textile 
industry. Towards the end of the Ming Dynasty, many weavers in Suzhou and Hangzhou 
realized that there was profit to be made and gradually increased the number of looms 
to hire more weavers for increased production. These, who began as self-employed 
workers who purchased their own raw materials and labored to transform the raw 
materials into finished products, no longer worked at the looms. There were also cloth 
merchants who distributed raw materials among the weavers (Bai Shouyi 2002). In this 
way, the former group—the weavers—developed from small commodity producers to 
become owners of handcraft workshops, and the second group—the cloth merchants—
became contractors. Both groups had capitalistic characteristics and production 
relationships. This gradual emergence represented the bare beginning of Chinese 
capitalism.
Though nascent capitalism made its appearance during the late Ming and early Qing 
period, it did not have a chance to grow further. In general, the main reason was the 
strong and stubborn resistance of the feudal organization of society, which capitalism, 
in its initial stage of development, could not overcome. Under this political constraint, 
it was also difficult to change the traditional formation of production, which was based 
on the self-sufficient unit or natural economy of the family where men tilled and 
woman wove; besides, an average peasant had no way of improving his livelihood as 
he was exploited and oppressed by his government and landlord. In other words, the 
feudal system, aging and corrupt though it was, was still strong enough to prevent the 
emergence of a new social system.
In short, the Ming-Qing period saw a change from progressiveness to backwardness 
in China. In comparison with world history, from the early sixteenth to the middle 
decades of the seventeenth century was an important era that marked Western 
Europe’s transition from feudalism to nascent capitalism. While the feudal forces of 
the Ming-Qing period remained strong enough to win temporary victories against the 
people, the end result was that Chinese people had to face an even sadder fate than 
ever. But the nascent capitalism had not been extinguished; it had only stagnated.
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§ 4.2.2 Colonization and the Emergence of Industrialization
To a certain degree, the positive side effect of colonization was the promotion of 
industrialization. The early stage of modern industry in China came about under 
foreign initiatives. Soon after the Opium Wars, from the 1860s on factories with foreign 
investment in many Chinese cities grew steadily. The majority were ship-repairing 
dockyards, serving the rapid development of inland navigation, and processing 
factories for making tea, bricks, reeling silk, cotton, and refining sugar from local raw 
materials. There were also other light industries such as match factories, paper mills, 
and soap factories, which exploited cheap Chinese labor and the easily accessible 
local market. The transformation of China into a market for world capitalism under 
foreign control brought about a depression in agriculture and handicrafts and the 
impoverishment of Chinese peasants and other producers. Foreign export of capital 
and the establishment of banks and factories in China were further indications of the 
semi-colonial nature of the Chinese economy in the early stage of industrialization.
From the 1870s, groups of officials, landlords, and merchants invested in modern 
industries of a capitalist nature, mainly filatures, textile mills, flourmills, match 
factories, and local mines. The tension between national capitalism and foreign 
capitalism was very strong. National capitalism could barely survive in a semi-colonial 
and semi-feudal society. For example, whereas foreign countries and their factories 
and mines in China could sell products and obtain raw materials due to their special 
privileges, the native industries, in addition to the difficulties in obtaining raw 
materials and securing markets, were constantly facing the danger of annexation by 
foreign capital. Ironically, instead of helping native industries, the Qing government 
levied heavy taxes on them and fettered their growth in every way. However, many of 
the industrialists themselves were originally officials, landlords, or merchants, so they 
were on the one hand in conflict with foreign capitalism and domestic feudalism while 
on the other bound closely to them.
The lowest social class was not the peasants but the first generation of modern 
industrial workers. This early Chinese proletariat emerged when the British opened 
up dockyards and factories in the 1840s. Most of the workers were originally destitute 
peasants and craftsmen. Suffering economic and political oppression, the Chinese 
proletariat had to fight for its survival. The proletariat in semi-colonial and semi-feudal 
China was subjected to the harsh and ruthless threefold oppression and exploitation by 
foreign capitalism, national capitalism, and feudalism.
The gradual development of Chinese capitalism did not change the semi-colonial, semi-
feudal nature of Chinese society. The development of national capitalism was also unable 
to affect the outstanding position of the feudal economy in the national economy as a 
whole. High feudal land rents, usury, and commercial profit all still restricted the formation 
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and expansion of industrial capital. In other words, Chinese capitalism was in conflict with 
Chinese feudalism while depending on it (Bai Shouyi 2002: 468).
However, within this framework, under the circumstances of that time, living in 
a special period full of ideological conflicts between the new and the old, the east 
and the west, the conservative and the advancing, some influential reformers with 
their personal financial strengths and social reputations survived by promoting their 
commissions to enhance the modern development of China. Wu Liangyong (2005) 
underpinned the evidence of early modernization by analyzing Nantong, which he 
called a pioneering city of modern China. Wu’s study of Nantong revealed how Chinese 
experiments in the early stage of modernization stemmed from individual idealists 
and reformers. Zhang Jian (1853-1926), born in Nantong and a well-known member 
of the elite, devoted himself to the local urban construction of Nantong (including 
establishing plants, reclaiming wastelands, improving transportation, undertaking 
water conservation projects, and initiating education activities. Wu proved that in 
the early stage of modernization the concept of urban structure, which was based on 
China’s agricultural society, had already emerged under the individual initiatives of 
reformers, especially those industrialists with a Chinese ideology. Their achievements 
in modern Chinese cities deserve further study.
§ 4.2.3 Republicans and the Emergence of Nationalism and Modernization of 
Architecture
The republican revolution of 1911 ended the Qing Empire and the long history of dynastic 
China. Chaos and wars ensued while warlords supported by foreign powers fought each 
other. After the Beiyang (Northern) warlords replaced the rule of the Qing Dynasty, 
contradictions in Chinese society deepened. The first nation-state in modern China was 
established by the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which was short-lived but 
the only period of formal unification and relative stability in pre-1949 China with Nanjing 
as its national capital and Shanghai its financial center. Historians name it as the Nanjing 
decade (1927-1937). Despite the weakness of authority and the disintegration of political 
coherence, it was before 1949 the most remarkable period of economic recovery, and 
cultural development of literature. It was also a short period when the first generation of 
Chinese architects emerged and supported the first Chinese nation-state, producing a new 
tradition to be carried forward in many decades to come.
Building in China has never been a simple task, but between the end of the Qing 
dynasty in 1912 and the onset of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, tasks 
associated with building were even further complicated by civil strife, incursions by 
foreigners, technological transfers that held unforeseen implications, and changing 
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notions of how Chinese architects might contribute to building a new kind of China. 
Several Chinese who formed part of what has been sometimes called the “first 
generation of Chinese architects” (diyidai) involved in building in republican China, 
were challenged by the shifting dynamics of a society seeking a new identity. Those 
key architectural figures at the time included Zhuang Jun (1888-1990), Shen Liyuan 
(1890 -1951) Fan Wenzhao (1893-1979), Lu Yanzhi (1894-1929), Liu Dunzhen 
(1897-1968), Zhao Shen (1898-1978), Dong Dayou (1899-1973), Li Jinpei (1900 -), 
Lin Keming (1900-1999), Tong Jun (1900-1983), Liang Sicheng (1901-1972), Yang 
Tingbao (1901-1982), and Chen Zi (1902 -) etc. (Cody 2001).
In comparison with Chinese ancient architecture (especially the imperial and official 
architecture), China’s modern architectural studies are not the mainstream in the 
world. Because global modernization originated from the West and Western culture 
was the basic reference point, modernization of non-Western cultures was a latecomer, 
passive in its development and marginal in geographical aspects. This non-mainstream 
characteristic was exactly the challenge that the first generation of Chinese architects 
and those involved in urban construction faced. At the republic’s inception, the 
first free exploration gave architecture its modern meaning, and those who devoted 
themselves to the field of architecture first had professional roles and personal 
voices. They also played exceedingly important roles in questioning contemporary 
architectural conventions. The earliest generations of Chinese architects, largely 
educated in the United States, returned to China as practicing architects, architectural 
researchers, and/or educators. Collectively, their inter-war works, theories, students, 
and discoveries remained highly influential for many years after the 1949 socialist 
revolution (Cody 2001; Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan 2003).
They confronted the dilemma of searching for modernism and revolution. In 
immediate terms, architects in both China and Europe had similar social problems, 
Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan (2003: 31) pointed out “the socio-economic and political 
situations in the major cities and ports of Europe and China were comparable and 
the problems such as low wages of workers, poor housing conditions, workers’ 
unrest, strikes, and a general feeling of social anxiety resulting from rapid change 
were common to all”. However, the political-economic constraints led early modern 
architects in China and Europe to different destinies. On the European continent, 
counterparts formulated clearly demonstrated modernist tenets with their own 
theories, statements and charters, competition projects, and new schools, while China 
as a country was just beginning its exploration of modernization.
In general, anti-colonialism and anti-federalism ranked high among local political 
issues of the interwar period. It remains difficult to characterize the work or statements 
of any Chinese architect of this time as “modernist.” Besides, a large effort in Chinese 
architectural research was devoted to the research of traditional architecture. European 
research activities focused on urban policy and planning, new technologies, and 
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architectural prototypes while all were driven by an industrial ideology that did not yet 
exist in China on a large scale. Within this framework, housing was the core of social 
progress and the major subject of European modernist design, but not in China. Most 
of the modern architecture built in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was later adopted 
as modern prototypes after World War II, for houses and collective housing projects. 
These buildings represented common goals: they were economically orientated; they 
applied and incorporated new industrial technologies; and they offered bright, open 
spaces as well as a sense of community. Contrary to this, there is no evidence of any 
leading Chinese architect with a particular interest in housing before World War II. 
Their commissioned buildings were mostly institutional, governmental, or commercial 
company apartments for high-income staff as well as private houses. This situation did 
not change until the 1949 revolution when China chose the socialist path.
Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan (2003) highlighted that even beyond the general societal 
background, the role of Chinese architects was different from that of their European 
counterparts. Firstly, modernism in Europe was about social justice and social 
progress; modernism in China was merely a style. Secondly, European modernists 
were among society’s leaders; Chinese architectural pioneers regarded themselves 
as society’s servants. Thirdly, the most fundamental difference was that European 
modernists believed that society could be reformed through the implementation of 
modern architecture and felt a social responsibility as the presumed leaders of society. 
Importantly, such features of modern architecture as economic rationality, mass 
production, and mechanical beauty were the outcome of social ideas. As for Chinese 
architectural pioneers, they were more interested in architectural business and/or 
expressing the Chinese cultural identity. Even when considering the design approach 
during this period, Chinese leading architects designed mainly modernist buildings 
along with eclectic mixtures borrowed from Chinese or Western traditions and styles.
As one of the key figures of the first generation, Liang Sicheng (1986: 167) reflected on 
the situation after the revolution: 
Most architects of my age have an educational background in eclecticism 
(which originated in the Beaux-Arts school of Paris). This approach began 
in the 15th century and declined with the rise of capitalism (…) In the early 
1930s, palatial architecture was very popular, which in fact merely added an 
Man Han Quan Xi (a Chinese banquet)64 to the architects’ eclectic menu.
64 Man Han Quan Xi (simplified Chinese: 满汉全席; Traditional Chinese: 滿漢全席).
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Behind the architectural production in modern China, Wang Haoyu (2003) analyzed 
the collective characteristics of Chinese architects under the influence of joint social 
and cultural forces. Four key phenomena can be found: eclecticism, revivalism, Art 
Deco, and architectural nationalism.
The revival of Chinese tradition received official support and reached its peak in the 
1930s under the promotion of architectural nationalism and the association of 
architects with Chinese educational policy. Architectural education was influenced by 
the Beaux-Arts school (Lai Delin 2003; Kuroishi 2003). Zhu Jianfei (2003) examined 
the political nexus with cultural practice in design and explored historical currents 
with which the national style was formed, and excavated strata of these architectures 
in which cultural patterns were the consequence of the political transformation. 
He emphasized that the Beaux-Arts education that originated from France in the 
nineteenth century and before offered an eclectic design method to combine “essence” 
and “practical use” and acted as an architectural medium through which ideas and 
spaces of bourgeois classical modernity from nineteenth-century Europe were brought 
into twentieth-century China (Zhu 2003: 116).
The early period of the republic provided a new perspective on the profession of the 
architect. The profession was a new social force with a new body of knowledge even 
though in the case of China, the architects, designing and constructing by following 
the requirements of the state, were becoming part of the new intellectuals emerging 
in China in the 1920s and 1930s, educated in the West and committed to a Chinese 
national revival. A growing professional elite and middle class, in large cities and 
especially in Shanghai, needed and further developed a bourgeois-democratic 
space, and a rationalist outlook in the use of their skills and knowledge. Zhu Jianfei 
(2003: 115) also argued in the Chinese context that the May 4th and republican 
and nationalist revolutions engendered social and intellectual changes in eclectic 
historicism and the use of traditional Chinese forms, as well as patterns of open 
space and public space for an emerging bourgeois society and a rationalist control of 
open space and of building an object in open space. In political terms, it embedded 
the nationalist ideology of the state through the use of “Chinese forms”, which again 
involved a Leninist left and a fascist right—nationalism against foreign imperialism to 
promote a nationalistic order, discipline, and traditional values.
As Zhao Chen (2003: 1) emphasized, “as a country with a huge territory and variety of 
cultures, China’s modernization has shown imbalance. Due to architectural culture’s 
close relation to social life, the phenomenon of “non-mainstream” inevitably became 
the characteristic of Chinese architectural culture.” The understanding of the value of 
being non-mainstream did not imply the negation of mainstream but rather signified its 
extension and opening of the field. After all, the period between the 1920s and 1940s 
was the period of the most distinctive group of architecture emerged. Furthermore, it 
marked a critical moment in the development of a major theme in architecture design in 
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modern China in pre-1949. Pioneers and unknown architectural students ultimately held 
important implications for how architecture was taught, practiced, and studied in China 
for decades. The influence on architectural education was also closely related to the later 
development of China’s architectural academia after the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China on October 1, 1949, which marked the end of a semi-feudal, semi-colonial age in 
Chinese history and the beginning of its advance into the socialist epoch.
§ 4.2.4 Communism and the Urban Geo-Spatial Reconstruction 
After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, Marxist philosophy became 
the key characteristic of the philosophical forum of China. Based on the collision 
and amalgamation of Chinese traditional and Western modern philosophies, the 
comprehensive innovation in “the localization of Marxist philosophy in China” has 
come through a tortuous historical process. The initial spread of Marxist philosophy 
in China happened to emerge under two international conditions. First, as the direct 
theory of the Chinese Communist Party and the state, the October Revolution led by 
Lenin marked a great victory for the spread of Marxism into China and set an example. 
Second, in the May 4th Movement’s new culture, Marxist philosophy is an important 
subject of academic research; Peking University was the cradle of Marxist philosophy 
in China. Within this framework, propagation of Marxism-Leninism produced the first 
group of Chinese intellectuals with an elementary knowledge of communist ideology.
The May 4th Movement, parallel to political upheavals in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, was a nation-wide cultural and intellectual movement associated 
with a specific incident of student demonstration in Beijing in 1919. All social and 
philosophical theories then current in the West and Japan were introduced. Scholars 
argued for different visions and viewpoints. Despite the divergence, the May 4th 
consciousness shared some common characteristics: it was liberal, modernistic, 
cosmopolitan, critical of Chinese tradition, and at the same time nationalist and 
patriotic. The May 4th Movement aimed at finding a path to modernize China so that it 
could survive and develop in a competitive capitalist world.
Within this framework, two critical themes of Leninism were introduced into China, 
which contributed to its dramatic success. One is his theory of imperialism. According 
to Lenin, capitalist powers were moving onto the last, imperialist stage. He argued that 
imperialists relied increasingly on overseas colonies for further capitalist accumulation. 
The proletarian revolution against capitalism, therefore, had to be fought increasingly 
outside Europe, in the colonies of the East. This theory highlighted imperialism as 
the enemy of the Chinese revolution and placed Chinese’s national effort in a global, 
historical perspective.
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Another aspect of Leninism was his revolutionary politics and methods to organize 
revolutionary forces. The party, full of disciplined intellectual elites, is the vanguard that 
should lead the army and the masses to wage revolution and transform society. In fact, 
the force of institutionalization transferred from European Russia to China shaped the 
structure of the party and the state to emerge for both communists and nationalists.
Within this framework, there were two attitudes to Chinese tradition: one was iconoclastic 
and remained dominant in the movement for the following decades. It attacked 
Confucianism as “cannibalistic”. The other was modest and conservative, following a 
tradition of studying the “national essence”65 (Zhu Jianfei 2003: 112). In general, both 
positions of the “left” and “right” of May 4th would find their respective echoes in the pre-
1949 period. In another dimension, an important influence during the May 4th movement 
is the spread of newspapers and journals. As printed materials became more accessible 
and a public domain emerged for free exchange of ideas and information, urban public 
space, inside or outside, expended in large cities—especially Shanghai.66 
With the above-mentioned initial background in mind, in addition, being embedded 
within the change of political and economic developments, philosophical advocacy, natural 
sciences and literature, Chinese urban development under the guidance of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristic” guided by Marxism also entered a new era. It was almost an 
immediate task of the Chinese communist regime to reconstruct the entire country. After 
decades of chaos and putrefaction, what had been left to such an immense country was 
poverty to be combated and endless works of reconstruction to be undertaken, especially 
the foundation of public facilities, which were completely destroyed. With the lack of 
experience it had, the government confronted the enormous pressure of providing long-
term guidance for the economic revitalization, and many urgent problems regarding urban 
construction emerged that needed immediate attention and solutions.
In the communist regime, the interlink between the political interventions and the 
geo-spatial reconstruction is obvious. In order to show the close link, in this paragraph 
the focus is on the general structural and spatial changes of China’s urban settlements 
since 1949 to the reform of 1978.
65 Chen Duxiu and Lu Xun were the strongest voices attacking Confucianism. Hu Shi advised careful research on 
national heritage, and Liang Qichao promoted a spiritual tradition in Confucianism and Buddhism to remedy 
the excess of Western materialism. 
66 One specific reform introduced by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi was the use of Baihuawen (simplified Chinese: 白话
文; traditional Chinese: 白話文), which means a form of vernacular speech in writing to replace the inaccessible 
elitist classical Chinese. At the same time, there was a spread of newspapers and journals using the vernacular. 
The language and the accessible printed material enhanced the free exchange of ideas and information. 
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I use two resources as reference. The first main resource is the research done by George 
C. S. Lin. Lin (1998, 2002a) studied how the structural and spatial redistribution of 
the urban population and of Chinese cities since the founding of the People’s Republic 
in 1949 is transformed gradually under the influence of political interventions. Lin’s 
researches help us to understand how the urban spatial structure and urban geo-
spatial construction has shifted before and after the Maoist regime. He concluded that 
prior to the 1978 economic reforms, the system of cities created by the Maoist regime 
was dominated by large and extra-large cities because of the imperatives of optimal 
industrialization. Because of national defense considerations, most of the new cities 
were created in the central and western interior rather than on the eastern coast. His 
studies paved the way for a better interpretation of the links between the political-
economic interests and the geo-spatial development.
The second main resource is the work of Hua Lanhung, a senior scholar born in Beijing 
in 1912. Hua Lanhung moved overseas when he was sixteen years old and obtained his 
architecture degree in France. From 1951 to 1977, Hua Lanhung worked in China, and 
Liang Sicheng recommended him to become the chief architect in charge of Beijing’s 
master plan. He was active in urban reconstruction during his career as a planner and 
an architect in China. In his book Reconstruiere la Chine, he recalled his insights on 
urban development from 1949 to 1978. This part of history had been studied in a 
broader sense; however, little research focuses on the urban development and planning 
perspective, at least in a systematic manner. Between 1949 and 1978, the debate on 
urban development was becoming an open phenomenon, and different archives have 
become accessible for public assessment. However, Chinese scholars wrote most of 
these in Chinese. Therefore, there is an urgent need to publish research in this field in 
translation to facilitate international reception of this knowledge.
There are two research questions highlighted in Lin’s study. The first one is the relationship 
between the role of different size settlements and cities and their responses to major 
political and economic changes in different historical contexts. The second one concerns 
the locational changes of cities and their geographical distribution as a result of the shifting 
spatial emphasis of national economic development. Based on the chronology of social-
political development, there are three phases of development from 1949 to 1978.
First phase: 1949-1961 
The initial period from 1949 to 1961 was characterized by a rapid increase in the 
number of cities and urban population. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of the 
national economy after the civil war greatly facilitated the pace of industrialization 
and urban development. During the initial period from 1949-1952, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) made great strides in bringing the country through three 
critical transitions: from economic prostration to economic growth, from political 
disintegration to political strength, and from military rule to civilian rule.
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From 1952–1954 the Chinese established a central planning apparatus and a set of 
central ministries and other government institutions that were close copies of their Soviet 
counterparts. Those actions were officially ratified by the first meeting of the National 
People’s Congress in September 1954, which formally established the Central People’s 
Government and adopted the first constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
The basic national development policy for China is embodied in the Five-Year Plans 
(FYPs) for National Economic and Social Development, also taken from the Soviet 
example. The key construction projects financed by the central government during the 
first Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1953-1957) provided a great impetus for the expansion 
of existing cities and the creation of new cities; most of them were located in the 
Northeast and North of China.
The first Five-Year Plan (FYP) was linked to the transition of China’s rural and urban 
economy to the collective forms. By the end of the Five-Year Plan in 1957, the number 
of designated cities dramatically increased from 132 in 1949 to 17667 (Lin 2002a: 
103). Within this framework, the housing development in the socialist economy 
was fully influenced by the Soviet standard. The idea of industrialized housing was 
imported in China from the Soviet Union. The advantage of industrialized building was 
that it could be constructed more quickly and at a lower cost by saving labor. A unit was 
to be designed with standard components conforming to a construction module. A 
residential unit consisted of several households using the same staircase. The success 
of the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) was no doubt the result of the original enthusiasm of 
the Chinese people to build a new nation.
A strong central governmental apparatus proved able to channel scarce resources 
into the rapid development of heavy industry. Despite some serious policy issues 
and problems, the communist leadership seemed to have the overall situation well 
in hand. Public order improved and many saw a stronger China taking form. The 
march to socialism seemed to go along reasonably well with the dictates of industrial 
development.
The success of the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) also led to the disastrous campaign of the 
“Great Leap Forward” (1958-1960). The plan adopted Stalinist economic priorities. In 
a country where more than four-fifths of the population lived in rural areas, about four-
67 The non-agricultural population in a city proper defines City Size; it is divided into four categories, namely 
extra-large (>1 million), large (0.5-1 million), medium (0.2-0,5 million) and small (<0.2 million). Due to the 
increasing growth of urbanization, super-large cities with a population above 2 million have emerged in China as 
well.
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fifths of all government investment was channeled into the urban economy. The vast 
majority of this investment went to heavy industry, leaving agriculture relatively starved 
for resources. The plan provided for substantial income differentiation to motivate 
the labor force in the state sector, and it established a “top down” system in which a 
highly centralized government apparatus exercised detailed control over economic 
policy through enormous ministries in Beijing. The spatial outcome of this campaign 
saw drastic growth in the number of cities from 176 in 1957 to 208 in 1961. In the 
same timespan, the urban population expanded from 54 to 69 million, a net growth 
of 15 million people in cities. This period can thus be described as a phase of urban 
expansion (Lin 2002a: 103).
During this period, the People’s Commune System (PCS) was born when Mao 
Zedong had a vision of surpassing the United Kingdom and the United States in a short 
period of time in terms of steel production. Mao also wanted to mobilize peasants to 
undertake huge water projects during the slack winter seasons to improve agricultural 
productivity. Each commune was a combination of smaller farm collectives, consisting 
of 4,000-5,000 households, and larger ones could consist of up to 20,000 households. 
In the commune, everything was shared. Everything originally owned by the 
households was contributed to the commune. All farming activities were to be centrally 
assigned by cadres every morning. The communes exercised management and control 
of all rural resources such as labor and land. The People’s Commune was formerly the 
highest administrative level in rural areas; in 1985, they were replaced by townships. 
The formation of the communes’ largest collective units embodied governmental, 
political, and economic functions in the early stage of social composition of the 
settlements in the rural areas (Hua Lanhung 2006).
Hua Lanhung (2006: 97) recalled that even though this period was seen as a national 
disaster due to the stagnation of the urban development, it allowed more in-depth 
research. For example, the on-site research into housing typologies was carried 
out systematically. The research results were efficiently applied to the new housing 
construction. The average living condition improved. New apartment types were 
established in the provincial and municipal architectural design institutes in charge of 
the standardized housing construction.
In addition, it is necessary to mention that cities in China are official establishments 
that require administrative designation and fiscal commitment of the government. Lin 
(2002a) pointed out that officially designated cities are included in the state budgetary 
allocation. They enjoy state capital investment in the urban economy and resources 
allocated by the government to the development and maintenance of urban facilities. 
Therefore, designation of a few cities or demotion of the existing ones has become a 
means for the state to either speed up or slow down the pace of urban development in 
response to changing political and economic situations.
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Second phase: 1962-1965 
The second phase constituted a period of economic readjustment beginning in 1962 
after the “Great Leap Forward” campaign turned out to be a great disaster. Economic 
mismanagement, natural catastrophes, and ideological dispute with the former Soviet 
Union in the early 1960s resulted in a tragic casualty of 15 to 30 million people. Within 
the framework, a large number of cities previously established were eliminated from 
the list of state budgetary allocation, and excessive urban population were either 
deported or “sent down” (Xiafang) to the countryside. From 1961-1965, the number 
of cities dropped from 208 to 168; the urban population declined from 69 to 66 
million (Lin 2002a: 103). This period appeared to be the pattern of de-urbanization, 
described by Lin as the “contraction” phase.
Third phase: 1966-1977 
The third phase is the stagnation and under-urbanization from 1966-1977. The Great 
Proletariat Cultural Revolution was a period of revolutionary upheaval, power struggles, 
and domestic turmoil. Mao launched the campaign of “up to the mountains and 
down to the villages” (Shang Shan Xia Xiang)68 by which an estimated 12-17 million 
urban educated youths were forced to move out of the cities to resettle in rural villages. 
In addition, urban cadres, university professors, schoolteachers, artists, musicians, 
medical doctors, and other professionals in cities were “sent down” (Xiafang). Another 
dimension is that the rapid industrialization based on a selected number of cities was 
essential to the expansion of military capacity and the maintenance of the national 
security. During this period, only seventeen additional cities were designated, of 
which sixteen were located in the central and western regions that were thought to be 
strategically less vulnerable to potential military attack. The result is a unique pattern 
of industrialization without the parallel growth of urbanization. The urban population 
in cities grew from 67 to 74 million, but its proportion in the total population dropped 
from 9 to 8 percent. This period appeared to be a pattern of urban stagnation, which 
also had been identified as the model of “under-urbanization” (Murray and Szelenyi 
1984; Chen Xianming and Parish 1996). Unfortunately, Marxist China ignored the 
national economy and societal development, which for a long time led the country 
backward.
68 Shang Shan Xia Xiang (simplified Chinese: 上山下乡; traditional Chinese: 上山下鄉).
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Geographically speaking, the evidence showed that Chinese urban development 
over a few decades before the 1978 reformation was shaped by the articulation of 
the state through investment strategy; simultaneously, administrative changes and 
reclassification of urban population and urban settlements were strongly related to 
the political interests and state control. Until its end, the Maoist regime maintained 
a strong anti-urban stance (Bergère 2000; Lin 2002a). The peculiar system of cities 
under the Maoist strategy of regional development favored inland regions over the 
eastern coast for both ideological commitment to spatial equality and national security 
(Fan 1995 and 1997; Wei and Ma 1996). This strategy has been reversed since Deng 
Xiaoping, and other reformists initiated institutional changes in 1978. Nevertheless, 
even though after the reformation China seems to embrace the market economy, the 
urban geo-spatial construction is still strongly influenced by the political-economic 
dominance. This relationship remained critical after the reformation.
In only a few decays, Chinese society had evolved from feudalism to communism. The 
great impacts that society experienced introduced an extreme case of new conditions 
for the evolution of modernization. In each period, it shows that modernization 
is a great social project even though the Chinese experience shows obstacles and 
stagnation. The evolution of the modernization movement in China showed the path 
that China took was not linear but a sequential result of combining diverse significant 
historical “turn”.
A few reflections are stated from this chapter. First, modernization is a synthetic 
process that includes political, economic, cultural, and social evolution that is rooted in 
the need for human existence and is the embodiment of the human desire to pursue a 
high level of existence. From this perspective, the evolution of Chinese modernization 
is rather an on-going process of hybrid bricolage, than an established system of 
synergy. Second, there is no short cut for such a massive country to accomplish its 
reformation without sacrifice. The construction of material civilization is an essential 
condition and foundation for the construction of spiritual civilization. In the evolution 
of the three major movements, modernization proves to not be able to develop without 
the self-awareness of the ruling class, bourgeois reformists, and finally the proletariat. 
Reformation of the structure and a system of organization are essential criteria as well. 
Third, shifting ideas that had been promoted by different advocacies during the process 
of modernization showed a lack of self-confidence, and the confusion of identity had 
decreased the value of traditional culture, which subsequently had been abandoned 
in shame. Without reformation of the organization, advocacy of new, external ideas 
would unavoidably conflict with old ideas. Four, despite the condition that Chinese 
modernization was triggered both by internal decay and external force, overall the 
earlier evolution of Chinese modernization contributes to the reformation of the 
1980s, as the outcome of sequential reformations and political decisions.
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Part 3 Initial Reformations and the 
Modification of the Planning System
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”: The State of 
the Art or the Art of the Bricolage? 
The overall reformation of the contemporary China is guided by Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous advocacy: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, or phrased in Chinese 
“Crossing the river by groping for stones”. This has been interpreted as the essential 
guideline for the success of Chinese taking off. What is the specialty of the reform era 
introduced to make this process possible? What kind of “turn” can be recognized? 
What new challenges has the new “cultural turn” generated to contemporary urban 
development in China? These are the themes to explore in Chapter 5. 
Further, in chapter 6, research focuses on the planning formation that has been 
introduced in accordance with the reformed policy, including the application of 
planning systems and the establishment of the planning institutions as well as its 
installed software, including plan forms and their legal status. 
The crucial notion in this part, following the setting of the second parameter planning 
formation, is to decode the “reformation with Chinese characteristics”, to reveal the 
new contemporary “turn” as part of the historical continuity, yet a progressive strategy 
of gradualism, that is carefully supervised by step-by-step by Communist-state 
leadership. 
This part reflects the Deng Xiaoping’s famous phrase “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics”. Can it become an innovative state of the art of Chinese political 
paradigm, or it gets stuck in the dilemma of the institutional bricolage, which is cleverly 
combined by the communist regime in the transitional process? 
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5 Contemporary Urban Development: 
Reformation and New Urban 
Phenomena
In December 1978, during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of 
power. The economic reforms accelerated the development of the capitalist approach 
that gradually dismantled the commune system. The transition of power from the 
ideological Maoist plan to the regulatory market reformation of Deng Xiaoping marked 
the 1978 watershed that started the new era of the People’s Republic of China. 
Reformations were on two levels: the reformation opened up the country to the outside 
world while at the same time this created the opportunity for China to learn new ideas 
and knowledge from foreign countries. There is a double meaning behind this: to open 
up means not only to open the country to the outside world but also to make it possible 
for other countries to get acquainted with China.
In this chapter, the selected factors of the initial policies of reformation are constructed 
in five major dimensions: urban and rural land reform, political reform, economic 
reform, social reform, and spatial reform. In order to elaborate each dimension, they 
are addressed separately. Notably, those diverse dimensions of the reformation cannot 
be regarded as divided or fragmented; they are actually all intricately connected in one 
entity with one goal: to modernize the country while retaining the legitimacy of the 
communist regime.
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§ 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform
Mao Zedong once said, “China’s problems are rural problems, and rural problems are 
land problems” 69. His statement remains highly relevant in terms of ensuring the 
livelihoods of China’s mass rural households. Prior to 1978, the rural land system of 
China had gone through a winding course. Economically, the country followed up on 
the Soviet Five-Year Plans (FYPs). The country went through a transformation whereby 
means of production were transferred from private to public entities.
The first land system reform was launched at the beginning of the founding of the 
new China. After coming to power in 1949, the Communist Party initiated land reform 
through the Land Reform Law and other accompanying regulations in 1950. The core 
of this reform was to confiscate the holdings of landlords and wealthy peasants and 
to distribute the property among all farming households on an egalitarian basis70. 
Under this law, China redistributed over half of its arable land to 50-60 million poor 
rural households, more than 60% of its rural population. The peasants obtained both 
the ownership and the right of use of the land individually. Such a “land to the tiller” 
program proved a huge success in increasing agricultural productivity; annual grain 
production went up from 113.2 million tons in 1949 to 166.8 million tons in 1953 
(Zhu Keliang et al. 2006: 769). Thus, agriculture became a small peasant economy, 
based on private ownership and household operation.
The second reform of the land system began in 1953, under the influence of the Soviet 
system, Mao Zedong initiated the land collectivization program that transformed 
individual to collective landownership and reinforced Party micro-management 
(Spence 1999). Closely following the first land reform, turning private ownership of 
land into public ownership during the rural socialist transformation movement by 
upgrading and adjusting gradually from primary and advanced agricultural production 
cooperatives to people’s communes71. The smallest unit of the organization of 
69 In 1946, the Outline Land Law of China was passed by the Land Conference of the Communist Party that 
highlighted the need for emphasize equal redistribution of land to win the civil war, for this was deemed as 
necessary to meet the demands of the poor and thus organize them in combat. 
70 Art. 20 of Land Reform Law of P.R. China (1950) provides that land confiscated from landlords, except for 
that owned by the state in accordance with this law, should be allocated to poor peasants fairly, rationally and 
uniformly for them to own.
71 The program was followed by the creation of production cooperatives, beginning in 1956, followed in 1958 by a 
dramatic scaling-up to communes, averaging 5,000 households and consisting of several production brigades, 
further divided into production teams of 20-30 households. See more Bruce (2009: 5).
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productive activities was the production team, but most tasks were managed at a 
higher level and the production team had no real power. Within this framework, 
farmers became collective farms’ “working members” who normally received pay based 
on how much time they showed up for work.
This land reform changed all the means of agricultural production, including land 
into collective ownership and management. The ownership and use of land remained 
unified in this land reform, but the major distinction is the change from the individual 
peasant to the collective. Although the collectivization of the agriculture was expected 
to benefit from the economies of scale predicted by Marx and to provide a base for the 
development or rural industries, under the collective management, there was a lack of 
economic incentives and motivation for the masses as well as for the local bureaucrats, 
who had no resources to improve agricultural efficiency (Wu Jinglian and Bruce 1988). 
As a result, the impacts of collectivization on production were disappointing72. In 
addition, the Great Leap Forward brought the country the suffering from the serious 
famine in 1960-1963. Shortages of food supplies spread throughout the country, and 
coupon food rationing was introduced in urban areas. Rural areas suffered from food 
shortages from the early 1960s till as late as 1987 (Bruce and Li Zongmin 2009: 5).
In 1976, Mao Zedong died and the Cultural Revolution came to an end. The country 
was in chaos, and there were grain failures and famine in parts of China. The third 
reform started in the late 1970s after the open-door policy that China launched, 
which transformed the collective production system of the people’s commune into the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS)73. By the mid-1980s, a nation wide Household 
Responsibility System (HRS)—based on contracts between the state and rural farm 
households—was in place as the communes were broken up and small plots of land 
were leased to households. This brought the land reform of the contemporary China 
into the new stage of the early reform period (Lin 1987, Ho 2001, Ding Chengri 2003, 
Guo Xibao 2004, Trichur 2012).
The background of the initial Household Responsibility System (HRS) originated 
in 1978 with a few production brigades in Anhui province, which was frequently 
victimized by flood and drought (Wang Tao 2007). Farmers in Xiaogang began to 
experiment with contracting land, other resources, and output quotas to individual 
72 Grain production during the agricultural cooperatives period (1953-1958) rose less strong than the pre-period 
of land to the tiller. 
73 The Household Responsibility System (HRS) or Jiating Lianchan Chengbao Zerenzhi (simplified Chinese: 家庭联产
承包责任制; traditional Chinese: 家庭聯產承包責任制).
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households by dividing their communally owned farmlands into individual plots. A year 
later, these teams brought in yields far larger than those of others teams in the same 
region. Soon some brigades in Anhui province that returned to household farming had 
production increases of two to five times compared to those in unconverted brigades 
(Bruce and Li Zongmin 2009). The experiment was carried out under the protection 
of local officials and the provincial governor74. I would argue this could be seen as an 
early example of the experimentation tactics that developed later into the experimental 
spirit of the government. 
In 1978, the Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party 
allowed the option of breaking up the communal lands into household holdings. 
However, at first the Party considered the system appropriate only for the poor areas 
of western and central China that were affected by famine; many considered it a 
temporary expedient. The formula under which the change was permitted did not 
refer to “land reform,” but rather conferred “five rights” to production team: the right 
to select production crops for production appropriate to local conditions, the right to 
make rational decisions for management and administration, the right to adopt other 
measures to increase output, the right to distribute products and cash according to 
their wishes, and the right to reject improper instructions from administrative agents 
(Zhang Hongye et al. 2006: 611).
At this stage, the new system spread by voluntary decision of the local collectives and 
it spread rapidly and not only in the poorer areas. In January 1980 only 1.02 percent 
of all production teams in China had changed over to household farming, but by 
December 1980 the figure was 14.4 percent, then 28.2 percent by July 1981, and 45.1 
percent by October 1981. By 1981, when the government finally recognized that the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) reform was broadly applicable, 45 percent 
of the production teams in China had already been dismantled (Lin 1988: S201; Lin 
1992: 36; Lin 2003: 144). By the end of 1983, about 97.7 percent of production teams 
and 94.2 percent of the farm households in China were farming under the new system 
(Lin 1988: 222).
The Household Responsibility System (HRS) first developed in many different forms in 
rural areas of China, but eventually settled into two main forms: “fixing output quotas 
for each household” and “fixing tax quotas for each household”, the latter becoming 
the most popular form by 1983 when the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
74 Wan Li was the provincial governor of Anhui who also promoted the idea of contracting land to household from 
Anhui to the Politburo. 
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was implemented all over China (Guo Xibao 2004: 63). At the end of 1983, farmland 
contracted by peasant households accounted for 99.5 percent of the total farmland 
area in China, of which “fixing tax quota for each household” accounted to 98.3 
percent of the total Household Responsibility System (HRS). Under the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS), land was assigned to each household according to 
the number of its members or according to the number of both its members and 
workers. Households were required by the contract to pay state taxes, fulfill contracted 
procurement quotas, and submit certain amount of produce to the production team as 
public accumulation funds and public welfare funds. After these obligations had been 
fulfilled, all remaining output belonged to the household75 (Lin et al. 1996: 142).
At this stage, the government did not ban the collective ownership system but rather 
decided to install a new mode of agricultural management and distribution. The main 
characteristic was to separate the property right of land from the use of land so that 
land is still owned by the collective and operated by peasant households according to 
contract (Guo Xibao 2004).
Compared to the People’s Commune System (PCS), the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) provided farmers with stronger rights to land and to production. 
It demonstrated the value of unified management combined with the individual 
possibilities of the peasants. This stimulated growth in agriculture and rural income. 
The land tenure system is based on land lease contracts. Farmland is de facto owned 
by village collectives that extend 30-year land lease contracts to individual farm 
households under the condition that households can use, sub-lease, and transfer the 
land, but they cannot sell it76.
The special characteristic of the initial Household Responsibility System (HRS) was 
that it worked without the knowledge and approval of the central government77. It was 
not imposed by the central authority, unlike many other institutional changes that 
occurred in the decades after the reform. Besides the growth in agriculture and rural 
75 The development of the household responsibility system itself can be roughly divided into three phases: the 
work-quota contract phase, the output-quota contract phase, and the responsibility contract phase. Every phase 
experienced the same evolution process from the contract with a group of workers, to the contract with each 
individual worker, and finally to the contract with a household. For more detail information about the condition 
of each phase, see Lin (1996: 141-149). 
76 These contracts were validated for fifteen years in 1984; in 1993, they were extended for thirty years; and in 
1998, the Party-State legalized the contracts with households for another thirty years. See Trichur (2012: 76). 
77 The HRS evolved from being absolutely illegal, to being partially legal, to eventually being promoted by the 
government. 
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incomes, the success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) also increased 
rural productivity and generated a huge surplus of farm laborers. In fact, the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) had in fact already spontaneously appeared in some 
rural regions early in the 1960s during Mao’s regime. However, it was not allowed or 
authorized by the central government and was soon criticized and forbidden due to the 
disturbance of “leftist” thought.
The Household Responsibility System (HRS) could be sustained and practiced 
by farmers due to the changing political interests of the late 1970s, gradually 
underpinning Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy of “four modernization” of agriculture, 
industry, science and technology, and the military. Coincidently, the innovative 
emergence and success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) constituted in 
part the decentralization promoted by the Party-state in the broader scope of economic 
reform. The success of rural reform since the late 1970s encouraged the central 
government to promote further reforms in the urban sector through a series of policies.
Before 1978, the state confiscated land in cities and proclaimed state ownership. The 
state allocated land use rights free of charge to socioeconomic units, called Danwei78, 
for an indefinite period, and the constitution banned land transactions. Land was 
neither considered a commodity nor an asset for producing economic wealth. The old 
land allocation system produced enormous land-use deficiencies. Under the planned 
economy, land value and land income were hidden in the overall profits of the state-
owned enterprises. Such as, the acquisition of a prime site for urban development was 
more or less reflected in the sequence of development, which was a random event that 
could not be explained by a transparent process and in many cases depended upon the 
political atmosphere prevailing at the time (Ding Chengri 2009: 112).
The land tenure system was first challenged when China adopted the open-door policy 
in 1978. The old land allocation system conflicted with the ultimate goal of economic 
reform to introduce a market mechanism in the allocation of resources to increase 
economic efficiency. The process of urban land reform went through many different 
stages. In the early period of reformation, “tax exemption” and “land-use right system” 
were first exercised in the “Special Economic Development Zones” in specially allocated 
areas along China’s east coast. The land use rights system, similar to the land leasehold 
system in Hong Kong, was first developed to accommodate the needs of foreign direct 
investments. (Ding Chengri 2009: 110)
78 Danwei (simplified Chinese: 单位; traditional Chinese: 單位).
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This early experimental reform of the land tenure system marked a new era of land 
policy: for the first time, land use rights and land ownership were separable. Its impact 
on land policy reform soon became profound.
The 1982 the Chinese Constitution recognized two kinds of land ownership: urban 
land is property of the state and rural land is collectively owned by the villagers79. 
The most significant changes to land policy occurred in the late 1980s. Within 
this framework, the bureau of land administration was established in 1986. The 
bureau was responsible for and in charge of land policy reform, land allocation, and 
acquisition, monitoring land development, comprehensive land-use plans, and the 
implementation of land laws. The Land Administration Law (or Land Management 
Law)80 passed in 1986 had legalized private organizations and individuals to access 
state-owned land in an attempt to develop the land market in China. However, the Law 
was in conflict with the Constitution of 1982 that banned any transferring of land-use 
rights. With additional amendments, the 1988 Constitution was the first national 
document that legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights; it 
also allowed the transfer of land use rights. A separation of land use rights and land 
ownership and the state’s remaining ownership of land not only avoided political 
turmoil but also helped to promote land market development. The 1988 Constitution 
and the Land Administration Law laid the foundation for land policy in the post-reform 
era. Although there is still no privately owned land in China, a land market has been 
created and land use rights entered the market under the policy of separation of use 
rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real estate companies, 
villages, individual farmers, and governments of all levels. These interest groups thus 
emerged with the rebirth of land as a market force in China, strongly influencing spatial 
development.
To provide concrete legal guidance, the State Council announced “The Provisional 
Regulation on the Granting and Transferring of the Land Rights over State-Owned 
Land in Cities and Towns” and enacted the regulation in 1991. The objectives of the 
provisional regulations was to reform the land-use system for state-owned land in 
79 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982, Ch. 1, Art. 10. 
80 Approved at the 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China on June 25th, 1986. Revised in accordance with the Decision on amending Land 
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China. Revised and adopted at the fourth Session of the Standing 
Committee of the ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 29th, 1998, to 
be put into effect as of January 1st, 1999. Revised at the 11th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress on August 28th, 2004. See more about Land Administration Law in Chapter 6.2.3 
System of Plans. 
i
 175 Contemporary Urban Development: Reformation and New Urban Phenomena
cities, to rationalize land development and land use, to enhance land management, 
and to promote urban construction and economic development.
According to the 1991 regulations, there are two kinds of land transactions. One 
is the sale of land-use rights and the other is the transfer of land-use rights. The 
former defines the “first” level land market, where a municipal government as a 
representative of the state sells land-use rights for a fixed period through auction, 
tender, or negotiation and where the state intends to control land markets through its 
monopolization of land supply. The transfer of land-use rights defines the “second” 
level of land market (Ding Chengri 2009: 112) where the government is not involved 
except for land registration, legal protection, and taxation (Liu Weixin and Xie Jingrong 
1994; Walker and Li Ling Hin 1994).
This marked the end of free land use and opened a new era of lawful transactions of 
urban land. There are three key features of China’s urban land-use reform. The first 
is land taxation, which requires all urban land uses, including both work units and 
individuals, to pay a land-use tax. The second is the separation of land-use rights 
from ownership so that the state retains ownership of the land and only the use right 
is leased. The third is a dual-track land system, in which the administrative land 
allocation of the pre-reform era and the newly established land leasing system coexist 
(Zhang Xin-Qiao 1997).
However, following the rapid urbanization and urban expansion in the mid-1990s, 
negatively, the unbalanced between rural and urban development was recognized 
as a negative result. Rapid urban expansion caused the depletion of farmland at an 
unprecedented rate due to the lack of a coherent legal framework to regulate urban and 
rural development. Ho (2001: 395) pointed out that despite the fact that substantial 
agricultural growth was generated predominantly by increased use of chemical fertilizers, 
land is still one of the basic inputs to farm production. The official figures mention a 
decrease of 4 percent in the total arable area over 1978-1996, an annual loss of 218,000 
ha81. The rapid reduction of farmland had alarmed top officials who believed that “self 
reliance” on agricultural crops for the country was important to maintain not only 
sovereignty but also social stability82. The government of China has pronounced concerns 
81 From the viewpoint of the government of China, the average area of farmland per capita is low; only one-third 
of the world average. Ho also emphasized that compared to a country with a strong export-oriented agricultural 
sector but with a much lower land per capita ration, such as the Netherlands it can be seen that taking the world 
average as the standard is irrelevant. 
82 Lester Brown (1995) shocked the Chinese government with his prediction that the People’s Republic would face 
critical food shortages. 
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about its ability to continue feeding a growing population due to the government 
targeted conversion of farmland to industrial and residential uses, especially in the most 
productive agricultural regions (Lichtenberg and Ding Chengri 2006).
In accordance with the Agricultural Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Land 
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China the intention is to practice special 
protection of basic farmland and promote sustainable development of agricultural 
production in a social and an economical sense. The State Council responded to the 
fast depletion of farmland by passing the “Basic Farmland Protection Regulations” 
in 1994. These regulations prohibit basic farmland conversion to non-agricultural 
activities and mandates countries and townships to designate the basic farmland 
protection districts in accordance with provincial farmland preservation plans83.
The law requires government at or above the county level to designate a basis farmland 
protection zone in every village or township; determination of basic farmland and 
designation of these farmland protection districts is subject to approval by higher 
government bodies up to the level of the State Council. In general, there are two kinds 
of basic farmland protection districts. The first level consists of high-quality land 
with high productive; the law prohibits converting such land to nonagricultural uses. 
The second level consists of good-quality land with moderate productivity; the law 
permits conversion of such land to nonagricultural uses under certain circumstances84 
(Lichtenberg and Ding Chengri 2006: 60). We can recognize, among the five classes of 
land, the fifth category empowers the government to determine when it is necessary 
without explicit definition, which indicate the macro-control of the state can be 
implemented adaptively. 
83 The Basic Farmland Protection Regulation applies to five classes of land: (1) ‘‘cultivated land’’ currently planted 
with food grains, cotton, and oilseeds; (2) ‘‘cultivated land’’ with good irrigation, drainage, and erosion control, 
along with medium and low quality land on which irrigation, drainage, and erosion control measures are being 
installed;(3) land planted with vegetables; (4) experimental plots for agricultural research and development; 
and (5) other cultivated land as determined by the State Council. See Lichtenberg (2006: 60).
84 The regulation further stipulates: (1) if the conversion of land within farmland districts is unavoidable in order 
to build national projects, such as highways, energy production or transportation, the state must approve the 
conversion of land parcels of more than 500 mu (1 mu is approximately equal to 666.7 m2, 15 mu is 1 ha) while 
the provincial governments must approve those of less than 500 mu; and (2) the same amount of farmland lost 
to conversion must be replaced by new farmland somewhere else. The act thus imposes a so-called ‘‘dynamic 
balance’’ (what in the US would be termed a ‘‘no net loss’’) policy the intent is to keep the total amount of basic 
farmland constant in the face of pressures from urbanization and infrastructure construction. See Lichtenberg 
(2006: 60).
i
 177 Contemporary Urban Development: Reformation and New Urban Phenomena
On the other hand, since the Household Responsibility System (HRS) has been 
practiced from 1983, government and other groups have undertaken extensive rural 
field researches. Many shortcomings related to rural land tenure security have been 
observed, including the short or uncertain length of the use term, the lack of written 
land-use contracts and the practice of frequent land readjustments etc. (Li Ping 2003). 
The legal framework of land use management is based on the revised Land 
Administration Law in 1998, which represented a watershed in the rural land tenure 
reform process85. Its objective is to cope with the rural and urban development and 
their interrelationship. It requires that annual quotas be set for land conversion 
from agricultural and unused categories into construction land (to accommodate 
the industrial, energy, transport and social projects set forth in the Five-Year Plans, 
sectorial plans and city development plans). Based on the annual quotas and the 
city development plans, the size and number, location, and character of grants and 
allocations of construction lands are fixed. On the other hand, the law also defines the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens, enterprises, and governmental agencies to achieve 
protection of environmentally and agriculturally important areas, and to promote 
market development, to encourage citizen involvement in the legislative process and to 
coordinate the planning and development of urban land (Ding 2003: 113).
Through the establishment of land-use management, land-use efficiency has 
improved and government revenues increased. Local authorities and agencies were 
main actors in the implementation of land reform, supported by reform of the fiscal 
system86. Together with the disposal rights of land granted by the Land Administrative 
Law, the role of the local government started to change. It also triggered the gradual 
reform of the housing sector while the state faced a severe housing shortage and 
allocated insufficient budget to construct more housing stock. It was not until 1998 
that the allocation of housing based on the state work-units (Danwei) was abolished. 
The objective of housing reform was to develop commodity housing to boost domestic 
demand and thus to stimulate economic growth. The direct housing distribution by 
work-unit (Danwei) employers came to an end while a multiple supply system was 
established, including state-supported affordable or low-cost commercial housing and 
high-standard commodity housing.
85 The revised Land Administration Law adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
28th August 1998. 
86  The main reason why the local government has encouraged privatization is because private firms are more 
productive which can significantly increase the budgetary as well as extra-budgetary revenues of the local 
government. See Li and Rozelle (2003: 1005).
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The adoption of the land-use rights system in China has had a remarkable influence 
on land development, government finance, real estate and housing development, 
infrastructure provision, and urban growth. However, like in any other country, 
it has negative side effects. Social inequity and injustice, urban-rural incoherent 
development, and speculation in the real estate market led to the restructuring and 
reshaping of the urban-rural landscape and in many cases, serious corruption became 
crucial for the government to combat in considering land reform policy. For the first 
time in modern Chinese history, land had value and was integrated as one of the most 
decisive entities in the urban-rural development. All these side effects accompanied 
the boosting urbanization under the market-driven land-use policy and will continue to 
challenge further land-use reform shall proceed.
In recent years, rural protests have become increasingly common as disgruntled 
farmers have demonstrated against illegal appropriations or corrupt local officials. At 
the same time, the creation of an urban real estate market saw an explosion of wealth 
in the cities that contributed to a sharp income divide between increasingly affluent 
city dwellers and impoverished peasants; tens of millions of mostly young farmers 
have flocked to cities in search of work, leaving plots of land to be tended by their 
elderly parents. Reducing the rural-urban income gap has been a major priority of the 
country’s leaders, but the gap has continued to widen in recent years and China has 
become one of the most unequal societies in the world87.
Increasing incomes in the countryside is a major part of the government’s effort to raise 
China’s domestic consumer spending at a time when the overall economy is slowing. 
More than 700 million people are still designated rural inhabitants, and their spending 
is minimal. Economists say that jumpstarting the rural economy is one way to offset 
the possibility of a recession, as exports are expected to slow because of the global 
financial crisis.
In 2008, the Chinese government announced a rural reform policy that for the first time 
would allow farmers to lease or transfer land-use rights, a step that advocates say would 
raise lagging incomes in the Chinese countryside. Under the new policy, the government 
will establish markets where farmers can “subcontract, lease, exchange or swap” land-
use rights or join cooperatives. The fate of this reform program in the future is uncertain.
87 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security’s 2011 Salary Report shows the growth in the people’s 
income has seriously lagged behind the growth in national GDP and fiscal revenue. While the government’s 
treasury increased by 20.4 percent from 2003 to 2011, the people’s average income growth was 13.7 percent. 
China’s overall economic growth over the past three decades has been excellent, but it has been accompanied by 
a widening wealth gap. (China Daily 2012-12-31) See more about rural-urban migration in Chapter 5.4
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Critics had warned that weakening the existing system of collective village 
ownership could deprive peasants of the security of having a piece of land 
and possibly lead to millions of landless farmers. But the existing system has 
become rife with corruption, as local officials and developers have illegally 
seized farmland for urban expansion while paying minimal compensation to 
the farmers. (New York Times 2008) 
Should the country return land to farmers and establish a primary land market, or 
just fix the existing system by limiting reform? Most farmers and experts advocate 
distributing land ownership to each farmer equally and granting farmers the same 
equal political and economic rights that urban inhabitants have been enjoying.
An encouraging element in the decision of the last party plenum was the admission 
that “the urban-rural dualist structure is a great contradiction”, along with the pledge 
to “break this structure by integrating urban-rural socio-economic development”. The 
government will also implement the rectification and registration necessary to issue 
titles for rural land use rights. People now ponder what China’s legislature should do 
next. Perhaps it should revise the related laws such as the Land Administration Law and 
the Property Law and remove the many restrictions imposed on peoples’ rights to their 
rural land.
Based on increasing awareness of the importance of property rights and secure access 
to land for sustainable economic growth, the above briefly highlighted rural and urban 
land reform in China provides insights in a process of legal change which, starting 
from a completely collective structure in the late 1970s, has gradually increased 
the security of property rights, aiming to facilitate a higher level of land transactions 
and to limit arbitrary political interference. After all, to secure farmers’ rights, it is 
critical that the central leadership takes the lead in clarifying the legal boundaries 
of collective ownership. The Chinese government is confronting the responsibility 
to shape the future institutional framework for land policy and administration and 
guarantee its social credibility88 (Ho, 2001). To what extend could political intervention 
and institutional reformation be recognized to accommodate the transformation of 
new demands? 
88 Based on FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) statistics, (1) the yields of maize and wheat almost tripled, 
and the yields of rice almost doubled in China from 1965 through 2002; and (2) China is currently one of the 
countries with the highest yields in the world, more than double of those in African countries. See Yu Xiaohua 
(2009:633). The disparity between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector will increase due 
to resource constraints in agriculture after economic takeoff. So far, China might temporarily solve the main 
shortage of the food problem by a continuous increase in yields; however, China currently is urgently facing the 
poverty problems of farmers.
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§ 5.2 Political Reformation: The Relaxation of State Control 
The period since 1978 has been characterized by a rapid surge of the number of 
designated cities as a result of both the relaxation of state control over city designation 
and the operation of spontaneous forces of market reform and globalization. Lin 
(2002a) concluded this remarkable reversal has been inseparable from the three 
powerful forces: the state shifting the emphasis of development from the interior to 
the eastern coast; phenomenal growth of rural industries; and the relaxation of state 
control over the upgrading of towns into cities89.
This resulted in two major developments. First, existing cities of different sizes 
have expanded both in population and land area; second, a large number of newly 
designated cities have been added to the existing system of cities. The change of the 
political-economic interest also strongly influenced the direction of urban development 
as well as urban planning. Unlike the previous Maoist period, it unveiled that structural 
and spatial changes of Chinese cities over the past three decades have been shaped by 
the re-articulation of the socialist state, whose functions shifted from interventional 
to regulatory. The transition of power from the Maoist ideological plan to the post-
Maoist market/regulatory regime has ushered a new development strategy that values 
efficiency over equity, individual creativity over collectivism, and regional comparative 
advantages over considerations of defense or ideology (Fan, 1995 and 1997; Lin, 1997 
and 2002a).
The basic national development policy for China is embedded in the adaptive guidance 
of the planned economy; in general, there are six stages of political-administrative 
reformation90. The reforms have displayed a cyclical pattern of centralization and 
decentralization of administrative functions that reflect the efforts of the Chinese 
leadership to find an “optimal” balance between central control and subnational 
limited autonomy.
89 Upgrading town into city means to relocate the central resources by allowing more towns to get the adventaged 
status of urban function. 
90 The division is in general based on the different political directions, which had been announced by the Central 
Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China.
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The first stage of institutional reformation: 1982 
In December 1978, during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, the main national policy emphasized 
economic reform. Within five years, the number of the institutional departments within 
the State Council had expanded to 100 units, and the total number of employees 
reached 500,000, the peak of governmental organization after 1949.
Governmental institutions below the central level were regulated by the provisions of 
the State Constitution of 1982. These provisions are intended to streamline the local 
state institutions and make them more efficient and more responsive to grassroots 
needs; to stimulate local initiative and creativity; to restore prestige to the local 
authorities that had been seriously diminished during the Cultural Revolution; and 
to aid local officials in their efforts to organize and mobilize the masses. As with other 
major reforms undertaken after 1978, the principal motivation for the provisions was 
to provide better support for the ongoing modernization program.
In 1982, to adapt to the increasing economic development and to reduce the 
governmental overhead, the departments of the State Council were reduced to 61 units. In 
general, during this period, the real reformation of the functions of governmental did not 
occur; it still embodied in the unity of governance and management.
Another administrative reform directly related to economic modernization was the 
establishment in 1979 of the special economic zones, which included Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, and Shantou, all in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. 
Supervising China’s special economic zones were the Guangdong provincial committee, 
headquartered in Shenzhen, and the Xiamen Construction and Development 
Corporation. The Guangdong provincial committee controlled Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and 
Shantou and shared its authority over Shekou (a small port zone within Shenzhen) with 
the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company. The latter was a Hong Kong subsidiary 
of China’s Ministry of Communications that had been empowered in 1979 to negotiate 
all foreign ventures in Shekou.
The special administrative region, another administrative unit, was developed to 
serve foreign policy goals. Article 3191 of the State Constitution of 1982 empowers 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) to enact laws to establish special administrative 
91 “The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special 
administrative regions shall be prescribed by law, enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the 
specific conditions.”
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regions to accommodate local conditions. Hong Kong came under this rule when 
Britain transferred its sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997, as delineated in the Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, signed on September 26, 1984. Macao 
was slated to become a special administrative region on December 20, 1999, when 
Portugal was to transfer governmental authority over Macao to China, as stipulated in 
the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao, initialed on March 26, 1987. In 1986 
and 1987, the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office was drafting the 
Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which would define Hong 
Kong’s system of government. The new law was due for completion in 1988.
The second stage of institutional reformation: 1988
In 1986, due to the demands of the urban-economic development, the units of the 
departments of the State Council had again increased to 72. It showed that without 
the decentralization of governance and management, it was impossible to cope with 
the real demands of the economic development. The lesson learned was that the 
reformation had to be embedded in the functional-intuitional transformation of 
the state governance both in its roles of governance and management. Within this 
framework, it was the first time that the institutional reformation had applied the 
concept of division of governmental functions between governance and management. 
The state control of governance gradually ceded legal rights to the entrepreneurial 
institutes, including private and governmental enterprises, to participate in marketing 
practices.
The first two stages of reformation can be defined as the early stage of the exploration 
of the opening-up policy (Feng Xianxue 2001: 72). However, the confusion about the 
practice of marketing capitalism remained and resulted in conflicts among the ruling 
group as well as the people. Voices argued that China was heading into the direction 
of capitalism. Therefore, in January 1992, Deng Xiaoping inspected south China and 
delivered a series of speeches to clarify the muddled idea about whether China’s reform 
was related to capitalism or socialism. Deng Xiaoping’s speeches clearly defined the 
term of “building up socialism with Chinese characteristics” and Marxism in terms of 
history and philosophy92.
92 Within this framework, the Research Center of Deng Xiaoping’s theory at Peking University was founded in 
1993. This center became the key research center base authorized by the Department of Education in the field 
of national colleges and universities.
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The third stage of institutional reformation: 1993 
The big ideological breakthrough occurred after all this in the Fourteenth Party 
Congress held in September 1992 when the Party, for the first time, endorsed the 
“socialist market economy” as China’s goal of reform. The watershed historic decision 
of November 1993, “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist 
Market Economic Structure”, was adopted by the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The November 1993 decision is a historic 
event because it constitutes a real strategic shift in the course of China’s reform. For 
the first time, it decided in essence to abolish the planning system altogether and set 
the goal of reform to be the establishment of a modem market system that would 
eventually incorporate international institutions recognized as “best practice” (Qian 
Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 6).
To adapt the reformation to promote a marketing economy within a “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” framework, the third stage focused mainly on deeper 
institutional changes of governmental function. It changed the role of government 
from controller to regulator, which main task was to provide guidance on a micro 
scale by decentralizing the direct control of the entrepreneurial activities as well as 
decentralizing the management to various newly established institutes.
The most significant effect is the rapid rise of the “non-State sector” (Qian Yingyi and 
Xu Chenggang 1993; Wu Weiping 1999). The non-State sector includes a variety of 
ownership enterprises, such as collectives, cooperatives, private businesses, joint 
ventures with foreign firms, and sole foreign invested firms. The non-State enterprises 
soon became the initial engine of growth and industrialization and growth. In 1978, 
the share of the State sector in industrial output was 78 percent of the national total; 
by 1993 it was down to only 43 percent. China’s market development was also pushed 
by its quick expansion of foreign trade. Due to the opening-up policy, both export and 
import increased much faster than the GDP. The export to GDP ratio increased from 
less than 5 percent in 1978 to more than 20 percent by early 1990.
In general, even though the third reformation emphasized the fundamental change 
of the role of the government, in practice, reformation progressed mainly in the areas 
of economic measures in order to serve a market economy. The application of the new 
political-institutional reformation was as yet unable to completely free the government 
from its double role as controller and player.
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The fourth stage of institutional reformation: 1998
The Third Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in 1998 decided the reformation had to be continued to realize the division between 
governance and management—especially in the practicing of marketing. The main mission 
of the government was clearly defined: to provide political guidance and public management 
and service. The management of marketing practices belonged to the entrepreneurial 
institutions—including private or government-owned enterprises. The reformation of this 
stage was broad, including administrative (re-)organizations of the institutes of governance 
and management as well as the installation of a new institutional mechanism. The scope 
and scale of this stage were further developed than the previous ones.
The second major breakthrough of the Fifteenth Party Congress, which was somewhat 
overshadowed by the ownership issue but nevertheless more important, was its explicit 
emphasis on the rule of law. However, “The rule of law is not the same as democracy. 
Chinese leadership seemed to decide to give priority to the rule of law rather than 
democracy: the rule of law is clearly crucial for a modern market economy, but not 
directly and immediately threatening the governing power of the party.” (Qian Yingyi 
and Wu Jinglian 2000: 11) 
In view of the increasing non-state sectors, both private ownership and the rule of 
law were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution in March 1999. An 
amendment to Article 11 placed private business on an equal footing with the public 
sector by changing the original clause “the private economy is a supplement to public 
ownership“ to “the non-public sector, including individual and private business, is an 
important component of the socialist market economy.” Furthermore, Article 5 of the 
Chinese Constitution was amended to include the principle of “governing the country 
according to law and establishing a socialist, rule of law country.” These Constitutional 
amendments were a major step in China’s transition to a full market system based on 
the rule of law (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000).
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The fifth stage of institutional reformation: 2003
Following the fourth reformation, the fifth made governmental organizations more 
transparent and efficient. Compared to the previous reformation, the global context 
was different. China had become a member of the Word Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. Jiang Zemin’s report delivered at the Sixteenth Central Committee Congress of 
the Communist Party of China in 2002 emphasized seeking truth from the facts: “The 
Chinese Communists will creatively combine socialism with market economy, opening 
up the glorious history of national revival.”93 In the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2003, a fine-tuning of the 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” is defined; after twenty-five years of market 
economy practices, China proved that the socialist market economy system was possible.
In this stage of the reformation, China demonstrated its success to the world. After 
years of development, China’s food and clothing and overall well being had improved. 
It was the first time that China’s GDP had exceeded $1 trillion and the per capita GDP 
exceeded $800; the people were becoming more affluent. Measured on a purchasing 
power parity (PPP) basis, China in 2007 stood as the second-largest economy in the 
world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-
income. Annual inflows of foreign direct investment in 2007 rose to $75 billion. By the 
end of 2007, more than 5,000 domestic Chinese enterprises had established direct 
investments in 172 countries and regions around the world94.
The sixth stage of institutional reformation: 2008 
To increase the reform of the socialist market economy and to enhance a balanced rural-
urban development was the key issue of the sixth stage of reform. In the Third Plenum 
of the Seventeenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
2008, the main agenda was to study the problem of rural reform and development. The 
National Party Congress (NPC) proposed a moderately prosperous society and a sound 
strategic plan for the socialist market economic system and then approved the socialist 
market economic system goals, tasks, guiding ideology, and principles. It proposed that 
to improve the socialist market economic system, a deeper understanding of the laws of 
a socialist market economy was necessary, as was reform of institutions to better allocate 
93 Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-off Society in the All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics,” report delivered at the Sixteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist 
Party of China in 2002. 
94 Economy Overview, World Factbook, 2008. Posted at: http://www.bartleby.com/151/fields/68.html. 
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resources to basic roles. Macroeconomic control had gained experience even though the 
rapid economic growth led to the emergence of unstable and unhealthy factors. The State 
Council would apply more legal and necessary administrative means, timely control, and 
fewer ups and downs of the economy, helping China’s economy to become more stable 
and to grow more quickly for several years.
After the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping gained power in 1978, the Chinese 
government began to shift its focus from class struggle to economic development, 
from social and spatial equality to economic growth (Lin, 2002a). The socialist Chinese 
government that desperately wanted to demonstrate its legitimacy and superiority had 
to deal with the balance between social and spatial equality on the one hand and the 
need for economic efficiency in urban development on the other. Therefore, no single 
factor, whether ideological conviction or rational economic consideration, is able to 
claim sole responsibility for the process of China’s urbanization.
I would argue that the experimental “doing by learning” initiatives from the bottom-
up within a top-down policy show that changes in the Chinese urban development 
strategy from the socialist era to the reform era are in fact a continuation of this 
struggle. For more than thirty years, the Chinese socialist market economy has not only 
proved the success of enhancing the general Chinese welfare in a radically globalizing 
society but has also demonstrated that the Chinese characteristics of evolutionary 
modernization, with their specific conditions, can contribute to set up a scale and scope 
of reformation that the Western countries could not possibly imagine, let alone realize.
However, political and economic reform is a complex issue, and in many imbalance and 
conflict cannot be predicted in advance in an ever more complex global environment. 
The Chinese reformation approach to a certain degree has proved that advancing the 
reform of the political initiative could reduce unnecessary conflict in society and avoid 
public demands while reducing the risk of one-sided interests becoming dominant—
either from the government or from the private market.
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§ 5.3 Economic Reformation: Crucial Economic Measures and the Reform of 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Political reform cannot be sustained without corresponding economic measures 
and vice verse. Besides the fundamental land reform system, within the economic 
framework, two economic sectors—State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and housing 
reform illustrate how the former planned economy gradually became a market 
economy; corresponding to this transformation, related financial systems were 
established.
In the late 1970s, the state was the dominating sector. One crucial reform relates 
to the privatization of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rise of the non-state 
sector.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are those that are wholly or mainly owned 
by the central (state), provincial, or municipal government. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) used to be the most important actors of the economy, accounting for 90 percent 
of the output in 1980 and employing the majority of the urban work force. Before 
the reform, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were directly controlled and managed by 
the government. There are two separate worlds in the state sector: one of small and 
medium State-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the supervision of local governments, 
and another of large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the central government. 
Small and medium State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often located in competitive 
industries, such as machinery, electronics, textiles, and food processing. The central 
government supervises most very large enterprises in natural monopoly industries 
such as telecommunications and railroad transportation and in government monopoly 
industries such as airlines, banks, electricity, oils and petrochemicals (Cao Yuanzheng 
1997).
The economic reformation was crucially related to the reform of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the emerging engine of economic growth based on the 
performance of non-state sectors. The reform of China’s state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) since the mid-1980s played a critical role in China’s economic growth in later 
years (Figure 5.1) (Kang Yong et al. 2008).
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Figure 5.1 China’s Industrial Output, by ownership in 1985  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2008).
In May 1984, the State Council issued “On Regulations of Further Expanding 
Autonomy of State-owned Enterprises,” which allowed State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
more autonomy in production plan and profit retention. Due to the success of the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS), the government started promoting a “contract 
responsibility system” in the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by installing 
financial incentive measures, which allows each state enterprise to keep the remaining 
profit for distribution to its staff and workers and for capital investment after paying 
a fixed tax to the government having jurisdiction over it. By the end of 1987, about 
80 percent of the large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises (SOEs) adopted 
a “contract responsibility system,” and by 1989, almost all State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) adopted this system (Wang Xiaozu 2003; Chow 2004).
 In 1990, China formally established the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)95, and a new government body, the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), as the country’s main regulators of the 
newborn stock market. Within this framework further measures were adopted by 
the Chinese government in reforming State-owned enterprises (SOEs). One of the 
first steps was to publicly list these state-owned companies in both domestic and 
foreign stock exchanges to turn formerly State-owned enterprises (SOEs) into modern 
shareholding companies and improve their efficiency along the lines of “expanding 
95 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established on November 26, 1990 and began operations on December 
19 of the same year. It is a membership institution. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was established on 
December 1, 1990. Both are directly governed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
i
 189 Contemporary Urban Development: Reformation and New Urban Phenomena
enterprise autonomy and increasing profit incentives.” In July 1992, the State Council 
issued “Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanism of State-Owned 
Industrial Enterprises,” granting State-owned enterprises (SOEs) further rights to set 
their own prices and wages, hire and fire labor, and invest in fixed capital and foreign 
trade.
In general, prior to 1992, even though the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform had 
been promoted for about a decade, the core of central planning remained. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were still controlled by the State and the Party in an old-fashioned 
way, if not in daily operation, then certainly in strategic decisions. Top managers were 
still appointed by the Party. And new market-supporting institutions were not built 
yet to replace the old planning institutions, including the marketing-supporting fiscal 
system, financial system, social security system for private investments, and legal 
system (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000).
Economic reform in the earlier stages had reflected the constraints of the confusion 
within the political consensus. The reform was not intended to change the state’s 
ownership, but rather to remedy the inefficiency of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Similar to the political reformation, in the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping initiated his 
famous southern tour to mobilize local support for further and more radical reform. 
The clear direction of the overall reformation was set. The mindset of the leadership 
started to change. In combination with the political reform and the decentralization 
(the third stage of institutional reform in 1993), local governments gradually were 
allowed to have an independent plan as well as autonomy in economic management.
The political will of the Party strongly influenced the steps of the economic reform. 
In 1993, the Communist Party’s Economics and Finance Leading Group, headed by 
Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin, worked together with economists to prepare a 
grand strategy of transition to a market system. The final outcome was the “Decision 
on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure”, 
adopted by the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993 
(Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 9). This document was to replace China’s 
centrally planned system with a modern market system and incorporate international 
institutions recognized as best practices; this landmark document represented a 
turning point in China’s road to a market economy. Based on the promotion of a “rule 
based system”, the decision called for building market-supporting institutions In this 
stage a series of reforms was launched, according to the November 1993 decision, 
beginning in January 1994, mainly in five areas: foreign exchange and external sector 
reform, tax and fiscal reform, financial reform, state-owned enterprise reform, and the 
establishment of a social safety net (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 18).
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Qian Yingyi (2000: 20) pointed out:
In 1994, China introduced major tax and fiscal reforms more aligned with 
international practices. This reform introduced a clear distinction between 
national and local taxes and established a national tax bureau and local tax 
bureau, each responsible for its own tax collection. This tax reform has made 
it very difficult for local government to erode national taxes as they did in the 
past. Reform also established fixed tax rules between the national and local 
governments. For example, under the new system, the value-added tax (VAT) 
became the major indirect tax shared by the national and local government at 
a fixed ratio of 75:2596.
In addition, reforms of the banking system were gradually undertaken by giving a 
framework of law when the People’s Congress passed respectively the Law on The 
People’s Bank of China (effective on the same day) and the Commercial Banking Law 
(effective July 1, 1995).
Related to the fiscal and tax reform policy, the central government put forth a series of 
policies to expand the power of local authorities in local finance (Lin et al. 2003) and 
decided to transformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into “modern enterprises” 
with “clarified property rights, clearly defined responsibility and authority, separation 
of enterprises from the government and employing scientific internal management” 
(Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 6).
In addition, local authorities opened their doors to the outside world, fully utilizing 
local resources and enhancing the performance of the non-state sectors. Industrial and 
commercial taxes were the major contributors to the government revenue. A negative 
effect was generated by the competition in financial performance, which focused 
mainly on short-term, quick revenue-generating projects rather than on investing in 
long-term, production-enhancing projects. The state was confused as to its role as a 
regulator and social planner to maximize the aggregated social welfare, versus its role 
as an investor to maximize shareholder profit. Non-state institutional investors and 
individual investors, confined by their lack of power in governance as well as insufficient 
legal protection, usually ended up engaged in speculative behavior rather than 
investment behavior (Kang Yong et al. 2008).
96 Under central planning, China had never had a national tax bureau, and there was no such need because all 
taxes were collected by local governments and turned over to the central government. After the 1979 reform, 
local governments often used their authority to reduce or exempt taxes that were supposed to be paid to the 
central government. 
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The first comprehensive law, “Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China”, which 
fully delineated the rights and responsibilities of modern companies in China, was 
issued in 1993 and marked the beginning of experimentation in modern enterprise 
structure. More importantly, it was the first major business law in China that did not 
differentiate legislation for companies based on their ownership structure. Instead, the 
1993 Companies Law classified companies into two groups: limited liability companies 
and joint stock limited liability companies, based on the number of shareholders. This 
law was regarded as a major step toward the modernization of Chinese enterprise 
legislation97 (Wang and Cui 2006).
Furthermore, following the Asia financial crisis in 1997, the export industry declined, 
and millions of Chinese workers were laid off from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 98. 
The Third Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party 
of China in September 1997 made another major breakthrough in ownership issues: 
state ownership was downgraded to a “pillar of the economy” and private ownership 
was elevated to an “important component of the economy”. While in 1993, state 
ownership was still regarded, as a “principal component of the economy” while private 
ownership was a “supplementary component of the economy” 99 (Qian Yingyi and Wu 
Jinglian 2000: 10).
During this period, the Fifteenth National Party Congress further promoted the 
privatization of small State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by putting forward the slogan 
of “grasping the large State-owned enterprises (SOEs), letting go the small State-
owned enterprises (SOEs),”100 which encouraged “small or medium size” State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to become private; only about 1,000 State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were considered “large” and had to remain state-owned.
Within this framework, ownership reform became a focus of State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) reform, and shareholding companies became the main form of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). However, large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were still under the 
97 In the past, Chinese enterprise laws were enacted according to the type of ownership: examples are the Sino-
Foreign Joint Enterprises Law (1979), Foreign Companies Law (1986), SOEs Law (1988), Temporary Regulations 
of Privately Owned Enterprises (1988), and Rules for Rural Collectively Owned Enterprises (1990).
98 Laid off or Xiagang (chinese: 下崗). By 1996 it appeared that a soft landing of the economy had been achieved, 
It was widely anticipated that the economy was in a position for a soft take off thereafter. However this has not 
eventuated, and instead a further slowdown of the economy is occurring.
99 Both the rule of law and private ownership were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution 1999. 
100 Zhua da fang xiao (Chinese: 抓大放小). 
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management of the central government with regard to their importance to national 
security and the lifeline of the national economy.
In 2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Congress issued a “Decision Concerning 
Issues of Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy System”. For the first time, the 
Party acknowledged property rights as the “core issue” of ownership reform and made 
building a “modern system of property rights” an important task of future reform. 
Furthermore, the Party promoted a “mixed economy”; it put private enterprises 
on equal footing with State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in terms of financing and 
taxation.101 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform demonstrated again how the incremental 
reform approach was highly related to the incremental mindset and the political will of 
the leadership, reacting to economic reality. The primary political objective of the Party 
was maintaining its power and successfully applies macro-stablization policy action. 
The lesson that the Chinese leadership had learned from the past was that maintaining 
economic development is the key to maintaining power, and the crucial criterion is 
always based on the dynamic balance between the decentralization of central power 
and the concentration of local power. Incremental reform avoided the central power 
losing economic control too quickly over public or non-state sectors; this avoided 
threats to the national security102.
A similarly gradual development of reform occurred in housing reform. As soon as the 
Chinese government launched its economic reform in 1979, housing reform was put 
on the agenda.
Before the economic reform, the urban housing sector had been subjected to heavy 
subsidizing. Housing was considered as a “non-productive sector” and thus deemed 
a low priority compared to other capital investments (Zhou Yu 1999). Under the old 
101 For further economic reform of ownership and the development of China’s stock market, see Wang Xiaozu 
(2003).
102 On the other hand, in the previous ten years, it is recognized that the supercharged SOEs have become the 
main problem of Chinese political economy. The Communist Party has become a deeply entrenched political 
interest, a privileged class that will find reform fundamentally detrimental to its existing privileges and interests. 
Pei Minxi argued, “If you look at state-owned enterprises, the bureaucracy, the local government, the military, 
there’s one line that runs through all of them, that’s the Communist Party.” (China Real time Report 2012, 
November 12). Ma Damein said, “the power of SOEs has been supercharged since the state used them as 
channels for stimulus money during the economic crisis. The growth of this money allowed them reversed the 
trend towards a largely private economy- and further increased SOEs’ already powerful political pull.” (China 
Power 2011, August 20). 
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system, housing was treated merely as a component of social welfare and was provided 
mostly for free by government institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As 
the nominal rent collected did not cover the cost of basic maintenance, there was little 
incentive for housing investment and improvement of these “work unities” (Danweis). 
The per capita living space, for example, declined from 4.5 square meters in the early 
1950s to 3.6 square meters in the late 1970s (Li Rongxia 1998).
In the early stage, even though several experiments were carried out in selected areas 
to test the feasibility of various public housing reform measures, a nationwide housing 
reform did not begin until the “Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System 
Reform in Cities and Towns” was issued by the State Council in 1988. This document 
marks a turning point in the urban housing reform from pilot tests and experiments in 
selected cities to overall implementation in all urban areas (Zhou Yu 1999: 18). As a 
result, public housing units throughout the country were sold to their sitting tenants at 
discount prices, and for those that could not be sold, the government raised the rent. 
But the efforts were insufficient to compensate for the deficit of maintenance.
Within this framework, work units during this period still treated housing provision as 
their core obligation. Enjoying the new fiscal freedom resulting from economic reform, 
many work units significantly expanded housing production for their employees. 
Housing thus continued to be allocated as a welfare good, rather than as a commodity 
traded on the private market. Public housing stock grew to an unprecedented level 
(Deng Lan et al. 2009).
In 1992, a more radical phase of China’s reform began. The official announcement of 
the transition from the socialist planned economy to a “socialistic market economy” 
greatly accelerated the market-oriented reform, but also brought the socialistic public 
housing system to its epilog in 1998 (Hui Xiaoxi 2012: 105).
In 1994, the Chinese central government issued “The Decision on Deepening the 
Urban Housing Reform”, which established a comprehensive framework for further 
housing reform. Within this framework, the government decided to build a multi-
layer housing provision system for different income groups. From the supply side, the 
Economic and Comfortable Housing (ECH) was introduced, by providing subsidized 
housing units, and in combination with the Housing Provide Fund (HPF) from the 
demand side, potential homebuyers would get subsidized mortgage loans. In addition, 
there were five policy measures included the Co-ownership of Housing Responsibility, 
Housing Provident Fund as a Cornerstone in the Reform, Socialization and 
Professionalization of Housing Management, Selling of Former Public Rental Housing 
to Sitting Tenants, and More Housing for Middle-and Low-Income Groups (Li 2007: 7).
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The overall objective behind all these efforts is to establish a functional housing market 
so that families could purchase housing directly from the market and work units would 
be relieved of their housing responsibility. Unfortunately, this did not happen easily. 
In 1996, 3 billion square meters of residential units have been finished. The average 
of urban per-capita living space was raised to 8.47 square meters. Nevertheless, 
there were still 50 million square meters of unsold housing. Although a quasi-urban 
housing market had been established, most participants in the market were not yet 
individual buyers. Instead of being sold to individual urban families, most of the 
newly built housing units were purchased by work units, which then resold them at 
enormously discounted prices to their employees (Wang Yaping and Murie 1996). One 
of the recognized reasons was that, although the increased average income in urban 
areas had made the progress of urban housing reform possible, during the 1980s and 
1990s, most families spent their savings on consumables including electronic goods. 
Concurrently, most people were still unwilling to purchase their homes. Therefore, 
most participants in the market were not yet individual buyers. (Zhou Yu 1999: 20).
In 1998 the Chinese central government decided to take abrupt action to cut the 
link between work units and housing provisions. Specifically, A Notification from the 
State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and 
Accelerating Housing Construction was issued. This notice prohibited work units from 
building or buying housing units for their employees. Instead, they would have to 
provide monetary subsides to their employees to help them buy homes on the market. 
(Deng Lan et al. 2009: 5).
Being embedded in a broader context, Lee (2006) observed that the 1998 reform 
followed the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997 and corresponded to the poor performance 
of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). China needed a new growth strategy that would 
stimulate domestic demand; the housing industry was chosen as the new growth 
engine. As a result, the Chinese government decided that it was time to terminate 
the old system and switch from in-kind housing provision to a cash-based housing 
subsidy103. Hui Xiao-xi (2012:106) pointed out the termination of the socialistic public 
housing system, as well as the large-scale housing privatization, by the radical housing 
reform in 1998 was an integral part of the economic stimulus plan.
103  While redefining the role of work units in the housing system, the 1998 reform also called for significant 
expansion of the two major housing programs created in 1994, ECH and HPF. By expanding the two programs, 
the Chinese government hoped to enable most urban households to purchase housing produced by private 
developers. Deng Lan et al. (2009: 5).
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In addition, decentralization of the government in housing reform allowed local 
government to adopt local conditions. Corresponding to the local governments, the 
representatives of the state are in charge of expropriating rural land for urban uses and 
allocating it to different users. Local government by controlling both the land supply 
and the zoning regulations can decide what can be built under their jurisdictions, 
subject to the requirements of the central government. Even though the central 
government lays out the framework for housing reform, it commits only limited 
resources; local governments are asked to pay for most of the costs involved in reform. 
This stimulated the local initiatives to cope with the central policy by installing local 
measures. Therefore, there has been considerable local variation in the timetable and 
degree of reform. The divergent pattern of the resources available affects the options 
and strategies appropriate for different provinces and cities. So the legislative and 
regulatory framework has guided the direction of reform in local conditions, shaped by 
differences in practices and local policy.
For example, owing to their strategic location, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou 
witnessed large-scale expansion of the commercial sector. Reform policies in those 
cities had much to do with housing market finance and housing mortgage services to 
individual buyers. New policies were tested in these large cities before application to 
other smaller cities.
Today, the housing industry is the new engine of growth, and private market housing 
transactions are normal for the new middle class Chinese households. From 2000 to 
2004, China’s annual investment in real estate averaged about 746 billion Yuan and 
accounted for almost 7 percent of the nation’s GDP (Yeh et al. 2011). Urban residents’ 
living conditions have also significantly improved, and homes have become the new 
form of private property for urban Chinese104. Unfortunately, on the negative side of 
the real estate market, and in a sharp contrast with the initial economic improvement, 
housing inequality between urban and rural areas, rich and poor people was a more 
important form of economic inequality than income inequality in pre-reform urban 
China (Wang Feng 2003).
Both the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the housing reform illustrate 
that whether it is an “incremental reform” approach as with State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) or a “gradualist” approach as with housing reform, the Chinese government 
still has a tremendous need for improvement, resulting from the challenges in housing 
104 The floor space per capita, for example, increased from 18.7 square meters in 1998 to 24.97 square meters in 
2004.
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inequality, urban poverty, social segregation, how to accommodate housing needs 
for the continued urbanization process, or to manage the balance between market 
efficiency and political accountability. The major task is installing new measures to 
ensure social stability and legitimacy of the regime.
The government and the urban individuals had been moving away from a work 
organization-based employment and welfare provision system within the framework 
of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a result of the reform. Millions of rural laborers 
started to move into the urban centers to seek better economic opportunities and 
enhanced social status. All these structural changes have had profound impacts on the 
lives of Chinese citizens and the structural changes had profound social consequences 
that have redefined the Chinese social landscape. The major social structural changes 
results from the overwhelming rural migration and the rapid urbanization this causes.
§ 5.4 Social Reformation: Administrative Control of Migration and 
Urbanization
Although China has an urban tradition of thousands of years, modern urbanization 
of the country commenced rather late. Throughout most of its long recorded history, 
China has been an agrarian society. For thousands of years, Chinese people lived in the 
countryside and engaged in agriculture in a societal context that valued self-sufficiency. 
Cities and towns as marketplaces were never well established under the firmly 
entrenched “physiocracy” (Yeh et al. 2011: 1), an ideology that encouraged farming 
and restrained trade and commerce in feudal China. While entering the modern period, 
Mao also promoted an anti-urban ideology by introducing several anti-urban and 
anti-migration policies and sending young people from cities to work on farms in the 
countryside in 1960 to endure hardship and learn about hard work. As a result, China 
was still a predominantly rural society as late as the 1970s.
In 1978, only 172 million people (18 percent of the total population) lived in cities 
(China Statistic Yearbook 2001). However, after the reversal of Chinese policies in 1978 
and the opening-up of the country for market initiatives and foreign investments, the 
perspectives have changed profoundly.
Due to the market reform and the socialist economy, an accelerated urbanization 
was initiated that was unprecedented in the history of mankind (Logan 2002). There 
were doubts since the mid-1980s because of obviously exaggerated official estimates 
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of the size of China’s urban population105. However, the last census of 2011 showed 
China’s urban population at 665.790 million, reaching 49.68 percent of the entire 
population; 674.148 million persons were rural residents, accounting for 50.32 
percent (Statistic Communiqué of the P.R.C 2011). Compared with the 2000 census, 
the number of urban residents increased by 207.137 million and the number of rural 
residents dropped by 133.237 million. The proportion of urban residents rose by 13.46 
percentage points106. Since 1978, Chinese urban development has been characterized 
by a rapid surge of the number of designated cities as a result of both the relaxation 
of state control over city designation and the operation of spontaneous forces of 
market reform and globalization. Recognition of the inherent economic comparative 
advantage led to the open door policy through a strategy of gradualism, with an initially 
implemented in coastal cities before it was adopted nationwide (Lin, 2002b; Huang 
Youqin 2006).
The urbanization process is an inevitable outcome of the modernization of China. The 
definition of urbanization by the United Nations notes that the movement of people 
from rural to urban areas with population growth equates to urban migration. However, 
urbanization means not only the statistic migration from rural to urban areas; it also 
means an overall change of living conditions shifting from rural-agricultural to non-
agricultural urban welfare.
China’s urbanization has created a tension between the state and the individual. Until 
now, the Hukou (household or residential registration) system has served to bind 
individuals to the state as one of the major tools of social control107. 
105 Regarding how to define an “urban area” and what proportion of the population within that area should be 
counted as “urban” is particularly complicated in the case of China. In general, there are two criteria: the 
geographical definition of an urban area related to the actual spatial coverage of the built environment that 
has certain “urban“ characteristics, such as urban infrastructure or residential blocks. The second concern 
is the proportion of the population within the defined urban areas that should be counted as urban. In the 
case of China, it refers to the household registration or “Hukou” status. Yue et al. divided China’s post-reform 
urbanization into three main stages, according to the forces that affected it: rural urbanization driven by 
industrialization (1978-1987); urbanization driven by land reform (1988-2000); and urbanization driven by 
the service industry (2001-). Each of these three stages of post-reform urbanization had different impacts on 
the pace and reform of urban development. See Yeh et al. (2011: 2-3). 
106 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm.
107 The Hukou system (Chinese: 戶口) controls the household register system. It officially identifies a person as 
a resident of the specific area of birth, which provides the State with a mechanism to control the movement 
of people between urban and rural areas. Unlike population registration system in many other countries, the 
Chinese system was designed not merely to provide population statistics and identify personal status, but also 
directly to regulate population distribution and serve many other important objectives desired by the State. 
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The evidence shows that the Chinese urban development over the past few decades 
has been shaped by the state through the means of a nationwide investment strategy; 
the administrative changes and the reclassification of urban population and urban 
settlements were strongly related to the policy of relaxation of state control. The 
transformation of the administrative system had a decisive influence on the evolution 
of the Chinese city and social formation.
The Hukou system was introduced in the early 1950s, originally for population registration 
and later also for migration control108. However, as influxes of peasants into cities escalated 
and began to be a serious burden, the first set of Hukou legislation was promulgated by 
the National People’s Congress in 1958. This new legislation established a fully-fledged 
Hukou institution and granted state agencies much greater powers in controlling citizens’ 
geographical mobility through a system of migration permits and recruitment and 
enrolment certificates (Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang 1999).
The rigid Hukou system of registration prescribes where each individual will live 
and determines whether he or she will be an urban or a rural resident. There are two 
classifications of Hukou: Hukou identity, such as the agricultural Hukou population 
(Nongye109) and the non-agricultural Hukou (Fei Nongye); the other defines residential 
location. Individuals register their Hukou at an administrative unit, such as the Hukou 
of Beijing or Shanghai. A Hukou in each administrative unit can be either agricultural 
or non-agricultural. Holders of a non-agricultural Hukou received grain and other 
goods and services allocated by the state. Those holding an agricultural Hukou were 
assumed by the state to practice farming and so they received no allocated goods or 
services. In the pre-reform period, the categorization of Hukou type was an effective 
way of controlling the movement of populations into cities. As most goods and services 
were controlled by the state, people could not live in the cities without state-provided 
resources.
Within this system, all civil rights are tied to the place of registration and the urban 
citizens are privileged over the rural ones. In this way, the Chinese state created a 
highly unequal society in which people were categorized and divided based on their 
geographical location (Wallen 2009).
108 The Hukou system was first set up in cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955. The early 1950s was 
a period of relatively free movement into and out of the cities and throughout the countryside in China. The 
constitution promulgated in 1954 even guaranteed citizens’ rights of free residential choice and migration. See 
Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang (1999: 820). 
109 Nongye (simplified Chinese: 农业; traditional Chinese: 農業); Fei Nongye (simplified Chinese: 非农业; traditional 
Chinese: 非農業).
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The Hukou system is a unique institutional arrangement aimed at closely controlling 
population movement, but with the additional function of making sure that the 
great surplus of laborers in China is used in a way that benefits urban development. 
Under the Chinese Hukou system, all citizens must be registered, and every change of 
residency and location is closely monitored. Like all bureaucratic control systems, the 
Hukou system ultimately is a determining factor in the lives of the people110. The Hukou 
system fettered the mobility of labor, and the success of the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS)111 led to a proposal for reform that aimed to take pressure off surplus 
rural labor112. In 1984, the State Council issued a landmark policy that allowed holders 
of an agricultural Hukou to migrate to nearby market towns and other small towns as 
long as they could provide for their own livelihood. This loosened the constraint on 
migration. Subsequently, industrialization in these towns absorbed the labor surplus 
released from the countryside (Yeh et al. 2011: 9).
Early reform and urbanization were mainly triggered by rural reform. The degradation 
of control over the Hukou restriction contributed to the early urbanization and 
reform. In general, rural urbanization was driven by industrialization. The Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) and the promotion of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) enabled millions of farmers to continue living close to their home villages while 
working in rural industries.
Traditionally, in the Maoist period, all economic activities in the countryside were 
included in the system of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs). The people’s 
communes played a dual role in the rural areas: they were both the lowest government 
apparatus and the highest level of the rural collective system. The commune itself was 
organized hierarchically—the immediate subordinate units of the commune were 
110 The one-child policy is another example of the social regulations. It was introduced in 1978 and initially 
applied to first-born children 1979. It was created by the Chinese government to alleviate social, economic and 
environmental problems. It officially restricts married, urban couples to having only one child, while allowing 
exemptions for several cases, including rural couples, ethnic minorities and parents without any siblings 
themselves. 
111 Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform.. 
112 The HRS allowed individual households to take full charge of production on their allocated land plots; peasants’ 
initiative galvanized rural productivity and generated a huge surplus of farm laborers. The number of surplus 
rural workers exceeded 100 million each year between 1982 and 1987, accounting for 33.5 to 43.5 percent of 
the entire rural labor force. See (Ma and Lin 1993). 
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brigades, and at the bottom level of the collective hierarchy were production teams113. 
In addition to Mao’s policy of encouraging rural industries, the budgets of communes 
and brigades mainly came from the Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs). All 
of this gave the communes and brigades strong incentives to set up Commune and 
Brigade Enterprises (CBEs).
As a result of the success of the reform of agriculture the commune system was 
officially abandoned in 1984. Consequently, all the commune governments were 
converted into township governments and the brigades into villages. Commune 
and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) were officially renamed Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs). The major function of a township government was transformed 
from agriculture to managing or setting up Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs). Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are collectively owned enterprises 
located in townships or villages. All the people in the township or village that “set 
up” the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) own the firm collectively. A township 
government is regarded as the “representative” of the people in the community, and 
thus it is the de facto executive owner of the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) 
in the community. Typically, the control rights of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) are partly delegated to managers through a contract (officially called the 
management responsibility contract). It was common for employees of a Township and 
Village Enterprise (TVE) to collectively sign a contract with the executive “owner”—the 
township government (Weitzman and Xu 1994).
Yeh (2011: 12) summarizes that throughout the 1980s, the process of rural 
industrialization was based on the integration of the different decisive factors. Initially, 
rural reform generated surplus rural labor and supplied sufficient farm produce to 
sustain non-agricultural activities in towns and cities, and further, changes of the 
Hukou system facilitated rural migration to small towns. Both factors were supported 
by the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) system to ensure the flourish of 
rural industries, and the entrepreneurship of local leaders. Yeh characterizes the 
urbanization in this stage as an endogenous and spontaneous growth of rural 
industries in small towns, leading to the urbanization of the countryside (Figure 5.2).
113 The Production Team was formerly the basic accounting and farm production unit in the people’s commune 
system in People’s Republic of China from 1958 to 1984. Production teams were largely disbanded during the 
agricultural reforms of 1982-1985. In the administrative hierarchy, the team was the lowest level, the next 
higher levels being the production brigade and the people’s commune. Typically, the team owned most of the 
land and was responsible for income distribution. Since 1984, production teams have been replaced by village 
groups. 
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Figure 5.2 Process of rural industrialization. 
Source: Yeh et al. (2011: 12).
At this stage, the development of rural industries enabled millions of former farmers to 
continue living close to their home villages. It was recognized as “leaving the farm but 
not the village; enter the factory but not the city”. This urbanization brought on by rural 
industrialization and a shift of employment out of agriculture into non-agricultural 
sectors had been called “urbanization from below”. The aforementioned relaxation of 
upgrading town to city is called “urbanization from above”114 (Ma and Fan 1994). 
In the mid-1990s, the pace of rural industrialization began to slow down. This was 
mostly due to the competition from the enterprises in cities. Urban land reform, which 
was initiated in the late 1980s in combination with the housing reform, which began in 
the late 1990s had contributed to the rapid urban expansion (Yeh et al. 2011: 17).
The new opportunity of urban development provided new working opportunities for 
rural-to-urban migrants, much more strongly than in the previous period. According 
to the 2000 Census115, more than 30 percent of the Chinese population lived in 
114 To further promote the growth of small cities and towns, the government’s criteria for designating towns were 
relaxed in 1984, which led to a surge in the number of designated towns, which went from 2,781 in 1983 to 
6,211 in 1984, and to 9,121 in 1987. Between 1980 and 1994, 287 new cities were so designated (K. W. Chan 
1994).
115 China Urban Statistic Yearbook 2002.
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a place different from their birthplace. There are in 2001 an estimated 100–120 
million in the so-called floating population—temporary migrants looking for new job 
opportunities in cities. Rural-to-urban migrants unquestionably contributed to rapid 
urban development by providing labor, skills, and talents and by filling employment 
and service gaps in cities (Huang Youqin 2006; Yeh et al. 2011).
However, even though the relaxation of the restriction of the Hukou system had 
increased social benefits for rural-to-urban migrants, these migrants were still 
discriminated against by both existing institutions and permanent urban residents. 
Based on the Hukou system, there are “permanent migrants” who are able to change 
their registration to their destination cities, and “temporary migrants” who are 
registered at places other than their destinations. The latter constitute the majority 
of migrants in Chinese cities. Although permanent migrants enjoy employment 
opportunities and welfare benefits similar to those of urban residents, temporary 
migrants, who are mostly from the countryside, are not eligible for state employment 
and benefits in cities.
The disadvantage of the “temporary migrants” can also be found in the conditions 
of their temporary jobs, so called “3D jobs”: demanding, dangerous, and dirty (K, 
W, Chan 2001). They often cluster in a few undesirable occupational niches such as 
in construction work for men and sales, restaurants, and maid service for women 
(Huang, 2006). Normally, they cannot participate in the housing stock, such as the 
accessibility to subsidized housing, and the unreasonable development of the private 
rental market had become rigid, so they had no other choice but to choose unbearable 
living environments such as dormitories, trading markets, and construction sites. 
They also lacked access to government services such as health care, pension, and 
public schooling. Migrants are often blamed for rising crime rates, overcrowding, 
overburdening of the public facilities, and the deterioration of the urban environment, 
so local municipal governments have periodically attempted to deport them and 
demolish their settlements (Zhang Li 2002; Huang Youqin 2006). Thus, temporary 
migrants became the stigma of the cities. This top-down neglect has created enormous 
tension to urban planning practice and development; further, poses a serious threat for 
future social unrest.
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Another social group forced to participate in such urbanization are the urban 
villagers116, whose land has been taken away for city expansion. They lost their houses 
or production land. Migrants who come to the city have no rights to affordable housing; 
villagers who had built houses in their collective residential settlements provided a 
reasonable and affordable alternative shelter to migrants. This is a spontaneous and 
extremely innovative needs matching of two groups in the city. Ironically, both groups 
are not counted as urban populations in the hardcore urban demographical statistics; 
yet they are integrally embedded in the urban economy that would not be able to 
function without them.
At the same time, a similar social impact occurs in urban areas. Another special 
social formation is confronted by the transformation: the Danwei, the labor and 
neighborhood unit, the self-sufficient unit that provides its members with food, 
shelter and work, and assumed responsibility for all social security benefits up to and 
including pension. Since 1949, these multifunctional associations have developed 
within defined geographical areas; they were cities within a city. The Danwei system 
was an indispensable social building block that originated from the commune 
during the planned economy era, adopted from the Soviet model117. Since 1949, 
the Danwei communes have played important roles in planning urban expansion 
and suburbs. Today, their significance is declining as work and social services are 
becoming increasingly detached and from each other. The newly emerging private 
sectors provided more efficiency through independent entrepreneurship as the urban 
economy, due to current urban development, is more and more characterized by 
specialization.
Unlike the Danwei compound, as part of China’s overall market transition, housing 
reform has contributed to a rapid development of private housing and to a profound 
transformation of the urban landscape and socio-spatial structure. In the socialist era, 
housing was considered part of the social welfare benefits that the government should 
provide to its urban citizens. Through massive construction of public housing and 
the socialist transformation of existing private housing, the government successfully 
transformed a market-oriented housing system into a welfare-oriented system 
dominated by public rentals. At the beginning of reform in the 1980s, less than 20 
percent of all houses in China were privately owned. Housing reform brought both 
116 See further elaboration of urban villages in Chapter 8.4. 
117 Three categories can be found regarding their nuclei: communes established around state-run factories 
and mines, communes established around administrative organizations and universities, and communes 
established around residents of street areas. See Koshizawa (1978: 20). 
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negative and positive results to the social transformation. Per capita living space 
increased from 3.9 square meters in 1978 to about 10 square meters in 1998 (Chinese 
State Statistic Bureau 1999). Yet compared to international standards, housing 
consumption in urban China is still low, and Chinese households still suffer from severe 
residential crowding.
China’s relatively homogeneous urban society based on work-unit compounds was 
rapidly disappearing, and one with social separation and residential segregation 
emerged. With increasing globalization, Chinese urban residents got a taste of Western 
consumption and lifestyles. In addition to import of Western goods and recreational 
activities, they embraced the Western fast foods provided by major chains in the city. 
Luxury and leisure commercial activities became part of the daily lifestyle for urban 
citizens. All those changes within 20 to 25 years in the societal dimension asked for a 
new type of habitation and spatial configuration.
It remains unclear to what extent China’s increased urban population should be 
attributed to such factors as administrative changes and modification of the urban 
definition. Nevertheless, the outcome of continued economic development in the 
twenty-first century will be the massive economic and spatial transition from the rural 
to the urban sector if the current trend of market reform and the relaxation of state 
control continue (Lin, 2002b). Such a massive transition from rural to urban will pose 
great challenges not only to the Chinese decision makers but also to anyone concerned 
about the sustainability of global development in general and human habitats in 
particular. China’s renewal cannot be viewed apart from a worldwide civilization 
process that is complex and extreme. Radical urbanization will be inevitable due to the 
demographic developments, making urban planning a key to the future.
The social and spatial reformations are strongly interrelated systems. The social 
transformation has led to spatial reformation. With ongoing urban land reform that 
allowed land transactions and rent capitalization, large business and commercial 
centers that require intensive land use were developed and significantly change the 
skylines of many Chinese cities: new urban paradigms were emerging.
§ 5.5 Spatial Reformation: New Urban Paradigms 
Since institutional changes were initiated in 1978, the trend of structural and spatial 
redistribution of cities has shifted. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, three fairly distinct phases of development in geographic terms can be 
identified. First, soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country 
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was characterized by two distinct “poles”: the eastern coastal regions and the inland 
regions. Second, after the reform and opening up, the economic landscapes evolved 
and there were three geographical groups distinctive in character: eastern, western, and 
central. Third, in recent years, further spatial reconstruction was emphasized, namely a 
division of mega regional development and cooperative development among different 
regions, and between the cities and rural areas. Obviously, this remarkable reversal 
was inseparable from the political-economic forces of the state’s shifting development 
emphasis from the interior to the eastern coastal areas (Figure 5.3) (Lin 2002a).
Figure 5.3 China’s three macro-regions, Open Cities, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 
Source: Lin (2002a, Figure 2).
The geographical situation, drawing from the trend of geographical redistribution of 
cities, was reversed before and after the institutional changes of 1978. The distribution 
of cities shifted from the west to the east; the eastern region demonstrated the highest 
growth rate in terms of the addition of cities (Figure 5.4).
Whereas small cities suffered from contraction in the Maoist era, they became the 
most dynamic urban settlements with the highest annual growth rate; the small and 
medium size cities also showed a substantial increase in the total urban population at 
the expense of their large and extra-large urban counterparts (Table 5.1) (Lin 2002a).
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Figure 5.4 Growth of the number of cities in China 1978-1998. 
Source: Lin (2002a, Figure 5)
City Size Number of Cities Annual Growth (%)
(Non-agricultural  Population in City Proper) 1949 1978 1998 1949-78 1978-98
Extra-Large (> 1 million) 5 13 37 3.35 5.37
Large (0.5-1 million) 7 27 48 4.76 2.92
Medium (0.2-0.5 million) 18 60 205 4.24 6.34
Small (<0.2 million) 102 93 378 -3.18 7.26
Region 1949 1978 1998 1949-78 1978-98
East 69 69 300 0.00 7.63
Central 50 84 247 1.81 5.54
West 13 40 121 3.95 5.69
Total 132 193 668 1.32 6.40 
Table 5.1 Number of Chinese cities by sizes and locations, 1949-1998 
Source: Lin (2002), Table 1 (revised by author).
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Notably, extra-large cities enjoyed significant expansion because of their inherent 
advantages of agglomeration economies; these large urban settlements received more 
than 60 percent of all fixed asset capital invested in cities since the 1990s (Table 5.2).
Fixed Assets Investment Utilized Foreign Investment 
Billion Yuan Percent Billion US$ Percent









86.81 707.23 46.53 52.56 0.84 13.00 35.34 43.56
Large (0.5-1 
million)
31.14 184.49 16.69 13.71 0.28 4.87 11.68 16.33
Medium (0.2-
0.5 million)
53.61 340.65 28.74 25.32 0.90 8.89 37.88 29.79
Small (<0.2 
million)
15.00 113.22 8.04 8.41 0.36 3.08 15.11 10.32
Region East 117.58 874.60 63.03 65.00 2.23 26.10 94.54 87.44
Central 47.07 304.17 25.23 22.60 0.10 2.85 4.11 9.55
West 21.90 166.81 11.74 12.40 0.03 0,90 1.35 3.00
Total 186.55 1345.58 100.00 100.00 2.36 29.85 100.00 100.00
Table 5.2 Domestic and foreign investment in Chinese cities, 1990-1998 
Source: Lin (2002, Table 4), revised by author. 
As aforementioned in Chapter 5.4, the development of China’s small towns has been 
understood as primarily a bottom-up phenomenon facilitated by such forces as the 
spontaneous marketization of the rural economy and the dramatic growth of Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVEs)—due to the reduction of state involvement in local 
economic affairs and relaxed restrictions on village-town migration. With the result 
that this new urban paradigm polarized the co-existence of a dual-track system: on 
the one hand, a top-down manner from the dominance of large and super-large cities 
in the urban hierarchy and on the other hand, a large number of newly emerged small 
cities and towns subsequent to the rural reform of political relaxation from below118.
McGee (1991) and Ginsburg (1990) have argued that both models have seen urban 
transition as a city-based process shaped by the forces of agglomeration in economies 
and comparative advantages, which may not be the only option for Asian urbanization. 
118 See Chapter 5.4, the phenomena of “urbanization from above” and “urbanization from below” (Ma and Fan 
1994).
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It has been observed that a distinct process of regional-based urbanization has 
been taking place in the extended metropolitan regions as a result of economic 
restructuring, influx of foreign capital investment, and revolutionary advances in 
telecommunication and transportation. This process has led to the formation of zones 
of intensive urban-rural mixture and interaction of areas surrounding and between 
metropolitan centers. In some areas it shows the emergence of polycentric regions, 
and a pattern of multi-layered governance, which originated in some regions of the 
European Union, has been established (Yang Chun 2008).
During the period of new urban development, many problems were recognized. The 
most rigid challenge among them was the question of how the reformation can be 
realized as the “market” was an unknown economic mechanism for the country 
and had never been addressed in the communist regime. Therefore, the idea of 
an experimental base (Shi-Dian) was addressed in the central government. In this 
framework, the city played an essential role in the experiments with “the market.” At 
the same time, the central government started to study many comparative cases in a 
multitude of other countries, such as the export processing zone, tax-free district, and 
trade-free zone. Even though the open-door policy was recognized as being on the right 
track, for a communist society it was a tremendous new experience, and the existing 
facilities and programs were not built to support it. China had been isolated from the 
outside world for a long time and there was a lack of experience in trade with other 
countries. Therefore, the establishment of the Special Economic Zone and the initiative 
of the urban experimental base was a very unique and most important factor that 
triggered and influenced the contemporary urban development of China.
In general, development is concentrated in the two coastal provinces, particularly 
the lower Yangzi region (Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou), the Pearl River Delta 
(Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou-Macao) and the grand Beijing region (Beijing-
Tianjin-Tangshan). Cities of these regions were given greater autonomy to attract 
foreign investment and practice free market forces. They were seen as catalysts 
of development, pioneers of economic reform, and centers of modernization. The 
special task of the Special Economic Zones119 was to attract foreign capital. They were 
Shenzhen on the border to Hong Kong, Zhuhai on the border to Macao, and Shantou 
119 Recognition of the inherent economic comparative advantages of the cities, particularly those along on the 
eastern coast, led the government to set up four Special Economic Zones in 1979 and designate 14 coastal 
open cities in 1984 (Yeung Yue-man and Hu Xu-wei 1992; Wu Weiping1999). Along with the emergence 
of Guangdong and Fujian, these cities were given greater autonomy to attract foreign investment. Now they 
have become pioneers of economic reform and centers of modernization. The four Special Economic Zones 
established in 1979 included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In 1988, Hainan Island, previously part 
of Guangdong Province, was designated as the fifth and largest Special Economic Zone.
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and Xiamen near Taiwan. The concept of Special Economic Zones was extended to 
fourteen other coastal cities following the program’s initial success in 1984. The idea is 
for each city to establish its own development zone, the purpose of which was to permit 
a flexible economic policy similar to that practiced in the Special Economic Zones. The 
approach of Special Economic Zones was made successful in a very short period and 
Chinese resulted in an immense urban development and economic growth (Huang 
Youqin 2006) (Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.5 Gradual open-door policies and emerging metropolitan regions 
Source: Huang Youqin (2006), Map 9.3.
One main strategy of the state-controlled economic modernization of China is to lead 
to an urban development that attracts a globally networked economy. The increasingly 
international character of the economic structure affects especially those cities, which 
due to their function and importance assume a key position in the global economy. 
They become hubs of a globally operating economy and their international ranking 
depends upon the extent to which they are able to attract global investment activity. 
In addition, in order to serve the new urban function, new urban features were 
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emerging in the metropolitan agglomeration. In contrast to the previously cellular 
urban structure based on work-unit compounds with comprehensive functions 
(Danweis), specialization and differentiation are now being pursued in Chinese urban 
planning, and the results are evident in the spatial restructuring of land use and the 
transformation of the urban landscape. First of all, large housing estates separate 
from employment centers have been developed—mostly on the outskirts of cities—
to accommodate households from different work units. This increasing separation 
of housing and workspace together with a surge in the use of private automobiles 
have made traffic a daily concern in most Chinese cities. The improvement of public 
transport and the extension of the city have produced a massive development of new 
housing in these suburbs.
The ideology of “production first, consumption later” in the Maoist era was reversed. 
Consequently, large business and commercial centers were developed, often at city 
centers, while high-rise buildings and skyscrapers mushroomed, which significantly 
changed the skylines of many Chinese cities. In the case of Beijing and Shanghai, the 
new central business district (CBD) became the location for high-rise office buildings, 
large hotels, and convention facilities. Chinese urban planners and decision makers 
clearly envision Western-style CBD’s comparable to those in Hong Kong, New York, 
London, and Paris. Another fashionable term is to build what is called specialized 
districts—such as High-Tech Zones. Urban makeover projects are taking place 
elsewhere by the municipal governments. In addition, Chinese cities, especially the 
large cities, are transformed by international architectural firms and designers, with 
foreign architects designing major landmark buildings in many cities (Huang Youqin 
2006). Not to mention, entire residential districts with traditional architecture in 
Beijing and Shanghai have been torn down, resulting in the palpable loss of urban 
identity built up over the centuries. A predominantly faceless investor’s architecture 
now defines the image of the cities. Western media portray Chinese cities as the stage 
for new scenarios in which the frantic pace of construction threatens to disrupt familiar 
social constellations.
The newly emerged spatial paradigm in the Chinese urban evolutionary process 
should not be categorized based solely on the interpretation of the Western-centered 
discourse even though the established, Western-centered urban discourse and 
theory seems to be handy and helpful in the level of a rational planning approach. 
However, emerging forces are coming from many different initiatives and form many 
different factors of reform; the whole process was generated within an extremely short 
framework of time and in the hybrid geo-context of China.
A few reflections from this chapter are summarized. First, the earlier stage of the 
reformation was not initiated by the central government with full confidence. It 
was the mutual awareness among the central group of party leaders as the planned 
economy entered a dead end and could no longer promise future development of 
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the country that led to the understanding that economic reformation needed to take 
place. The selected factors of political intervention indicated that the force of the 
reformation was not mainly triggered by external forces of a changing global-economic 
environment: initially, it was more the urge of the internal desire for better living 
conditions. Second, still dominantly, the political decision-making process is the core 
subject during the evolution of modernization, which can be recognized throughout 
the whole process of reformation. Third, following the logic of the political interest 
and guidance, in comparison with thee earlier stages of modernization of chapter 
4, open-door policy demonstrates the contemporary China by avoiding the sudden 
collapse of “turn” through gradualism of learning by doing. Fourth, regarding the path 
that Chinese civilization has been taking over the past 200 years—and particularly 
in the past three decades—we can see how the country has been shifting toward a 
more open society balanced between decentralization and centralization. In addition, 
beyond the impact of the reform policy from the top down, a positive reflection on 
the modernization of thoughts and ideas has been slowly embedded in Chinese 
civilization. Fifth, the gradualism of the transition of the Chinese political economy 
from central authoritarianism to local corporatism and from plan to market means 
that the nature of cities as both administrative and economic entities is undergoing a 
profound transformation. Sixth, from these perspectives, is China becoming an open 
and democratically planned society, as being defined by Mannheim? Or does Chinese 
modernization and urbanization experience prove actually a new model of urban 
evolution that is an alternative to Western trajectories? 
Undeniably, after years of practice in a stable and gradually improving environment, 
Chinese modernization has taken a turn for the better in many aspects. Practices 
show that reform can provide thriving vitality by importing advanced technology and 
science, establishing experimental Special Economic Zones, and importing foreign 
capital. Chinese self-exploration steadily and synchronous with the global context of 
development implemented modernity. While the global environment was becoming 
more dependent on international collaboration, as a member of the global society 
China could no longer be absent and ignored. The profound change of the interrelation 
between the government and the public has demonstrated that a society of emerging 
bottom-up initiatives, individual interests and hybrid evolutions is now on its way.
In the following chapters, the research further explores to what extent that the 
planning system and practices in contemporary Chinese urban development could 
cooperate with this unique context of overall reformation and smoothen the process of 
transition within the framework of the planning execution.
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6 Transformation of Planning in China 
Urban planning must be accompanied by the maintenance of statistical social and 
political control mechanisms, while varied urban practices at the level of the local and 
central governments have to serve new social and economic demands of the different 
sectors involved in urban development. 
This chapter, following the highlights of the reformation in Chapter 5, focuses on how 
the role of urban planning has been adaptively reforming under the new condition of 
the emergence of the new “Cultural Turn” after the 1980s. In this framework, three 
components related to the changes of planning entity are elaborated. The first part, 
which gives an overall framework of the planning structure, focuses on the general 
background of the political embodiment and indicates the interrelation between the 
governmental function and the role of planning as it has shifted and has been modified. 
The second part focuses on the planning system: the overview of the planning 
administration and the instruments of laws and plan forms. The third part focuses the 
planning execution: the illustration of the execution of the planning procedure and the 
implementation. 
In this chapter, the planning entity provides a referential framework as top-down 
intervention, to be compared later120 with the micro-implementation of the local 
execution in Shenzhen.
§ 6.1 Planning Formation
The 1950s and 1980s were the first and second springtimes of Chinese urban 
planning121 (Zhao Shi Xiu 1999). If the 1950s gave birth to urban planning, a single 
entity to serve communism derived from the design professions of the socialist 
Soviet Union, then the socio-political reformation in the early 1980s provided the 
resurrection of urban planning after decades of dissolution. From 1980 to 1990 was 
120 Chapter 7 Planning for the Reality.
121  The 1990s were defined as the “third spring.” 
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the second springtime of urban development. In early 1984, the Chinese State Council 
issued the “City Planning Ordinance”122. Through this state directive, all municipal 
and county governments were required to develop master plans to guide their spatial 
development in accordance with existing practices of local economic planning. The 
principle is to embed planning practice into the existing mandate of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” and economic opening up.
In this paragraph, a general background of the shifting role of planning and the Chinese 
political structure as well as a background of the governmental apparatuses and their 
relative functions of planning are elaborated. It is important to mention that these 
three elements—political structure, governmental apparatus, and planning system—
are highly interrelated. However, in order to decode their essences in a systematic 
manner, they are addressed separately.
§ 6.1.1 The Changing Role of Planning 
In history, in comparison with Western planning, urban planning practice in China 
had a much narrower mandate. The field of planning in the West is defined as being 
derived from two streams or traditions: a rationalist stream that comes from the 
design professions and scientific thought as well as a critique from the social sciences 
(Abramson 2002: 167). In Chinese tradition, urban planning (guihua) mainly 
derives from economic planning (jihua) 123. In the Maoist economy, urban planning 
was a profession with a single traditional role: to serve an economic mission. The 
establishment of urban planning was based on the Soviet socialist model. Under the 
centrally planned economy, urban planners have had little opportunity or reason to 
include economic or social analyses in their activities, and unlike in the West, neither 
theory nor practice has been fundamentally influenced by the social science critique.
122 The “City Planning Ordinance” was the first ordinance issued by the central government after the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, which clearly defined the requirement of regulations in the field of 
urban planning, urban construction, and urban management. 
123 Guihua (simplified Chinese: 规划; traditional Chinese: 規劃 ) and Jihua (simplified Chinese: 计划; traditional 
Chinese: 計劃 ).
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The reason for this is obvious. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, China organized its science establishment along Soviet lines—a system that 
remained in force until the late 1970s, when China’s leaders called for major reforms. 
The Soviet model is characterized by a bureaucratic rather than a professional principle 
of organization. Mostly emphasizing the separation of research from production, the 
principle and purpose of scientific work was to develop the natural sciences and to 
serve the construction of industry, agriculture, and the national defense. The Sino-
Soviet relationship was very influential in the establishment of the national guidance in 
many different fields during the first few decades.
For example, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was explicitly modeled on the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, whose director, Sergei I. Vavilov, was consulted on the proper 
way to organize Chinese science124. Soviet influence also occurred through large-
scale personnel exchanges. Since the 1950s, China has sent about 38,000 people 
to the Soviet Union for training and study. Most of these people had backgrounds as 
technicians in key industries. The Soviet Union also dispatched some scientific and 
technical personnel to China.
With regard to planning, the first Five-Year Plan began in 1953 and stemmed from 
the Soviet tradition. Since the founding of the Republic and the transformation of 
society and the urban development, the urban planning system in China has gone 
through three stages: the period from 1949 to 1957, guided by the first Five-Year 
Plan and focusing on urban planning and the establishment of the new nation; from 
1958-1978, when urban development was suspended due to societal stagnation that 
resulted from class struggle; and during the 1980s, when urban development was 
restored and promoted following the adoption of reform and an open-door policy.
During the 1950s, the role of planning was to serve the planned economy of the 
national economic development, used mainly to provide the executive framework for 
key national constructions. In the 1980s, with the accelerating of social and economic 
construction as well as the development of urbanization, the role of urban planning in 
guiding and regulating the development of urban economy and social construction was 
widely understood and accepted.
124 Sergei I. Vavilov, 1891-1951, Russian physicist. In 1932, he became director of the P. N. Lebedev Physical 
Institute, which he organized around the laboratory of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1945, he became 
president of the academy. He is known for his work in radiation, luminescence, the creation of cold light through 
the conversion of ultraviolet rays, and optics. His book Thirty Years of Soviet Science was translated into Chinese 
to serve as a guide. The Library of Congress Country Studies; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. 
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The reform and shift from a planned economy to a market economy in the 1980s 
brought profound change to the role of urban planning as well as redefined the scope 
of planning, the role of the government, the scope of planning, and the participation of 
different sectors in the process.
First, urban planning gained importance while incorporating the new approach into 
urban development. Therefore, urban planning became a critical and useful instrument 
for accomplishing the embodiment of political, social, economic, and spatial reform.
Second, the Chinese government highlighted the role of urban planning in guiding 
and comprehensively regulating urban constructions. The government regarded 
urban planning as an important instrument in guiding the rational development of 
construction and administration, and it asked local governments at various levels to 
take urban planning, construction, and administration as their main responsibility. This 
is in contrast with the government’s role in the stage of planned economy, when the 
government played a dominant role in the allocation of resources and urban planning 
was just a continuation and detailed implementation of the national economic plan.
Third, the decentralization of reform that enhanced the legal system in urban planning 
and administration progressed continuously, and the modernization of administration 
was improving. Furthermore, a working mechanism for urban planning that fitted the 
national condition of China was forming. Corresponding plans were made in all cities, 
and most towns and villages, which effectively guided and coordinated the land use 
and construction activities, promoted economic and social development and improved 
living conditions in urban and rural areas.
Overall, the legal status of urban planning was developed rather late. The Urban 
Planning Law was issued by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1990125. Since 
then, the central government of China has sped up the creation of a legal system for 
urban planning. As stipulated in the Urban Planning Law, the legal system consists 
of planning national cities and towns systems along with provincial and autonomous 
regional cities126. Urban planning had never had such an important role, and it had to 
start responding to the rapid growth of urban development and the urban economy.
125 Urban Planning Law or City Planning Law. Adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
Seventh National People’s Congress on December 26, 1989, promulgated by Order No. 23 of the President of 
the People’s Republic of China on December 26, 1989, and effective as of April 1, 1990, at http://www.china.
org.cn/english/environment/34354.htm. 
126 See further elaboration on the legal system of urban planning in Chapter 6.2.2. 
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The 1990s are regarded as the third springtime of Chinese planning. During this 
period, China has gradually created a system of urban planning administration and 
technical regulations, with the Urban Planning Law as a framework and with relevant 
laws, regulations, rules, and norms included. The number of organizations responsible 
for the formulation and scientific study of the urban planning is 2,000, with a working 
staff of more than 60,000; the Urban Planning Society of China127 has more than 
2,000 members. Furthermore, various urban planning societies and associations are 
established, forming a network of societies and associations in this sector has been 
established (Tang Kai 2004).
Tang Kai, the former director general of the China Department of Urban and Rural 
Planning, Ministry of Construction (MOC) (the precursor of the Ministry of Housing and 
Rural-Urban Development (MOHRUD)) emphasized that a new Chinese era of planned 
economy has gradually stepped into the market economy; different societal conditions 
have to be recognized—the market plays the main role in resource allocation, and the 
most important task of urban planning was to maintain public interest and fairness. 
Solving conflicts between public-interest administrations and the protection of 
private rights should be taken into consideration in urban planning. He argues there 
is a tendency toward diversification among citizens in their choices of living places, 
environments, and standards of living. There is an unprecedented power struggle that 
competent administrations of urban planning and staff have to face. The only way out 
was to comply with the law of the market economy and to reform the existing urban 
planning system gradually (Tang Kai, 2004).
The efforts that the government has made during the past few decades are clear and 
obvious. Urban planning decisions have increasing effects on urban development, and 
a new discourse of urban planning is gradually defined.
First of all, urban planning has, in fact, become a very important part of public 
policy. The Chinese government makes urban planning a legal procedure; it executes 
administrative power, which is authorized by law. Regarding implementation, the 
fundamental purpose is to fulfill its regulating and guiding function so as to promote 
the reasonable use of resources and to protect nature and the environment.
127 The Urban Planning Society of China, voluntarily incorporated by urban planners across the country in 1956, is 
the only legally registered academic organization at the state level.
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Secondly, urban planning is employed in correspondence with economic initiatives. In 
accordance with economic reform, urban planning is used to influence the allocation of 
national resources in relation to private investment. Particularly based on the logic of the 
market economy, urban land has become the substance of economic accumulation.
The third characteristic of urban planning involves becoming a social activity. Due 
to the diversification of subjects who are investing, urban planning has to deal with 
many different interest groups. Therefore, not only public interest but also private 
rights should be guaranteed in the process of formulation and implementation. 
Urban planning requires broad public participation and needs to provide a system of 
openness, fairness, justice, legalization, rationalization, and sensibility.
Last but not least, its role is to serve a political function as well as a social one; urban 
planning is becoming a comprehensive subject that involves multiple fields, such as 
natural science, social science, and environmental science, and above all, it serves as an 
embodiment of culture.
The evolutionary role of urban planning requires momentous change and recodification 
of the existing planning mechanism. Within the past four decades, the modification 
of the planning mechanism has become a crucial driving force for the new discourse 
of urban planning. This is accredited to a society characteristized by the reformation of 
governmental functions that are gradually adapted to the emergence of a civil society; 
an actual reinvention of the government is demanded.
§ 6.1.2 Reinventing Government and Civilian Society in Transition 
In general, the Chinese reformation of the planning mechanism involves two related 
modes that sometimes contradict one another. The first is the state-led, top-down, 
dominant government. In the past, in a planned economy with urban planning that as 
subjected to the continuous and detailed implementation of the national economic 
plan, the government was superior to civilian society and was dominant in resources 
allocation.
Since China’s reform and the promulgation of the Urban Planning Law, the Chinese 
urban planning administration system has gradually become a dual-track system. The 
former “big government” and “small society” became conflicting civilians increasingly 
demanded to be allowed to participate in bottom-up planning of spatial development 
(Feng Xianxue 2006: 79).
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The participation of civilians in the decision-making process, implementation, and 
superintendence of public works increasingly came into confrontation with the 
government mandate. However, an evolution in this direction in order to comply with 
a market-orientated society can only be attained under the condition in which the 
modification of existing planning still belongs to the government. Thus, reform of the 
government is inevitable.
David Osborne and Peter Plastrik (1992) stated five core strategies for institutionalizing 
the process of transforming unresponsive government bureaucracies —local, state, 
or national—into entrepreneurial systems that are open to innovation and change. 
The authors set forth a heady vision of community empowerment, whereby citizens 
organize as residents, neighborhood associations, and non-profit organizations 
and where business groups play their specific roles in planning. They promote an 
“entrepreneurial culture” of government in which agencies offer services, citizens 
are customers, and the rewards and perils of a market-like environment improve the 
performance of traditionally inflexible bureaucrats. Implementation is to occur through 
five common-sense strategies: clarify purpose (core), create incentives for employee 
performance (consequences), obtain feedback from service recipients (custom), 
empower people to do what is needed (control), and replace old habits with new 
commitments (culture)128.
In general, entrepreneurial governments support competition between service 
providers. Authority is decentralized, and entrepreneurial governments encourage 
the involvement of the public, private, and voluntary sectors. They empower citizens 
by shifting control of the bureaucracy into communities. Rules and regulations are 
of little importance compared with providing a goal and a mission that drive every 
organization.
Skeptics challenge Osborne’s and Plastrik’s emphasis on the “entrepreneurial 
culture” and doubt whether it does produce actual benefits for citizens rather than 
mere enthusiastic cheerleading from management mavens as a pure policy outcome. 
128 Furthermore, David Osborne and Peter Plastrik (1992) pointed out ten principles for the reinvention of 
government: A “Catalytic Government” provides direction and vision instead of acting as regulator and 
administrator; a “Community-owned Government” decentralizes authority in civil society by providing a broader 
scope of participation; a “Competitive Government” installs a competitive mechanism in governmental services; 
a “Mission-driven Government” establishes reflexive institutional adaptation to fulfill dynamic missions; a 
“Results-oriented Government” and “Customer-driven Government” emphasize governmental efficiency; an 
“Enterprising Government” promotes an entrepreneurial culture in the governmental apparatus; and finally, an 
“Anticipatory Government” and “Decentralized Government” can lead to a “Market-oriented Government.”
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Delusions and problems occur in practice. For sure, the ongoing evolution of the 
two entangled modes of the centralized-control of empowered government and the 
entrepreneurial-decentralization of emerging civil society will continually confront 
Chinese society.
The extreme tension between the government and civil society is in general a critical 
issue, which is confronting Chinese modernization on a daily basis. Embedded 
in a complex evolutionary procedure, in order to achieve economic development, 
sometimes the sacrifice of social justice is unavoidable. One of the examples is the 
overheated real estate development, resulting the speculation in the housing market 
and land appropriation. However, failures of market practice were immediately 
recognized, and actions were taken from the top down when necessary. In 2004, 
the government began to apply a series of policies to reinforce the taxation of house 
ownership so as to constrain the housing market and to control land leases against 
the public opinions of those who belong to the group most benefitting from market 
speculation. Macro-scale adjustment is a powerful governmental intervention and a 
Chinese specialty. Due to the governmental monopoly, these interventions can become 
immediately effective.
After the 1980s China became a more active civil society. In general, Chinese political 
formation is still constrained by a monopolizing government that is still similar to what 
it was in the former period of planned economy. However, speedy urbanization and 
globalization have reinforced the development of diverse sectors and actors from a 
society in which they can only be sustained if the opportunities for civilian participation 
are ensured. Political reformation and the market-oriented practical evolution under 
the phrase of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” have sometimes generated 
collisions and sometimes conflicts that make Chinese urban planning an extremely 
interesting subject. Apparently, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” still has an 
unclear meaning and future. Awareness of these features can be helpful to understand 
Chinese institutional reform and Chinese political culture. Furthermore, it can help 
to decode the planning practice and planning experiments in contemporary China 
while we analyze its political environment and governmental structure and their 
interrelationships with the planning administrations and practices.
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§ 6.1.3 Hierarchical Structure of Governance
Without a doubt, planning is one of the most powerful governmental and political 
instruments that can influence the allocation of national resources. In China’s case, 
this interrelation between the function of planning and its political status is even more 
extreme. The given political condition and its governmental structure determine state 
of the art of the planning system. Therefore, without understanding the hierarchical 
structure of Chinese politics, it is impossible to decode the decision-making process of 
planning that is influenced by the opaque political shift in secrecy.
From the beginning, the political formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
was communist and authoritarian. The main political structure of the PRC comprises 
two vertically integrated institutions. One is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or 
Party), headed by the Party Political Bureau (Politburo) and its standing committee; 
the nominal leader of the CCP is the general secretary, but control of the Party is held 
collectively by its standing committee. The other is the state government apparatus, 
headed by the president, who presides over the State Council of the PRC, a de facto 
cabinet129. Throughout China, Party and government structures closely parallel one 
another. In addition, two other major institutions play important roles in Chinese 
politics: the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA)130 (Figure 6.1).
129 Formally, the president is elected by the National People’s Congress (NPC in accordance with Article 62 of 
the Constitution. The PRC president is a state organ instead of an administrative post; also, it is an important 
national symbol that serves as the nominal head of state. The most important position in the PRC has been 
that of the general secretary (as chairman before 1982); the post holders are usually the de facto leaders of the 
PRC. In most cases, the PRC president holds the position of general secretary of the Communist Party of China, 
making him China’s paramount leader. 
130 China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is not a national army belonging to the state. Rather, it is an 
armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the party’s exercise of “absolute leadership” over the 
military a fundamental guarantee of Communist Party rule. 
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local governments2, and the issue of national administrative orders, or the notification of some conference 
decision.  Moreover, at each level of government, the various land management programs implemented by 
different government sectors also has important influence on urban land growth patterns.   
 
There have been various definitions and discussions on the glossary –“central government” in different 
countries as well as in different eras.  In this paper, although the administration part—viz. the State Council 
and its subordinate bodies is primarily discussed, the government of a broader sense, including the congress 
and the supreme court, is also involved to explain the national policies.  Moreover, due to the particular 
one-party system of China, the leading influence of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) should not be 
neglected too when we discuss the central government’s role on any social and economic issue.  Thus, the 
role of the “central government” to be discussed in this paper includes that of a very broad sense– a cluster 
of administration, legislation, justice, and party systems (Figure 2).   
General Secretary 
 
Figure 2– Structure of the Central Government of China 
NPC: National People’s Congress 
Constructed by author.  Data source: Chinese Constitution 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
 
Correspondingly, the definition of local government in China also needs to be particularly clarified in this 
paper.  The government system of China is an extraordinarily complex one with five levels of government 
entities—national level, provincial level, prefecture-level, county-level and township-level3.  Of all levels 
of governments, only the prefecture-level, county-level and township-level governments are responsible to 
provide local infrastructures for urban development.  However, because of the lack of ultimate authorities 
in all social and economic issues, governments of provincial level are at the same status as prefecture-level, 
county-level and township-level governments.  Moreover, governments of provincial level often pay more 
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Figure 6.1 The structure of th  Chinese central cadre and organization 
Source: Han, Haoying, and Nishimura Yukio (2006, Figure 2).
In the Maoist period, the state go rn ent bur aucracy was relatively weak, nd 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) was under the mandate of Party leadership131. 
Therefore, in the planned economy period, the hierarchical structure was in line 
with the political entity of the Party and was supported by the military coalition 
among the major political actors, under which the planning system was bonded to 
the authoritarian Party system with loyal support of the administration and a weak 
bureaucratic government.
131 According to Article 57 of China’s Constitution, “The National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic 
of China is the highest organ of state power.” Its highest officers are the president and vice president of the 
NPC, who are directly elected by the members of the NPC. Articles 85 and 92 of China’s Constitution state that 
the State Council of PRC is the executive arm of the government and reports to the NPC. However, in reality, 
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In view of the evolution of reformation and decentralization, the dominance 
of economic players, a proliferation of research groups and other actors in the 
political system, and the explosion of the Internet and other alternative sources of 
information, policy and administrative processes decentralized further and power 
diffused (Martin 2010).
Even though the central political system still remains strong at the nexus of Chinese 
politics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leadership are not always able to 
dictate policy decisions. Instead, the Chinese political process is infused with a number 
of bureaucratic and non-central government actors that influence and sometimes 
determine government policy. These political actors include a muscular ministerial 
bureaucracy; provincial and local officials; a growing body of official and quasi-official 
policy research groups and think tanks that feed proposals directly into the policy 
process; and a collection of state sector, multinational, and even private business 
interests that bring more pressure to bear on policy decisions.
On the other hand, the political shift to establish an efficient and transparent 
government is required by a vigorous academic and university community, and diverse 
media groups to a certain degree are allowed to expose issues of official malfeasance 
to the public, which has enhanced a better-informed citizenry that demands more 
transparency and accountability from the government. New forms of communication 
and information availability have also pressured the PRC government to make changes 
in its political system and to simultaneously provide the Party with new means of 
maintaining political control (Martin 2010).
Chinese politics is further complicated by other factors. In the absence of a more 
formalized institutional infrastructure, personal affiliations can play a significant role 
in political decisions, adding unpredictability to an already murky process. In addition, 
discipline between the different levels of party and government structures can be 
tenuous, leading to ineffective implementation of policy and, in some cases, serious 
problems with corruption.
This paragraph highlights the different institutional systems and their main tasks, 
explaining how the diffusion of political power between party and government can 
make it difficult and complex to determine who has the authority to set and/or 
implement specific policies. The selection of highlighted institutional systems is based 
on criteria of strong relations to the field of planning.
The (National) People’s Congress (NPC)
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s highest legislative body, and, 
according to the Chinese Constitution, the ultimate power of the Chinese government. 
Even though the National People’s Congress (NPC) is not China’s sole legislative body, 
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it is the uppermost layer of a nationwide system of “people’s congresses” at various 
levels of government in the PRC. The National People’s Congress (NPC) deputies are 
not elected by public vote, but instead, they are selected for five-year terms by the next 
lower tier; deputies in the people’s congresses at the provincial and municipal levels, 
in turn, are selected by deputies at the county level. Although the public directly elects 
deputies for the lowest level, the Party controls candidate lists, and candidates for all 
levels are subject to Party approval.
Officially, the full National People’s Congress (NPC) selects the PRC’s president, 
premier, and cabinet, allowing the PRC government to assert its legitimacy through 
“elections” by representatives of the Chinese people. However, many leadership 
decisions are made earlier and in secret by senior Party officials after a lengthy 
process of negotiation and maneuvering. Due to its overwhelming majority in the 
People’s Congress, the Communist Party has total control of the composition of the 
Standing Committee, thereby controlling the actions of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC). The local people’s congresses are the National People’s Congress’ (NPC) 
local counterparts, and whose functions and powers are exercised by their standing 
committees at and above the county level when the Congresses are not in session. The 
standing committee of a local people’s congress comprises a chairman, vice chairmen, 
and members.
Before 1980, people’s congresses at and above the county level did not have standing 
committees. These were considered superfluous because local congresses did not have 
heavy workloads and, in any case, could serve adequately as executive bodies for the 
local organs of power. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision in 1978 to adopt 
the Four Modernizations132 as its official line, however, produced a critical need for 
broad mass support and the means to mobilize that support for the varied activities of 
both Party and state organs.
The establishment of the standing committees in effect also meant restoring the 
formal division of responsibilities between Party and state authorities that had existed 
before 1966. The 1979 reform mandated that the Party should not interfere with the 
administrative activities of local government organs and that its function should be 
confined to “political leadership” to ensure that the Party’s line was correctly followed 
and implemented.
132 These refer to the modernization of China’s industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1250.html.
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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) view was that the standing committees were 
better equipped than the local governments to address such functions as convening 
the people’s congresses; keeping in touch with the grassroots and their deputies; 
supervising, inspecting, appointing, and removing local administrative and judicial 
personnel; and preparing for the election of local deputies to the next level congresses. 
The use of standing committees was seen as a more effective and rational way to 
supervise the activities of the local people’s governments compared to requiring 
that local administrative authorities check and balance themselves. The proclaimed 
purpose of the standing committee system was to make local governments more 
responsible and more responsive to constituents.
The local people’s congresses and their standing committees were given the authority 
to pass local legislation and regulations under the Organic Law of the People’s Courts 
of 1980. This authority was granted only at the level of provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special municipalities. Its purpose was to allow local congresses to accommodate 
the special circumstances and actual needs of their jurisdictions.
China’s approximately 3,000-member National People’s Congress (NPC), largely a 
symbolic organization for much of its existence, has become somewhat more assertive 
in recent years, although it still cannot veto basic Party policies. To a great extent, 
the fragmentation of the process of decision-making has blurred lines of authority 
in China.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
With the inherited root of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
operated based upon the principle of “democratic centralism”133. In theory, the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) democratic centralism allows for debate and discussion of 
policy among Party members, but requires unquestioning support of policy once a 
decision is made. In practice, democratic centralism has created a hierarchal political 
dynamic where senior Party officials expect disciplined compliance from junior officials, 
but junior officials are allowed to comment on policy proposals before decisions have 
been made. It is an important interactive relationship between the senior and junior 
133 “Democratic centralism” is the name given to the principles of internal organization used by Leninist political 
parties, and the term is sometimes used as a synonym for any Leninist policy inside a political party. The 
democratic aspect of this organizational method describes the freedom of members of the political party to 
discuss and debate matters of policy and direction, but once the decision of the party is made by majority 
vote, all members are expected to uphold that decision. This latter aspect represents the centralism. As Lenin 
described, democratic centralism consisted of “freedom of discussion, unity of action.”
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officials where, even though the lower party organizations are subordinate to higher 
organizations, lower party committees select the members of the higher party congress. 
Thus, it is crucial for the senior officials to obtain and to retain their political power by 
maintaining the loyalty and support of the lower party organization.
The National Party Congress134 is, in theory, the highest body of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The Party convenes in Beijing once every five years to establish 
the country’s overall policy direction and to choose the members of the Politburo) 
and other senior Party officials. Political power is formally vested in the much smaller 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Committee. Central committee meetings are 
known as plenums (or plenary sessions) that are to be held at least annually135.
The day-to-day work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is carried out by the 
Secretariat and its various departments—all placed under the direction of the 
Party’s most powerful policy and decision-making entity, the Party’s Political Bureau 
(Politburo), which comprises the Party’s two dozen or so most powerful senior officials 
and its standing committee, which is formed by a much smaller group of elite Party 
members that wields much of the political power in China136. The official head of the 
Party’s Political Bureau (Politburo) is the Party’s general secretary. The other important 
department is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission, 
which is also elected by the central committee and exercises authority over the military 
through the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLN) 137.
134 The National Party Congress should be distinguished from the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s highest 
legislative body. After its ascent to power in 1949, the Party held no congress until 1956. This was the eighth 
congress since the party’s founding in 1921. The ninth National Party Congress convened in April 1969, the 
tenth in August 1973, the eleventh in August 1977, and after 1977, meetings were held once every five years 
until the present. 
135  There are partial, informal, and enlarged meetings of central committee members where key policies are often 
formulated and then confirmed by a plenum. 
136 The Politburo Standing Committee that emerged from the 17th Party Congress now has nine members. See 
http://English.cpc.people.com.cn/. 
137 Organization chart of the 18th CCP central leadership, see http://english.cpc.people.com.
cn/206972/207121/index.html.
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In this framework, below the central level, party committees and congresses were 
formed in the twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions, and four directly 
governed municipalities138 that were directly under the central government. The rest of 
the Party’s formal structure consists of layers of local, municipal, and provincial party 
congresses and committees.
Even though membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not obligatory 
for citizens, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has more than 77 million members 
involved in over 3.6 million grassroots organizations 139. The contemporary Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is organized into many extensive, hierarchal networks of 
organizations that reach into many aspects of society. There is a wide variety of 
institutions, including universities and schools, think tanks, state-owned enterprises, 
and private corporations. An applicant for Party membership must complete an 
application form and be introduced by two Party members, and every Party member 
must be in a branch, cell, or other specific unit of the Party in order to participate in the 
Party organization’s regular activities. Joining the Party was once a wholly ideological 
act, but it has become a way for many young people to make connections for career 
advancement.
The composition of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “Chinese-style” meritocracy 
emphasizes the compromised balance among the different factions. Loyalty to officials 
who are higher in the Party organization can be crucial to a person’s career, more 
often, it follows a behind-the-scenes principle of familial and clan relationship that is 
reminiscent of imperial China. This peculiar socialization of talented and motivated 
individuals into an ideological elite community engenders both feeling of loyalty to a 
club with strong mutual ties and the opportunity to develop a specific type of guanxi140: 
interpersonal networks based on quid pro quo relations (De Jong 2013: 92). 
138 The five autonomous regions are Giangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxi, Xinjiang, and Xizang. The four directly governed 
municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin. 
139 The total Chinese population is approximately 130 billion. See the official webpage for the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), http://English.cpcnews.cn/92247/6279373.html, based on the report of the 17th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2007. 
140 Guanxi (simplified Chinese: 关係; traditional Chinese: 關係).
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For example, some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders use their influence (guanxi) 
to secure positions of authority for their family members, regardless of their abilities 
or experience. This is low-level corruption at best and a serious threat to the Party’s 
legitimacy with the public at worst, although some of the “Princelings” have used their 
preferential access to power for social causes141.
The PRC’s Communist Party-led political system has proven exceedingly resilient 
to past and current challenges, but it is still under stress and undergoing reluctant 
transition. The Party’s commitment to remaining in power forces it to adapt continually 
to changing circumstances and to make incremental compromises with other 
participants in the political process. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary, but in practice, the Party often makes the decisions.
Within this framework, two major tensions are influencing the continuously shifting 
balance. On the one hand, the Party’s authority rests primarily on the government’s 
ability to maintain social stability; appeals to nationalism and patriotism; party control 
of personnel, media, and the security apparatus; and continual improvement in the 
living standards of most of the country’s 1.3 billion citizens. On the other hand, to the 
Party leadership, the exploration of reform is no longer defined by how closely it reflects 
hallowed political quotations or ideas but by whether or not it produces demonstrable 
benefits for the reform program.
Because the fourth generation of China’s leaders belongs by and large to the postliberation 
generation, selected from the best-educated segment of the Chinese population, most 
of China’s new leaders, who came of age in the new socialist China, studied natural 
sciences or engineering in college and worked as specialists in production-related fields in 
bureaucratized organizations. Thus, the new leaders are not “critical intellectuals” who, 
by virtue of their knowledge of tradition, values, norms, or ideology tend to act as critics of 
the existing system. With their career backgrounds as engineers and specialists who are 
trained in hard science—possessing narrowly defined technical knowledge that is related 
mainly to a formal rationality that helps to choose the best means once the basic goals 
of society are agreed upon—the new leaders likely see their mission as improving and 
perfecting the existing system (Lee Hong Yung 1991: 402).
141 Tai Zi Don (simplified Chinese:太子党; traditional Chinese: 太子黨) in colloquial Chinese, or “Princelings” refers 
to an important but informal politically influential group. The group consists of relatives of senior Chinese 
government officials who use their family relationship to obtain access to privilege, positions of power, and 
wealth—often by circumventing the official channels and procedures. Ironically, more than 90 percent of 
China’s billionaires are children of senior government officials, and they represent the type of “class privilege” 
that the Cultural Revolution was supposed to eradicate. 
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Since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, China has had no supreme leader. The 
central leaders, who sit on the Politburo Standing Committee, form a collective 
leadership in which each man has a rank. In general, many of China’s central 
leaders wear multiple hats, holding positions concurrently in all three systems of 
government, military, and Party. This adds to the difficulty of knowing how exactly 
PRC decision-making occurs. Often, the internal hierarchical structure is based on a 
range of intangible factors apart from their actual positions and the official criteria. 
These intangible factors include experience, seniority, personal connections, degree 
of expertise, and to some extent association with past performance in the economic 
realm. Those intangible factors are influenced by the relationship between the distinct 
systems that may be well known to the respective parties involved, although not 
necessarily apparent to the outside world.
Age and term limits for top Party and state positions are a recent innovation introduced 
in the beginning of 1997. All top officials have since been limited to two five-year terms 
in the same posts. Those age and term limits define the number of positions that will 
turn over at each Party Congress and limit the pool of possible candidates. The fifth 
generation came to power at the eighteenth National Party Congress in 2012, when 
Hu Jintao stepped down as Party secretary and Xi Jinping was appointed as successor. 
In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance 
majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of China’s 
leaders was born in the post-war years between 1945 and 1955 and was educated at 
top Chinese universities142 (Table 6.1).
142 See Michael F. Martin (2010: 5). The recent development of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) shows 
that it has split between two distinct leadership camps: the “populist” group, represented by Li Keqian, and 
the “elitist group,” by Xi Jinping. According to the analyst, the “populist” group favors balance in economic 
development, focuses on improving the livelihood of the poor and disenfranchised, and emphasizes the 
principles of a “harmonious society”. The “elitist” group favors continued rapid economic development, less 
emphasis on social issues, and nurturing China’s growing capitalism and middle-class populations. Xi Jinping 
and Li Keqian, two newly appointed Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members, had been tipped as 
successors, respectively, to Hu Jintao as Party secretary and to We Jiabao as premier at the 18th Party Congress 
in 2012. They are the only Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members born in the 1950s, making them the 
first of the “fifth generation” of China’s potential leadership to rise to this level. 
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Generations of Chinese Leadership Position Characteristic 
First 1949-
1976
Mao Zedong as 
core
Chairman The guiding political ideologies for the first generations were 








This turns of focus from class struggle and political mo-
vements to economic development, pioneering Chinese 
economic reform. Dominant political ideology of the era was 
Deng Xiaoping Theory. 
Third 1992-
2003




Continuing economic development, the establishment of 
the early stage of reform. Continuing the direction of Deng 




Hu Jintao as core General 
Secretary
A new technocratic style of governance and a less centrali-
zed political structure. The majority of this generation was 
engineers; unlike their predecessors and likely successors, 
they have spent very little time overseas. The dominant 
political ideology of this era is Hu’s Scientific Develop-
ment Concept with a goal for a Harmonious Society. They 
are seen as more populist than the previous generation. 
Fifth 2012- Xi Jinping as core General 
Secretary
Incorporating the Scientific Outlook on Development into 
Constitution, along with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Though, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important “Three 
Represents Theory” of Jiang Zemin2. 
Table 6.1 Generations of Chinese leadership
Source: Constructed by author.
After the 1980 speech of Deng Xiaoping “On the Reform of the Party and State 
Leadership System”, the evolution of the reform has been based on fine- tuning the 
banner slogan “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It implies that considerable 
leeway would be allowed in doctrinal matters to achieve the overriding goal of 
rapid modernization. The problematic challenge to the reform leaders prior to 
communism’s stabilization of political authority, came from the awareness that 
successful implementation of the broad reform program required a stable, professional 
bureaucracy to direct the course of events, which includes a more rational division of 
powers and functions of the Party as well as of the government.
Even though China is a one-party state that has been ruled by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) since 1949, rather than being rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian, 
political power in China is now becoming more diffuse, complex, and highly 
competitive. The political struggle still remains in the spirit of the Chinese political 
realm; only it is now hidden deeper in its camouflage of reformation.
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The Governmental Apparatus 
The second major institute of the Chinese political structure is the entire governmental 
apparatus. Under China’s Constitution, the highest government administrative body is 
the Chinese State Council. This Council functions essentially as the cabinet of the PRC 
government. The entire government apparatus is effectively divided into two parts.
The first part is a system of ministerial organizations, which is generally organized by 
type of activity. Like the Party, the ministries are organized into hierarchical layers with 
offices at the provincial and local levels and consolidations between different ministries 
are often taking place. Besides the ministerial arm, there are many special agencies and 
commissions.
The daily administration of the government is generally handled by the Chinese State 
Council’s Standing Committee (SCSC). It includes the premier, four vice premiers, 
the five state councilors, and the Chinese State Council’s secretary general. The 
State Council’s Standing Committee (SCSC) generally meets twice a week. Each vice 
premier and state councilor oversees a different aspect of the administration of the 
government. However, the actual administrations make sure that the central policy 
relies on ministerial functions. Despite their subordination to the Chinese State Council 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ministries wield decisive influence on 
policy making by virtue of their role in interpreting, implementing, and overseeing 
what central leaders often broadly and somewhat ambiguously define as Chinese 
policy goals. Ministries often function as independent operators, with the minister 
functioning as a chief executive officer over his or her agency. However, ministers are 
still answerable ultimately to the government’s board of directors, the Party’s Political 
Bureau (Politburo), and must frequently contend with the secretaries of the ministerial 
Party committees when establishing and carrying out policies.
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The second part of the Chinese government system is related to the system of 
geographic organizations, the administrative arm of the people’s congresses, the 
local governments. It consists of four levels of government entities: provincial level 
(provinces, autonomous regions, directly governed municipalities, and special 
administrative regions), prefecture level (prefectures, autonomous prefectures, 
prefecture-level cities, and leagues), county level (counties, autonomous counties, 
county-level cities, districts under the jurisdiction of the city, banners, autonomous 
banners, forestry areas, and special districts), and township and village level (towns, 
townships, sub-districts, ethnic townships, village committees, and neighborhood 
committees) 143.
According to China’s official statistic report, there are 33 provincial-level 
governments144, and more than 300 prefecture level governments, nearly 3,000 
county-level governments, and more than 40,000 township-level governments (Martin 
2010). In addition, in 1982, the Chinese Constitution defined that the State would set 
up special administrative districts whenever necessary. On July 1, 1997, China resumed 
sovereignty over Hong Kong and set up the special administrative district of Hong Kong. 
In 1999, Macao returned to China, and a new special administrative district was set up 
(Table 6.2)145 (Table 6.3).
143 The levels of local government have undergone several changes since the foundation of the PRC. There were 
six levels from October 1949 to September 1954: large region, province, city, county (urban district), district, 
and country (township). In September 1954, the number of levels dropped to five: province, city (prefectures, 
leagues, and autonomous prefecture), county (autonomous county, banner, and district under the jurisdiction 
of the city), city district, and village (people’s commune, township, and autonomous county). At present, the 
organizational system of local government is divided into four levels (town merged with the village). 
144 This is based on the official statistics of the PRC, which includes twenty-two provinces (Sheng), five autonomous 
regions (Zizhiqu), four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) and two special administrative 
regions (Hong Kong and Macau). 
145 Sumu (simplified Chinese: 苏木 ;traditional Chinese: 蘇木) are a type of administrative district used in Mongolia, 
China. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) it is equivalent to the township. Gacha (Chinese: 嘎查) is an type of 
administrative district used in Mongolia. China. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) it is an equivalent to the village 
level. Qi (Chinese: 旗) or Banner is an type of administrative district used in Mongolia, China. In Inner Mongolia 
(Nei Mongol) is an equivalent to a county level. Each banner had Sumu as nominal subdivisions.
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Central Government (Population: 1.3 billion) 
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(Region of the 
One country, two 
systems)
Region District
Civic and Municipal 
Affairs Bureau
Table 6.2 Structural hierarchy of the administrative division 
Source: www.gov.cn (Official website of the central People’s Government of the PRC) Administrative divisions of 
the People’s Republic of China. Constructed by author.
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Pudong New Area 
Table 6.3 Subnational government in China 
Source: www.gov.cn. Constructed by author.
The main function of the local government is to manage the economy of its jurisdiction. 
It includes drawing up socio-economic development strategies for the regions as well 
as middle- and long-term plans for economic development, year plans, measures of 
developing resources, transforming technologies, importing technologies and capital, 
solving important economic contradictions between branches and between branches 
and regions, mediating economic relations, organizing and coordinating production 
and circulation, enforcing economic laws and regulations, appointing and dismissing 
cadres, and providing infrastructure, basic conditions, and services for economic 
development.
After the reform of the economic system in 1978, local governments have increasingly 
participated in economic construction and played an important role in rural industry 
promoting economic development. The most well known example is the economically 
well-developed Pearl River Delta (PRD). The rapid development of rural industries 
resulted to a large extent from the impetus of local governments. Local governments 
directly intervened in the economy and played a leading role by providing favorable 
conditions for market-oriented development. In this framework, transferring 
governmental functions to reinforce market development is emphasized. In addition 
to managing the economy, local governments are also responsible for other societal 
functions, such as culture and education. They are also in charge of the urban and rural 
development construction, and finance and taxation.
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Regarding the formation of government in China, an indirect rather than direct 
election system is adopted for electing local administrative officers. Local voters elect 
the representatives to the people’s congresses and have the right to elect the officers 
of local governments. The candidates for senior officers and vice officers have to be 
nominated by the presidium of the people’s representatives or co-nominated by more 
than ten representatives. The people’s congresses at the provincial, city, and county 
levels each elect the heads of their respective government organizations. These include 
governors and deputy governors, mayors and deputy mayors, and heads and deputy 
heads of counties, districts, and towns. The people’s congresses also have the right to 
recall these officials and to demand explanations for official actions. Specifically, any 
motion raised by a delegate and supported by three others obligates the corresponding 
government authorities to respond. The people’s congresses at each level examine 
and approve budgets and the plans for the economic and social development of 
their respective administrative areas. They also maintain public order, protect public 
property, and safeguard the rights of citizens of all nationalities. All deputies are to 
maintain close and responsive contact with their various constituents.
The authorities of the local governments follow a hierarchical structure with a 
characteristic of leadership at different levels, the lower level being subordinate to a 
higher level. This means that lower-level governments must accept the leadership, 
instructions, supervision, and examination of higher-level governments and complete 
the tasks received from them. In reality, it is impossible for higher officials to fully 
monitor the activities of lower-level officials, and it is equally impossible for lower-
level officials to fully comply with instructions from their supervisors. As a result, there 
is a fair amount of policy slippage between the directives of the central government 
and the actions of local officials. In general, the ministries rely on local authorities 
to implement national laws and regulations. Because of a lack of personnel, local 
officials are frequently responsible for carrying out the policies of the Party, the 
central government, and multiple ministries—often forcing them to prioritize among 
competing requirements and restrictions (Martin 2010: 15). As a result, the goals 
and objectives of the central authorities may not be adequately reflected in the local 
situation.
The central government can exert its influence on local administrations in many 
ways. The Chinese State Council, in terms of administrative legislature, controls local 
administrative procedures. The local governments must follow the laws and regulations 
of the central government. The Chinese State Council guides the local administrations 
in terms of policies and assigns tasks to local governments in terms of plans. In doing 
so, the central government confers on the local governments the necessary authority. 
The Chinese State Council examines and approves the works of local governments 
through general supervision of the subordinate administration, special supervision 
of supervisory branches, and economic supervision of auditing branches. The 
central government evaluates the local governments’ policies, laws, and plans. Local 
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governments can work against the central government to some extent. In recent years, 
some local governments have exerted a certain influence on the central government in 
decisions on finance, import, export, trade, and so on.
Reform programs have brought the devolution of a considerable amount of decision-
making authority to the provincial and lower levels. Nevertheless, because of the 
continued predominance of the fundamental principle of democratic centralism, which 
is the basis of China’s Constitution, these lower levels are always vulnerable to changes 
in direction and decisions originating in the central government. In this respect, all 
local organs are essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus are 
responsible for the “unified leadership” of the central organs.
This challenges governmental officials to develop new collaboration and negotiation 
skills, especially in the field of regional development, where one can see that the trends 
of collaboration and negotiation between different hierarchical levels of government 
are more often active. In general, local governments at different levels compose the 
system of complete political power; in practice, each tier of government exercises 
varying degrees of autonomy.
The other important personnel system within the governmental apparatus is related 
to the organization of cadre personnel management, which consists mainly of 
organization branches of the Party committees at different levels and personnel 
management branches of local governments at different levels. As is the case with the 
central government, virtually all of the lower-level governments contain a parallel Party 
administration (headed by the secretary of the Party Committee) and governmental 
body (headed by the governor, mayor, or county head). In most of the cases, at the 
provincial level, these are two separate people; at the county level, one person may 
have both roles (Martin 2010). The relationship between the local Party leader and the 
local top government officials is critical to the effectiveness of the local government146 
(Lee Hong Yung 1991; Zhong Yang 2003; Guo Hong Tao 2007; Martin 2010; De Jong 
2013).
146 Beginning at the provincial level, China’s party-government dual administrative system arranges a hierarchy by 
which the party chief is in charge of determining the direction of policy as well as personnel changes, and the 
corresponding government leader is responsible for implementing party policy and for arranging the annual 
budget as well as other everyday government matters and ceremonial tasks. 
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Think Tanks and Government-sponsored Research Institutions
In recent years, think tanks (Zhiku)147 and other research institutions have proliferated 
greatly in China. China’s think tanks serve multiple functions for the government. They 
are often linked to various government entities and especially value a close connection 
with the upper stratum of the Chinese leadership. Broadly speaking, China’s think tanks 
are autonomous organizations that conduct research and that provide consultancy 
services on policy issues.
Based on the research of Zhu Xufeng (2006), there are three types of policy research 
institutes: official policy research institutes, semi-official think tanks, and civilian think 
tanks (Table 6.4).
China’s Policy Decision-making Consultant System
Think Tanks 
Official Institutes Semi-official Think 
Tanks 
Civilian Think Tanks 
Research Office in 
Bureaucracy 









Government Agency Public Institute Enterprise 
Table 6.4 Three types of Policy Research Institutes in China 
Source: Zhu, Xufeng (2006: 5). Constructed by author.
China’s official policy research institutes include the Chinese Research Office of the 
State Council and the Offices of Policy Studies of the local governments, ministries 
and commissions. Under Chinese law, an official policy research institute is regarded 
as a “government agency”. Although the first task of these policy research institutes is 
to conduct research on policy issues, they are often responsible for drafting important 
policies, releasing information and organizing studies on policy issues. Zhu Xufeng (2006: 
3) argued that China’s official policy research institutes function as immediate actors in 
the government’s policymaking process, not as “outer brains” of the government, the 
basic feature of think tanks, thus they cannot be counted as “think tanks”.
Semi-official think tanks are independent legal bodies founded by the government 
that acts as their supervising unit. Under Chinese law, semi-official think tanks are 
147 Zhiku or Think Tanks (simplified Chinese: 智库; traditional Chinese: 智庫). 
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“public institutions”. Semi-official think tanks are not completely autonomous. Various 
ministries and local governments established many semi-official policy research 
institutes after the reform in 1978. They are headed by government-nominated 
personnel and accept startup capital from their supervising government agencies. They 
also receive a steady flow of funds as fees for regular research tasks assigned to them. In 
general, semi-official think tanks can run their research in a more autonomous manner 
than official policy research institutes can. After the reform, they gradually received 
fewer sponsored funds from the government. They have more freedom, as they can 
accept other research tasks from other government departments and organizations. 
Following the reform policy of privatization and decentralization, semi-official think 
tanks have also become increasingly market-oriented and acquire assignments from 
private organizations, enterprises, and even foreign funds.
The last type of think tank emerged with the open-door policy. On-campus policy research 
organizations were an emerging category of civilian think tanks, with college scholars 
beginning to exert influence over China’s policymaking process. In general, they have fewer 
links with the government and are sometimes supervised by a government department. 
Yet, the tie between supervisor units and civilian organizations is very loose. This reflects 
their independence and diverse sources of funds.
The growing importance of think tanks in China and the frequency with which they 
are able to facilitate international exchanges has to be understood within the context 
of China’s rise on the world stage. In 2006, the Chinese State Council approved the 
founding of a new think tank in Beijing, the China Center for International Economic 
Exchanges (CCIEE). Within this framework, for the first time in the PRC’s history, the 
top ten think tanks in the country were designated (Table 6.5). The formation of the 
China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) reinforces what some 
scholars see as an emerging trend in China’s research institutes to facilitate broad 
domestic and international policy discussions by knitting together and drawing on 
the expertise of government officials, private entrepreneurs, and internationally 
renowned scholars148 (Li Cheng 2009: 1). According to its charter, the China Center 
148 Four months later, the CCIEE organized an international conference on the global financial crisis and the role of 
think tanks in promoting international cooperation on issues of global importance. This so-called “Global Think 
Tank Summit” attracted approximately 900 attendees. Among them were 150 former or current government 
leaders (Chinese and foreign), officials from such international organizations as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, about 450 scholars and think tank representatives from around 
the world, roughly 200 businesspeople and 150 journalists. China’s top leaders were among those who made 
their presence felt at the conference, with Premier Wen Jiabao on hand to meet with distinguished guests and 
Executive Vice-Premier Li Keqiang delivering a keynote address. For almost a week, Chinese media outlets 
covered this event widely as part of the headline news.
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for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) is to operate “under the guidance and 
supervision of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in terms of 
its business scope” (Li Cheng 2009; Zhu Xufeng 2006; and Martin 2010).
Rank Name Current Head Year Location 
1 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chen Kuiyuan 1977 Beijing
2 Development Research Center of the State Council Zhang Yutai 1981 Beijing
3 Chinese Academy of Sciences Lu Yongxiang 1949 Beijing
4 Academy of Military Sciences Liu Chengjun 1958 Beijing
5 China Institute of International Study Ma Zhengang 1956 Beijing
6 Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations Cui Liru 1980 Beijing
7 China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation Mei Ping 1986 Beijing
8 China Association for Science and Technology Han Qide 1958 Beijing
9 Chinese International Institute of Strategic Society Xiong Cuangkai 1979 Beijing
10 Shanghai Institute for International Studies Yang Jiemian 1960 Shanghai 
Table 6.5  Top 10 Think Tanks in China (Compiled by Chinese Authorities at the “First Forum on China’s Think 
Tanks” held in Beijing in 2006.) 
Source: Li Cheng (2009, Table 1).
The Office of Policy Studies (OPS) of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), the biggest ministry in the State Council of China, was established 
at the same time that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
was reorganized from the Chinese State Development Planning Commission in 2003. 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), whose purview is the 
macroeconomic management of the Chinese economy, is widely considered to be the 
most important ministry in the Chinese government. The Office of Policy Studies (OPS) 
acts not only as a research entity but also is in charge of the press and journals under 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)149 (Zhu Xufeng 2006: 4).
The two most important institutes in the second category of think tanks are the 
Development Research Center (DRC) of the Chinese State Council and the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS). The Development Research Center (DRC) focuses on 
149 The press and journals under the NDRC include The Chinese Planning Press, The China Economic Herald, and 
the Journal of Macro-economic Management, in which policy information from the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) is released. 
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policy research projects, while the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) conducts 
both policy and academic research. They are also the top two think tanks of the top ten.
Li Cheng (2009) in his research points out that there are three distinct groups of elites—
current or retired government officials, business leaders, and public intellectuals—who 
have become increasingly active in promoting their personal influences, institutional 
interests, and policy initiatives through these semi-governmental organizations. In 
present-day China, think tanks allow retired government officials to pursue a new phase 
in their careers, but they are also a crucial institutional meeting ground where officials, 
entrepreneurs, and scholars can interact. In addition, China’s think tanks are becoming 
more transparent and operate with greater visibility than do other parts of the PRC 
government. In other ways, they play a crucial role in informing policy discourse and in 
proposing alternative courses of action for PRC policymakers.
Zhu Xufeng (2006) emphasized that with the broadening of reform, China’s think 
tanks have also diversified their research interests. Emerging issues have caused think 
thanks to expand their scope of interest from macroeconomic issues to include other 
related topics. Second, think tanks can take part in the open policy debate and have 
started to hold differing viewpoints. Besides, government officials are paying more 
attention to the opinions proposed by civilian think tanks, especially those that have 
knowledge and experience in the field of international matters and relations.
China is still in the early stages of developing a network of think thanks that can engage 
in systematic and well-grounded research and that provide balanced and independent 
policy analysis for policymakers and the Chinese public on the one hand. On the other 
hand, the strong coalition among the prominent officials, business leaders, and well-
known scholars might result in a “wicked coalition” that may influence government 
policy for their own benefit. Li Cheng (2009: 19) concludes, 
In the large scheme of things, this development adds a new analytical wrinkle to the 
long-standing and complicated relationship between power, wealth and knowledge. 
Only time will tell whether these dramatic changes in the composition of Chinese 
think tanks will contribute to profound and positive development in elite politics—or 
whether this new confluence of political, economic and academic elites will spell 
trouble for China’s near-term future.
Since the reform, the interactive wrestling among the Party and government, the 
central and local government, governmental institutes and think tanks, and Party 
leadership and public civilians has increased much, leading the Chinese reformation 
toward an unknown future. Consequently, such interactive wrestling is exerting 
influence toward redefining the new planning culture of China. What follows is 
an analysis of the planning structure of China, which brings us one step further in 
examining how such interactive tensions are reflected in the planning domain.
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§ 6.2 Planning System 
In general, Chinese planning systems are embedded in two types of institutional 
management. One is the system of macro-scale economic management, and the other 
is related to the physical construction of the spatial development. This dual-track 
institutional mechanism of management is guiding interactively the major direction of 
land-use policy, spatial planning, and urban development. Within these two systems, 
planning is organized hierarchically based on the scope and scale of planning objects 
geographically and administratively.
§ 6.2.1 Authorities Relating to Spatial Policy
On the national level, land and resources planning is an important part of the state 
planning system, through government macro control of the development and 
the utilization of resources to establish a policy on a harmonious and sustainable 
development. The basic national development policy for China is embodied in the 
Five-Year Plan (FYP) for National Economic and Social Development. This plan serves 
to outline the physical/geographical distribution of large-scale construction projects 
and centers of productivity as well as to decide how resources are to be portioned out 
to different sectors of the national economy. The plan also sets objectives and attempts 
to lay out a course for the national economy while the nation’s revitalization and 
reconstruction are urgently needed in all fields.
Within this framework, two administrative systems under the Chinese State Council are 
responsible for the spatial plans at national and regional levels. One is responsible for 
national economic development. The Five-Year Plan (FYP) is approved by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (formerly the Chinese State Planning 
Commission, which was formed in 1952), which is responsible for drafting plan proposals 
and has a broad administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy. In addition, 
the National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) functions are to study and 
to formulate policies for economic and social development, to maintain the balance of 
economic development, and to guide the restructuring of China’s economic system.
The other is within the ministerial system, such as the Chinese Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) (formerly the Ministry of Construction), 
which provides housing and regulates the state construction activities in the country, 
and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) which is responsible for the regulation, 
management, preservation, and exploitation of natural resources, such as land, mines, 
and oceans.
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In general, since the establishment of the PRC, regarding the demands of the 
governmental management of the national economic development and the physical 
construction of spatial development, there are four types of formation based on either 
the collaboration or the demarcation between these two poles.
Before 1958, spatial plans at the national and regional levels were divided into two 
parts, based on the demarcation of the two systems. The State Planning Commission 
(SPC) (Guo Jia Ji We)150 (the precursor of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)) had managed China’s centrally planned economy since 1952 
and was in charge of setting the planned economy guidelines, the regulations, and 
the approval of planning. The ministerial system (Jian Gong Bu)151 was responsible 
for the supervision of the implementation. During this period, the division was based 
on the dual track system of macroeconomic management and physical construction. 
However, the physical construction of spatial development mainly served the economic 
development of the country based on the top-down blueprint of the economic plan 
(Zhao Shi Xiu 1999).
Since 1960, due to the economic stagnation of the entire country, spatial planning 
of the State Planning Commission (SPC) was centralized, while spatial development 
stagnated and was suspended.
In 1979, the Chinese State Administration of Urban Construction was established, and 
in 1982, it merged with the State Planning Commission (SPC). The Chinese Ministry 
of Construction was founded (the precursor of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development (MOHURD)). After large-scale economic construction and house 
building began in 1978, problems appeared, such as the absence of an exact overview 
of land resources, fuzzy ownership, and the abusive occupation and illegal use of land. 
Meanwhile, contradictions among land and population, urban land, and agricultural 
land use became obvious.
The serious land problems had become a great obstacle for the development of the 
national economy and for social development. Strengthening land management was 
put on the agenda. In 1981, the Chinese State Council issued the Urgent Notice on 
Forbidding Invasion of Farm Land for Building Houses in Rural Areas, and in 1982, it 
released the Regulations on Land Management for House Building in Villages and Towns 
and the Regulations on Requisition of Land for State Construction to strengthen the 
150 Guo Jia Ji We (simplified Chinese: 国家计委 ; traditional Chinese: 國家計委).
151 Jian Gong Bu (Chinese: 建工部). 
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management of land requisition. In 1982, the central government decided to set up the 
Chinese Land Management Bureau under the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, 
and Fishery. The bureau exercises the power authorized by the Chinese State Council 
for national land management; however, the improvement is still imperfect because a 
unified land management system is missing, due to the lack of a coherent mechanism of 
land management and legislation. Therefore, overall reform is needed.
Since 1986, the state has implemented a series of major reform measures in land 
management152:
In March 1986, the central committee and the Chinese State Council issued a Notice 
of Strengthening Land Management and Forbidding Abused Occupation of Land, and 
based on this document, it emphasized the establishment of comprehensive measures 
to strengthen land management, especially noting the use of economic means to 
control the non-agricultural use of land.
In June 1986, the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated the Law on 
Land Management of the People’s Republic of China; and in December 1988, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) revised the Land Management Law. In April 1998, 
the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) approved an overall revision of the 
Land Management Law. The revision of the approval system adopted the land use 
management system to strengthen the protection of non-urban land, especially 
farmland.
3. Also, in 1986, the National Land Management Bureau (NLMB) was established to 
manage national land and land institutions in cities and towns on a unified basis. The 
efforts resulted in a unified management system from central to local governments, 
and unified land management institutions at the county level and above were 
established. Land management branches and personnel were installed at the township 
level. A five-level land management network (state, provincial, prefecture (city), county, 
and township) was formed (Ding Chengri and Knaap 2003).
4. Reform of non-agricultural land use systems was carried out smoothly and steadily. 
Paid use of national land as well as the renting and transfer of land use rights were 
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5. In July 1995, the National Land Management Bureau (NLMB) promulgated the 
Provisional Regulations on Land Supervision, which provided land management 
departments with legal protection to enforce land supervision. In June 1996, China 
invited, for the first time, twenty-one special national land inspectors to strengthen 
enforcement of land supervision and to help establish a social supervision mechanism 
for land management.
6. In April 1998, the Chinese State Council revamped its structure and combined the 
National Land Management Bureau (NLMB), the Geological and Mineral Ministry, the 
National Ocean Bureau, and the National Survey Bureau into the Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR). This was a major reform of national land resource management. It 
symbolized that China had begun a unified management of national land resources 
from land to underground, from continent to ocean. It was also an important step in 
the management of China’s natural resources.
In 1998, the State Planning Commission (SPC) was renamed the Chinese State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC), which then merged with the State Council 
Office for Restructuring the Economic System (SCORES) and became part of the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in 2003. Since then, the organization 
further shifted its policy from a planned economy to a socialist market economy. The 
restructured organization merged into a newly created National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2003, which gained greater responsibility and power in 
overseeing China’s economic development.
However, the major workload of regulating urban development and planning had 
shifted to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the 
Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). The dual-track system between macroeconomic 
management and physical construction was reestablished, different from the first 
Five-Year plan (FYP). Broader reform reflected a desire to keep abreast of the shift in 
focus toward the establishment of a market economy. It also proved that the reforms 
and paradigm shifts in the systems of government in China were inevitable. As of the 
eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 2003, the government replaced the Chinese term 
corresponding with the English “plan” with the equivalent to “guidelines”
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The abovementioned three major state departments153 are influential in guiding the 
economic-spatial planning and development of the state, and their functions are 
clearly prescribed by the Chinese State Council.
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is one of the most powerful 
governmental agencies under the Chinese State Council. In terms of planning formation, it 
is the responsibility of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to draw 
up Five-Year Plans (FYPs). It seeks input from all relevant ministries and organizations of 
the Chinese State Council. The latter can, in turn, solicit information from provincial and 
lower-level governments if necessary. There should be two components in the proposals 
submitted by each ministry or organization, one requiring central government action 
and financing (to be included in its budget) and the remainder to be left to provincial 
governments—which, in turn, need to coordinate and direct local governments under 
their jurisdiction—or to market forces (Tang 2004).
According to the prescription of the Chinese State Council, the main functions are as 
follows.154
From an economic perspective, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) is responsible for formulating and monitoring macroeconomic and social 
development by providing strategies for economic measures, such as the formulation 
of fiscal, monetary, and land policies. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) is also responsible for coordinating the restructuring of the 
economic system and for formulating regulatory targets, such as drafting the layout of 
key construction projects. In addition, from the perspective of planning regulation, it 
is responsible for carrying out research and analysis of the domestic and international 
economic situation by providing a draft of plans and relevant laws and regulations 
concerning national economic and social development.
They have two main tasks: To provide, formulate, and coordinate economic factors that 
can contribute to the overall economic strategy as well as to organize, draft, analyze, 
and study the relevant laws, plans, and regulations to underpin the implementation of 
153 Here refers to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).
154 See more information on the official website of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/default.htm.
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the economic and social developments. In accordance with relevant regulations of the 
Chinese State Council, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is 
also responsible for the administration of the Chinese State Grain Administration and 
the National Energy Administration.
The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) is responsible 
for drafting policies, laws, and development plans related to city, village, and town 
planning and construction, the building industry, and municipal works. In the 
Chinese State Council’s 2007-2008 round of reorganization, the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) was created from the older Ministry of 
Construction (MOC). Since the mid-1990s, the MOC/ MOHURD has had three broad 
issues to tackle.
First, the central government has used the building of infrastructure projects as a 
mechanism to keep the Chinese economy growing. Thus, the construction industry 
has been a recipient of significant funds from the central government throughout both 
the ninth Five-Year Plan 1996-2000 and the tenth Five-Year Plan 2001-2005. The 
Ministry of Construction (MOC) manages competition for these funds and oversees 
many of the projects, which include urban planning and infrastructure development, 
improvement in water supply and wastewater treatment facilities, and the expansion of 
public transport.
Second, the MOC/ MOHURD has helped to privatize the national public housing 
system as China transitions into an economy where families own their own houses. 
In view of the increasing liberalization of the property sector, the MOC/MOHURD 
must manage construction in the real estate market, the displacement of low-income 
families because of new construction, and the resulting shortfall in affordable housing.
Third, the MOC/MOHURD has been plagued in recent years by a series of construction-
related incidents, such as the collapse of bridges, dams, and buildings. Many of the 
problems stem from lack of oversight, corruption in the issuance of construction 
licenses, the use of inferior materials, poorly trained construction workers, the 
insufficient enforcement of standards, and local officials’ unwillingness to cooperate.
In response, ministry officials have introduced new inspection procedures, issued more 
standards on construction materials and building codes, and established a national 
program to train project owners, engineers, managers, and technicians. They have set 
national standards for construction projects and have overseen market access, project 
bidding, and quality and safety supervision. This includes preparing plans for scientific 
and technological development and technical economic policies for related industries. 
Due to the booming housing market and serious problems arising from the imbalanced 
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housing provision, it tries to increase control of the housing sector by directing housing 
construction, overseeing the reform of the urban housing system, and managing 
the real estate industry. In addition, there is a strong focus on methods of economic 
appraisal for project feasibility studies, economic parameters, land-use targets, and 
the cost management of construction projects. Special attention is given to develop 
sustainability in public facilities, such as the use of underground urban water and 
space; the work related to fuel, heat, municipal facilities, public transit, gardens, and 
urban greening, landscaping, and environmental sanitation; and national scenic spots 
and historic cities.
The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR)
The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) was established in 1998 as part of the 
restructuring of the Chinese State Council. On the basis of the Scheme for the 
Organizational Reform of the State Council approved by the first meeting of the 9th 
National Party Congress and the Notice of the Organizational Setup issued by the 
Chinese State Council, the former Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources, the 
State Land Administration, the State Oceanic Administration, and the State Bureau 
of Surveying and Mapping merged to form the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), 
a department of the State Council responsible for the planning, administration, 
protection, and rational utilization of land, mineral, and marine resources. The Chinese 
State Oceanic Administration and the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping are state 
bureaus under the administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).
The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) is responsible for land reform regulations, 
such as developing and implementing regulations for the assignment, lease, 
evaluation, transfer, and governmental purchase of land use rights; for working out a 
catalogue guide for the allocation of land use rights for state-owned land and measures 
for land utilization by villages and townships; and for administering the transfer of the 
use right of non-agricultural land owned by rural collectives. Within this framework, 
it works to administer the evaluation of land prices (benchmark and standard land 
prices), to validate the qualification of the land evaluation and appraisal agencies, to 
confirm land-use prices, and to examine and submit applications for land use that 
require the approval of the Chinese State Council, as prescribed by law.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) is in charge of the supervision 
and examination of the approval, registration, and licensing of the rights of mining 
mineral resources and the transfer of rights according to relevant provisions of the 
collection and use of mineral resources compensation; the examination and validation 
of the qualifications of the institutions that are responsible for the evaluation and 
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examination of exploration rights and mining rights; and the confirmation of the 
results of evaluation and estimation.155 
To a certain degree, in comparison with the earlier stage of reformation, the 
restructuring of the planning administration is progressive. The major tasks among 
the three departments are becoming well divided and defined. Urbanization and 
sustainable environmental issues are becoming more and more critical in China, 
as in the global society in general. Certain subjects are highlighted and included in 
major national missions that demand more collaborative and cross-department 
reinforcement. This requires more responsive and reflexive mechanisms of the 
administrative system (Table 6.6).
Ministry/Committee Department in Charge Functions of Urban Planning 
National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)
Department of Development Plan-
ning and Department of Regional 
Economy
To draft a comprehensive plan 
and a yearly plan of the national 
economy and social development, 
including long-term and mid-term 
plans;
To decide on important national 
projects;
To decide on the plan for the na-
tional distribution of productivity. 
Ministry of Land and Resources Department of Planning To draft the national land use plan; 
To frame the drafting methods of 
land use plans; 
To supervise and approve land use 
master plans and other thematic 
plans of provinces, autonomous 
regions and some big cities. 
The Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD)
Department of Urban and Rural 
Planning 
To frame the drafting methods 
of urban planning, and town and 
village planning;
To supervise and approve towns 
system plans of provinces, autono-
mous regions, and some big cities;
To supervise and approve plans of 
important national parks. 
Table 6.6 Functions of Urban Land Use Planning and control in three main central government sectors  
Source: Han, Haoying and Nishimura (2006). Revised by author.
155 http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/.
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§ 6.2.2 Legal System and Administrative System of Planning 
According to the Organizing Law of All Levels of Local People’s Congresses and Local 
Governments in 1979, the Chinese Constitution in 1982 (Chiu Huangdah 1985), and the 
Chinese Legislation Law in 2000 (Paler 2005), the legal system of China has three levels: 
1) the Chinese Constitution and all the laws based on it; 2) the administrative ordinances 
promulgated by the State Council; and 3) the local ordinances promulgated by the local 
congresses, the local regulations issued by the local governments, and the sectional 
regulations issued by the ministries and committees of the State Council. The Chinese 
Legislation System has given the government sector comprehensive power of legislation, 
and it gave the State Council administrative legislative power superior to local regulations 
(ordinances) (Figure 6.2) (Paler 2005; Han Haoying and Nishimura 2006).
 
Figure 4- Legal System of China 
The contradictions between local ordinance and sectional regulations are firstly coordinated by the state council.  
If the state council supports the local ordinance, the sectional regulation should be adjusted according to the local 
ordinance; if the state council supports the sectional regulations, the case should be submitted to and finally judged by 
the standing committee of the people’s congress.  (Legislation Law, Item 86) 
? ?  The contradictions between different regulations are arbitrated by the state council. (Legislation Law, Item 86) 
Constructed by author. 
 
Table 1- Examples of Laws, Ordinances and Regulations in China 
ITEM EXAMPLE 
Basic Laws Chinese Constitution 
Chinese Legislation Law 
Ordinary Laws Land Use Administration Law 
Urban Planning Law 
Administrative Ordinances Land Use Administration Ordinance 
Management Ordinance of the Land of Villages and Towns 
for Construction Use 
Sectional Regulations Urban Planning Drafting Method 
Local Ordinance Urban Planning Ordinance of Beijing City 
Local Regulations Regulations for the Management of the Construction and 
Planning of Villages and Towns in Beijing City 
Constructed by author.  
 
Table 2- Instruments of Legislation 
Classification Item Legislation Institution Promulgator 




Gui Ding  
Ban Fa 
The State Council Prime Minister 
Sectional Regulation Guiding 
Banfa 
Ministries & Committees of the State 
Council 
Minister 
Local Ordinances Tiao Li  
Gui Ding  
Ban Fa 
Local People’s Congress of Provincial 
Level and of Big Municipalities7
Local People’s Congress of 
Provincial Level and of Big 
Municipalities 
Local Regulation Guiding 
Banfa 
Local People’s Government of 
Provincial Level and of Big 
Municipalities 
Provincial or Municipal 
Governor 













Standing Committee of 
People’s Congress People’s Congress Government 
Government 
Branches 
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Figure 6.2 Legal Sys em of China 
Source: Han Haoying and Nishimura (2006, Figure 4)
Chinese written laws use a nu ber of terms to define the scope of application and 
the level of authority of enactment. Terms include law (Fa), regulations or provisions 
(Tiaoli), rules (Guize), detailed rules (Xize), methods or measures (Banfa), decisions 
(Jueding), resolutions (Jueyi, Guiding), and orders (Mingling). Prior to the open-door 
policy, the publication of China’s laws was irregular, and often, the use of the various 
terms was confused and sometimes overlapping. The Chinese State Council has taken 
i
 249 Transformation of Planning in China 
steps to emphasize that the terms should be used properly in order to reflect the level 
of authority and the scope of enactment.156 
A law (Fa) is a statute that has been enacted by the Chinese National People’s Congress 
(NPC) or its standing committee. Regulations or ordinances (Tiaoli), also translated, as 
“provisions” or “measures,” are administrative rules that are designated to implement a law 
or policy and are usually issued by the Chinese State Council. “Regulations” or “ordinances” 
are issued by the Local People’s Congress to designate implementation of a local law.
Within this framework of legislation, a set of rules (Guize) or detailed rules (Xize) is 
used to give specific interpretations or explanations of a law or regulation. Methods or 
measures (Banfa) are rules or regulations that are more detailed in order to address an 
issue of limited scope.
Decisions (Jueding) and resolutions (Jueyi, Guiding) have little prescriptive legislative 
value but record common concerns and opinions expressed at a particular meeting or 
forum. An order (Mingling) refers to a proclamation issued by a state organization that 
is intended to prescribe legal standards (Table 6.7).
Classification Item Legislation Institution Promulgator 
Law Fa National People’s Congress President 
Administrative 
Ordinances 
Tiaoli, Guiding, Banfa State Council Prime Minister 
Sectional Regu-
lation 
Guiding, Banfa Ministries and Committees of the 
State Council 
Minister 
Local Ordinances Tiaoli, Guiding, Banfa Local People’s Congress of Provincial 
Level and of Big Municipalities
Local People’s Congress 
of Provincial Level and of 
Big Municipalities 
Local Regulation Guiding, Banfa Local People’s Government of 
Provincial Level and of Big Munici-
palities
Provincial or Municipal 
Governor 
Table 6.7 Instruments of legislation 
Source: Han, Haoying, and Nishimura (2006, Table 2).
156 See Chinese Legislation Law (National People’s Congress PRC 2000), Organizing Law of All Levels of Local 
People’s Congress and Local Government (National People’s Congress PRC 1979), and Management Method for 
the Document of State Government (State Council 2001). 
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The promulgation and implementation of the Urban Planning Law in 1990 was a major 
milestone in planning legislation. Since its enactment, China has gradually come up 
with a working system of urban planning administration and technical regulation.
The new Urban and Rural Planning Law$1, which emphasized the integration of urban 
and rural areas, was promulgated in 2007. A series of related planning laws were also 
issued to form a multilevel and comprehensive system of laws and regulations along with 
the Urban and Rural Planning Law$1.
Compared with the original Urban Planning Law of 1990, the new legislation was 
a profound change. The act describes distinctly that urban and rural planning is 
an important public policy for government to guide and to control the legality of 
urban-rural construction and development, which means the legality of planning 
management (administrative management procedure, law accountability in urban 
planning) and planning implementation (supervision of planning and modification 
of planning). Urban and rural planning became an integrated system. It emphasized 
strengthening the supervision of the people’s congress. The new law set specific 
regulations to discourage local officials from blind enlargement of city scales. On the 
other hand, the new law also clearly stated that local authorities are not allowed to 
make any random amendment or alteration to the legal procedures concerning urban-
rural planning. All plans that have already been announced, except for those related to 
national security, should be accessible to all people and organizations in the country.
Based on the Urban Planning Law, the urban master plan should use national 
economic development planning as a foundation, and it should link to the general 
land-use planning. The urban master plan is to be limited by land supply and has to 
cooperate with land use planning for urban spatial development. The scale of urban 
development is defined by the urban master plan and must be based on the national 
land allocation index. In the past, land-use planning and urban spatial planning did not 
have a clear relationship; urban planning breaking through the land supply index was 
very common (Liu Yun et al. 2008).
As stipulated in the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the legal system of urban planning 
is divided into two sub-systems: vertical and horizontal. The vertical system is a four-
tier system of planning laws, ordinances, regulations, and directives issued by different 
levels of authority (Table 6.8).
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Four Tiers of Planning Laws and Regulations Issued by 
National Laws National People’s Congress
National Administrative Ordinances State Council
Local Ordinances and Regulations Provincial Authorities
Local Regulations and Directives Municipal Authorities
Table 6.8 Vertical system of legal system of urban planning 
Source: Derived from Urban and Rural Planning Law and constructed by author.
Horizontally, the system consists of principal act, subsidiary legislation, and other 
relevant laws (Table 6.9).
Principal Act Urban and Rural Planning Law
Subsidiary Legislation Guidelines for making City Plans
Regulations on Assignment and Transfer of Land
Use Right on State-owned Land in the Urban areas
Various Technical Standards and Norms
Other Related Laws Land Administration law, Environmental Protection Law, Water Law, Construction 
Law etc. 
Table 6.9 Horizontal system of legal system of urban planning 
Source: Derived from Urban and Rural Planning Law and constructed by author.
As stipulated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the competent administration 
(presently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)) under 
the Chinese State Council is responsible for the organization of formulating planning 
for national cities and towns; the provincial government or the government of an 
autonomous region is responsible for the organization of formulating planning for 
local cities and towns; and the city government is responsible for the organization 
of formulating planning for the city. In generally the framework of the present urban 
planning administration is shown in Table 6.10.
Administrative hierarchies Relevant authorities
National Level Ministry of Housing, Urban and Rural Development (MOHURD)
Provincial Level Construction Administrations/Commissions, Planning Bureau
City and County Level Planning Bureaus
Table 6.10 Framework of the urban planning administration 
Source: Tang Kai (2004). Constructed by author.
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All cities are required to compile Statutory Plans, the fundamental and most important 
city plans specified in the Urban and Rural Planning Law. The Chinese Ministry 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) is in charge of planning 
administration at the national level. The provincial construction administrations/
commissions and planning bureaus are in charge of planning administration at 
provincial levels. The municipal and county planning bureaus are in charge of planning 
administration at local levels (Table 6.11 and Figure 6.3).
Administrative hierarchies Relevant authorities
National Level Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
Provincial Level Construction Administrations / Commissions, Planning Bureau
City and County Level Planning Bureaus
Table 6.11 Hierarchy of planning authorities and administrationsSource: Derived from Urban and Rural Planning 
Law and constructed by author.
Ministry of 
Construction 
Provincial Dept. of 
Construction 
Planning Sector














of Urban Planning 
County Bureau of 
Urban Planning 
Town Office of 
Urban Planning 
Chinese Academy 
of Urban Planning 
Municipal Bureau 
of Urban Planning 
Municipal Academy 
of Urban Planning 
District Sub-Bureau 
of Urban Planning 
Urban Planning 
Office 
City &County Bureau 
of Urban Planning 
Figure 6.3 The framework of the present urban planning administration
Source: Tang Kai (2004: 4).
In view of the increasingly complex and diverse conditions of spatial development, 
the sector administrations of urban planning and design as well as the market 
administration of planning and design are responsible for much broader and diverse 
administrative functions such as the formulation of relevant regulations and policies, 
qualification checks, approval and annual checks, qualification recognition of registered 
planners, and administration of the registration (Tang Kai 2004). However, the work 
cannot be completed and realized by governmental administrative sectors alone; in 
addition, China has established a qualification certificate of urban planning and design.
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Individual planners should be registered by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development (MOHURD) by passing a registration exam to become registered 
planners. However, they are not allowed to perform planning services on an individual 
basis but may join a qualified planning-services provider to do so. A planning-service 
provider should be qualified by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD) to obtain a certificate that specifies requirements on its plan-making 
activities, including numbers of registered planners and other professionals. Within 
this framework, since the structural reform of the Chinese State Council in 1998, 
detailed work, such as qualification checks of planning-formulating units, annual 
checks, and appraisals of good performance, have been shifted to the Chinese 
Society of Urban Planning. The qualification recognition of registered planners and 
the registration administration have been shifted to non-governmental institutions 
specifically for registration (Tang Kai 2004).
There are nearly 2,000 institutions that have access to the urban planning and 
design market. Individual planners and designers also have to obtain qualifications at 
institutions, most of which have design personnel who are engaged in urban planning. 
The new legal and administrative and registration mechanism provides much broader 
access to participants’ involvements in urban planning practice. Therefore, setting 
up the formulation and approval of implementation of urban planning is a crucial 
element. In general, the formulation of urban planning is still hierarchical, from the top 
down.
§ 6.2.3 System of Plans
Within the framework of the administrative system of planning and its legal status, 
there are three major components of systems and plans, related to China’s spatial 
planning policies.
The basic national socio-economic development policy for China is embodied in the 
Five-Year Plans (FYPs), which are drafted at the national, provincial, and county levels. 
The second component is land use (spatial) plans, which are drafted at the national, 
provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels. The last component is urban and 
rural plans, which are drafted at the national, provincial, prefectural, and county levels 
(Table 6.12). 
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System of plans Authorities
The Five-Year Plans National Development and Reform Commission
Land Use Plans Ministry of Land and Resources 
Urban and Rural Plans Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
Table 6.12 Plans and responsible authorities 
Source: Constructed by author.
Five-Year Plans (FYPs)
China’s policy process is not known for surprises but rather reflects the demands 
and evolution of a socialistic society and its economic development. Embedded in 
democratic centralism, Chinese policy prefers a predictable and steady regulatory 
environment conducive to meeting its long-term development goals. China’s Five-Year 
Plan (FYP) for National Economic and Social Development is a critically important tool 
used by the government to achieve its development objectives by mapping out in five-
year cycles the country’s future progress via guidelines, policy frameworks, and targets 
for policy makers at all levels of government. Five-Year Plans (FYPs) provide economic 
guidance and indicate China’s major political maneuvers.
A Five-Year Plan (FYP) is a key characteristic of centralized, communist economies, 
and one plan established for the entire country normally contains detailed economic 
development guidelines for all its regions. Although most consider the Five-Year Plan 
(FYP) to be a single document, it represents a complex web of Chinese policy-making, 
containing previously implemented regional and long-term development plans and 
hundreds of targeted policy initiatives, all of which undergo constant review and 
revision during the course of the five-year cycle. Although this process might seem 
rather chaotic and mysterious, since the reformation, the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) 
process is increasingly standardized, open, and under the oversight of a wider and more 
transparent bureaucratic framework.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, there was an economic recovery period 
until 1952. Starting in 1953, the mechanism of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) was 
implemented. Except for a two-year hiatus for economic adjustment in 1963-1965157, 
the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have been continuous (Table 6.13).
157 Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the 1960 nationwide farmine, the Chinese leaders 
emphasized four guidelines in the three years (1963-1965) of the readjustment period. The four guidelines in 
this period referred to adjustment, consolidation, enrichment and elevation (rising standards). See Liou, Kuotsai 
Tom (1998:11). 
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Five-Year Plan Key feature Leadership 
First 1953-57 Stalinist Central Plan Mao Zedong
Second 1958-62 Great Leap Forward Mao Zedong
1963-65 Economic Readjustment Mao Zedong
Third 1966-70 Agricultural Push Mao Zedong
Fourth 1971-75 Cultural Revolution Mao Zedong
Fifth 1976-80 Post-Mao, Reforms and Opening Up Hua Guofeng (Chairman), Deng Xia-
oping (Paramount leader). 
Sixth 1981-85 Readjustment and Recovery Hu Yaobang (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping 
(Paramount leader). 
Seventh 1986-90 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang 
Zemin (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping 
(Paramount leader). 
Eighth 1991-95 Technical Development Jiang Zemin (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping 
(Paramount leader). 
Ninth 1996-00 SOE Reform Jiang Zemin
Tenth 2001-05 Strategic Restructuring Hu Jintao 
Eleventh 2006-10 Rebalancing Alert Hu Jintao
Twelfth 2011-15 Pro-Consumption 
Table 6.13 Key features of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) 
Source: about.com and China.org.cn. Edited and constructed by author.
In summarizing the highlights of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), we noticed that the 
economy of China is developed based on a rapid and sustained economic growth. 
The major economic growth is directly reflecting the evolutionary progression of 
society. Not only does it show the demands of Chinese society for the future, but also it 
responds to dynamically to global development.
Before the reform of 1978, the first four Five-Year Plans (FYPs) emphasized the laying 
of a preliminary foundation for socialist industrialization. For two decades, even 
though the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward plus natural calamities 
severely affected the development of the national economy, a policy of readjusting, 
consolidating, filling in, and raising standards for the national economy was 
permanently adopted by the Chinese government to ensure that China’s economic 
construction stayed on track.
The fifth and sixth Five-Year Plans (FYPs) (1976-1980 and 1981-1985) established 
Chinese socialist modernization through a policy of revitalizing the domestic economy 
and opening up to the outside world. A fresh situation appeared in economic 
development through the introduction of economic construction by increasing 
efficiency.
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The institution of the Household Responsibility System (HRS)158 for farming and the 
rise of quasi-private township and village enterprises created unprecedented growth 
and capital accumulation in China’s rural sector. During this period, the central 
government for the first time opened China’s economy to foreign direct investment. 
Beginning in 1980, Special Economic Zones were created in southern coastal areas, 
where it was legal for foreign companies to invest in export-producing joint ventures 
using local Chinese labor.
In addition, the sixth Five-Year Plan (FYP) included massive investment in energy 
conservation, with funds equal to about ten percent of the energy supply investment 
for energy conservation projects. The major policies included restructuring energy-
intensive industries; reducing the direct burning of oil; increasing equipment and 
process efficiency with technology; eliminating the most inefficient equipment and 
production processes; issuing energy consumption standards for energy-intensive 
products; using a system of rewards and penalties to encourage energy-conservation 
activities; providing low-interest loans for some energy conservation projects; and 
supporting research and development in energy-conservation technologies. These two 
periods marked the transition away from the Soviet-style command economy.
The seventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1986-1990) continued to carry out the reform 
of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) designed mainly to establish a modern 
entrepreneurial system and progressed steadily. Reform of social security, housing, 
education, and science, and technology also made new strides.
Pushing by Deng Xiao Xiaoping’s south tour, the eighth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1991-
1995) marked a period of high-speed economic development with little fluctuation. 
The central government put forward the basic policy of “seizing the opportunity to 
deepen the reform and open wider to the outside world”. As a result, the national 
economy maintained a rapid and sustained development while inflation was brought 
under effective control. On the other hand, the state increased its investment in 
infrastructure and basic industries and established new development mechanisms 
for these industries through reform. This ensured a sustained, rapid, and sound 
development of the national economy to stimulate growing foreign trade. During 
the eighth Five-Year Plan (FYP), China’s foreign trade expanded considerably, and it 
managed to become one of the ten major export countries in the world.
158 See more in Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Reform. 
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There were significant achievements of the new financial system with tax 
decentralization at its core, and the new tax system with a value added tax as its 
main component was set up. Policy finance and commercial finance were gradually 
separated. A macro regulating system emerged, and the market started to play a major 
role in resource allocation. More than 1,100 cities at the country level were opened to 
the outside world; 13 bonded zones159 and other Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were 
established.
In the two decades after the initiation of reform and opening-up, China’s economy 
underwent a fundamental change from a planned economy to a market economy. The 
economic strength of the country was increased. The standard of living of the people 
improved gradually. The annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) was 
about 10 percent, and the target of quadrupling the annual industrial and agricultural 
output value of 1980 by the end of the century was fulfilled ahead of schedule. In 
1996, China worked out the outline of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1996-2000) for 
National Economy and Social Development and the Long-range Objectives through 
the Year 2010. Through national engineering efforts, new achievements were made in 
reform, open-door policy, and modernization.
However, following the boost of economic performance, the central government 
recognized and was challenged by two aspects of risk. The financial risk occurred as 
a result of the overdraft of public expenditure, which had swallowed nearly all of the 
capital reserve of the state banks. In addition, the social-political risk was recognized 
due to the local government’s pursuing urban development by taking massive lands 
from the farmers. This became a major source of social conflicts. Thus, to obtain 
macro-control, China’s economy initiated a “soft landing”160. This was a sign that 
China’s economy had entered a period of sound operation and thus laid a solid 
foundation for the fulfillment of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP). In 1997, adhering to 
the principle of “seeking progress in the midst of stability” and macro control policies, 
China continued to develop at a moderately high speed.
159 Besides the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), there are a variety of bonded areas throughout 
China: trade zones (FTZs), export processing zones (EPZs), bonded logistic parks (BLPs), bonded ports (BPs), and 
comprehensive bonded zones (CBZs). All of these areas are under the special supervision of the Chinese customs 
authorities and are called customs specially supervised areas (CSSAs). Each type of CSSA featured different 
business activities, and there are substantial regulatory differences from customs, tax, and foreign exchange 
perspectives. See Pfaar and Wang Xiaodan (2011). 
160 Jiang Zeming and Zhu Rongji, as the core of the third generation of collective leadership, were forced to take 
action and to launch three-year macro control under the name of “soft landing”, and they fought back with the 
political slogan, “stability is the top and top priority”. 
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The fifteenth National Party Congress in 1997 saw a breakthrough in terms of state 
property ownership reform. The restructuring had three primary components. First, 
the state-owned economy’s scale was reduced through privatization, and state capital 
was withdrawn from key branches of the economy. In addition, various methods for 
accelerating productivity and development through public ownership were sought. In 
addition, the National Party Congress declared an important part of a socialist market 
economy by encouraging the development of individual and private enterprises. Within 
this framework, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) changed from a structure-based 
system with complete capital control by the state to an enterprise system based on 
diversified shareholding (Wu Jiannan and Ma Liang 2009).
The Second Plenary Session of the Fifteenth National People’s Congress (NPC) was 
held in March 1999. The session stressed that 1999 was a crucial year for achieving 
the objective of getting most of the large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) operating at a loss out of their plights and accomplishing the initial steps in 
the establishment of a modern enterprise system in most of the large and medium-
sized State-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 1999, governments at all levels put a stop 
to redundant development and quickened the pace of industrial restructuring and 
reorganization; continued to guarantee the basic needs of workers laid off from State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and helped them to find new jobs; promoted the separation 
of the functions of the government from those of the enterprises; improved the 
supervisory system and consolidated and improved the leadership of enterprises. China 
continued to relax control over and invigorate small State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
various ways161.
The 1982 Chinese Constitution recognized two kinds of land ownership: urban 
land is the property of the state, and rural land is collectively owned by villagers. 
With additional amendments, the 1998 Chinese Constitution was the first national 
document that legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights. It 
also allowed for the transfer of land use rights. The Chinese State Council passed the 
regulation of urban land use rights in 1988 and enacted the regulation in 1990. The 
1988 Chinese Constitution and regulation laid the foundation for the land policy in the 
post-reform era. Although there is still no privately owned land in China today, a land 
market has been created, and land-use rights entered the market under the policy of 
separation of use rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real 
161 See Chapter 5.3 Economic Reform.
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estate companies, villages, individual farmers, and government of all levels. These 
interest groups thus emerged with the rebirth of land as a market force in China.162
During the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1996-2000), China’s information industry 
emerged as a new growth area for national economic development, becoming the 
principal part of a hi-tech industry and the representative of new productivity. The 
information industry not only exerted significant influence on Chinese people’s daily 
lives but also became an important indication of China’s comprehensive national 
strength. It promises to be a strategic industry for China’s economic and social 
development in the near future. China’s information industry not only made its 
contribution to the national economy and played its role in promoting other industries 
but also became a strategic industry in boosting the readjustment of China’s economic 
structure. It marked China’s entrance in the global informational society.
The tenth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2001-2005) continued to elaborate goals for the 
sustainable economic and social development of China. The significance of this 
plan lies in the Energy Conservation and Resources Comprehensive Utilization, 
formulated to thoroughly implement and carry out energy conservation, reduction 
of the consumption of energy, and the comprehensive utilization of resources. It 
also promoted a shift in the mode of economic growth and sustained economic 
development. Energy objectives focused on the development of clean burning, 
renewable and efficient technologies. It elaborated certain means, including clean fuel 
demonstration projects, energy efficiency standards, a labeling/identification system, 
efficiency incentives, and the introduction of the “Energy Conservation Publicity Week”. 
The period is divided into the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) period, 2006 till 2010, 
and the period from 2010 to 2020. The energy conservation objectives and the focus 
on development by 2010 are planned, whereas the objectives for 2020 are proposed. 
In its “alternative to oil strategy,” part of the Five-Year Plan (FYP), Beijing called for a 
doubling of renewable energy generation to fifteen percent of the country’s needs by 
2020, including major increases in wind power and biomass use.
Almost immediately after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao ascended, they began to 
distinguish themselves from Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji by introducing the notion of 
“putting people first”. The Hu-Wen team also cultivates a more open and consultative 
image, one that has been conducive to the incorporation of different views into the 
plan as well.
162 See Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Reform.
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The eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2006-2010) was a major policy shift for the 
Chinese government, as it moved away from a focus on “growth at any cost” toward a 
pattern of a more balanced and sustainable growth, under the policy framework of the 
“harmonious society” and the “scientific development concept”. For example, the shift 
from economic planning (jihua) to urban planning (guihua) is symbolic because the 
former connotes a central planning mode of administration, whereas the latter has a 
more open tone (Fan 2006).
Besides, the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2006-2010) had the heavy responsibility 
of combating corruption and building a clean government with the trust of the Party 
and the people. During the past three decades of reform and open-door policy, facing 
complicated and changeable international surroundings and difficult and onerous 
domestic tasks, the central government embarked on a new path to build an honest 
government and combat corruption. New missions lay ahead, and China announced 
the establishment of a scientific, history-based decision to fight government corruption 
by improving publication and further promoting Party integrity163.
In October 2010, the Chinese Communist Part’s (CCP) Central Committee approved the 
guiding principles of China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) for National Economic and 
Social Development (2011-2015), ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
in March 2011. The government sought to focus on “inclusive growth”, which means 
ensuring the benefits of economic growth are spread to most Chinese citizens. The key 
themes are balancing the economy, ameliorating social inequality, and protecting the 
environment.
However, the recently enacted twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015) is, first 
and foremost, a strategic framework aimed at changing the economy’s remarkably 
successful growth structure of the past 40 years. Even though it is expected to pick up 
where the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) left off in terms of broad policy direction, its 
environment is markedly different, internally and externally: The global financial crisis, 
rising property prices, and increased risk of social instability are all salient issues in 
China that will be dealt with by this plan in the coming five years.
163 In order to avoid corruption, “in 2009, the discipline inspection and supervision organs at various levels will 
carry out supervision and inspection around the most important objective of enhancing scientific development 
through maintaining a stable and rapid economic growth and preventing excessive rises and falls as well as 
around the implementation condition of the Central Government’s policies and measures.” Xinhua News Net 
Time, February 15, 2009.
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According to Roach (2011: 9), 
China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) stands to be a major milestone on the 
road to its development and widening prosperity. It sets the stage for the 
long-awaited transformation of a production-led economy into one that 
provides greater sustenance for its 1.3 billion consumers. This is hardly a 
shocking outcome for any developing economy—let alone, China. After all, 
there is a reason why this nation is called the People’s Republic of China (…) 
While absolutely essential in order to take the Chinese economy to the next 
stage; a pro-consumption model also introduces new and important tactical 
challenges. The key will be for China to strike the right balance between 
strategy and tac-tics. The stakes are enormous—for China and for the broader 
global economy.
Learning from the development of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), I would like to emphasize 
that for more than 60 years of modern China’s development, much time has been 
spent on carrying out various economic reforms: from original class struggles to 
system reform and developing a market system while maintaining a system of public 
ownership and a planned economy, and then going on to a complete transformation 
to a market economy. Simultaneously, the fifth Five-Year Plan (FYP) of the late 1970s 
ushered reform and open doors, and the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) of the mid-1990s 
set the stage for an historic ownership transition leading to an era of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) reform and the corporatization of China’s increasingly market-
oriented economy. To sum up, property rights reform, market reform, enterprise 
reform, and reform of the political system, working together, unleashed vitality in the 
national economy, and led to an average growth rate of close to 10 percent per year for 
the past 30 years. The rapid pace of development allowed China to become the world’s 
third-largest economy.
China’s economic reforms have already been wading into deep waters. There will 
undoubtedly be bumps in the road. However, now there is no turning back, and there is 
a reason to expect that more practical and effective reform plans will push the country 
further forward. It can be done not only economically but also spatially; it will all, 
hopefully, continue to modernize the country.
The timeline of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) gives us an overview of the evolutionary 
political-societal-economic context of China. The second background for the spatial 
planning system is given below in the introduction of the two major systems of spatial 
plans in urban China: the land use (spatial) plans and the urban and rural plans. It 
shows how the political-socio-economic guidance is realized within the legal planning 
framework.
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Land-use Planning
Land-use planning is a part of the National Land and Resources Planning, which is an 
important part of the Chinese state planning system. National Land and Resources 
Planning is an aggregate of various kinds of land and resources planning, and it is used 
by the government for macro control and development and utilization of resources. 
In the reform era, the focus of the planning system has shifted to emphasizing 
the realization of a well-off development. The function of the Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR) is the planning, management, protection, and reasonable utilization 
of natural resources, such as land, ocean, and mines. Newly introduced measures 
included land planning, land utilization planning, mine resources planning, ocean 
resources planning, and biologic resources planning.
Concerning current socio-economic development, the nature of land planning is land 
development and renovation of an entire nation or a certain scope of areas stipulated 
according to general strategic directions and objectives of national social economy 
development balanced with natural, economic, social, and scientific and technological 
conditions of planning areas.
As mentioned before, real land-use planning in China began in 1986, when the 
National Land Management Bureau was established and the Land Management Law of 
the People’s Republic of China was promulgated, and it has been in place now for more 
than twenty years. Different phases of land-use planning have been carried out since 
the founding of the PRC (Cai Ymei et al. 2009). Although land-use planning began late 
in China, and its theories and methods have not yet been fully developed, the different 
phases have in practice achieved great progress due to a constant trial and error, 
studying, and learning from mistakes.
The first stage was an exploration phase before 1986 when land-use planning focused 
on cultivation systems, land improvement, fertilizer increase, and irrigation. The 
applied theories and methods were copied from the Soviet Union and focused on 
agricultural land-use planning.
The second stage began with the enactment of the Land Management Law in 1986 at 
the beginning of the reformation. It still had service-oriented characteristics under a 
socialistic planned economy. Although it was an ineffective piece of legislation, it laid 
the foundation for land-use planning in China under a five-level land-use system and 
a three-level structure of land-use planning. During this period, the land-use plans of 
the country, all provinces and most cities, counties, and towns were compiled (Cai Ymei 
et al. 2009).
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In 1996, the second round of land-use planning was undertaken according to the 
requirements of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) and the Long-term Targets for the Year 
2010 to meet the demands of establishing a socialistic market economy and to meet 
the demands of socialistic modernization. This planning established the land-use 
mode of “index with zoning,” promulgated the regulations and processes related to the 
making of plans and published the examination and approval methods for land-use 
plans164 (Pan Wecan 2004).
The new round of land-use planning began after the 16th congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) (2002-2006) put forward the goal of “building an all-round, 
well-off society”. The third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put forth the Several Issues of Improving Socialist 
Market Economy System and established the concept of comprehensive, coordinated, 
and sustainable development. Under the guidance of “government organizing, 
expert-led planning, sectorial cooperation, public participation and scientific decision 
making”, the focus was on enhancing the application of intensive usage of land by 
introducing GIS technology in plan-making and management, coordination principles 
of regional land-use policy, and a land-use planning index system (Cai Ymei et al. 
2009).
China’s land-use planning progression is recognized: the three-structure, Land 
Use Master Plan, Sector-specific Land Use Plan (including land coordination and 
reclamation, protection planning of basic farmland), and Detailed Land Use Plan. In 
terms of national and regional plans, Overall Land Use Plans are drafted to address the 
entire country as well as individual provincial regions. These plans are mandatory in the 
Land Management Law. Overall Land Use Plans dictate the general allocation of land 
resources, and serve as strategic guidelines for the development, use, improvement, 
and conservation of land resources (Figure 6.4).
164 In 1998, the Chinese Minister of Land and Resources (MLR) was established, with land planning as one of 
its important functions. To promote the practice, the Chinese government established trial land-planning 
organizations in many provinces, cities, and municipalities, such as Tianjin, Shenzhen, Liaoning, and Xinjiang. 
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strictly five-level hierarchical system, including the plans of national, provincial, municipal/prefecture, 
county/district and village/town levels (Figure 5).  The land use master plan system, including the land use 
master plan, yearly land use plan, and the thematic land use plan, has gradually become one of the most 
direct and important instruments to manage urban land growth for the central government, as it strictly 







Figure 5– Five Levels of Land Use Master Plan  
Source: (Liu 2005), revised by author according to (National People's Congress PRC 1991) 
a Special municipalities include three types of municipalities: (1) the capitals of provinces and autonomous districts; (2) 
the municipalities with the population over 100 million; and (3) the municipalities empowered by the central 
government to share the same power with the capitals of provinces and autonomous districts to frame and promulgate 
local ordinances and local regulations (National People's Congress PRC 1991). 
 
Administrative Intervention 
In China, in addition to the administrative ordinances issued by the State Council and regulations issued by 
the ministries and committees of the State Council, administrative orders have been frequently used as a 
most direct way by the central government to achieve its objectives.  Due to the historic reasons, 
administrative intervention had been the most important instrument of urban land use management and 
other social-economic fields in the pre-Mao period.  Although considerable laws have been established and 
have gradually replaced the function of administrative orders since 1982 Chinese Constitution, the 
administrative orders, until now, are still often applied as the most direct and effective way of control on 







Bureau of Land & 
Resources 
Bureau of Land & 
Resources 











Get approval if delegated 
by provincial government
- 10 - 
Figure 6.4 Five levels of Land Use Master Plan 
Source: Han Haoying and Nishimura (2006), Figure 5.
In addition, the highest level of the National Land and Resources Planning is land-use 
planning, and different natural resources planning systems, such as general planning 
of land utilization, mine resources planning, and ocean planning are included as well.
To make land-use planning more scientific and normative, abundant guidance and 
measures have been published and compiled, such as the Key Points of Land-Use 
Master Pla  Compilation at Provincial Level and the Key Points of Land Use Master 
Plan Compilation at County Level, Regulations on Land Use Master Plan Compilation at 
County Level, and Technical Guidelines of Environmental Impact Assessment of Land 
Use Master Plan Compilation at Provincial Level (Cai Ymei et al. 2009).
To guarantee the implementation of land-use planning, there is a system of rules, 
policy suggestions related to planning management, examination and approval 
of management, and a series of documents: the Regulations on Examination and 
Approval of Land-use Planning, the Measures for Examination of Land-use Planning at 
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Provincial Level, the Notice on Strengthening Management of Recording the Land-use 
Planning Files and Outcomes, and the Opinions about Implementation Management 
of Land-use Planning.
China’s land-use planning was established gradually during several decades. Scholars 
and governments have studied its problems of systems and management (Pan 
Wencan 2004; Han Haoying et al. 2006), perspectives of legality and rights in land 
expropriation (Ding Chengri and Knaap 2003; Zhao Min and Wu Zhicheng 2005), and 
land reformation of urban-rural interrelations and urban planning (Zhu Jieming et al. 
2007 and Cai Ymei et al. 2009). To implement scientific development and to improve 
the methods and apply suitable theories of land-use planning for Chinese society, 
it is crucial to elaborate on the tools and systems that support land compilation, 
examination, approval, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
Urban and Rural Plans
The third component is urban and rural plans. The Urban and Rural Planning Law of 
the PRC was adopted at the thirtieth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress (NPC) on October 28, 2007, and came into force in 2008; it 
replaced the Urban Planning Law165. Previously, urban and rural areas were governed by 
different laws. The Urban Planning Law governed urban areas and the Administrative 
Regulation on Country and township Construction Plans governed rural areas. The new 
Urban and Rural Planning Law ushered an era of integrated urban and rural planning. 
According to Article one, “This Law is formulated for the purpose of strengthening 
urban and rural planning administration, harmonizing urban and rural spatial layout, 
improving people’s living environment and promoting the integrated, harmonious and 
sustainable development of urban and rural society and economy.”
According to Article two, “Making and implementing urban and rural planning as well 
as conducting construction activities in planning areas shall be governed by this Law. 
(…) The term ‘planning area’ as mentioned in the Law refers to the built-up areas of 
cities, towns and villages as well as areas that must be under planning control for urban 
and rural construction and development.”
165 When the Urban and Rural Planning Law came into force in 2008, the Urban Planning Law (or City Planning 
Law) was abolished. 
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The statutory plan-making system is compatible with a top-down administrative 
system. It has defined “planning area” as a built-up area of cities, towns, and villages 
as well as areas that must be under planning control of urban and rural construction 
and development. The specific scope of a planning area shall be defined by the people’s 
government in light of the urban and rural economic and social development level 
and the needs for an overall development of urban and rural areas in organizing the 
establishment of the overall planning of a city or county (town), a township, or a village.
The Urban and Rural Planning Law notes that an urban and rural plan should include 
Urban System Planning, City Planning, County Planning (Town Planning), Country 
Planning (Township Planning), and Village Planning (Table 6.14). In urban areas, City 
Planning and County Planning are divided into City Master Planning166 (Zongtiguihua 
or overall planning) and Detailed Planning (Xiangxiguihua). Detailed Planning includes 
regulatory detailed planning and site detailed planning. City Master Planning, County 
Master Planning, Country Planning, and Village Planning should consider the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (FYP) of the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and should integrate the Comprehensive Land Use Plan 
by the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources. Although Country Planning (township 
planning) and Village Planning were recently included in statutory plans, they are not 
widely practiced due to a need for further development.
Statutory Plans
Urban System Plans National Urban System Plan
Provincial Urban System Plan
City Plans and Country Plans City Master Plans
Detailed Plans Regulatory Detailed Plans (applicable to cities and 
towns)
Construction Detailed Plans (applicable to desig-
nated areas)
Country Plans and Villages 
Plans
Country Plans and Villages Plans 
Table 6.14 Statutory Plans  
Source: Constructed by author.
166 According to the Chinese Urban and Rural Planning Act (has been in effect since 1 January 2008), the Chinese 
urban planning system consists of two tires: the mastsre plan (Zongtiguihua, simplified Chinese: 总体规划; 
traditional Chinese: 總體規劃) and the detailed plan (Xiangxiguihua, simplified Chinese:详细规划; traditional 
Chinese: 詳細規劃). The detail plan is composed of the Regulatory detailed plan (kongzhixingxiangxiguihua) and 
the urban design and parcel-based Construction detailed plan (xiujianxingxiangxiguihua).
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In general, urban and rural planning shall be worked out and implemented by following 
a reasonable layout; saving the land; implementing intensive growth and planning 
before construction to improve the ecological environment; enhancing the construction 
and comprehensive utilization of resources and energy; protecting farmland and other 
natural resources as well as cultural heritages; maintaining local features, ethnic 
features, and traditions; preventing pollution and other public nuisances; satisfying the 
needs of regional population development; and promoting natural defense, disaster 
prevention and alleviation, public health, and public safety.167
The Urban System Plans are drafted to address an entire country as well as individual 
provincial regions. These plans are legally required under the Urban and Rural Planning 
Law. The Urban System Plans affect the development of specific regions. Because the 
development of urban areas has tremendous impact on an entire region, the goal of the 
Urban System Plans is the development and arrangement of urban areas to change the 
economic development of the broader regions in which they are located.
The department of urban and rural plans under the Chinese State Council shall 
together with other relevant departments under the State Council organize the 
establishment of the National Urban System Plan, which shall be used to guide the 
establishment of a Provincial Urban System Plan and a City Master Plan.
A Provincial Urban System Plan shall include a spatial layout of cities, counties, scale 
control, significant infrastructure, and areas under strict control to protect ecological 
and environmental qualities and resources.
At the local level, the master plan outlines the general land use pattern of a city and 
usually has a planning horizon of 20 years and shall consider long-range development 
strategies. The main content of master plans includes the city’s development 
direction, functional zones, land use layout, comprehensive transportation planning, 
construction-forbidden areas, construction-constrained areas, construction-suitable 
areas, green land planning, and tourist planning. The Detailed Plan deals with areas 
that face immediate development or are specified in the master plan.
In general, the Urban and Rural Planning Law also introduces many other promising 
aspects: emphasizing procedural requirements such as a notice and comment period; 
tightening environmental protection and natural and cultural heritage protection; 
integrating and strengthening rural planning; introducing public participation and 
167 See Urban and Rural Planning Law of PRC, Art. four. 
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increasing supervision and inspection; and providing relevant legal liabilities to punish 
local governments for non-compliance.
According to Article four, urban and rural planning shall be worked out and 
implemented by principles of urban and rural area planning as a whole. This was not 
emphasized in the Urban Planning Law. In Article ten, the state encourages adopting 
advanced scientific technologies to make urban and rural planning more scientific and 
to improve the efficiency of the implementation, supervision, and administration of 
urban and rural planning. According to Article nine, any entity or individual shall have 
the right to report or accuse of any act in violation of any urban and rural planning to 
the competent department of urban and rural planning or other related department. 
Such department shall promptly accept the report or accusation and organize 
manpower to investigate and handle it. Article twenty-six notes that before filing an 
urban or rural planning for examination and approval, the entity establishing it shall 
announce the draft of the planning and collect opinions from experts and the general 
public by way of argumentation, hearing, or other. The draft shall be announced for at 
least 30 days.
The Urban and Rural Planning Law formalizes and systematizes various levels of the 
plan introduced by provincial and local authorities to cope with problems emerging 
form economic reform. Regional development, infrastructure construction, urban 
renewal, conservation, and environmental and sustainable development became 
priorities in urban planning.
On the other hand, to adapt to local development needs, there are non-statutory 
plans not specified in the Urban and Rural Planning Act. There are no compulsory 
requirements regarding their content and approval. In general, they provide guidelines 
for strategic plans, conceptual plans, specialty plans, developments plans, and action 
plans.
The following paragraph illustrates the mechanism of planning implementation that 
follows a wide scope of planning systems based on the establishment of approval, 
evaluation, and monitoring of urban planning in China.
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§ 6.3 Establishment of Statutory Planning 
The statutory planning procedure contains the following steps: preparation, approval, 
implementation, and monitoring and supervision.
§ 6.3.1 Preparation and Approval of Urban Planning 
As stipulated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the competent administration 
departments of urban and rural planning under the Chinese State Council together 
with other relevant departments under the State Council are responsible for the 
organization of formulating planning for the national urban system plans. The 
provincial government of an autonomous region is responsible for formulating 
planning for local cities and towns. A city government is responsible for formulating the 
overall planning of the city. The county government shall establish the overall plans of 
the town where the county government is located. The overall plans of any town shall 
be established by the people’s government of the town (Table 6.15).
Statutory Plans Responsible Authorities
National Urban System Plans Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and other 
relevant Government Departments under the State Council 
Provincial Urban System Plans Provincial Governments
City Master Plans (City and County System Plans 
Included in City Master Plans and Detailed Plans)
City Governments and City Planning Bureau
Country Plans and Villages Plans Country Governments
Table 6.15 Statutory Plans and responsible authorities 
Source: constructed by author
In general, the preparation of a lower-tier plan shall follow the guidance of the higher 
tier plan while small adjustments and feedback are allowed. To make a typical statutory 
plan, a qualified planning service provider is normally commissioned by a responsible 
government authority. This provider then puts forward a number of planning proposals 
through site investigation, research, and analysis of problems. Relevant stakeholders 
such as government departments, professionals, and the general public are consulted 
on objectives and strategies. Through supplementary investigation, modification, 
improvement, and consultation, a final planning proposal is then formulated and 
submitted to the responsible authorities for approval. The final planning product shall 
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include written documents, relevant drawings, and maps. Government authorities at 
different levels approve the statutory plans.
The national urban system plans and provincial or autonomous region urban system 
plans shall be filed by the competent department of urban and rural planning under the 
Chinese State Council with the State Council for examination and approval.
The overall plans of a municipality directly under the central government shall be filed 
by the people’s government of the municipality and the Chinese State Council for 
examination and approval.
The overall plan of a city where the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s 
government is located or which is specified by the Chinese State Council shall be filed 
with the State Council for examination and approval after it is examined and approved 
by the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s government.
The overall plan of any other city shall be filed by the people’s government of the city 
with the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s government for examination and 
approval; the overall plans of the county shall be filed by the people’s government at 
the next higher level for examination and approval and the overall plans of any town 
shall be filed with the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and 
approval (Table 6.16).
Statutory Plans Approval Authorities
National Urban System Plan State Council
Provincial Urban System Plans State Council (Endorsed by MOHURD)
City and County System Plans Approved along with City Master Plans 
City Master Plans  State Council 
Other Designated Cities Provincial Authorities
Designated Towns County Authorities
Detailed Plans City Authorities
Table 6.16 Statutory Plans and approval authorities  
Source: constructed by author.
At the national level, planning of cities and counties is submitted to the Chinese State 
Council for approval by the competent administration responsible for urban planning. 
The competent administration under the State Council responsible for urban planning 
checks the planning of cities and counties in provinces and autonomous regions; it 
then submits the plan to the State Council for approval. After obtaining consent from 
the State Council, the competent administration then approves the implementation of 
the planning.
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The overall planning of municipalities, provincial capitals, and cities assigned by 
the Chinese State Council is checked and agreed to by the municipal and provincial 
government and then submitted to the State Council for approval. It is stipulated that a 
city government may make partial adjustment to the overall urban planning but must 
report to the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at the equivalent level for 
deliberation and submit it to the original approving administration for the record.
The city government must obtain consent from the people’s congress at the equivalent 
level or its standing committee and then obtain approval from the original approving 
administration for important adjustments to the overall urban planning’s nature, scale, 
development direction, and overall layout (Tang Kai 2004).
§ 6.3.2 Implementation of Urban Planning 
A city government shall promulgate the City Master Plan when it is approved and 
prepare the procedure for implementation. As stipulated by law, administration 
procedure and system are implemented with the legal urban planning zones, defined 
in the overall urban plans. In terms of managing individual land lots, “Proposal for site-
choosing,” “Land-use Planning Permit,” and “Construction-project Planning Permit” 
are basic administrative instruments used by the local planning bureaus (Table 6.17).
Instruments Prior to 
Proposal for site-choosing Official setup of a development project 
Land-use Planning Permit City level Land use application submitted to local Land Admi-
nistration
Country and village level 
Construction-project Planning Permit Building Permit
Table 6.17 Instruments of urban planning in China 
Source: Constructed by author.
The following procedures are included in the implementation of urban planning in 
China (Figure 6.5): 
Urban planning that is approved in legal procedures must be announced and open to 
the public;  
Land use and land construction within legal urban planning zones must be in line with 
urban planning and be subordinated to the planning administration.
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Proposal for site choosing
A proposal for site-selection, which is checked and granted by a competent 
administration responsible for urban planning, must be presented for a construction 
project within the legal urban planning zone.
Land-use planning permit
If land is needed for construction within legal urban planning zones, legal documents 
about the construction project must be prepared when an application is submitted to 
the competent administration responsible for urban planning. Then, the competent 
administration will define the location and border of the needed land, put forward a 
design, check it, and grant a license for construction.
Construction-project planning permit
Legal documents are needed for the building, expansion, and change of buildings, 
roads, pipelines, and other engineering facilities within legal urban planning zones. 
An application has to be submitted to the competent administration, which will put 
forward terms for design, and then check and grant the license to plan the construction 
project; 
The competent administration supervises and checks the construction activities and 
land use of the city by checking and accepting the beginning operation, process tracing, 
completion check and acceptance, and examination of illegal activities. It relies on 
the law to examine and settle illegal activities in the land use and project construction 
process; 
The competent administration is authorized to participate in the completion check 
and acceptance of important construction projects within legal urban planning zones; 
it will check whether the construction is in line with the urban planning by six months 
after the completion check and acceptance; it will file the relevant materials about the 
completion check and acceptance with the competent department of urban and rural 
planning; 
Additionally, as stipulated by law, any unit or person must be subordinated to the 
decisions made by the government in terms of the adjustment of urban planning of 
the city.
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Figure 2-1 One Report and Two Permits System   
(Source: Ng 2000, pp. 412) 
 
Though the development control system is at the core of the land development process in China, but it 
is ineffective because the system allows urban officials in the planning department to exercise 
discretionary power. In theory, planners should make decisions according to the intentions that 
specified in plans. But in practice, the criteria used in assessing the development applications are not 
specified and transparent. As argued in M. K. Ng’s paper (2000), the main constraints of the 
development control system are three. First, the decisions of the planning department is interfered by 
the government officials, because in China, local planning departments are usually administratively 
subordinated to governments. The interferences are mainly with the purpose to promote economic 
growth. Secondly, when aggrieved developers submit appeals to the government-appointed city mayor 
for resolution, “the mayor would have the opportunity to influence planning decisions and arbitrate 
over the validity and interpretation of planning legislation and policies” (pp.413). Finally, the 
cooperation between the planning-related agencies is not effective, which influences the efficiency of 
controlling the development. 
 
12 
Figure 6.5 Implementation of Urban Planning  
Source: Pu Hao (2007: 24)
§ 6.3.3 Evaluation and Monitoring 
China is undergoing rapid urbanization and responding to many demands for 
plans to guide city development. The Urban Planning Law provides little specific 
information about evaluation and monitoring. Evaluation of planning, especially 
plan implementation, is normally of secondary consideration; there is an absence of 
discussion and dialogue about planning performance among both the local authorities 
and professional planners. Most evaluations focus only on alternative plans that 
depend on the application of indicators based on the plan’s character.
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For various reasons, evaluation is not popular in Chinese tradition. Many factors 
demand sufficiency of information systems and expertise; lack of evaluating 
institutions and procedures is one reason—particularly in the planned economy period 
planning officials are not trained to qualify for this mission (Talen 1996; Seasons 
2002; Chen Xiao 2009). Since the economic reform, urban planning activities involve 
many different interest groups with different values, needs, and expectations; those 
expectations affect planners during the evaluation as well. On the other hand, in China 
it is generally the government and developers who carry out planning evaluations. Most 
evaluation is carried out internally, i.e. within the planning organization, municipality, 
and higher levels of planning departments. In-house staff usually only access a plan’s 
adherence to its own stated goals and objectives. There is seldom any involvement of 
external evaluators, such as community groups. Internal staffs, comprising academic 
experts, officials, and professional planners, often have a comprehensive and sound 
understanding of the planning, but they might be affected by personal biases as well as 
organizational considerations of politics and culture.
As monitoring implies a continuous evaluation of activities in policies, processes, 
and plans, there are deficiencies in the methods of monitoring plan implementation. 
Monitoring is normally carried out after construction or development has started, 
sometimes even after it is finished—and after any damage has already occurred. By 
then, negative social impact and economic loss are hard to undo (Chen Xiaoyan 2009).
 However, in recent years, the importance of evaluation and monitoring is explored in 
policy and academic discussions and is considered in planning practices. With policy 
reform and the advancement of information, efforts have been made to reform the 
evaluation and monitoring processes, which is reflected in planning laws, regulations, 
and policies.
The Urban and Rural Planning Law came into effect on January 1, 2008. It contains 
an entire section about monitoring. According to Chapter 5, the monitoring system 
for planning has three levels: local administrative departments, the local People’s 
Congress or Standing Committee, and the public. Monitoring shall be carried out for 
the entire process of plan preparation, approval, implementation, and amendment.
The Urban and Rural Planning Law also contains policies and regulations for planning 
evaluation. It requires that urban system plans and master plans be evaluated in two 
circumstances: before they are submitted to the government and when they need to be 
amended. The organizer of a plan should perform evaluations by holding consult and 
public meetings. The local People’s Congress, experts in relevant departments, and the 
public are involved in the evaluation at different stages. The result of the evaluation and 
strategies dealing with it are open to the public.
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These regulations and policies on evaluation and monitoring reflect momentous 
progress in Chinese urban planning.
Reform of urban planning systems is a natural requirement of building a socialist 
market economy. It is also a premise for an urban planning system to keep track 
with the existing international mechanism after China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Reform of an urban planning system has become a part of the 
reform of the administration system of the Chinese government. The evolutionary 
reform of planning in China demonstrates how urban planning administration in China 
is active in exploring reform of its urban planning system. A gradual establishment 
of urban planning and implementation of an administration system is a process in 
a socialistic-market economy, and making Chinese society more open to democracy 
requires science and legalization in the process of planning formulation, decisions, 
administration, and supervision.
This chapter focuses on the planning structure, system, and implementation to 
provide a contextual framework of the system of Chinese planning and its evolution 
from an official perspective. Without a doubt, enormous efforts have been made to 
persist in political reform for the survival and development of the nation without 
threatening to the Communist Party-led regime and keeping up with time the need 
for China to develop and advance economically. Being embedded in these two 
fundamental principles, strengthening institutional and system innovations, and 
reforming law-based systems and mechanisms have been consistently implemented 
by the government throughout the whole reformation in the past few decades. One 
could say that reform is the driving force, development is the goal, and above all, 
stability is the prerequisite. Under the phrase of Den Xiaoping’s “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics”, many results had been progressively achieved. However, 
contradictions and conflicts were recognized and caused by the not yet fully defined 
socialist democracy under the Communist regime. To achieve the establishment of a 
socialist democracy, besides the legal system, efforts need to be made for the collective 
emancipation of the mind, not only by the government but also by the people. All of 
these criteria cannot be simply described and written down in blueprints and lines of 
rule.
In view of planning practice and spatial development, very often, various challenges, 
subjects, and unforeseen factors are emerging outside of the rules and regulation. 
Overcoming these challenges can only be achieved through consistently learning from 
the practice and execution of doing the real cases.
In the next part, the case of Shenzhen, one of the most promising cities after the reform 
and an experimental lab for urban planning, leads us further into the practice of urban 
planning in relation to the planning outcome.
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Part 4 Planning Practice and emerged Socio-
spatial Challenges 
Spatial Planning beyond the political intervention 
while socio-spatial meaning can be retrieved. 
Part III reveals, within forty years, enormous efforts have been made from the 
top-down initiatives of the Chinese central government to launch a soft-landing 
reformation with Chinese characteristics. 
Spatial planning is one of the most helpful and powerful instruments in China to 
coordinate the new demands of society and urban development, as well as to serve 
the political stability practically for the unique Chinese political demands. In Part III, 
it shows after the reformation, providing a reliable framework of planning system is 
becoming even more critical than the Maoist period. 
Within the evolutionary development of the past few decades, spatial planning evolves 
in a broader scope of participations, changing the monopoly of the central government 
as the sole actor in the spatial-planning domain. The application of the Chinese 
planning system after 1987 was a gradual progression of confrontation between, 
on the one hand, the top-down planning policy based on the central interventional 
framework as shown in Part III, and on the other hand, the local adaption to solving the 
problems in reality from bottom-up, which is elaborated in this part. 
Part IV following the setting of the third parameter planning outcome focuses on 
the exploration of these confrontations between the planned framework and the 
spatial realization in reality. It comprises two parts, first part Chapter 7 focuses on the 
planning implementation at the municipal level, Shenzhen is chosen as a case study. In 
Chapter 8, three projects in Shenzhen are selected to reflect the challenges between the 
planned and emergent spatial demands. 
It argues, recently, for various reasons, many other Chinese cities have been appointed 
as experimental bases for practicing new principles of spatial planning. This 
development has mirrored the rise of a new Chinese society moving from collectivism 
toward consensus based on individualism. It is a society in which the traditional top-
down structure is asked to become more reflexive and responsively. A bottom-up civil 
society is gradually emerging and required by the people in the socio-spatial domain.
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7 Planning for the Reality
The application of planning approaches by local authorities is one of the most 
challenging and advanced experiments of spatial development in China. 
Shenzhen is chosen for further exploration of planning implementation at the 
municipal level. The reason is Shenzhen was built by following the market liberation 
policies of the early 1980s. Its birth was an experiment in implementing and testing 
the effects of market economy principles, which, until that time, barely existed under 
the communist regime. In the context of these special circumstances, many new 
strategies and approaches to urban development were introduced that were driven 
by the guidance of a dynamic and free market. Indeed, knowledge and approaches 
of spatial planning that were introduced during the reformation were accumulated 
through the experience of the Shenzhen model. 
This chapter explores how the planned system is asked to adapt the new challenges 
of the local demands. It elaborates the urban evolution of the city of Shenzhen 
chronologically. Further, it focuses on the establishment of planning mechanism 
through time in local practice.
§ 7.1 The Application of the Chinese Planning System after 1978 
Deng Xiaoping’s widely quoted phrase “Crossing the river by groping for stones” had 
pushed the situation of reformation forward, yet, how far can China go across the 
river? To be able to achieve Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy, the efforts have to be directed 
to both the dimensions of flexibility and of reliability. For this reason, Shenzhen can be 
regarded the epitome of China’s new planning culture.
§ 7.1.1 The Given Condition: An Accident of Conjuncture and an Iron-hard Fact 
David Harvey (2005) argued that after almost two decades of national disaster and 
societal catastrophe, we might well look upon the years 1978-1980 as a revolutionary 
turning point in the world’s social and economic history. In the same global contextual 
background, Chinese society took a major cultural turn.
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One must recall that China of the late 1970s was an extreme society, which was 
experiencing a great political, economic, and cultural reshuffling.
In the cold winter of 1978 in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping and his comrades from the 
Party’s Central Committee decided that reform was the only way out of the economic 
and political difficulties facing China. At that time, China was a poor, closed, agrarian 
economy on the verge of collapse. The path that Deng Xiaoping defined was to 
transform China in two decades from a closed backwater country to an open center 
of capitalist dynamism with sustained growth rates. At that time, many factors 
contributed to the momentum of the reform. One could say, taking the path of 
reformation had been influenced by, different coincidental elements as well as by then 
emerged facts in pursuing the economic survival of the country.
Internally, besides facing the difficulties of political uncertainty in the wake of Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, China was an extremely poor country in serious economic 
stagnation. The decade-long debacle of the Cultural Revolution had just ended, 
leaving the economy dormant and the people physically and emotionally drained168. 
The dwindling national income growth rate and widening disparity between China 
and other countries forced Chinese leaders and elites to reconsider the economic 
system China had implemented prior to 1978. At that time, the new idea of opening 
up the country to global contacts and influences after three decades of self-imposed 
isolation seemed a no less drastic measure to China’s leaders than the original policy of 
economic and social closure (Yeung et al. 2009).
With regard to the conjuncture of the initial reformation of China, Harvey (2005: 120) 
argued: 
We may never know for sure whether Deng Xiaoping was all along a secret 
“capitalist roader” (as Mao Zedong had claimed during the Cultural 
Revolution) or whether the reforms were simply a desperate move to ensure 
China’s economic security and bolster its prestige in the face of the rising tide 
of capitalist development in the rest of East and South-East Asia. The reform 
just happened to coincide—and it is very hard to consider this as anything 
other than a conjuncture accident of world-historical significance—with the 
turn to neoliberal solutions in Britain and the United States.
168 Based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures, the share of the Chinese economy in the world was at its 
historical low of close to 4.6 percent in 1973, sliding down from 32.9 percent in 1820. See Maddison (2008: 
87). 
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Furthermore, he emphasized: 
The outcome in China has been the construction of a particular kind of market 
economy that increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated 
with authoritarian centralized control.
By then, despite the global trends of neoliberalism and development, the open-door policy 
was triggered by a fundamental, regional, economic restructuring as shown in Chapter 
5. The initial success of Chinese open-door policy highly depended upon the Hong Kong 
connection (Logan, 2002; Harvey 2005; NG 2005). Due to the booming world market, 
Hong Kong was already a significant center of capitalist dynamism. Unlike the other 
states in the region, Hong Kong became an export-oriented industrial powerhouse in the 
1960s and 1970s by adhering to an economic policy of “positive nonintervention”. As 
Harvey (2005: 136) pointed out, Hong Kong’s manufacturing had developed along labor-
intensive and low-value-added lines, and it conveniently stood at the center of a Chinese 
business diaspora that already had significant global connections.
By the end of the 1970s, Hong Kong suffered from severe foreign competition and 
acute labor shortages. Rising land and labor costs had pushed low value-added and 
labor-intensive industries to relocate north to the mainland of China (NG 2005; Schenk 
2010). Consequently, the economic restructuring process of Hong Kong intensified and 
coexisted with the reform of Chinese economy in general.
The open-door policy of the PRC announced by Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978 
marked a new era for Hong Kong’s economy. Guangdong province, just across the 
border in China, had all the cheap labor. In the framework of industrial restructuring, 
Hong Kong capital seized the opportunity. On the one hand, Hong Kong took advantage 
of its many hidden connections across the border in China; it played the role of the 
intermediary for whatever foreign trade China already had, while on the other hand, 
on the other side of the border, the conditions of that moment in time also provided a 
perfect opportunity for China to engage in international trade and investment.
From 1978 to 1997, visible trade between Hong Kong and the PRC grew at an average 
rate of 28 percent per year. At the same time, Hong Kong firms began to move their 
labor-intensive activities to the mainland to take advantage of cheaper labor. The 
integration of Hong Kong with the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province is 
the most striking aspect of these trade and investment links. The effect continually 
intensified, and at the end of 1997, the cumulative value of Hong Kong’s direct 
investment in Guangdong province was $48 billion, accounting for almost 80 percent of 
the total foreign direct investment (FDI) there. Hong Kong companies and joint ventures 
in Guangdong province employed about five million people. Most of these businesses 
were labor-intensive assemblages for export, but from 1997 onward there has been 
increased investment in financial services, tourism, and retail trade (Schenk 2010).
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This conjuncture coincident169 as Harvey (2005: 121) described it led the reform 
starting from the setup of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract further foreign 
investment. To supplement this effort, China’s reform policy was under strict state 
supervision. Experimentation was initially limited, mainly to the Guangdong province 
close to Hong Kong, conveniently remote from Beijing.
The choice of location for experimenting with trade liberalization was not simply a 
one-way process dictated by Beijing. It involved local initiatives as well (Lai Hongyi 
2006: 72). In January 1979, the Guangdong provincial authorities and Ministry of 
Communications jointly proposed to the State Council to invest in sectors related to 
naval navigation in Bao’an County170, which is the border county adjacent to Hong 
Kong. In addition, at that time, the central and local governments realized that the only 
way to stop the flood of illegal emigration to Hong Kong was to accelerate development 
of Bao’an County (Lai Hongyi 2006: 75). Within this framework, in July 1979, the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued No. 
50 Document171 and approved the requests from Guangdong and Fujian provinces for 
special policies and flexible measures and for setting up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
in Shenzhen (2020), Zhuhai (1687.8 km2), Shantou (2064 km2) within Guangdong 
province, and Xiamen (1565 km2) of the Fujian province172.
The main consideration of Deng Xiaoping and other top reformist leaders was to set up 
the first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces because of 
the geographical, economic, historical, and political advantages of these provinces (Ota 
2003; NG 2005; Lai 2006; and Yeung Yueman et al. 2009).
169 Harvey (2005:121) emphasized that: 
                                         “The gathering strength of neoliberal policies on international trade during the 1980s opened up the whole 
world to transformative market and financial forces. In so doing it opened up a space for China’s tumultuous 
entry and incorporation into the world market (…) The spectacular emergence of China as a global economic 
power after 1980 was in part an unintended consequence of the neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world. 
“
170 Shenzhen was known as Bao’an County before it had been promoted to prefecture level in 1979. Later Bao’an 
became a district of Shenzhen. 
171 See Guangdong Dangshi (2010). The central government announced the official establishment of Shenzhen’s 
“Special Export Zone” on July 15, 1979. The original planned population was 350,000, of which 77 percent 
was to be agricultural. To cover the comprehensive characteristics, tasks, and functions of the Shenzhen Special 
Zones, its name was formally changed in March 1980 to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. 
172 For more detailed information about the designation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), see Lai Hongyi (2006: 
72-74). 
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Shenzhen is adjacent to Hong Kong; Zhuhai is connected to Macao; Xiamen is close to 
Taiwan and Shantou is located between Hong Kong and Taiwan (Figure 7.1). These cities 
could offer both inexpensive land as well as labor for the first cluster of investors from Hong 
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, as well as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Besides, many overseas 
Chinese came from Guangdong and Fujian provinces and became successful entrepreneurs, 
yet had strong sentimental ties to their Chinese hometowns. Traditionally, Cantonese and 
Fujianese were enterprising and receptive to foreign business and the world markets and 
for the last thousand years, both provinces had a tradition of trade and entrepreneurship, 
especially in foreign trade. Importantly, they are located far from the center of political power 
in Beijing, minimizing potential risks should any problems or negative political effects be 
generated (Tian Hao 2004; Lai Hongyi 2006; Yeung Yueman et al. 2009).
Figure 7.1 Regional Setting of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
Source: Yeung Yueman et al. (2009, Figure 1) 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are essentially a type of free ports. The government 
reduces or eliminates tax tariffs to create a favorable investment environment, and 
encourages foreign investment and the introduction of advanced technology and 
scientific management to promote economic and technical development. Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) use flexible economic measures and special economic 
management systems to develop an export-oriented economy.
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By 1984, when the early success of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) had been confirmed, 
China resolved to open its economy further by extending similar favorable policies to 
fourteen “coastal open cities.”173 At the beginning of 1985, the Party-state decided to 
expand the open coastal areas, extending the open economic zones of the Yangtze River 
Delta, Pearl River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian province, 
Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei province, and Guangxi province into an 
open coastal belt. In 1988, a fifth, the Hainan Special Economic Zone, was established. After 
the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the Chinese government decided to open the Pudong 
New Zone in Shanghai to overseas investment in 1990, and opened more cities in the 
Yangtze River Valley. In this way, a chain of open cities extending up the Yangtze River Valley 
was formed, with Shanghai’s Pudong as the “dragon head” (Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2. Coastal Open Cities 
Source: Adapted from World Bank World Development Report (2009: 254).
173 Unlike the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), all located in southern China, the selection of the fourteen 
coastal cities reflected the central government’s determination to expose a much greater area to change. From north 
to south, they include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. See http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez.htm.
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However, after 1989, there was increasing debate in China’s ideological and academic 
circles about whether the country should continue reform and recognize its fledgling 
market economy and whether a pro-socialism or a pro-capitalism approach should 
be adopted.
One could say the initial success of Deng Xiaoping’s strategy grew, especially after 
his “southern tour” in 1992174. In Deng Xiaoping’s speech, “the practice of using a 
planned economy is not equivalent to socialism because there is also planning under 
capitalism; but the practice of using a market economy is not equivalent to capitalism 
because there are also markets under socialism”175 he defined socialism as “the pursuit 
of common prosperity” and arbitrated a debate among officials and scholars about 
the proper way to implement a market economy in China. Inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s 
words, Chinese people began to break the shackles of tradition. The importance of 
economic development, reform, and open-door policy took deeper root in China’s soil.
Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, 
all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. 15 free trade zones, 
32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new and high-
tech industrial development zones have been established in large and medium-sized 
cities176. As a result, a multi-level, multi-channel, omni-directional, and diversified 
pattern of opening-up formed in China, integrating coastal areas with river, border, and 
inland areas.
As these open areas adopted different preferential policies, they developed a foreign-
oriented economy by generating foreign exchange through exporting products and 
importing advanced technologies and accelerate inland economic development. 
As China had just reopened to foreign trade and investment, the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) had an almost immediate impact. In 1981, the four Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) accounted for 59.8 percent of total FDI in China, with Shenzhen 
accounting for the lion’s share at 50.6 percent and the other three roughly 3 percent 
each (Wong Kwanyiu 1987). In 2001, China became a new member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO); to meet WTO requirements, China cut its import tariffs 
174 See “Record of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Shenzhen Tour”, available at http://english.people.com.
cn/200201/18/eng20020118_88932.shtml. 
175 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/21/c_131422589.htm; “Excerpts from talks 
given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Shuhai and Shanghai,” available at http://www.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/
dengxp92.htm. 
176 Information available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez.htm.
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from 23 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 2002 (Lardy 2002: 34). The state has been 
overhauling its legislation, regulations, and administration177. Since 2003, China has 
become the top recipient of FDI, surpassing the United States. Its total global trade 
volume improved from the twenty-seventh place in 1978 to the third in 2004178. By the 
end of 2010, China had been the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer 
for two consecutive years179.
Statistical evidence shows that China managed to construct a form of state-
manipulated market economy that delivered spectacular economic growth and 
rising standards of living for a significant proportion of the population for more than 
thirty years, even though it was accompanied by similarly growing environmental 
degradation and social inequality.
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) has been the most economically dynamic region of China 
since the launch of China’s reform program in 1979. The region’s GDP grew from 
just over $8 billion in 1980 to more than $89 billion in 2000. During that period, 
the average rate of GDP growth in the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone exceeded 16 
percent, well above China’s national figure of less than 10 percent. In 1991, almost 
50 percent of foreign investment in China was in Guangdong province, and 40 percent 
in the Pearl River Delta (PRD). By 2001, its GDP rose to just over $100 billion, and it 
experienced an annual growth rate of more than 3 percent above the national growth 
rate. The abundance of employment opportunities created a pool of wealthy, middle-
income, professional consumers with an annual per capita income that puts them 
among China’s wealthiest. Since the onset of China’s reform program, the Pearl River 
Delta Economic Zone has been the fastest growing portion of the fastest growing 
province in the fastest growing large economy in the world (Xu Jiang 2008).
The path that China has taken has never been an easy one. As Harvey emphasized 
(2005: 122), China did not take the “shock therapy” path of instant change and 
managed to avert the economic disasters by taking its own peculiar path towards 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”. I agree that the path that China has been 
taking during the past few decades of reform is progressive and persistent which is an 
177 See Lai Hongyi (2003: 154-158). 
178 The utilized FDI grew to $61 billion in 2004.
179 See “Historic progress in China’s Foreign Trade” in White Papers of Government, available at http://www.china.
org.cn/e-white/index.htm. 
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art of institutional bircologe180 (De Jong 2013). Furthermore, it is an art of inclusion 
that is deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition and reflects the philosophical thinking of 
the “Way of Tao” which has been elaborated in Chapter 3181. It is the same ideological 
foundation that was applied to construct the form of Shenzhen’s initiative.
§ 7.1.2 From a Fishermen’s Village to An Open Economic Practice Laboratory
In the first decade of the millennium, like many other world cities, Shenzhen is 
promoting a more green and environmentally friendly urban perspective for living, 
investment, and leisure. Unlike most world cities, leading to this stage, Shenzhen has 
experienced a miracle over the past few decades.
Recently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and 
Shenzhen Municipal Government jointly signed a framework agreement 
on China’s first low carbon eco-demonstration city. As the first low carbon 
eco-demonstration city approved by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development, Shenzhen will embark on a road to low carbon and green 
ecology as the result of the joint efforts of the ministry and the municipal 
government.182
Today, as a gateway to the world for China, the city is the high-tech and manufacturing 
hub in southern China, the world’s fourth-busiest container port, China’s fourth-
busiest airport and China’s fourth-largest tourist destination. The high-tech, logistical, 
financial, and cultural industries are mainstays of the city. In addition, Shenzhen 
was the first mainland city to use the green GDP and to index economic growth 
with the environmental consequences of growth as a performance measure for the 
city’s development. It promotes economic development of low-cost, low-energy 
consumption but with at the same time high yield and high profit. In addition, as a 
180 Martin de Jong (2013: 95) claimes that the cautious and selective approach of Chinese reform reflects a generic 
Chinese traditiona of institutional bricolage. In many cases adoption of original examples from elsewhere is 
not automatic and mindless, but far more selective and conscious. One could call this effectual practice in and 
perspective of policy borrowing one of low uncertainty avoidance, allowing policy-makers to tamper selectively, 
practically and synthetically with policy ideas and institutions from foreign and home grounds.
181 Further augumentation is given in Chapter 9 Conclusions. 
182 People’s Daily Online, January 18, 2010. 
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major innovation-oriented attraction, it ranked first in China in the number of patent 
applications for inventions. The city is also well known for design, boasting more than 
6,000 design companies employing a total of more than 60,000 people. Shenzhen was 
named a member of UNESCO’s Creative Cities Network and awarded the title of City of 
Design by UNESCO in 2008.
From the very beginning, the building of Shenzhen was based on the concept of an 
ecological garden city, with more than half of its total area within the natural protection 
demarcation line, in which construction is banned. As a young city in China, with a 
deeply rooted volunteer culture, Shenzhen has been voted as China’s most favorable 
city by migrant workers—particularly for young talent. When Friedmann (2005a: 
189) defined Shenzhen as “the best planning practice” in China, he meant that 
Shenzhen was built as an “instant” city from a fishermen’s village as an open economic 
laboratory. Within 30 years, Shenzhen, a small border town of 30,000 people in 1979, 
has grown into a modern metropolis. It established many firsts in the world’s history 
of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. Undeniably, it is one of the 
most noticeable successful economic laboratories of China and has drawn enormous 
attention worldwide.183 
In 1979, Shenzhen was a municipality just north of the border of Hong Kong. Within 
30 years, it became a metropolis that by the turn of the millennium already boasted a 
residential population of over 4 million (Shenzhen’s actual population, established in 
the 2000 census). Data of 2006 shows the residential population at over 8 million and 
this is still expected to increase with an annual growth rate of 9-10 percent (Shenzhen 
statistics in 2006). At present, the average age in Shenzhen is less than 30. Of the total 
population, 8.49 percent are between the age of 0 and 14, 88.41 percent between 15 
and 59, 20 percent between 20 and 24, and 1.22 percent 65 or above. The population 
has two extreme peaks: intellectuals with a high level of education and migrant 
workers with poor education. In June 2007, over 20 percent of China’s PhDs worked in 
Shenzhen.184 
The numbers do not include the unknown floating population. The latest data 
according to the sixth National Population Census of 2010 shows that Shenzhen’s 
residential population had reached 10.3 million (Shenzhen statistics in 2010). 
More importantly, roughly 70 percent of Shenzhen’s official population comes 
183 See “What has Shenzhen’s Significance Been in Post Mao China?” Available at http://maryannodonnell.
wordpress.com/2012/01/05/what-has-shenzhens-significance-been-in-post-mao-china/. 
184 Shenzhen Government Online, “Citizens’ life”, available at www.sz.gov.cn. 
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from someplace else. This data again does not include the illegal population, 
which is estimated to be about 2 million now. Their presence in the city is thus not 
acknowledged, and master plans typically exclude them from calculations (“floaters” 
have no “right to the city”.) (Friedmann 2005a: 189).
From a economic-political perspective, the region has served not only as a testing site 
to develop an open market economy within a socialist context, but also as a valuable 
laboratory for investigating how local and global forces are interacting in the Chinese 
context. Despite the geographic advantage of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in general 
and Shenzhen in particular, its implementation has to be accredited to the significant 
political leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the reformists (Lai 2006, Yeung et al, 2009 
and Wang Tao 2010). The thoughtful selection of locating the first Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in China is also highly supported by careful selection of appointed leaders 
as well as by the institutional arrangements resulting from the local initiatives in 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
Deng Xiaoping and other reformists also carefully appointed leaders to head 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces as well as the mayors of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) to accomplish different tasks for reform. Normally, these leaders were loyal 
cadres who received the trust of the party politically. In general, they tended to be 
open-minded and possessed a wealth of political experience (Lai Hongyi 2006: 76-77).
Xi Zhongxun185 is an open-minded veteran politician who was one of the few senior 
level leaders who voted in 1980 for open reform. From 1978 to 1981, Xi Zhongxun was 
sent by Deng Xiaoping to lead Guangdong province.
In 1979, Xi Zhongxun arranged for the creation of special economic zones in 
Guangdong province, including Shenzhen. When he first arrived in Guangdong 
province, the provincial government was struggling to hold back the tide of Guangdong 
residents trying to flee to Hong Kong186. At the time, monthly wages in Guangdong 
province averaged 40-50 yuan and GDP per capita was 376 yuan, while that in Hong 
185 Xi Zhongxun is the father of Xi Jinping, the incumbent General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. 
186 The loosening of social controls in China after Mao Zedong’s death led to an influx of over 0.5 million legal and 
illegal immigrants into Hong Kong from 1976 to 1980. Unlike the refugees of the 1950s, the illegal immigrants 
of the late 1970s were looking for better economic opportunities instead of fleeing from political persecution. 
Sung Yun-Wing (1998: 16). 
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Kong was $5,000187. Besides, Xi Zhongxun needed to win over leaders in Beijing 
skeptical of capitalism. With the support of Deng Xiaoping and the reformists, Xi 
Zhongxun’s proposal was approved by the national government in 1979. At the 
beginning, the constraint was that the central government had no funds, but as Deng 
Xiaoping said, “we can give you some favorable policies and you have to find a way 
to fight a bloody path out.”188 One year later in 1980, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) approved the articles on Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which means that 
the legislation on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was passed and the construction of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was started (Wang Tao 2010; Shih Tsuen Miao 2010).
The second important figure in this framework is Ren Zhongyi. If Xi Zhongxun is 
regarded as the founder who stabilized the Guangdong provincial government and 
began to liberalize the economy, then Ren Zhongyi, as Xi Zhongxun’s successor and 
one of the foremost pragmatic politicians, is widely regarded as the bold reformer who 
led Guangdong province to reform. Ren Zhongyi encouraged the reform initiatives 
and protected them from national conservative criticism, and he was prominent 
for his decisive action under the major principle of “more opening outward”, “more 
revitalization inward”, and “more decentralization downward”, which provided future 
guidelines for Guangdong’s opening and reform, laying a steady ideological base for 
rapid economic growth in the region. Ren Zhongyi (2000) advocated:
Improving the leadership to the Party means establishing a system that can 
effectively supervise and constrain the Party. Deng Xiaoping thought that the 
absence of constraints on the Party was dangerous. The Party needs to be led 
well but it needs to be supervised as well.
187 Guangdong Sheng Dui Wai Kai Fang Cheng Gong De Di Li Xiao Fen Xi (廣東省對外開放成功的地理學分析) In China 
Review Academic Publishers Limited (in Chinese). Available at http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/
cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=33661&secid=33683.
188 Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Guangdong lishi Dashi Ji 1949.10-2005.9 (中国共产党广东历史大事记1949.10-
2004.9). In Guangdong Dangshi (The history of the CCP in Guangdong) (in Chinese). Available at www.gddsw.
com.cn. 
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Furthermore,
The Communist Party supervising itself is like having the left hand supervise 
the right hand, it just won’t do. The Party needs to be supervised not just 
by the Party but also by the people, the democratic Party group and by 
independent persons. Not only must it be subject to the supervision of society 
and public opinion, it must be constrained by law as well.
Ren Zhongyi’s advocacy was similar to that of other reformists at that time. His upright 
character enabled him to rise above charges of corruption. Reform in Guangdong 
province was consolidated under his leadership from 1980 to 1985.
The given condition of Guangdong’s reform initiative also helped to speed up the 
establishment of Shenzhen. In May 1980, Guangdong province established a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) management committee. In June, the Guangdong Party 
Committee, presumably directed by Ren Zhongyi, decided that Wu Nansheng, a native 
of Shantou and a provincial party secretary, would become the first Party Secretary of 
Shenzhen. In March 1981, Liang Xiang, a native of Kaiping in Guangdong province 
and the second Party Secretary, was appointed by the National Party Committee 
and government to the position of first Party Secretary and mayor of Shenzhen. The 
message that was conveyed from the political consideration regarding the selection 
of leaders was loud and strong, and politically clear: Liang Xiang’s role in the reform of 
Shenzhen was comparable to that of Ren Zhongyi in Guangdong province.
However, what Liang Xiang was facing at that time in Shenzhen was very rigid. Given 
its humble beginning, the lack of central resource infusions into Shenzhen posed 
a particularly daunting problem, making its initial progress rather modest. The city 
desperately needed a foundation for urban development, infrastructure, and facilities.
Politically, additional administrative powers were granted to Shenzhen to allow it 
more freedom in pursuing new policies and development measures. In 1981, the 
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee granted Shenzhen the same political status as 
Guangzhou, the provincial capital.189 In 1982, the State Council under Zhao Ziyang’s 
leadership created a Special Economic Zone’s Affairs Office led by Premier Zhao Ziyang 
and Vice Premier Gu Mu. Shenzhen, along with other Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
could communicate directly with the central government while also earning the 
support of leaders of their home province.
189 CCPR (China City Planning Review) Shenzhen (1987: 53). 
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Liang Xiang took numerous bold and liberal measures to speed up development. He 
assembled a work team that comprised talented people from various fields; the team 
quickly formulated a comprehensive, ambitious, but workable blueprint for Shenzhen’s 
development.190 The first administrative reform took place in 1982, aimed at changing 
government bureaus and executive units into economic entities. From 1981 to 1982, 
the government of Shenzhen was downsized and its structure and organization 
streamlined. For instance, management units within the government responsible 
for staple products, resources, construction, foreign trade, and commerce were 
transformed into economic enterprises (NG 2005: 128). Three new offices responsible 
for economic policies in the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) were placed under the 
jurisdiction of the mayor’s office: the General Office of the city government, the Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) Development Company, and the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
Construction Company. These changes installed predominant control of the mayor over 
the course of the city’s development. This centralized and efficient economic decision 
process in the hand of local leaders in combination with an unparalleled advantage 
allowed it to experiment with whatever policies and practices it deemed expedient 
to vitalize the economy. This paved the way for rapid formation and operation of the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ).
Economically, Shenzhen enjoyed preferential treatment in tax and tariff reductions 
and exemptions from the requirement of submitting tax revenues to the central and 
provincial government over its first ten years 191 (Zhu Jieming 1996) as well as granted 
preferential fiscal arrangement (Lai Hongyi 2006: 80). Shenzhen is where the first 
overseas bank established its presence in China in 1982 and where the first post-1949 
Chinese stock exchange came into existence in 1983.
Yeung Yueman (2009: 226) summarized the special roles assigned to the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) and outlined the innovations with which they have been 
associated (Table 7.1). Among the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Shenzhen has 
consistently been at the cutting edge of reform. 
190 Under Liang Xiang’s leadership, Shenzhen created a number of benchmarks in China’s economic reform in the 
early 1980s, called “Shenzhen efficiency.“ In 1984, when Deng Xiaoping toured Shenzhen, he was impressed 
by Shenzhen’s persistent reform and rapid growth and urbanization. The success of Shenzhen also seized the 
conservative attacks on the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). See Lai Hongyi (2006: 77-78). 
191 For example, the corporate income tax on the SEZs was set at a preferential rate of 15 percent, even lower than 
the 18.5 percent in Hong Kong. According to national and provincial provisions, Shenzhen did not have to remit 
revenue to the national and provincial government until 1989, nor would the province and Beijing provide 
subsidies. See more about tax exemption of Shenzhen in Zhu Jieming (1996: 187-194). 
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Eschewing undue reliance on limited-term government incentives, Shenzhen instead 
focused on private sector-led, innovative measures and technological up scaling to 
improve its competitive position192.
Special roles Innovations
Shenzhen Slow but steady shift to market conditions on a 
greenfield site (fishing village).
Learn from Hong Kong methods of global 
capitalism, modern management methods. 
Raise capital.
 
New contract labor and wage system.
New tender system.
Home-purchase scheme for workers.
First urban land development rights auction 
(1987).
Separations of commercial functions from 
the state and government departments.
Increasing emphasis on the role of the 
legal system and the democratic election of 
factory managers.
First stock exchange in China (1990). 
Market-led individual upgrading. 
Zhuhai Capitalize on geographical proximity to learn 
from and work with Macao.
A bridge to Europe and Portuguese-speaking 
countries. Raise capital.
First local legislation in China.
Speed and success in developing infrastruc-
tures.
A state-of-the-art airport built in 1994 but 
not founded on sound market principles. 
Shantou Chaozhou culture with extensive domestic and 
global links to overseas China.
Once second largest city in Changdong, with a 
fair chance of rapid development.
Somewhat off-center location in terms of re-
gional growth and institutional innovations.
First legislation in China on individual 
self-funded enterprises.
Xianmen Established itself as a central city in southeas-
tern China.
Play a constructive role in peaceful relations 
with Taiwan.
Possible free port status to facilitate cross-
strait travel. 
Particularized culture predicated on a 
competitive spirit to acquire efficiency, and 
entrepreneurial environment, an urge to 
innovate, and a healthy human environment.
Hainan A model of reform with local characteristics.
Tropical climate, rich resources, strategic 
location relative to Southeast Asia, and large 
land area are strengths to pursue special 
development. 
Top-down administration from province to 
cities and countries; end of “small govern-
ment “ mentality.
First in China to: abandon dual-track 
reporting on production/livelihood data; 
simplify procedure for company registration; 
implement un-gated highways; implement 
comprehensive social insurance protection; 
and engage in large-scale infrastructure 
projects via a stock-sharing system. 
Table 7.1 Special roles and innovations in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
Source: Yeung Yueman et al (2009, Table 1). Revised by author.
192 See Yeung Yueman et al. (2009: 222-240). 
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In early years of development, Shenzhen became the base industrial development, 
specializing in electronic industry. Because foreign investments were not forthcoming, 
Shenzhen had to turn to domestic sources of investment193 (Wong Kwanyiu 1987). In 
1983, Shenzhen appointed eight State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be the developers 
undertaking comprehensive urban construction in the market environment in all 
districts.
Consequently, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) captured many domestic 
investments from central ministries and other provinces that were eager to capitalize 
on the preferential policies offered. One example was the Shekou Industrial District 
established by the State Council in 1979 and owned by the China Merchant Steam 
Navigation Company (CMSNC), under the Ministry of Communication. Another one 
was Shangbu, where one square kilometer of land was allocated to the Ministry of 
Electronic Industry and several additional pieces of land were allocated to departments 
from the central government (NG and Tang Wing- Shing 2004: 201).
In 1984, some of them became independent enterprises to compete with other foreign 
or private developers. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Shenzhen began to transform 
from government land distributors to market-oriented construction firms (or real 
estate firms). To attract investment from central ministries, tax exempt and free land 
tracts were offered. In 1984, enterprises of more than 24 bureaus and departments 
from the central government had committed to investment in Shenzhen, either 
operating factories or building industrial estates (Tian Hao 2004: 65).
The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) also adopted an official minimum wage and 
implemented the first labor contract system among all enterprises and public and 
social institutions in 1982. In 1983, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
introduced social labor insurance for employees in labor contracts. In this framework, 
migrant workers soon began to gravitate to the city from many parts of China, and by 
1989, more than 1 million temporary workers had already converged on the Zone. 
Improvements in labor productivity followed and the beginnings of a free labor market 
emerged by the early 1990s (Yeung Yueman 2009: 229).
However, early on, local initiative in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) also 
played a critical role in Shenzhen’s success. The guiding principal was “learning 
by doing”; within this framework, Shenzhen’s forward and backward linkages 
encompassed a large number of foreign and domestic-funded enterprises capable 
193 About 90 percent of FDI in Shenzhen originated from Hong Kong. 
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of synergistic learning. Due to the difficulties in accessing the Chinese market, the 
non-convertibility of the Chinese currency and unfamiliarity with the rules deterred 
foreigners from investing in China. The most popular form of investment during this 
period besides government enterprises was through the operation of cooperative joint 
ventures (CJVs) to reduce risk194 (Ota 2003: 19).
On the other hand, in Shenzhen, Liang Xiang was confronted with a severe shortage 
of qualified talent and of office floor space. To overcome these problems, Liang Xiang 
promised spacious apartments, generous wages, and easy urban residency to attract 
talent. From 1979 to 1983, the number of engineers grew from 2 to 732. Building 
office space was another top priority for the city. Active recruitment allowed the 
number of construction workers to grow from several hundred to 100,000. In addition, 
Shenzhen was short of funds necessary for building streets and urban infrastructure. 
The army had to be brought in to help build basic infrastructure, and early reliance was 
on joint ventures (JVs) in housing and other basic facilities with Hong Kong developers. 
The city solved the problem by taking bank loans, investing in urban infrastructure 
such as roads, power, water, telephone, and sewage in new districts, and charging rent 
on land use. It also reinvested earnings and loans in new urban development projects. 
Within a few years, the city accomplished an amazing amount of urban development 
(Lai Hongyi 2006: 81).
Since 1984, embedded in the seventh Five-Year Plan (FYP), improvement continued 
and allowed for a comprehensive system to control and coordinate economic 
development at the macro level. Policies related to land initiated and implemented 
in the last 30 years are of key importance to the socio-spatial development of reform. 
Before land reform, the urban land use all over China had the following aspects: land 
was acquired through free administrative allocation; there was no limited land use; and 
the local government and its agencies were the largest users of land195 (Han Haoying 
and Nishimura 2006).
From 1982 to 1985, external projects flocked to Shenzhen with twofold annual 
increases. Shenzhen and all of China had no land market, with all urban land owned 
by the state and distributed to State-owned enterprises (SOEs) without fees. Many 
194 In 1980, within the framework of FDI, cooperative joint venture (CJV) was the most popular cooperative 
operation in comparision with equity joint venture (EJV) and whole foreign owned (WFO). See Ota (2003: 12), 
Statistics and Information Yearbook of Shenzhen 1998. 
195 See land reform in chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform. 
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investors demanded premises to rent or to buy land to construct factories and start 
production immediately. Pushed by this market impulse, in January 1982, the 
Shenzhen Land Management Regulation declared the end of the era of free land use 
in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). From 1982 to 1983, the Shenzhen 
Development Company (SDC), one of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the city, 
leveled and made infrastructure connections for an area of 80 hectare in the Louhu 
commercial district and lent 40 hectare of buildable land to tenants at an average lump 
sum rent of Hong Kong $4000-5000/m2, valid for 30 years (Tian Hao 2005: 65). This 
was a unique transitional period when urban development could be conducted based 
on the commercial principle196.
Three major events marked the course of land reform in Shenzhen. In the old system, 
the government decided the allocation of land without use. This was replaced by 
various channels for obtaining land use rights (Xie Liou and Sit 2007).
The first and most important reform was in 1987-1988. In 1987, rights associated 
with a parcel of land were first auctioned in Shenzhen197, which ended the age-old 
free land allocation system. Although the state still owned the land, land use rights 
henceforth could be sold or transferred as a commodity in the market, which forced 
planners to re-think their practice. In January 1988, the Regulations of the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone on Land Management were promulgated. The system of 
compensatory and conditional usage of land was legally established in Shenzhen198.
The second change was due to the promulgation of the Provisions on Land Trading 
Market of Shenzhen in 2001. A tangible land market was established, and all 
transactions in land use rights were required to take place publicly in the land market. 
196 Within this framework, the Shenzhen Housing Company obtained 3 km2 of land and began the first test in 
China of a commerical residential housing project. See Tian Hao (2005: 65). 
197 Shenzhen Development Company (SDC) (the predecessor of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Real Estate 
(Group) Co., Ltd.) had the land-use right to a parcel of land in Luohu at auction for 5.25 million yuan.
198 With additional amendments, the 1988 Constitution was the first national document that legalized the 
separation of land ownership from land use rights; it also allowed the transference of land use rights. The State 
Council passed the regulation of urban land use rights in 1988 and enacted the regulation in 1990. The 1988 
Constitution and the Regulation laid the foundation for land policy in the post-reform era. Although there is still 
no privately owned land in China today, a land market has been created and land use rights entered the market, 
under the policy of separation of use rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real estate 
companies, villages, individual farmers, and government of all levels as well. These interest groups thus emerged 
with the rebirth of land as a market force in China. See more about land reform in Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban 
Land Reform. 
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The office managing the tangible land market is the Shenzhen Land and Housing 
Trading Center.
The third change was in 2005 when the first industrial land was leased successfully on 
the land market. This indicated that the range of land resources regulated by market 
mechanisms in Shenzhen had expanded to include industrial land.
The new land system retained public ownership of the land but allowed its use rights 
to be leased or transferred. Land use rights could be obtained from the state by four 
means: mutual agreement, invited competitive bidding, public auction, and listing 
(starting from 2004). This established a tangible land market. The supply and demand 
of land was largely regulated by the market mechanisms with some intervention of 
government (Han Haoying and Nishimura 2006: 14). The allocation of land use rights 
grew rapidly since reform. Reform of housing policy was also crucial to continuing 
urban development in Shenzhen.
Following the framework laid out by the central government, the focus of Shenzhen’s 
housing reform changed from a physical allocation system to a monetized system. The 
scheme stopped the physical allocation of housing, it incorporated increasing rent and 
providing subsidies while encouraging house purchasing and setting up a housing fund 
(Xie Liou 2007).
The first official housing reform document was the “Housing Reform Scheme in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” of July 1988.199 It included two objectives. First, 
it transformed the welfare in-kind benefit to monetary distribution in the housing 
sector. Housing should be tradable in the market. Within this framework, the Shenzhen 
Housing Trading Center was established in 1989 and the Housing Provident Fund 
was established in 1992. A new housing directive was adopted by the Shenzhen 
government in the early 1990s, the “Dual-Track, Three Categories and Multi-
pricing System”, to accommodate high, middle, and low-income groups. The official 
interpretation of the new direction is as follows200 (Wong Ngai-ching 1994; Lau Kwokyu 
1997; Li Jian-lin 1999).
199 See more in Chapter 6.3 Economic Reformation: Crucial Economic Measures and State-owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) Reform. In 1988, the Chinese central government issued an important document, Implementation Plan 
for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns, which marked the beginning of a nationwide housing 
reform.
200 Retrieved from Shenzhen Housing Bureau. 
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• Dual-track: the source of housing investment from both the local government and 
private developers. The local government is responsible for building welfare housing 
and low-profit housing. Private developers are responsible for the construction of 
commodity housing in the market.
• Three Categories: There are three categories of housing provided. Welfare housing 
will be provided for the civil servants. Low-profit housing will be offered to the staff 
and workers in SOEs and government subsidized institutions. Welfare housing and 
low-profit housing are built by the Housing Bureau. Commodity housing (marketing 
housing) is built by private development companies and could be purchased in the 
market by anyone.
• Multi-pricing System: It aims to provide different housing prices with regard to the 
affordability for various income groups. The price of welfare housing would be set in 
line with construction cost (RMB 1,000 -2,000). Low-profit housing would be sold at 
slightly above construction cost (RMB 2,800-4,400). Commodity housing would be 
purchased at market price (at an average RMB 5,500 per square meter) (Table 7. 2). 
Type of housing Price (RMB) per square meter 
construction space
Monthly Rent (RMB) per square 




Welfare Housing  
(multi-storey, full-cost)
1,000 6






Low-profit Housing (high-rise) 4,000 15 to 25
Low-profit Housing (duplex) 2,500 Not available 
Market Housing (multi-storey) 5,133 38
Market Housing (high-rise) 6,973 54
Table 7.2 Price and rent level of different types of housing in Shenzhen 1994 
Source: Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Nianjian 1994 (Shenzhne Special Economic Zone Yearbook 1994: 80); Shenzhen 
Fangdichan Nianjian 1995 (Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate 1995: 95 and 104). Retrieved from Lau Kwokyu 
(1997, Table 5).
However, problems of housing inequality were recognized due to the housing need of 
temporary residents being unmet and neglected. Although enterprises are generally 
expected to provide dormitory type housing to workers with temporary resident status 
as the operation of the enterprises expands and land price increases, enterprises find 
immense difficulty in accommodating these workers. With the result that many of the 
temporary residents have to rely on their limited wage to solve their accommodation 
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problems. In reality, the rapid growth rate of the number of temporary residents, who 
became the main workforce to create wealth, has forced the Shenzhen government 
to reconsider its housing provision strategy. A renewed understanding of the housing 
need of temporary residents is required.
Furthermore, some work units still provide houses for their employees as they did in 
the socialist era. Normally, these work units are highly profitable state enterprises or 
government institutions such as research institutions that have capital for housing 
construction as part of the welfare for their employees. The differences between 
housing provision in the transitional era and the socialist era are that these houses 
may not necessarily be located within a walled neighborhood, and the employees may 
have to pay a small part of the cost of construction. Preferential policies are also given 
to government officials or staff in government agencies, who have privileges to acquire 
cheaper or higher-quality houses. Shall government employees continue to receive 
favoured treatment in housing provision such as purchasing public sectors housing 
at below cost and with subsidised interet rate? This has to be justified by further 
development of the housing provision stragety (Lau Kwokyu 1997).
Nevertheless, due to the variation of housing reform measures offered, the rigid 
connection of the individual and its employer in terms of housing was broken. 
Shenzhen established a new system of housing provision and allocation. Although land 
was still publicly-owned, the increased ability to obtain and transfer land use rights 
spurred booms in real estate development201 (Chiu 1993; Wong Ngai-ching 1994; Lau 
Kwokyu 1997).
Like land reform and housing reform, fiscal autonomy generated tremendous fiscal 
incentives and exerted heavy pressure for Shenzhen to reform and develop. These 
privileges also enabled investors to enjoy the lowest corporate income tax rates and 
tariffs on imports and exports, as well as a freer play of markets in Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). To help foreign firms in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), 
the Shenzhen government agency reduced taxes and land use fees, lowered wage 
standards, and streamlined administrative approval procedures for foreign enterprises.
In response to Deng Xiaoping’s speech of 1992 during his tour of the southern 
provinces urging local governments to speed up the opening-up of the economy for 
further development, there was a surge in the inward FDI between 1992 and 1993, 
201 Housing reform is not the main subject of this research; more detailed information and research about housing 
reform can be found in the referenced literatures.
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which had increased at an unprecedented rate. Within this framework, new sectors and 
areas were opened to FDI. Even previously forbidden sectors such as domestic retail, 
finance, tourism, real estate, shipping, and resource development were allowed. On 
the other hand, due to rapid economic development in open coastal cities, the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) were losing many advantages and competitive edges they once 
enjoyed; it was no longer possible to continue the same development strategy as before 
(Ota 2003: 21).
In reaction to cooperate with the increasing demands of economic development, since 
1992, the government has broadened administrative reform.
With the growth of foreign investment and trade, a Trade Development Bureau was set 
up to take care of commercial and trading activities. In the central level, the Ministry of 
Planning and Land Management was set up to take over the functions of the Ministry 
of Construction. Combining planning and land management was a bold and innovative 
move for planners in Shenzhen and helped to guarantee funding for planning works. 
Gradually, Shenzhen became a real city; it was no longer a testing site for the industrial 
backyard of Hong Kong. Urban development was becoming a crucial and complex issue. 
Building public works became the focus. Many advisory committees were established 
as bureaus. The government’s directive was “government nurturing market, market 
liberating government, government liberating enterprises, and enterprises liberating 
productivity” (NG 2005: 131).
In 1994, the Shenzhen municipal government ordered the separation of governing 
and economic functions within the government202. All the economic entities had to 
unlink from the government, in terms of function, finance, manpower, and names. 
These economic entities can no longer rely on the government for survival. NG (2005) 
showed that with the broadening reform to separate the administrative and economic 
functions in the Shenzhen municipal government, the number of state-owned and 
collective enterprises decreased. On the other hand, investments from overseas and 
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan increased (Figure 7.3).
202 See Chapter 5.2 Political Reform. It is embedded into the third stage of central institutional reformation in 
1993. 
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Figure 7.3 Number of establishment under different types of ownership in Shenzhen (1984-1999) 
Source: NG (2005, Figure 6.9).
Furthermore, even though Shenzhen is still basically an industrial economy, it has been 
gradually moving toward high-tech industries. The foreign investors from 67 countries 
and regions around the world, including 76 on Fortune magazine’s top 500 list, had 
set up more than 14,000 foreign-funded enterprises in Shenzhen. This development 
helped speed up the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market 
economy in the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) announced in 1996. This precondition also 
encouraged the Shenzhen municipal government to emphasize building a world-class 
city that is attractive to global investors (NG 2005).
Special Economic Zones (SEZs)—particularly Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SSEZ)—had miraculous GDP, FDI, and urbanization growth. The transformation 
of China has been successful, and the driver of the market approach was planning. 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), as an instant city, had to provide space 
for market elements to grow. It was a planned product, and Shenzhen was built 
according to basic parameters laid down by different master plans. As a result, the 
Shenzhen government was entrusted with the formidable task of reforming existing 
economic entities under the planned economy while learning to accommodate private 
investment.
For a city that had experienced rapid growth, forward-thinking city officials and 
planners were crucial to its success. Shenzhen officials were able to implement a total 
of four master plans within the span of 30 years, each adding to the growth. The open-
door policy, location, leadership, policy, and institutional arrangements accounted for 
the success of China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs). While some of the initial policies 
and measures utilized in Shenzhen were common to all Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), Shenzhen independently adopted many of the bold and creative measures that 
made it stand out from the others (NG 2005; Lai Hongyi 2006; Harvey 2005; Xie Liou 
and Sit 2007; Yeung Yueman et al. 2009). In the next paragraph is illustrated how 
how the innovation has been applied for the evolution of the urban development in 
Shenzhen. 
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§ 7.1.3 The Evolution of Urban Development 
Shenzhen is a new city. Its convenient position as a neighbor of Hong Kong and the 
status of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) allowed building for economic expansion rather 
than solving the existing problems of an old city. Nevertheless, Shenzhen, like other 
cities of China, had to plan within the broad development framework set by the central 
government through various government policies: to fulfill the overall economic goals 
of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) while being creative to accommodate emerging market 
demands in planning the city’s development. New mechanisms to sustain these two 
tasks were invented by the municipal government, their planners, and decision makers. 
Interactively, these two forces are determining the urban development.
Over 30 years, Shenzhen revised overall city planning and development strategies nine 
times. Influential and significant were the master plans of Shenzhen in 1986, 1996, 
and 2006. These three plans were each prepared for a period of ten years as Shenzhen 
transformed from a border city of 300,000 in 1979 to a metropolitan area with a 
population around 11 million at present203. The fast growth of Shenzhen’s economy 
and its spatial expansion exceeded expectations of the master plans of the past three 
decades. The market is more difficult to manage through central planning and is 
becoming the third force to shape the urban development. Market forces and planning 
guidance have to be confronted by the emergence of changing ideas simultaneously, 
and changing ideas have to be taken into account in each adjustment of the master 
plan in order to adapt to new conditions in the transition period. 
Although Shenzhen was born as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), at the time Bao’an 
County was just a minor producer of crops. Shenzhen was not planned as a new city; 
providing services for industrial activities made it a prime spot for an export economy. 
The first master plan of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which was drafted 
in 1980, delineated the geographic boundary of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SSEZ): bordering on Hong Kong to the south, Dapeng Bay to the east, the Pearl River 
estuary to the west, and the mountains to the north; 49 km from east to west with an 
average width of 7 km from north to south. The total area covered 327.5 km2 with 
an estimated population of 600,000 in 2000. Within Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SSEZ) boundaries, not only export processing activities were promoted, but also 
agricultural, touristic, and real estate development. To prevent smuggling, an 80-km-
203 According to Shenzhen‘s published population statistics, in 2011 the total population with Shenzhen Hukou 
was 2,594,000 and without Shenzhen hukou was 9,017,000, making the official population 11,611,000. 
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long abattis, a 2.80 m high wall, and 7 m wide patrol road were constructed in May 
1982, with six joint checkpoints to its surrounding established along the path to it’s 
surrounding (Tian Hao 2004: 37).
Based on the “Guideline of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) Socio-economic 
Development Plan of 1982”, the structure of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SSEZ) was adjusted by following a nonlinear “multi-centered” development strategy, 
establishing three clusters: from west to east, Shekou-Nantou, Luohu-Shangbu and 
Shatoujiao clusters. Shekou-Nantou cluster was developed as the main industrial zone; 
Luohou-Shanbou was based on the existing Ban’an town center; and Shatoujian was by 
then the commercial center.
The total planning area was 118.6 km2, and the population was about 1 million 
by 2000. Major industrial sectors with 1,500 factories occupying 7.2 km2 of land 
and residential areas for 200,000 workers were projected, with proposals to attract 
foreign investment. Different land uses were functionally separated. At this time the 
two-tier planning system of the 1950s was in use: master plan and specific site plan 
(detailed layout plan). Both plans intended to support industrial projects approved by 
economic planning, and both lacked a clear definition of the legal responsibility for land 
development (such as a zoning system), and an operable control mechanism to modify 
the rights of both the private and public sectors (Tian Hao 2004: 52).
In the plan, the city’s layout was based on traffic backbones. To enhance 
comprehensive economic efficiency, residential areas were close to industrial zones, 
warehouse close to train stations and ports. Zoning was flexible to adjust to local 
demands. At the same time, the concept of a Garden City was studied and incorporated 
into the layout by creating green belts to separate the three clusters. This green concept 
was retained in later plans.
In general, the spatial structure of that time emphasized on providing the industrial 
services to Hong Kong and attracted traditional industries of Hong Kong to Shenzhen to 
help develop an export-oriented economy (Figure 7.4).
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Figure 7.4 The Conceptual Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1980 
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010, Figure 1.2). 
Caption here.
In the early 1980s, the economic success of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
led to the “Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986-
2000” in 1984. This plan actually established the basic spatial structure of the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and contributed to the broader development 
scheme of the entire city planning. The main concept was to set up the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as the base for industrial development in Shenzhen, 
supported by surrounding multi-functional special zones. Within this framework, 
the Futian cluster was separated from the former Luohu-Shangbu cluster as it was 
designed as a financial, commercial, and administrative center. Shahe cluster (later 
named Overseas Chinese Town, OCT) was added between Nantou and Futian as the 
area expanded. Together with the three existing clusters, it formed a belt along the 
coastline, and became the skeleton of Shenzhen’s spatial expansion. Due to fast urban 
development and to encourage growth and greater density many infrastructures were 
constructed: highways and a massive subway system. Three major east-west highways 
became the main axes of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ): from south to 
north Binhe Avenue, Shennan Boulevard, and North Central Avenue (Figure 7.5).
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Figure 7.5 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986- 2000  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010, Figure 1.3).
Based on the cluster system, the planned area was divided by rivers and other features 
of the topography into fifteen industrial districts. These were clearly specified as 
relatively independent systems. To reduce cross traffic within the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone (SSEZ), mixed functions were allocated within each cluster. Each 
had its own role: the Futian cluster was used for international financial, commercial, 
trading, and convention purposes; Shahe cluster comprised the Overseas Chinese Town 
(OCT) and colleges, touristic, and industrial zones; the Luohu-Shangbu cluster was for 
commerce, storage, housing, government offices, and industrial zones; the Eastern 
cluster had tourist attractions and ports, and as the largest cluster, Nantou included 
Shekou, Qinhai reserved land, Nanhai Oil Logistic Service Base, Science and Technology 
Park, Shenzhen University, and Mawan Port (a comprehensive expansion area) (Tian 
Hao 2004).
For the long term, the master plan also defined paramount strategic issues such as 
the city’s coordination with Hong Kong after its handover in 1997; century-crossing 
projects such as the utilization of the Yantian and Mawan deep water ports; and the 
construction of a petrol-chemistry base.
The urban structure of Shenzhen was developed based on the master plan of 1986; 
the concept of “cluster cities” that concentrated growth and infrastructure along three 
main axes from east to west formalized the basic urban layout that is still valid today. 
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Planners paid attention to city design and environmental protection204 (Tian Hao 2004: 
73). Some heavily polluting factories from the first planned period were forced to move 
out of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and wastewater was treated before 
discharge into the river. Land was reserved in advance for ambitious future needs. For 
instance, Gongmin and Hengang counties outside the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SSEZ) were reserved for satellite city development. In addition, the plan also 
outlined the design of a potential new downtown, a 4 km2 site located in the Futian 
District for the city’s future CBD development.
Economically, from 1986 onward, Shenzhen entered a takeoff period.
The plan also adapted a flexible enactment process to meet the rapid economic 
development and population growth. It was the first time that each cluster was 
encouraged to seek its own characteristic spatial development. It was the first time a 
plan integrated socio-economic guidelines and spatial planning coherently. However, 
rural towns outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) were still not covered 
by the plan.
The 1989 Urban Planning Act first set up a comprehensive urban planning system. The 
Shenzhen Development Strategy in 1989, by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land 
Resources Bureau and the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, first reported 
Shenzhen as a modern, international city. Shenzhen’s urban planning system evolved 
from a two-tier to a five-layer system205.
Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the south in 1992 encouraged the mayors of Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou to speed up the formation of a market economy. Rapid growth in the 
market economy of 1993 showed the planner that the planning process should not be 
just a top-down procedure. They began to balance requests from the general public as 
the planning’s feedback mechanism, and public engagement gradually merged into 
the planning process.
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) and Hong Kong entered a new stage of economic 
restructuring in the mid-1990s. Hong Kong’s economy became conspicuously 
dependent on financial services. It provided a good opportunity for Shenzhen to 
update its manufacturing to foster high-tech industries by creating science parks. The 
204 For instance, they attempted to use buildings to create an alternating “open” and “compression” spatial rhythm 
along Shennan Boulevard. 
205 See chapter 6.2.3 the two-tire planning system and chapter 7.2.2, the five-tire of Shenzhen planning system. 
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future perspective allowed Shenzhen to become a regional nexus of finance, trade, 
information, logistics, commerce, transportation, and tourism. Furthermore, Shenzhen 
was losing its advantage as other Chinese cities were granted more special policies206. 
Shenzhen needed a better macro-strategy to guide its future development. Due to 
a new strategy for industrial restructuring, substantial regional coordination and 
cooperation became necessary.
To maintain Shenzhen’s leading economic position in the nation and counteract its 
diminishing uniqueness, Shenzhen decided to incorporate the “rural” areas outside 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) (Guanwai) 207, bring them under the 
control of the Shenzhen Municipal Government and integrate them into Shenzhen’s 
planning strategy. In 1993, Bao’an and Longgang counties officially became districts of 
Shenzhen and provided land to replenish the city’s already shrinking land resources.
Even though the rural areas outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
enjoyed speedy development, inside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
former native villagers built a lot of illegal housing on their compensated residential 
lots, leading to the concept of the “urban villages”. This new phenomenon was 
completely out of the control of urban planning208.
As the activities were decentralized outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SSEZ), the master plan of 1996 included the entire municipality. Based on the belt of 
clusters and the major transportation axes, a new “network-based” conglomeration 
system was planned. The 1996-2010 plan formed three other north-south axes to 
connect the gradually expanding clusters. Nine functional clusters (three of which are 
in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)) created a basic future city structure. 
The central conglomeration comprises the two centers of Futian and Luohu. The 
total area is 74 km2. This is the political, economic, and cultural center of Shenzhen. 
In addition, the western axis, passing through Xin’an, Xixiang, Fuyong, Shajinn, and 
Songgang, connects with the western part of Dongguan which will be an important 
traffic corridor between Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and the industrial base. The 
eastern urban cluster comprises Shatoujiao, Yantian, and Meisha; and the Nabshan 
206 Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, all the capital cities of 
inland provinces and autonomous regions. 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological 
development zones, and 53 new and high-tech industrial development zones have been established in large 
and medium-sized cities. See chapter 8.1.1. 
207 Guanwai or areas outside the SSEZ (simplified Chinese: 关外; traditional Chinese: 關外)
208 Further elaboration on urban villages, see Chapter 8.3. 
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Urban Cluster, with 1478 hectare reserved construction land and driven by the Yantian 
Deepwater Port, would become an important logistic corridor and industrial base. At 
the same time, the boundary of the Shenzhen Central District was located in the Futian 
district and delimited to a total area of 6 km2 (Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1996- 2010 
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.
Starting in 1996, after fifteen years of transformation, the post-reform development of 
Shenzhen reached a stage of stable growth. The original goal set by the state in 1996 
was to develop Shenzhen into a high level, export-oriented commodity production 
base, combining manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism for Hong Kong tourists—a 
new type of border city became a large international city.
The plan is divided into three stages, and the population would be limited to 4.3 
million by 2020. The first stage (1996-2000) maintained a compact urban form based 
on clusters along the transportation spines and protection of the environment by 
enforcing intensive use of already used land. The second stage (2001-2010) was to 
build and consolidate Shenzhen into a well-managed, major, livable city. And the last 
stage (from 2010 onward) was to establish the city as a modern international city with 
a strong identity within twenty years.
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In 2000, the State Council approved the Master Plan of Shenzhen City 1996-2010.
Lower labor costs enhanced the industrial production processes relying on just-in-time 
transportation. To alleviate bottlenecks in land transport, many projects for highways 
and railways have been proposed and are being implemented (Tian Hao 2004:105). 
Within this framework, in 1995, Guangdong province completed the “Pearl River 
Delta Regional Plan” (Figure 7.7). It suggests that a well-planned, integrated transport 
network of high quality and efficient coordination shall be established in the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD). Although the plan contained insufficient detail to truly guide the transport 
development, it pointed out the network within the region and between the region and 
other provinces, between the southwest China hinterlands, Hong Kong and Macao. 
However, at this stage, regional development was still rather weak.
Figure 7.7 Pearl River Delta Regional Plan  
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 further embedded China’s economy in a global 
world. Shenzhen’s economy gradually changed from quick industrial development 
to multi-functional urban development. Socio-economic guidelines emphasized 
improving the ecological environment, developing culture and education, and 
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improving people’s livelihoods. The stakeholders continued to operate in this 
transitional urban development and influence social and spatial structure. Since the 
handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the implementation measures for the Integration of 
Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta (PRD) by enhancing the Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
connection have been emphasized.
In 2005, the Shenzhen municipal government officially issued the “Implementation 
Measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta”, which 
proposed that the “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Cooperation Circle” be established as the first 
tier, as well as a critical foundation, of Shenzhen’s integration into the Pan-Pearl River 
Delta. 2007 saw the formal launch of the “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Innovation Circle”209.
The role for Shenzhen in the long run is to strengthen its link to the global urban 
network. To become a hub of logistics, information, services, and tourism, and to 
become a high-tech nexus between the Pearl River Delta (PRD) city network and Hong 
Kong, the construction of infrastructure—particularly projects linking Shenzhen to 
Hong Kong and other Pearl River Delta (PRD) metropolises—is crucial.
Within this framework, regarding to the regional connections, the Guangzhou-
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link will connect Hong Kong (west Kowloon) in 
the south (known as Hong Kong Section) and Shenzhen (Futian Station), Guangzhou 
(Guangzhou South Railway Station), Guangdong in the north (known as Guangshen 
Section). The expected travel time from west Kowloon, scheduled to open in 2015, 
to Shenzhen’s Futian station is 12 minutes, and from Shenzhen’s Futian station, 
scheduled to open in 2014, to Guangzhou south railway station is 36 minutes. In 
addition, Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link connects to the Beijing-
Guangzhou High-Speed Railway Line, which belongs to a part of the national high-
speed rail network, stretches 2,298 km (1,425 miles) in length and can accommodate 
trains traveling with an average speed of 300 km per hour210. The urban metro system 
was inaugurated in December 28, 2004, making Shenzhen the sixth city in China to 
have a subway after Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. The Shenzhen 
209 As early as June 2004, with an eye toward establishing a world-class Hong Kong-Shenzhen metropolis, the 
two governments signed a memorandum and eight cooperation (1+8) agreement in December 2007 and 
six additional (1+6) agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation. On May 21, 2007, the Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen governments entered into the “Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation Circle Cooperation Agreement” in 
the presence of Mr. Cheng Jingpei, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology and Mr. Song Hai, 
Vice Governor of Guangdong Province, marking the formal launching of the “Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation 
Circle”. See Bauhinla Foundation Research Center (2007: 7) and Yeung Yueman et al. (2009: 233). 
210 GAOTIE.CN (in Chinese), available at http://crh.gaotie.cn/guangshengang/
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Metro currently has 5 lines, 137 stations, and 178.44 km (110.87 miles) of total 
tracking in operation. The network underwent rapid expansion prior to the 2011 
Summer Universidad, opening 110 km (68.35 miles) of track in June 2011. Proposals 
for expanding the system by five more lines were accepted in July 2011 and are 
expected to be completed between 2015 and 2018.
Taking a cue from Hong Kong’s long-term plan for 2030, Shenzhen mounted a parallel 
study211. In 2003, the municipal government commissioned the China Academy of 
Urban Planning and Design of Shenzhen to undertake a research study: “Shenzhen 
2030 Development Strategy”. It was published in July 2006, stating that Shenzhen 
shall position itself as part of an international metropolis with Hong Kong. This is 
a very important topic for Hong Kong. In February 2007, the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region’s Chief Executive Mr. Donald Tsang proposed for the first time 
in his campaign platform that Hong Kong should develop a strategic cooperation 
partnership with Shenzhen to establish a world-class metropolis. In March 2007, 
Mr. Li Hongzhong, Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), made a favorable comment on such a proposal during the 
National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
Mr. Xu Zongheng, Mayor of Shenzhen, also made some favorable remarks to the media 
after the conclusion of the National People’s Congress (NPC).
It has been argued that the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), in many aspects 
has already been integrated economically with Hong Kong. The new perspective of 
collaboration in the social and cultural dimensions is becoming crucial to synergize 
the concept of a Hong Kong-Shenzhen mega-metropolis. According to the “Building a 
Hong Kong-Shenzhen Metropolis Research Report”, Hong Kong-Shenzhen Metropolis 
is not a concept that is being force-fed to Hong Kong and Shenzhen. It is an instinctive 
judgment of the current status of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen relationship and a 
generalization of the pattern of change in the history of cooperation between the two 
cities. Solid facts from practices are the basis of all concepts, as well as subsequent 
policy proposals derived therefrom.212 
211 “Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and Strategy,” available at http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/
comp_s/hk2030/index.htm; “Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy,” available at http://www.szpl.gov.cn/
main/sz3/index.html.
212 Bauhinla Foundation Research Center (2007). 
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This statement exactly reflects the evolution of Shenzhen’s urban development in 
the past 30 years. From a backyard wetland to center of the arena, the Hong Kong-
Shenzhen cooperation promises “one country, two systems”. This new perspective 
will definitely lead to a revival of the planning culture of Shenzhen anew, in terms of 
administrative systems, political situations, economic policies, and legal framework.
In 2010, the State Council approved the fourth Master Plan of Shenzhen City 2010-
2020213. According to the plan, in Shenzhen by 2020 the control of the urban resident 
population shall be less than 11 million people and urban construction of land shall be 
limited to 890 km2. The master plan determines the 1953 km2 of urban planning area 
by implementing unified planning and management. For the downtown core, it focuses 
on improving the urban functions by forming a “three-axis, two corridors and multi-
center” structure, based on which the axis and corridors of the structure will integrate 
the joint-clusters of sub-centers.
To enhance the development of the coastal zones, planning and guidance, strict 
control of land reclamation, conservation, and rational use of coastal resources are 
emphasized to properly handle the relationship between development and protection. 
Hopefully, this would strengthen the villages in these zones, urban-rural reform and 
improvement, and promote the coordinated development of urban and rural areas 
(Figure 7.8).
213 China News, July 2010, available at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/08-24/2487796.shtml. 
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Figure 7.8 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 2010-2020 
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.
I would like to summarize in a few points as follows after the review of the urban 
development of Shenzhen. An overview of Five-Year Plans (FYPs) is given in Table 7.3.
Even though the major urban development is under the guidance of the central policy 
and guidance of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), very often, regulations and approaches are 
created anew based on adjustment to the local conditions.
1 Even though the major urban development is under the guidance of the central policy 
and guidance of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), very often, regulations and approaches are 
created anew based on adjustment to the local conditions. 
2 In the early stage of urban development, the main emphasis and focus was to build 
Shenzhen as an industry-led export zone. This changed due to the unexpected success 
of the urban growth. During the ten years after the first master plan, urban planning 
could not manage the fast urban development and became quickly outdated.
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3 During the implementation time of the third master plan (Master Plan of Shenzhen 
City, 1996-2010), Shenzhen’s urban development entered a period of stable growth. 
The planning scheme began to focus on both urban expansion and urban spatial 
quality, and the basic urban feature of Shenzhen was gradually shaped by the diversity 
of urban characteristics. 
4 In the fourth master plan period (Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 2010-2020), 
Shenzhen became one metropolitan region. The urban planning of the city’s future was 
integrated in regional plans, which brought up the question to what extent the Hong 
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(2000)
1979 Establishment of  “Export 
SAR”.
Shenzhen City Master Plan Bao’an County 
became Shen-
zhen Municipality 
35 Long term: 
300,000 
(2000)
1980 Fifteenth meeting of the Stan-
ding Committee of Fifth Natio-
nal People’s Congress decided: 
Approval of “Guangdong 
Province Special Economic 
Zone Ordinance”  
 
“Export SAR” was renamed 
“Special Economic Zones “ 
The first Overall Master Plan 







to-south: 7km.  







1981 Sixth FYP. 1981-1985 98 Long term: 
1,000,000 
(2000)
1982 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone socio-economic Development Plan Outline
1983
1984 Macro-economic control. 
 
“Regulation of Urban 
Planning”
Second Socio-Economic Development Plan  (1984-1989)
1985
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1986 Seventh FYP. 1986-1990 The second Overall Master 










1988 Promulgation of “Ordinance of land management” and “Housing reform program”
1989 “Urban Planning Act” Modification of the second 
Overall Master Plan of SSEZ 
 
According to (Shenzhen Spe-
cial Economic Zone Urban 
Development Strategy), plan-
ning area was expanded to 
include the whole Shenzhen 
city into four rankings: 
 
1. SSEZ, world city.  
2. Bao’an and Longong 
central district, first tier 
satellite city.   
3. Fu-jong etc, second tier 
satellite city. 
4. The rest, third tier satellite 
city.  











1991 Eighth FYP. 1991-1995 Draft Ten-year Plan for Socio-economic Development in Shenzhen and the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan
1992





1994  Guideline for modification of Shenzhen Overall Master Plan
1995 Pearl River Delta Regional Plan Municipal government 
approved the outline for mo-
difying the Shenzhen Overall 
Master Plan  
 







1996 Nineth FYP. 1996-2000 Draft third Shenzhen Overall 
Master Plan 
: Shenzhen Overall Master 
Plan 1996-2010 (version of 
1996s)
Planning area: 2,020 
Built-up area:  
380 (SSEZ: 130) in 2000; 
480 (SSEZ: 160) in 2010. 







1997 Hand-over of Hong Kong 
1998 “Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen” 
Introducing Statutory Plan System  (Fadingtuze)  
1999 “Regulation of the technical requirement for the Statutory Plan of Shenzhen”
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2000 The Third Overall Master 
Plan of SSEZ 1996-2010, 



























2005 Implementation Measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River 
Delta. 
2006 Eleventh FYP. 2006-2010 Eleventh Five-year Plan socio-economic Development in Shenzhen 
“Shenzhen 2030 City Development Strategy” 
Draft fourth Shenzhen Overall Master Plan 
Shenzhen Overall Master Plan 2010-2020 (version of 2010)
2007 Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation Circle Cooperation Agreement
2008
2009
2010 The Fourth Shenzhen  
Master Plan of Shenzhen City 









2011 Twelfth FYP. 2011-2015  Twelfth Five-Year Plan for socio-economic development in Shenzhen
2012
Table 7.3 The highlights of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) and the making of Master Plans for Shenzhen 
Constructed by author
Clearly, the future critical role of Shenzhen in the regional economic development of 
the Greater Pearl River Delta (PRD) is two-fold. Due to the proactive planning culture of 
Shenzhen under a constrained framework at the central level, planning Shenzhen with 
limited available land for urban growth local government and planners had no choice 
but to learn through trial and error. In addition, imaginative and bold administrative, 
legal, and planning measures helped to accommodate the dynamic challenges of 
various economic entities in the transitional process and made Shenzhen a world city 
in Asia with a “socialist market economy”.
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§ 7.2 Planning Shenzhen in Practice
Although urban development and urban land use is basically a local issue for cities, 
many important policies from the central government to ensure the national interest 
set goals and present constraints and limitations. After the practice of the socialist 
market economy, although with most of the authority and responsibility for urban land 
use planning and control delegated to the local government, the central government 
keeps the power to withdraw this at any time. Therefore, the interaction between 
the central government guidance and local operation in daily practice of urban 
development is crucial. The evolution of planning involves three types of reform: of 
administration, of planning formation, and of planning execution. Overlooking these, 
it shows that administrative intervention is the most important instrument to lay the 
groundwork for directing planning execution.
§ 7.2.1 Administration and Management of Planning 
When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was established in 1980, 
its administrative system was just a copy of the highly centralized and unified 
management model of the socialist administrative system of China. The adoption 
of the open-door policy was not just an economic experiment because it required 
concomitant institutional changes in the central, regional, and local government. It 
was difficult for Shenzhen, as a frontier experimental base, to accommodate market 
elements in a centrally planned economy, which was new to the country However, 
under the national structure of planning sectors during the past 30 years, intended to 
cope with the evolving demands of building a socialist market economy, eight major 
rounds of administrative reforms within the Shenzhen city government were carried 
out. As a part of this reform, the departments within the municipal government 
responsible for urban planning were restructured. These eight rounds of reform were 
proposed and implemented in 1981-1983, 1984-1985, 1986, 1988, 1991-1993, 
2001, 2003-2004, and 2009214.
214 The division of the different periods of reform may vary in different researches. This series is based on the 
Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010). 
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1. 1981-1983
When Shenzhen was established, the government was built on the administrative 
structure of Bao’an County. The old system, characterized by central-structure of 
power, an oversized bureaucracy, overlapping of administration and economy, and 
low efficiency, was not suitable for the establishment of Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SSEZ). The first administrative reform, which took place in 1981-1983, aimed 
at decentralization, establishment of a large-scale system of management, and 
changing government bureaus and executive units into “economic entities”. For 
instance, management units within the government responsible for staple products, 
resources, construction, foreign trade, and commerce were transformed into economic 
enterprises. The number of vice mayors was reduced from 19 to 8, and the number of 
cadres was cut with 60 percent, from over 2,200 to 800 (NG 2005: 128).
In this period, the responsible department of urban planning has been restructured 
in total three times based on the redistribution of administrative powers initially. 
When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was established, the responsible 
department of urban planning in the municipal government was the Urban 
Construction Bureau. In 1980, the planning and land-use divisions merged into the 
new Urban Planning and Design Bureau, which, in 1981, split: the design function 
belonging to the Office of Projects, and planning belonging to the Urban Planning 
Bureau. They were both subordinate to the Land Management Bureau of the central 
government. 
2. 1984-1985
The second focus of reform was to strengthen the government’s macro-control 
functions and improve the macro-control mechanism to enrich the management 
system. New advisory committees were set up for economic development, industry, 
import, export, and urban planning, as were new offices for infrastructure, financial 
trade, transportation, and agricultural trade. This reform was set to support the 
development of export. Four committees (Social and Economic Development 
Committee, Industrial Development Board, Board of Urban Planning, and Committee of 
Import and Export) and five offices (Infrastructure, Finance and Trade, Transportation, 
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and Culture and Education) were newly installed. 
The function of the offices was to assist the mayor in inspection and guidance of the 
system.
In general, the basic administrative structure of urban planning in Shenzhen followed 
that of the previous period.
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3. 1986-1987
The third administrative reform, which took place two years later in 1986, aimed 
at improving the coordination, consultation, and monitoring functions of the 
government. Like the reform of the civil service system and politics, this separated 
party and government functions, improved the legal system, improved the system of 
dialogue between different parties, and more.
In this period, the basic administrative structure of urban planning in Shenzhen again 
followed that of the previous period. However, the decentralization had empowered 
the local government to practice urban planning by planning management reform. The 
Urban Planning Bureau was no longer subordinate to the Central Committee; instead, it 
was directly under the supervision of the municipal Urban Planning Committee215.
4. 1988 
The fourth reform focused on economic development and the management practices 
of the infrastructure agencies. Executive control over the establishment of economic 
enterprises was terminated.
In 1987, Shenzhen’s municipal government implemented a two-level management, 
streamlining agencies, ministries, commissions, offices, and bureaus. The Urban 
Planning Bureau was under the supervision of the Urban Planning Committee. Under 
the Urban Planning Bureau, there was a Planning Office, a Planning Department, a 
Construction Department, a Land Use Department, and the China Academy of Urban 
Planning and Design of Shenzhen.
In general, all the reforms of the 1980s aimed at simplifying government structure 
and decentralizing power to enhance efficiency. They also showed a lack of a model to 
follow; Shenzhen had to grope for a suitable regulatory regime to cope with an economy 
that had been developing by leaps and bounds.
215 Yet the decentralization allowed the local planning authority to gradually gain the administrative power of 
planning. However, at this time, the division of the actual responsibility between different bureaus and offices 
was still blurrily defined. The Urban Planning Committee of this period was more a legal review and approval 
organization but not a legal decision-making organization like the role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen 
(UPBSZ) latter in 1998. 
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5. 1991-1993
Since 1992, the government has deepened administrative reforms. Due to the increase 
of foreign investment and trade, the government has realized the need to reform its 
administrative system to complete its move towards a market economy.
The watershed occurred when the National People’s Congress (NPC) made a significant 
amendment to the Constitution by endorsing the term “socialist market economy” 
to replace the old term “planned economy” in 1993. It is commonly said that a 
market economy is a rule-of-law economy. For this reason, law is indispensable to the 
development of the Chinese market-oriented economy and the new type of governance 
over economic activities (Paler 2005 and Zou Keyuan 2006).
Drafting of the Legislation Law began following the eighth National People’s Congress 
(NPC) in 1993. It took seven years, from 1993 to 2000, to move from drafting to 
passage of the Legislation Law, attesting to the number, interest, and power of the 
various actors engaged in the process (Paler 2005: 303). This law represents an 
attempt by the National People’s Congress (NPC) to rationalize China’s legal system, 
establish a uniform legislative hierarchy, and consolidate its authority over other 
important lawmaking institutes216.
The fundamental administrative reform began in 1993 when the new Civil Services 
Regulations were promulgated, which reinforced the separation of administration and 
economic enterprises.
According to the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Civil Servants: 1) civil servants are to be 
recruited into the service through open, competitive examinations, rather than through 
labor allocation; 2) civil servants are to be paid according to levels of compensation paid 
to managers of economic enterprises; and 3) the content of training for civil servants is 
to be revamped to meet the needs of a market economy (Burns 1993: 355). Within this 
framework, training for senior civil servants is provided by various agencies, including the 
National School of Administration and the Central Party School, both located in Beijing. 
The training infrastructure also includes cadre and party schools established at all levels 
of the administrative hierarchy. Education levels of leading officials in China have risen 
dramatically in the past 20 years. Currently, more than 80 percent of all those working at 
216 Paler (2005:301) argued that the politics behind the Law’s development offer insight into the balance of power 
in China’s lawmaking arena, revealing how key institutions—the National People’s Congress (NPC), the State 
Council, and local People’s Congresses—engaged in bureaucratic bargaining over fundamental questions of 
their existence and authority within an evolving system. 
i
 320 Between Flexibility and Reliability
ministry, bureau, and division levels of the central government are university graduates. 
Official policy gives a high priority to training, and local governments in particular are now 
buying training opportunities for their employees from universities in China and from 
overseas and regional providers (Zou Keyuan 1998: 205).
This round of administrative reform focused on restructuring the government for a 
market economy. This involved: 1) strengthening macro-economic management 
functions and agencies (such as banking, taxation, auditing, statistics collection, and 
setting up new agencies to regulate newly established stock markets); 2) transferring 
economic production functions to enterprises and abolishing government departments 
with economic production functions (parts of many government departments were 
corporatized); and 3) downsizing.
On the level of central government, the Ministry of Planning and Land Management 
was set up to take over the functions of the Ministry of Construction. Shenzhen’s 
urban planning administrative structure followed the same procedure. To coordinate 
coherent management, the former flat structure of urban management became 
vertical and decentralized in each district and was led by a responsible office. To 
integrate the land-use planning and urban planning, Shenzhen’s Urban Planning and 
Land Resources Bureau was established. Planning Departments and Urban Design 
Departments were established. Combining planning and land management was a 
bold and innovative move for planners in Shenzhen. In 1998 the Urban Planning 
Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality217 set up an urban planning system centering on 
statutory detailed planning, and defined the legal statue of the Urban Planning Board 
of Shenzhen (UPBSZ)218 through local legislation.
6. 2001
The requirements from the WTO constituted a second main factor for the 
transformation in China’s legal environment and law enforcement rationale and 
methods. As a WTO member, China brought relevant laws and regulations in line with 
those of the organization; those that were in conflict with WTO rules were revised and/
or abolished. The WTO requires its member governments to behave in accordance with 
its requirements, including transparency and accountability.
217 Shenzhen Cheng Shih Gui Hua Tiao Li (simplified Chinese: 深圳市规划条例; traditional Chinese: 深圳市規劃條例).
218 Shenzhen Cheng Shih Gui Hua Wei Yuan Hui (simplified Chinese: 深圳城市规划委员会; traditional Chinese: 深圳城
市規劃委員會) and the successor of Urban Planning CommTittee. 
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7. 2003-2004
The focus of the seventh reform was to integrate government agencies and to enhance 
government functions in the public domain and to strengthen the government’s public 
service function. The government has attached great importance to finding solutions 
for the reduction of the overlap of functions between government agencies. Based 
on the concept to build a “Scientific and Harmonious Society” proposed by Hu Jintao 
in 2004, the intention was also to realize further transformation of the government 
functions, to protect the configuration of government institutions, to adjust the 
division of functions of government institutions, to improve management level, and 
to form an administrative system featuring standardized behaviors, coordinated 
operations, fairness and transparency, honesty and high efficiency (Wang Yukai 2008).
In 2003, due to the restructured organization on the national level, a newly created 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was established, that gained 
greater responsibility and power in overseeing China’s economic development.
In 2004, the State Council laid down and issued a “Program for Comprehensively 
Implementing Government Administration in Accordance with the Law”, clarifying 
the guiding ideology, specific goals, fundamental principles and requirements, major 
tasks, and steps for comprehensively implementing government administration in 
the following ten years. It is a landmark in the history of government law construction, 
manifesting that administration in accordance with the law has stepped into a 
new stage.
In general, following the previous structure, the Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau is 
responsible for the urban planning and urban project development of the entire city. 
Under the bureau, three major offices are responsible for different tasks: the Chief 
Planner Office for the comprehensive plan and long term strategy; the Urban Planning 
Office for the District Plan and Detailed Control Plan; and the Department of Urban 
and Architectural Design for the Detailed Blueprint Plan and the final control of the 
implementation and urban design guidelines.
With regard to directing and supervising the implementation of construction project 
plans, the role of the Urban Planning Bureau is to regulate the use of construction-
purpose land; to issue the Comment Paper on Construction Project Location, the 
Urban Planning Permit for Construction-purpose Land, the Urban Planning Permit for 
Construction Project (also known as “One Paper and Two Permits”), as well as the plan 
drawings for construction-purpose land; to relocate construction projects as required 
by the overall urban plans; to direct and supervise the public bidding procedures for 
urban designs; to review construction projects for fitting into the urban planning and 
to provide relevant administration; to inspect construction projects for fitting to the 
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urban planning; and to direct and supervise landscape survey work for construction 
projects219.
After reviewing the evolution of administrative reform we can summarize different key 
components triggered the carrying out of the reforms. The first six rounds of Shenzhen 
governmental reform have focused on streamlining government organization and staff 
size to improve efficiency in coherent with the central policy of institutional reform 
which is mentioned in Chapter 6.2. At these stages, the key direction of government 
and institutional reforms was to support economic development. The government’s 
function in urban development and urban planning is rather passive. Lacking 
consistent guidance by law from the central government, the reform of the municipal 
government was basically following the demands of locally predominant market 
mechanisms.
Gradually, the roles of decision-making, execution, and supervision became clear 
in the WTO era. The seventh round of reform in 2003 was aimed at strengthening 
public administration and services. After the transition of the Chinese leadership 
from the Third Generation to the so-called Fourth Generation, the “Program for 
Comprehensively Implementing Government Administration in Accordance with the 
Law” issued by the State Council in 2004 ushered a new era of administrative reform 
in China. According to this document, China will spend ten years constructing a rule 
of law government by 2015. “The document provided six basic requirements for a 
law-based administration: lawful administration; reasonable administration; rightful 
procedure; efficiency and provision of convenience for the people; honesty; and power 
and responsibility. It offers guidelines on other areas of administration to deepen the 
institutional reform in compliance with relevant laws” (Zou Keyuan 2006: 7).
In general, in comparison with the previous stage of reform, implementing law-based 
administration reinforces administrative transparency. Governments at all levels in 
China have to rethink and change their methods of administration and governance. 
From 2003 to July of 2007, 33 legislation proposals had been submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and 125 administrative 
regulations were enacted. Among them were 52 laws and regulations on economic 
regulation and market supervision, and 106 on social management and public service 
(Wang Yukai: 3).
219 See “Shenzhen Municipal Bureau of Urban Planning,” Shenzhen News (2006), available at http://www.sznews.
com/english/content/2006-03/29/content_69464.htm. 
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The law is becoming more and more important in government management. The law 
also is designed to limit the government’s power, to establish adequate administrative 
procedures, and to foster the concept of responsible governance. There are a number 
of special laws regarding administration in China, such as the Law on Administrative 
Licensing, the Law on Administrative Punishment and the Law on Civil Servants (Zou 
Keyuan 2006: 9).
8. 2009 onward-
The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the 2nd 
Plenum of the 17th Communist Party of China Central Committee both made the 
important disposition of carrying out a “super ministry system”220 to further the 
administrative system reform in 2008 (Xinhua news agency 2008a). “Opinions on 
Deepening the Administrative Reform” were passed by the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). The report states “China is facing a new circumstance and new missions” 
(Xinhua news agency 2008a). “The existing problems of the current administration 
include cross functions, separation of responsibility and authority power”. The Party 
called for a new round of reforms in government functions. In March 2008, a new 
round of reforms was launched under the name of “Institutional Reform of the State 
Council” (Xinhua news agency 2008b).
This round of reforms emphasized improving people’s livelihoods and strengthening 
social management. Reform of the “super ministry system” was borrowed from the 
United Kingdom (Dong 2010). Five giant-departments were set up on the central level: 
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Urban-Rural 
Construction and Housing, and the Ministry of Transport (Xinhua news agency 2008b). 
The giant-department became the first step in separating powers in policy making, 
implementation, and supervision from each other with the expectation that further 
reforms will establish a perfect administrative system with Chinese characteristics by 
2020 (Xinhua news agency 2008c).
Within this framework, Shenzhen, China’s first Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and 
the first Chinese city to implement a policy of reform and open doors, published two 
guideline documents indicating a shift towards reform of the political system. On May 
22, 2008, the Shenzhen municipal government website published a draft document 
220 The giant department (“super-department or “mega-department”) could possibly help counteract 
departmentalism, although supposedly unitary departments in their own rights, in practice, sometimes failed to 
develop cohesion. They were, moreover, difficult to manage. See Greenwood et al. (2001: 40).
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outlining a 19-point reform program for Shenzhen. The first 8 points focused on 
political, governmental, and administrative reforms and the remaining 11 points 
dealt with economy, society, education, health, and culture. The points dealing with 
intra-Party democracy, grassroots democracy, and reform of the election mechanism 
attracted the most attention. In June, the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee 
adopted a resolution on adhering to reform and open doors. Provisions regarding 
the development of socialist democratic politics and the promotion of reform of the 
political system were included in the resolution, including reform of the mechanism for 
appointing cadres and making key policy (China.org.cn, 2008).
The practice followed the central policy of reform of “giant-departments”; Shenzhen 
pioneered this practice. The most prominent and ambitious item in this package is 
the reform of the administrative system, which divides the municipal government 
departments into three categories, namely decision-making, execution, and 
supervision. The specialty of this round of reform was tagged as an experiment in 
“separation of powers”. The draft of Shenzhen’s reform program focused on democratic 
politics and a service-oriented government, and presents 19 different systemic reform 
proposals, covering issues like the election of National People’s Congress (NPC) 
deputies, the selection and appointment of cadres, inner-Party democracy, reform of 
the judicial system, and anti-corruption measures221.
“It is the first time democratic politics has been given priority, and the first attempt 
to formulate a systematic reform of the national political structure”, Huang Weiping, 
director of the contemporary Chinese Politics Research Institute in Shenzhen, 
emphasized (Ma Yujia 2008). On the other hand, several Party leaders from other 
provinces and cities publicly expressed their reservations about the Shenzhen 
proposals. Doubts and debates rose high among the public (China news 2008).
Ma Jingren from Shenzhen University said that democratic politics is the key 
to moving the reform process forward. “If we allow citizens to participate in 
political management, we can push the reform process onto the next stage.” 
“This round of political reform in Shenzhen is still on the drawing board. It is 
a long way from implementation,” a local official told Caijing. Le Zheng, the 
director of the Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences, agreed. “Now is not the 
221 The points dealing with intra-Party democracy, grass-roots democracy, and reform of the election mechanism 
attracted the most attention. 
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ideal time to carry out political reform,” he said. “I doubt there will be any big 
moves within the year222.
Since 2001, Shenzhen has carried out reforms almost every year, but mostly related 
to economic and administrative issues. Shenzhen’s reform program indicates that the 
municipal government’s leaders have a clear understanding of the obstacles to reform 
and the problems existing in the political system. However, in order to cope with the 
requirement of central policy and in balance with the local demands of the market 
economy, consistently adoption of the existing administrative structure is highly 
required.
In July 2010, Shenzhen announced the implementation of the eighth administrative 
reform, said Liu Yupu, Party Chief of Shenzhen government (NEWSGD 2009):
Shenzhen will streamline government institutions by more than 30 percent 
by the end of October, and officially launched China’s first administrative 
structural reform, which is being called an experiment in “the separation 
of powers”. The plan is intended to streamline an overlapping array of 
government agencies, with 46 departments to be incorporated into 31.223 
(…) All these changes would work toward making Shenzhen a public service-
oriented government by 2013—seven years earlier than the nation had 
expected.
According to the “Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government’s Institutional Reform 
Program”, which had been approved by the central and provincial government in 
2010, after the reform, the municipal government was reshuffled into three major 
categories: decision-making, execution, and supervision. According to the positioning 
of departmental functions, three types of municipal government departments were 
installed, namely “Commission,” “Administration or Bureau,” and “Office”. Under the 
mayor, there are Policymaking Commissions, under which there are Policy Execution 
222 China News, Ma Yujia (2008) available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/local_
governments/2008-07/04/content_15955536.htm. 
223 Newsgd.com, 2009. 
 “The reshuffle excluded seven departments at bureau level—public security, education, civil affairs, justice, 
auditing, checkpoints and Taiwan affairs. Seven “policymaking commissions” under the mayor will be created 
around core issues such as development and reform, science and trade, finance, urban planning and State land 
resources, traffic, hygiene and birth control, and the environment. Under the commissions, there are “policy 
execution” bureaus. The reform will help the government run more efficiently and will also play a positive role in 
checking each branch to keep the government clean, Acting Mayor Wang Rong said. “
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Departments. The existing Supervision Bureau and Audit Bureau are part of a single 
body, which takes over all supervision functions that were before exercised by various 
departments (Table 7.4).
Before reform After reform
Sectors
1 Development and Reform Bureau Development and Reform Commission 
2 Trade and Industry Bureau Science, Industry, Trade, Information technolo-
gy Commission Science Technology and information Bureau 
 High-Tech Office
 Free Trade zone Bureau 
3 Financial Department Finance Commission 
4 Urban Planning Bureau Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commis-
sion Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau 
5 Environmental protection Bureau Human Settlements and Environment Com-
mission 
6 Traffic Bureau Transport Commission
Highway Bureau 
Communication Administration 
7 Health Bureau Health, Population and Family Planning 
Commission
Table 7.4 Newly established Commissions after Shenzhen administration reform of 2009 
Source: Shenzhen government. Summarized and constructed by author.
Seven newly installed “policymaking commissions” are responsible for the 
policymaking, planning, and providing of guidelines for core issues such as 
development and reform, science and trade, finance, urban planning and state land 
resources, traffic, hygiene and birth control, and the environment.
 In addition, administrations and bureaus are responsible for the implementation 
and regulatory functions. Ten departments at the bureau level were established for 
public security, education, civil affairs, justice, auditing, checkpoints, and Taiwan 
affairs. Vertically, regarding the reinforcement of policy and execution between the 
commissions and bureaus, certain commissions are responsible for coordination of the 
cross-department affairs.
For historical reasons, administrative intervention had been the most important 
instrument of urban land use management and urban development in the pre-Maoist 
period (Han Haoying 2006: 5). In the case of Shenzhen, the evolution of administrative 
reform from the very beginning demonstrated how the decisive moments came from 
both top-down and bottom-up forces. This was the case during the second reform 
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conducted under the “law-based administration” by the central government and 
the recent initiative toward the third round of “testing political reform” by the local 
government based on the approval of the central government.
Overall, without the high praise and support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and the state, Shenzhen’s institutional innovation would not continue. Shenzhen’s 
experiences in institutional innovation have provided China with practical grounds for 
the revision of the Constitution and the Land Administrative Law. Shenzhen is also the 
first city in China to introduce the public bidding mode for construction projects. Many 
successful experiences have since been applied throughout China.
§ 7.2.2 Establishment of Planning System
In the domain of urban planning, a general top-down urban planning framework 
contributes to set up the outline of the urban development strategy, yet the urban 
planning in practice needs to confront many unexpected conditions originating from 
local initiatives. Urban development, land use management, and economic growth 
management in China involve both the central and local governments. In Chapter 
7, I elaborate the overall planning system from the central level and perspective. 
Herewith, in the framework of central guidance and local execution concepts, three 
entities directly influence the evolution of the local planning practice. The first is the 
administrative structure of the government; the second one is embedded in the entire 
system of government sectors responsible for planning; the third one is the framework 
of the planning system. Each entity contains elements of the overall legal system of the 
local planning practice.
Firstly, to place Shenzhen in the framework of the broader administrative structure, 
one must recall briefly the administrative structure of the government224.
224 Since the founding of China, the designation of the central government entities corresponding to the 
development and changing political and economic situations have experienced adjustment. See more in 
Chapter 6.1.3.
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The new Chinese Constitution225 in 1982 reaffirmed that the local authorities at the 
province, municipality, county, district, and township levels consisted of the People’s 
Committee and the People’s Government. In this framework, the government entities 
were divided into five levels: national (central government), provincial, prefecture, 
county, and township (village). Each administrative level is well defined.
The provincial level is the highest level of local government and includes provincial, 
autonomous regions, and municipal governments (of the directly governed 
municipalities). A standard provincial government is nominally led by a provincial 
committee, headed by a secretary. The committee secretary is the first in charge of 
the province; second is the governor of the provincial government. The municipality 
(Zhixiashi) is the highest level of city and is directly under the Chinese government, with 
a status equal to that of the provinces. In practice, their political statuses are higher 
than common provinces. Administrative chiefs (mayors) of a municipality generally 
have the same rank as a division minister (Buchang)226 of a national ministry. An 
autonomous region (Zizhiqu)227 is a minority entity, which has a higher population of 
a particular minority ethnic group along with a local government, and theoretically has 
more legislative rights than other local governments of the same administrative level. 
The governor of an autonomous region is usually appointed from the respective ethnic 
minority.
The second level is the city level and included cities under the jurisdiction of the 
provinces, prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and districts under the jurisdiction of 
the cities. Administrative chiefs (mayors) of prefectural level cities generally have the 
same rank as a division chief (Sichang)228 of a national ministry.
When Shenzhen was established, its administrative rank was upgraded from 
county (Bao’an County) to the newly created category of cities separately listed in 
the province’s economic planning as “city specifically designated in the state plan” 
225 The 1982 Constitution was subsequently amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004, generally modifying the 
document in accordance with economic and political reforms over that period. The current compilation dates 
from March 14, 2004. See also Chiu Hungdah (1985). 
226 Buchang (simplified Chinese: 部长; traditional Chinese: 部長). 
227 Currently, there are five autonomous regions (Zizhiqu) in China: Xinjiang Uyghur, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia 
and Guangxi autonomous regions. 
228 Sichang (simplified Chinese: 司长; traditional Chinese: 司長). 
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(Jihuadanlieshi)229, under the jurisdiction of Guangdong province. This category was 
newly installed in the 1980s to underpin the administrative status of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). Due to their special roles in national plans, they are not exactly the same 
as prefecture-level cities. They were granted provincial level economic management 
authority, but not provincial level administrative authority. Unlike prefecture-level 
cities, Shenzhen in the very early period did not have to remit revenue to the provincial 
government230; instead, it was directly controlled by the central government. Until 
1993, there were in total fourteen cities specifically designated in the state plan 
(Jihuadanlieshi): Chongqing (in 1983), Wuhan (1984), Shenyang (1984), Dalian 
(1984), Guangzhou (1984), Xi’an (1984), Harbin (1984), Qingdao (1986), Ningbo 
(1987), Xiamen (1988), Shenzhen (1988), Changchun (1989), Chengdu (1989), and 
Nanjing (1989).
In 1994, a level of administrative entity was created out of prefecture-level cities, 
namely, the sub-provincial level, similar to prefecture-level cities ruled by a province 
but administrated independently in regard to economy and law. Normally, a sub-
provincial level refers to an administrative unit that comprises a main central urban 
area and its much larger surrounding rural area containing many smaller cities, towns, 
and villages. The mayor or chairman of a sub-provincial level is equal in status to a vice 
governor of a province. Its status is below that of municipalities, which are independent 
and equivalent to provinces, but above others; they are completely ruled by their 
provinces.
Within this framework, the original fourteen cities specifically designated in the state 
plan (Jihuadanlieshi) were identified as sub-provincial level cities, and two additional 
were added to the list: Hangzhou and Jinan. After 1997, Chongqing was made a directly 
governed municipality (Zhixiashi)231; reducing the remaining sub-provincial level cities 
to fifteen232.
229 Jihuadanlieshi (simplified Chinese: 计划单列市; traditional Chinese: 計劃單列市). 
230 Shenzhen enjoyed preferential treatment in tax and tariff reductions and exemptions as well as preferential 
fiscal arrangements.
231 The current on list directly governed municipalities (Zhixiashi) are: Beijing (1949-), Shanghai (1949-), Tianjin 
(1949-1958 and 1967-) and Chongqing (1949-1954 and 1997-). 
232 The original fourteen sub-provincial cities were created on February 25, 1994 by the Central Organization 
Committee out of prefecture-level cities. Among them, the remaining five cities specifically designated in the 
state plan (Jihuadanlieshi) are Shenzhen, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, and Dalian, and the rest cities are the 
capitals of the provinces in which they are located. See Baidu Encyclopedia.
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Shenzhen as a city specifically designated in the state plan (Jihuadanlieshi) had a 
special administrative and economic status and it was granted a specific government 
sector responsible for planning as that of sub-provincial level cities.
In Chapter 6 is shown that there are three major government sectors at the national 
level that control the urban-rural land use planning: the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), and the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHRUD); all three ministries and 
commissions have their corresponding local sectors to execute the land management 
function in Shenzhen.
After the administrative reform of Shenzhen in 2009, two corresponding local sectors 
were in charge of urban growth and development and management: the Development 
and Reform Commission (DRC) and the Urban Planning, Land and Resources 
Commission (UPLRC).
The Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Shenzhen Municipality is the local 
corresponding sector of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to 
undertake coordination of national economic and social development, responsible for 
implementation of national, provincial and municipal laws, regulations, and policies on 
economic and social development. It formulates the economic and social development 
strategies of mid to long term annual plans, carrying out the implementation of 
planning after approval and convergence of the overall urban planning, land use 
planning, human settlement development planning, and other special plans and 
regional plans.
Corresponding to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the 
Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Shenzhen Municipality ensures that 
the national economic and social policies are well carried out locally, following the Five-
Year Plans (FYPs).
The second sector is the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC) 
of Shenzhen Municipality. Before 2009, the execution of land-use development and 
urban planning development was divided into two different departments. One was the 
Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau, which is in charge of the land-
use management and housing development management and was the corresponding 
local sector of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) in Shenzhen. The second one 
was the Urban Planning Bureau. At the central level, housing management is normally 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD).
The major functions of the Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau are 
executing the state, province, and municipal laws, regulations, rules, and policies 
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on the administration of land, minerals, housing, and mapping; formulating and 
implementing local administration regulations, rules, and policies; organizing to draw 
up and implement overall plans for land exploitation and plans for state-owned land; 
drawing up plans for land development, exploitation, and renovation; managing land 
requisition, allocation, selling, transferring, and changing; auditing construction land 
projects and submitting theses projects to higher authorities for approval; conducting 
overall management of the land and housing administration and registration in both 
rural and urban areas; being responsible for the confirmation, transfer, registration, 
and issuance of the licenses for land and house property rights; and investigating and 
arbitrating disputes of house property rights and of compensation for resettlement.
The Urban Planning Bureau was the main executive sector of urban construction 
before the 2009 reform. In general, its responsibilities can be summarized in three 
tasks: research and drafting plans, supervision of implementation of construction 
projects plans, and implementation of national and provincial regulations, policies, and 
guidelines on urban planning (Du 2006). In doing so, the Urban Planning Bureau took 
on the daily work of the Shenzhen municipal Urban Planning Committee.
Since the reform of 2009, to enhance administrative efficiency and to avoid the 
confusing overlap of responsibilities of the departments and the lack of coordination 
between land-use management and urban spatial planning and construction, 
Shenzhen Municipality merged the above-mentioned two different departments into 
one mega-commission, namely, the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission. 
Following the decentralization policy, it set up the representative offices in different 
districts to be responsible for implementation and management of city planning within 
their respective administrative districts.
The Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission has six major duties: urban 
planning, land-use management, real estate management, mapping management, 
geographical environment management, and names management233. In this 
framework, all the plans that are related to the urban land-use development, urban 
construction development, urban renewal, and urban strategic development are 
operated under this commission. Its function is to provide a link between the drafting 
and directing of plans for the city by following the overall guideline of the socio-
economic development plans down to the implementation status and providing 
supervision and monitoring of the implementation of construction projects.
233 See official website of Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission, http://www.szpl.gov.cn/. 
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The last entity regarding urban planning is the entire framework of the planning 
system: the socioeconomic development plan, the overall plan of land utilization 
system, and the urban and rural plan system.234 
Following the Five-Year-Plans (FYPs) for the central socio-economic development, the 
local government is responsible for drafting guidelines to adopt local socio-economic 
development in the master plans, such as the socio-economic strategic plan drafted 
in 1982; the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Socio-economic Development Plan 
Outline and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Strategy in 
1989; the Ten-year Plan for Socio-economic Development in Shenzhen; the eighth 
Five-Year-Plan (FYP) in 1991; the Socio-economic Development Strategy and the ninth 
Five-Year-Plan (FYP) in 1996; and the tenth Five-Year-Plan (FYP) for Socio-economic 
Development in Shenzhen in 2000.
As stipulated in the Urban Planning Law, there was only a two-tier framework235 in 
which the comprehensive plan and the detailed plan apparently lacked coordination.
Due to the pragmatic demands of efficiency and the technical feasibility to justify 
urban planning decisions being gradually weighted, according to the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone Urban Development Ordinance in 1989, Shenzhen evolved into the 
“three-tier five-phase” planning system.
During this period, at the top of the system is the City Comprehensive Plan that 
outlines the city’s general function, the planned target size of the city, the standards, 
norms, and criteria for main construction in the city, the land use structure, and 
the comprehensive transportation system. It also includes the objective of regional 
coordination with the other cities in the PRD. The second level is the Sub-regional 
Plan that coordinates the growth among different regions to ensure the continuity 
and integrity of the City Comprehensive Plan. At this time, the development of the 
urban area and the non-urban areas were not incorporated in one plan. The Sub-
regional Plan can help to fill the gap between the areas covered and not covered in the 
Comprehensive Plan.
234 See Chapter 6:2.3 System of Plans. 
235 Urban Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 18. 
                                         “The plan for a city shall as a rule, be worked out in two stages, i.e. comprehensive planning and detailed 
planning. For large and medium-size cities, district planning may be conducted on the basis of comprehensive 
planning in order to further control and define the use of land and determine the scope and capacity of each plot 
and to coordinate the construction of various items of infrastructure and public facilities.” 
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The third level, the Urban District Plan, sought to link the master plan with the needs 
of day-to-day development control. Although the Comprehensive Plan shows the 
future urban spatial structure, it does not specify the detailed land uses at the land 
parcel level. Urban District Planning, converting the master plan into urban land layout, 
attempts to complement the master plan by disaggregating land development into 
urban planning districts, and to achieve better coordination between master planning 
and detailed planning.
Under the Urban District Plan, there was a Regulatory Plan and Detailed Blueprints. 
Their function is to define the scope for the use of land for each construction project 
within the planned plot and provide the control of the utilities engineering and the plan 
for the site engineering. Regulatory Plans are the lowest level to control a concrete plan 
for the various construction projects to be undertaken in the immediate development 
area of the city.
 From 1989 to 1997, Shenzhen experienced an enormous impact from the mechanism 
of the market economy in its urban development. Different explorations of urban 
planning approaches were applied, taken from urban planning systems from abroad, 
mainly from Hong Kong. Although Shenzhen had established a more advanced 
planning system than any other city in China at that time, negative effects were also 
apparent when the market force was too strong to force the adaptation of the plan 
(Wang Fuhai, 2000).
In 1995, Shenzhen began to draft the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen 
Municipality, enacted in 1998. Based on the Ordinance, Shenzhen introduced the 
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze)236. According to Article 23, the techniques 
that formulate the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) shall be prescribed by 
the Municipal Government separately. The next year, based on the Urban Planning 
Ordinance of Shenzhen, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ)237 
promulgated the Rules for Formulating the Statutory Graphic Standard of Shenzhen to 
formulate the specific content of Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze). It showed 
that the planning system of Shenzhen had gone from technical to statutory.
The Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) System was introduced from Hong Kong. 
The Town Planning Board was the principal authority responsible for the statutory 
planning in Hong Kong. Its main duties included preparation of draft statutory plans, 
236 Fadingtuze or Statutory Graphic Standard (simplified Chinese: 法定图则; traditional Chinese: 法定圖則). 
237 Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ), http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/jgzn/.
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consideration of representations made in respect of the daft plans, and consideration 
of applications for planning permission and amendments to the plans under the 
provisions of the Town Planning Ordinance. The special aspect in comparison to 
the former stage is the integration of public participation in the planning process. 
The Town Planning Board is responsible for the development of Statutory Detailed 
Plans. According to the procedures, all Statutory Detailed Plans must be published 
in the Government Gazette and newspapers to inform the public and ask them for 
advice. In this way, the government can also balance the interests of all parties during 
development proposals.
Learning from Hong Kong’s Statutory Plans system, in the case of Shenzhen, the 
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) was created between the existing levels of 
District Plans and Regulatory Plans. It further clarified the planning quality of land use 
functions, the development intensity, and supporting facilities. A Statutory Graphic 
Standard (Fadingtuze) approved by the Urban Planning Board has the force of law and 
any unit or individual parcel cannot be changed without the approval of the Board. The 
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) strengthens the spirit of the “rule of law” in 
urban planning and the public participation and understanding in the urban planning 
process.
According to the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, the Statutory Graphic 
Standard (Fadingtuze) comprises two parts: the graphic and the text. The Rules for 
Formulating Statutory Graphic Standard of Shenzhen were promulgated in 1999 and 
defined the content of text and graphic as follows (Table 7.5): 
Text Graphic
1 General Principle: Plot boundary and coverage Land use property 
2 Development objective and Urban function Site plan 
3 Land use type Area number 
4 Land development intensity: Floor-area ratio Block division 
5 Public utilities and facilities Block boundary 
6 Transportation system Supporting facilities 
7 Urban design Traffic control 
Municipal Works 
Table 7.5 Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) of Shenzhen City 
Source: Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, Shenzhen government. Summarized and constructed by author.
In 2000, Guangzhou’s municipal government drafted the Guangzhou Comprehensive 
Development Conceptual Plan, which was the first time the idea of conceptual plans 
and strategic plans were introduced in China. The Strategic Plan was immediately 
practiced in many different cities, although the Conceptual Plan and Strategic Plan 
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were not included in the statutory planning system. Yet it bridged the gap between the 
guidance of overall socioeconomic development and the implementation of spatial 
construction planning by providing a strategic vision for urban development. Within 
this framework, the aforementioned Shenzhen 2030 City Development Strategy was 
prepared for a long-term vision of the urban development strategy.
The new Urban and Rural Law enacted in 2007 defined a comprehensive planning 
system based on the concept of a coherent urban and rural entity. Following the 
administrative hierarchy from the national level to the local level, the establishment 
of the overall planning of a city or town, a township, or a village shall be based on the 
national socio-economic development planning as well as the overall of land use. In 
addition, in order to adopt the emerged urban challenges and local urban conditions, 
based on the Comprehensive Overall Planning system, various thematic planning 
systems also have been established by following national policies such as Urban 
Renewal Planning and Real Estate Planning. Gradually, the Shenzhen planning system 
was built by following every step of the administrative restructuring and embed this in 
the statutory framework (Table 7.6). Based on the entire planning structure, the next 
paragraph is to explore to what extent the body of the planning content can be put into 




National Land and Resources Planning
Provincial
Level 




Strategic Planning Land Use Planning
Comprehensive Plans
1 Master Plans (period of 20 years) Thematic Planning
Short-Term Construction Plans Urban Renewal 
Plans
Real-Estate 
Planning2 Sub-regional Plans Special Construction Plans
3 District Plans (Cluster Plans)
4 Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze)
5 Detailed Blueprints Detailed Construction Plan
Urban Design Guidance
Table 7.6 Shenzhen Planning System 
Source: Shenzhen government: http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/. Constructed by author.
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§ 7.2.3 Planning Execution and Key Elements 
According to the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality, the urban 
planning system of Shenzhen is centered on the Statutory Graphic Standard 
(Fadingtuze), and defined by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) through 
local legislation. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is a decision-making 
board whose power lies mainly in the final review and approval of important regulatory 
plans in accordance with accepted statutes. This separates the acts of decision 
making and management in urban planning; it also makes the Urban Planning Board 
of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) a legal organization affiliated with governmental authority as 
well as a decision-making organization authorized by the people’s congress as an 
independent administrative entity. The major control of urban planning and urban-
growth development occurs at the stage of regulatory plans and the final control 
and management of construction projects. Therefore, the creation of the Statutory 
Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and the establishment of the Urban Planning Board 
of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) played a crucial role in planning implementation to transfer 
statutory technical planning regulations to the actual execution of spatial construction. 
The following elaborates upon their respective functions and characteristics.
Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) 
Although setting up this type of commission has not been the privilege solely of 
Shenzhen238 in Chinese history, the role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen 
(UPBSZ) is unique.
In general, the different types of urban planning boards in China are categorized 
according to the degree of support for local legislation and the decision-making 
authority in regulatory urban planning (Guo Sujun 2009; Li Kanjen 2008):
• Consultative and coordinating organization. This kind of urban planning board is 
common in China. Its major role is to provide advice on major urban planning and 
construction projects; however, as non-legal organization, its decisions are not 
incorporated into the governmental administrative process.
238 In China today, almost all the provincial capital cities and some prefecture-level cities have set up urban 
planning boards of various structures and functions. 
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• Legal review and approval organization. As its work is explicitly included in 
governmental administration processes, all its decisions have considerable 
influence in governmental decision-making; however, the final power to approve 
regulatory planning belongs to the municipal government and its urban planning 
departments.
• Legal decision-making organization. Besides its legal role of accessing and 
approving plans, this kind of urban planning board is established according to local 
legislation. It produces governmental decisions, rather than consultative opinions, 
that must be implemented obligatorily, which means it has the power to make the 
final decision to approve or override plans239. However, there still remains confusion 
over its nature. 
To quote Chapter 2 of the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality240: 
The Municipal Government shall establish an Urban Planning Board of 
Shenzhen (UPBSZ). The primary duties of this Board shall be as follows: 
examining the drafts of a citywide overall plan, sub-regional plans, and district 
plans; examining the selected locations of major projects that have not been 
approved and are still under consideration by city planning; assigning a task 
to make an annual statutory graphic standard; examining and approving a 
statutory graphic standard, and supervising its implementation; examining 
and approving special plans; fulfilling other duties authorized by the municipal 
government.
The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) consists of 29 members, including 
both civil and non-civil servants. The number of civil servants among them shall not be 
more than 14241 and non-civil servant members include experts and the public.
239 This type has more the characteristics related to the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ).
240 Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality. Available at http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/
yingyu_246857.html. 
241 The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall have posts of chairpersons held by the mayor of 
Shenzhen; the executive vice mayor; the vice mayor in charge of urban construction (vice-chairman); the 
administrator of each district; and representatives from municipal departments, including economy and trade, 
culture, education, sanitation, agriculture, and forestry and urban construction. http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/
jgzn/201105/t20110506_63998.html. 
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The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was established based on the 
promotion of decentralization, since the new demands of a market-oriented 
mechanism required a change to incorporate bottom-up processes. The role of urban 
planning jurisdiction is seen not only as an administrative and political endeavor, 
but also as a technical, social, economic, cultural, and legal embodiment. Decision-
making should include officials, but also entrepreneurs, experts, and citizens. In this 
framework, legal access to the planning decision-making process is, importantly, open 
to the public.
The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is a legal body condoned by the 
people’s congress. Thus, its authority is also endowed by the people’s congress. This 
empowers the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) to become a legal deputy of 
the municipal government to make decisions regarding urban planning affairs as well 
as to provide a platform for experts and citizens to participate in a decision-making 
processes. Besides, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was authorized 
as a decision-making body as part of the implementation of the Statutory Graphic 
Standard (Fadingtuze), which makes it an intermediary in the transfer of power 
between the municipal government and the municipal people’s congress. The approval 
process is distributed among three committees: the Development Strategy Committee, 
the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) Committee, and the Architecture and 
Environmental Art Committee (Guo Sujun 2009).
Although the pioneering role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is 
to promote democratization and expanded legislation in urban planning decision-
making, this advanced local initiative is on many levels contradictory. Regarding 
the legal power of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) in the decision-
making process, because political reform does not yet move forward equally at the 
central level, attempts to endow the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) 
with the power to review and approve Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) can 
be accomplished only within the framework of local legislation. Second, the unclear 
role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) results from the fact that 
while the power of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is granted by the 
People’s Congress of Shenzhen, it is actually organized by the Shenzhen Municipal 
Government, most of whose members are civil servants. In addition, the nature of 
the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) as either a legal organization or a 
governmental authority is vaguely defined; financially, it is not independent from 
the governmental administrative system but nevertheless it acts as an independent 
decision-making administrative entity. This conflict makes its identity rather confused. 
However, because of the socialist market economy and the centrally controlled political 
environment, such a contradiction is not surprising.
This contradictory relationship reflects the tension between economic reform and 
the Chinese political system. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ), in 
i
 339 Planning for the Reality
the attempt to legislate urban planning, will doubtless be affected by factors such as 
increased public participation, the development of non-governmental organizations, 
and the changing role of the government itself. At the frontier of the reform practice, 
such social institutions will need a long, gradual evolution. So far, the Urban Planning 
Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) and the local planning ordinance can be implemented only 
in regulatory planning supported by local legislation, so the question remains to what 
extent China’s political reform will continue to support such local legislation initiatives.
Regarding planning implementation, the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen 
Municipality and the legal framework of Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) play 
an important and generally accepted role in regulating planning implementation in 
local urban planning practice.
As the pioneer urban planning board in China, it was inevitable for the Urban Planning 
Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) to initially face challenges, but the inherent Shenzhen 
spirit always allows for improvement. In 2009, the recently revised Urban Planning 
Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality was specified following the spirit of new Urban 
and Rural Laws as well as the recent administrative reform based on the Institutional 
Reform Program242. In the revision of the ordinance, the emphasis on the separation 
of “plan examining and approving” and “urban planning management” is further 
clarified.
Within this framework, the new mega Urban Planning, Land, and Resources 
Commission (UPLRC) of Shenzhen Municipality, as the Shenzhen Municipal People’s 
Government’s administrative department of city planning, is responsible for citywide 
urban planning and construction management, including formulating plans, 
implementing plans, and approving construction projects. The Urban Planning Board 
of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is responsible for examining and approving the drafts of plans.
In addition, under the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC), the 
Shenzhen Urban Planning and Development Research Center is the first statutory body 
to meet the needs of the urban planning work in Shenzhen City. Based on performance 
of specific public functions as part of the market-driven management, its main 
functions include commitment to formulating the strategy of urban development in 
Shenzhen, overall urban planning, land use planning, zoning, statutory plans, special 
242 Shenzhen Shi Ren Min Zheng Fu Ji Gou Gai Ge Fang An (simplified Chinese: 深圳市人民政府机构改革方案; 
traditional Chinese: 深圳市人民政府機構改革方案). 
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plans, and providing technology, project and land management in urban planning.243 
This means that, within the commission, one major governmental agency is authorized 
to prepare draft plans and regulations for the entire city, and other departments are 
responsible for management and administrative work.
“Urban planning examination and approval” and “urban planning management” are 
integrated within the framework of four administrative procedures: presenting to the 
public for opinions, examining, approving, and public notice through the media. 
The primary duty of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is divided into two 
levels: examining and approving. 1) Examining. The Board is authorized to examine 
all the plans (including master plan, short-term plans and district plans, Statutory 
Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and detailed blueprints) prepared by the municipal 
government. 2) Approving. The legal power to approve is limited to the special plans, 
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and detailed blueprints. The legal power to 
approve master plans, sub-regional plans, and district plans is still held by the People’s 
Congress and its standing committee, based on urban and rural law.
For example, the municipal government shall organize the formulation of a master 
plan. Before examining the draft of the master plan, the Urban Planning Board of 
Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall exhibit its contents to the general public for at least 30 days 
and solicit suggestions from various circles and the public. The Urban Planning Board 
of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall seek and consider all types of opinions, negotiate with 
various departments that have differing opinions on the draft plans, and arbitrate the 
various appeals of the public. After the examination by the Urban Planning Board of 
Shenzhen (UPBSZ), the master plan shall be submitted by the municipal government 
to the municipal people’s congress or its standing committee for examination and 
approval, and be reported to the state council after the Guangdong Provincial People’s 
Government has checked and approved the plan. After the state council’s approval of 
the master plan, the municipal government shall make its summary public through a 
notice to the media of the city within 30 days.
Strategic plans are examined and approved by the municipal people’s congress or 
its standing committee. While short-term plans and district plans are examined 
by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) and approved by the municipal 
243 The Shenzhen Urban Planning and Development Research Center is a think tank that, according its 
characteristics, belongs to the official policy research institutes. Under Chinese law, an official policy research 
institute is regarded as a “government agency.” See Chapter 6. 
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government, only short-term plans that are part of the master plan need to be filed by 
the responsible department of the state council.
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) provides technical standards for urban design 
and detailed blueprint plans. The process is similar to that of the master plan; the only 
difference is that final approval is authorized by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen 
(UPBSZ). Based on the planning implementation process, we can see that, even though 
they are constrained by the lack of clarity of political reform regarding to what extent 
local authority can be enhanced, Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) has much 
stronger legal force in Shenzhen to direct the actual spatial construction related to land 
use for construction projects. The statutory planning mechanism, created based on 
the demands of the Shenzhen Municipal Government’s daily practice, is sometimes 
regarded as too advanced in China (Table 7.7).
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Table 7.7 Types and features of Planning Committees in China and abroad 
Source: Guo Sujun (2009: 9).
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Planning and Management of Land Use for Construction
The last phase of planning implementation is related to the management of land use 
for construction projects. Since land is no longer distributed through a state-controlled 
mechanism, establishing the management of construction projects is one of the 
most important ways for the local government to control the final spatial realization. 
According to Urban and Rural Planning Law, “Proposal for Site Choice”, “Land Use 
Planning Permit”, and “Construction Project Planning Permit” are basic administrative 
instruments used by the local government to manage individual land lots.244 In 
Shenzhen, this is divided into two steps: planning and management of land use for 
construction, and management of planned construction.
In order to enhance the efficiency, only certain types of construction projects need to 
submit a proposal for site choice for approval245. The procedure for obtaining a Land 
Use Planning Permit differs depending on how the right to use a public land was 
obtained. When obtaining the right to use a public land by auction bidding, the unit 
undertaking construction shall bring a Land Use Release Contract to get a Land Use 
Planning Permit; when by agreement, a unit undertaking construction shall apply to 
the city planning department or the representative offices for a Land Use Planning 
Permit before signing a Land Use Release Contract. The city planning department or 
the representative offices shall rely on city planning in the related area to examine and 
approve the design targets for planned construction land use, set the city planning 
design requirements, and issue a Land Use Planning Permit.246
Obtaining a Land Use Planning Permit and Land Use Release Contract is an important 
step in completing land acquisition. Once the use of the land is acquired, building 
can begin.
244 See Chapter 6.3.2. 
245 See Urban and Rural Planning Law of PRC, Article 40. Available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/
LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21899292.htm.
246 Within 90 days after obtaining a land use planning permit, if a unit undertaking construction has neither been 
able to sign a land use release contract nor applied for an extension, the land use planning permit automatically 
becomes invalid. 
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The construction referred to in the ordinance includes building works and municipal 
works. The building works comprise buildings and structures not covered by municipal 
works.247 Municipal works refer to public utility facilities within city planning areas. Any 
new construction, extended construction, and reconstruction of building works and 
municipal works within the city-planning region shall obtain a Construction Project 
Planning Permit.
The procedure to apply for a Construction Project Planning Permit shall be as follows. 1) 
An applicant shall bring the application, the document of approval of the construction 
investment, the Land Use Release Contract or the land use plan, the Land Use 
Planning Permit, and the statement of the related responsible specialized department 
evaluating the design plan and submit the design plan to the city planning department 
or the representative offices. Only upon approval of the abovementioned documents 
may preliminary design be started. 2) Preliminary designs shall be approved by the city 
planning department or the representative offices before the construction drawings 
can be started. 3) Upon approval of the first and second steps, a Construction Project 
Planning Permit can be issued. To avoid the situation in which land for construction 
projects is leased but construction is not completed on time, if construction has not 
been started by one year after obtaining the Construction Project Planning Permit, the 
permit automatically becomes invalid.
Based on the spirit of the Urban and Rural Planning Law, after a construction project is 
completed a unit or an individual undertaking construction shall bring a surveying and 
mapping report of the completed construction to the original department in charge 
of examination and approval and apply for check and acceptance. In this framework, 
Shenzhen introduced the Certificate for Check and Acceptance According to Planning. 
Without check and acceptance or with a conclusion of failure to meet the standard, 
the constructed building shall not be issued a certificate for check and acceptance 
according to planning and, as a result, also cannot be registered for real estate 
ownership or put into use.
There are three main stages during this process in which the urban planning 
department in charge of urban development can intervene in the design of proposed 
projects: 1) before the formal application takes place, the city planning department 
or the representative offices express their preferences; 2) when issuing the Proposal 
247 Municipal works comprise roads, bridges, tunnels, rails, transit facilities, urban water supply, drainages works, 
flood-control facilities, electricity supply, lighting installations, postal and telecommunication services, cable 
TV, associated gas, pipelines and facilities of heating power, environmental works, sanitary facilities and other 
public utility facilities within the city planning region. 
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for Site Choice, the city planning department or the representative offices draw the 
design requirements from the relevant statutory graphic plan or urban design plan 
and, based on the submitted initial site design plan, formulate the planning and design 
conditions; and 3) when issuing the Land Use Planning Permit, the representative 
offices express detailed design requirements before the Construction Project Planning 
Permit is issued.
In the case of Shenzhen, the whole statutory urban planning system and the approval 
rights of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) have brought about a 
relatively transparent planning process. However, when facing a pro-growth urban 
development strategy, the urban design-control model does not always reach its full 
potential goal (Deng Zhaohua 2009).
First, the sequential design control procedure requires two-way negotiations between 
the developers and the local government, which means that, at each of these stages, 
the developer can negotiate the requirements with the city planning department or the 
representative offices. Therefore, the officials and planners are obliged and challenged 
to provide good-quality planning concepts and norms. The dilemma at this stage of 
control is often the extent to which compromises between the local government and 
the dominant developers will be made. For example, if market forces are weak and the 
local government has a strong desire to attract investors, it may compromise and allow 
developers more freedom to build more like what they want.
Second, the evolutional urban development of Shenzhen has wrought an explosion in 
its population and economic indexes in a short time and, with it, the changes in local 
application of urban planning on a daily basis in order to resolve conflicts between 
state-led and market-driven policy. The city’s transformation from a manufacturing 
zone to a regional nexus, from homogeneous to diversified, and from an industrial zone 
to an information-based society has been enlightening and inspiring. It demonstrates 
that cities like Shenzhen in contemporary China are becoming multi-dimensionally 
interdependent. Planning and building a city are highly challenging issues to city 
managers, designers, and planners, particularly in the last stage of the control process 
and the design outcome.
Third, diverse urban and social issues that have emerged in the transitional urban 
development of Shenzhen in the past few decades reflect the microcosm of transitional 
planning culture that contemporary China is gradually becoming. When comparing 
Shenzhen with typical Chinese socialist cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, or the 
other transitional cities in Eastern Europe and western capitalist cities, a new type of 
transitional city in contemporary China has risen.
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Fourth, no matter how, the mechanism that China is applying cannot be easily defined 
based on any other mode of any country, even though the globalization of its economy 
pressured the Chinese government to transform its function and meet international 
standards of law-base framework. The specialty of Chinese reform is that some of the 
political factors in China’s administrative reform were carefully avoided, Debates arise 
on whether this is the beginning of a new stage of Communist ideology (Zou Keyuan 
2006: 23) like the quotation from the Asia Times states (Wang 2009): 
In China, historically and at present, a government department is normally 
the policymaker, executor and supervisor in its jurisdiction. But some say this 
is a major cause of red tape, abuse of power and a lack of transparency and 
oversight. From this perspective, any reform that separates administrative 
powers would bring fundamental changes to the system of government—but 
it is by no means expected to lead to democratization.
I argure we would need to face the emerging term with “China’s soft-landing”. The 
concept of democratization that is defined by the Western needs to be (re-) interpreted 
into the Chinese context of “democratization with Chinese characteristics”. A scenario 
that China continues to be run by an one-party regime that refuse open the political 
dissent, and yet continues to interwine with the rest of the world in terms of economic 
ties. It is still too early to say whether Shenzhen’s spirit and speed create a new 
possibility for political reform in China. Nevertheless Shenzhen’s innovative spirit can 
certainly inspire more reformists on all round level. The mode of further political reform 
in China is uncertain; for sure it is becoming an indispensable issue that China has to 
face in the near future.
In the next chapter, in order to deepen the understanding of the planning challenges 
and to confront the implementation of planning in practice, three thematic projects are 
chosen to illustrate in which way the production of social space has been incorporated 
or constrained by the planning interventions.
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8 The Production of Space beyond 
Planning
The research of the Chapters 6 and 7 show that Chinese planning practice is 
theoretically a state-led, top-down system, which means the spatial appropriation 
follows the logic of the planned intervention. This precondition defines the political 
background in which the three projects are embedded and introduced. 
In this chapter, the inquiry takes one step further to explore under the guidance of a 
relative successful Shenzhen planning spirit, to what extent is socio-spatial interaction 
integrated in the process of Shenzhen’s urban development? What spatial meaning in 
the contemporary Chinese society can be retrieved or recognized? 
To acknowledge Castell’s (2005: 46) advocacy, “Spatial transformation must be 
understood in the broader context of social transformation: Space does not reflect 
society, it expresses it”. Once the spatial appropriation begins to proceed, socio-spatial 
interaction also begins to evolve. 
The socio-spatial interaction involves actors with various interests who are 
appropriating space simultaneously. Spatial transformation has a specific introverted 
mode of changing process that involves the interaction of both the participants/actors 
individually and collectively and their related re-creation of space (of places and flows) 
simultaneously and dynamically. How this integration is recognized in Chinese spatial 
appropriation? 
§ 8.1 The Criteria of Selection of the three Projects
In this chapter, three thematic projects were chosen to show the range from the top-
down to the bottom-up initiatives with regard to their effects on planning (design 
control) and design outcome. In particular, they examine to what extent the production 
of space is formulated within the planning domain. They demonstrate a common 
characteristic of how the top-down planning ideology is asked to adjust, coordinate, 
and compromise on the execution level in accordance with emerging bottom-up 
conditions.
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 Unexpected challenges emerging from bottom-up conditions are erroneously regarded 
as limiting the capacity of the planning approach. In the case of Shenzhen, they often 
stimulate new and innovative ideas. The emerging demands during the development 
of these three projects in particular have provoked heated discussions regarding new 
urbanization in China. They have triggered new applications of urban policy and design 
approaches that would not have been applied nationwide if not for the Shenzhen’s 
model, where daily practice provided an opportunity to test the market. Therefore, the 
cases are thematically representative for crucial phenomena that have emerged in 
contemporary Chinese urban development. Indeed, for a city like Shenzhen, with such 
a short history, urban observation requires a certain passage of time, during which the 
execution and completion of projects can be assessed. This consideration is also one of 
the criteria for selection.
Let’s recall the primary theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.
(Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations (…) “space” 
is the production of society; it is the result of social production (…) Therefore, 
while “space” is produced, the society and the space begin to influence each 
other. In other words, space also continually reproduces society. The link 
between space and society (…) leads us to the understanding that “space” is 
the product of any activities that involve the economic and technical realms 
of the society, while at the same time also dwelling in the realm of politics. 
Thus, it is never a dead end; it is more akin to a dynamic producing and re-
producing process (…) Therefore, (social) “space,” as the (physical and virtual) 
body of society, is asked to respond permanently, within its own system, to the 
requirements of societal changes248. 
In the following three projects, socio-spatial interaction is the key focus underpinning 
the findings. At the same time, they demonstrate the way in which urban planning, 
in the framework of the Chinese political environment, has been (re-)modified. A 
question common to these three projects arises as to whether Chinese planning 
modification follows the principal that is elaborated in Chapter 2: The planning 
mechanism cannot be guaranteed only by the political mandate but also relies on 
justice and public moral mentalities of public consensus even under the control of a 
top-down authority like China.
248 See Chapter 2.3.1.
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The discussions of these three projects illustrate the research question of how Chinese 
planning culture dwells in the political-socio-spatial domain primarily guided by the 
planning mechanism moving between the top-down intervention and the bottom-up 
initiative while the public and private initiatives are equally important. 
The first project is selected based on the high degree of planned intervention and lesser 
degree of bottom-up initiative. It is the central district of Futian, the planned Central 
Business District (CBD) of Shenzhen. The second project, the OCT-Loft, is selected 
based on both its high level of planned intervention with innovative participation of a 
diversity of actors, including the general public, designers, planners, and governmental 
officials. The third one is selected because of the high level of bottom-up initiation 
and later strong focus on the discussion of the land reform system and urban renewal 
challenges regarding the phenomenon of Urban Villages.
§ 8.2 Central District of Futian
In the 1980s, the 53-story International Trade Building, together with old Shenzhen 
Town and Shekou industrial zone, let the world know that China was opening its doors 
to foreign investors and defined a preliminary commercial district. In the 1990s, the 
385-meter-tall Diwang Plaza and its surrounding high-rise groups symbolized the 
initial success of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)’s economy and the 
shift of its economic structure from an industry-led export city to the creation of an 
international city. Entering the new millennium, the citizens and planners of Shenzhen 
anticipated that the city’s ambitious superior infrastructure and environment would 
continue to attract international investors. With this perspective, the city needed a 
new approach to city branding: new marketing strategies to fit its future image, while 
urban features and forms had to be built in order to accommodate the comprehensive 
demands of future urban life and functioning. The city planners facing this challenge 
also faced the question: What morphology can Shenzhen use to instantiate the 
international city to anchor its planned functions now that the market system and land 
reform are already fairly mature?
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§ 8.2.1 CBD, Foreign Concept and Local Implementation 
Futian CBD and the city’s central axis were originally proposed in the comprehensive 
plan in 1986 and the area is characterized by the most in-depth and comprehensive 
planning study in Shenzhen. After 20 years of planning study and development, 
most of the buildings in the central district are completed. Now the area is centered 
on the citizen center and surrounded by city-level cultural facilities, convention and 
exhibition centers, commercial and office buildings. The whole area suggests a new 
type of Chinese city and bypasses the socialist model by embracing globalization and 
influences from Western cities (Xue et al. 2011). The design and development of 
Shenzhen Futian CBD reveals how a Chinese city is learning to practice urban design on 
a broader scale. Shenzhen is the first city in China in which the statutory status of urban 
design is made through local planning legislation (Hao Tian 2004; Deng Zhaohua 
2009).
The concept of the CBD has been widely implemented in other countries; it is not 
original to Chinese tradition. Historically, in the imperial period, the central area of the 
city served mainly political purposes. Later, in socialist society, urban development 
was guided based on state-controlled resource allocation. After the Opium War at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, however, modern planning concepts introduced 
by Western planners and Western-trained Chinese specialists were seen in China. 
But because of national and international conflicts and the breakout of the civil war, 
the implementation of modern planning concepts was limited249. Regarding CBDs 
in capitalist cities, theoretical perspectives tend to observe the following natural 
characteristics: a CBD is defined by its centrality, accessibility, and concentration of 
top-end businesses within a city; a CBD commands the highest land value and rent in 
an urban settlement, and intensification of land use and development density is more 
extreme in a CBD than in other parts of the city; the CBD dominates other areas in 
terms of its physical, economic, and symbolic significance; and competition of all sorts 
is likely to be the keenest within a CBD (Tang Bo et al. 2011).
In the early stages, because of local economic development conditions and a planning 
system still under construction, although the concept of the new Futian CBD had been 
brought up and the site of the planned area selected and defined in the Master Plan 
of 1986, design practice and control were still in a learning stage. During that same 
period, the concept of the CBD was introduced and became very popular in China. One 
249 See the background introduction of Chapter 4. 
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of the well-known cases is Pudong, Shanghai250 (Xue et al. 2011). However, unlike 
typical CBDs in capitalist societies, socialist cities have distinctive political factors that 
distinguish them from capitalist societies: the property rights system and the role of 
the state.
The Chinese Party-led state has reformed the economic system, but politically it 
remains unchanged; it privatizes urban land by pay-to-use policy but retains partial 
government allocation and decentralizes decision-making power to the local level but 
retains strong central control of political appointments.
In general, the concept of CDB that was introduced in Shenzhen emerged gradually, 
with Shenzhen’s municipal government following a learning curve through the 
evolution of its urban development by applying foreign concepts in combination with 
local legitimacy of implementation.
Before 1986, the city’s early objectives and strategies did not diverge much from the 
other free zones, although it was a comprehensive economic development zone of 
considerable size. The city was originally thought of as an export-processing zone, 
where multinational capital could be attracted into Joint Ventures (JVs) with large 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). In the early creation phase the planning of Shenzhen 
focused on improving the investment environment: meeting the needs of growth 
and giving priority to industrial projects. This reveals why, from the very beginning, 
Shenzhen paid a lot of attention to traffic systems, infrastructure investment, and the 
improvement of living circumstances for investors. However, while the government’s 
priority for urban development was infrastructure construction to draw foreign 
investment, urban design was neglected.
250 See Xue et al, (2011: 211).  
“The development of Pudong originated in Lujiazui. In the late 1980s the general idea for a CBD in Lujiazui 
came into being. On 18 April 1990, the Premier of the State Council Li Peng announced the decision to 
develop Pudong, Lujiazui Financial District, thereby prioritizing the project for its task force teams. In 1992 
an international urban design competition was held by the Preparatory Committee of Pudong New District, 
which was assigned by the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). Several international architectural firms 
were invited to submit proposals for the design consultancy, including Richard Rogers from the UK, Dominique 
Perrault from France, Toyo Ito from Japan and Massimiliano Fuksas from Italy, jointly with the Shanghai Urban 
Planning and Design Institute (SUPDI). The general visions stemming from the competition entries gave rise 
to thoughts on the development of Pudong’s physical form. These ideas were then linked to the prevailing 
economic and political climate, which together formed a viable environment for development. The impact of 
globalization and the subsequent positive reaction from China to the ideas adopted from Western cities, led to 
their inclusion in the Pudong development. The ideas were totally new to China and therefore unique when used 
in the physical planning process in Pudong.” 
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The 1982 Master Plan apparently accelerated road construction, with 25 streets in 
progress simultaneously in one year. By 1985, 63 streets, totaling 90 km, were done. 
The comprehensive plan of 1982 vaguely pegged Futian as the city’s new commercial 
business district, but the district’s fleshing out was carried out really only after 1996.
 In the 1980s, the original city center was in Luohu District, located next to the 
Shenzhen-Hong Kong customs checkpoint. As the city’s industrial sector continuously 
grew, a new demand for industrial services emerged. With the municipality’s strategy 
to promote real estate development and to establish a new urban image to attract more 
domestic investment, the Futian CBD was designated in early 1986, based on the Master 
Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986–2000. Futian CBD would be 
developed with an expectation of high environmental quality (Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
Figure 8.1 The location of Futian Central Business District (CBD) 
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 13).
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Figure 8.2 Topographic map of Futian Central District in 1984  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 12).
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Shenzhen would use the new Futian CBD to help the city transform to a regional 
financial, trade, and information center over the next 30 to 40 years. The total area of 
the CBD is 4.2 km2; it is bounded by Lianhua Mountain (140 m high) to the north; Bijia 
Mountain to the east; Mangrove Eco Protection District to the west; and Shenzhen Bay 
and Yuanlang of Hong Kong to the south, with a north-south visual and spatial axis 
perpendicular to east-west-running Shennan Boulevard.
In the early period, many offices and experts have participated in the central district 
planning study and have provided various schemes. The broader layout and street 
system of the Futian CBD was mainly decided before 1994 by a few conceptual master 
plans and transport studies, such as Futian District Plan (Cluster Plan) and the traffic 
system design plan of 1989, which was drafted in 1988 by Shenzhen Urban Planning 
and Design Institute (Figure 8.3).
Figure 8.3 Futian District Plan 1988 
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute.
In 1989, the Urban Planning Act was enacted. For the first time, a comprehensive 
urban planning system was set up by law in two tiers. Developing Shenzhen into a 
modern international city was first brought up in the report “Shenzhen Development 
Strategy in 1989” by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Bureau and 
the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute. To facilitate these aims, Shenzhen 
was taking progressive approaches to the practice of urban design. According to the 
city’s new goals, the entire area was intended to set new standards for urban planning. 
One of the first scratch areas would be built based on the strict application of the new 
urban planning approach.
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In the same year, four design institutes were invited to present conceptual schemes 
for the whole area: Huayi Design Consultant from Hong Kong, PACT International 
Consultancy from Singapore, and two Chinese institutes: the Shenzhen Urban Planning 
and Design Institute and the Shenzhen Branch of the Architectural Design and 
Research Institute of Tongji University. Following the main layout of the master plan 
and district plan, the Chinese traditional urban layout was applied in combination with 
the concept of Feng Shui.
Based on these four conceptual schemes, in 1991 a new master plan was proposed 
by the joint venture between the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute and 
the Shenzhen Branch of the Architectural Design and Research Institute of Tongji 
University. The whole area was divided into 25 land parcels following the main axes 
of south-north and east-west. The clusters of buildings comprised an inner circle 
of commercial functions and an outer circle of mixed residential and commercial 
functions. The whole area was divided into a northern and a southern part. The 
northern area was used for public facilities and the southern area for business and 
commercial purposes. Along the two axes, large green areas were reserved for leisure.
Until then, all of the conceptual proposals actually tried to bridge the gap between 
the district plan and the detailed plan. They had a common purpose: to explore an 
appropriate urban design practice and prepare for the establishment of the statutory 
graphic plan.
In 1992, the Control Detailed Plan of Futian District was created by the Shenzhen 
Urban Planning and Design Institute. Furthermore, in 1993 the urban infrastructure 
design was completed by a joint venture between the Shenzhen Urban Planning and 
Design Institute, the Shenzhen Branch of Wuhan Steel and Iron Design Institute, and 
the Beijing Urban Infrastructure Design Institute251. The design adopted the proposal 
for high-density development, and the construction of various major and secondary 
streets began. Even though more detailed control of each parcel had been specified 
(for example, the original size of each block was too large, so greenery areas had 
been created in order to provide a more human scale in each block), the responsible 
department of urban planning and its planners were aware of the lack of urban design 
guidance at the level of the buildings that could also lead to a design outcome that was 
out of control.
251 Wuhan Iron and Steel (group) Corp. is one of the biggest State-own enterprises (SOEs) in China which was 
funded in 1955, and the Wuhan Iron and Steel Design Institute is later founded in 1966 as a kind of think tanks. 
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In 1994, based on the detailed plan, the urban design for Futian district was proposed 
by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute. As a result, the idea gradually 
emerged to introduce an “urban design” approach into the development of the Futian 
CBD. At the end of 1995, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen suggested that 
international design consultations should be undertaken for the important parts of the 
Central District in order to acquire the best plans (Figure 8.4).
Figure 8.4 Urban design study of Futian Central District 1995  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 170-171).
§ 8.2.2 International Competition for Conceptual Design
Not only the concept of CBD was newly introduced from western countries, 
international consultancy was also a new experience in urban development. Today 
international design consultation is becoming a common strategy to generate 
broader conceptual ideas in China, but at that time it was a whole new experience 
for the planners and the local government. During the mid-1990s, however, market-
oriented real estate that corresponded to the established statutory planning system 
in Shenzhen was practiced more maturely in the field of urban development. The 
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organization of such an event and the preparation of necessary materials and criteria 
for the competition were not part of the normal daily administrative work of the 
planning department and its planners, but because CBD development was strongly tied 
to the future development of the city, the local government was eager to learn from 
foreign experience. During the speedy urban development in China in the mid-1990s, 
Shenzhen had gradually lost its superior position, so city branding was embraced as a 
new strategy to boost local economic development.
Instead of continually building high, without a systematic spatial structure 
underpinning the future vision, the approach Shenzhen’s municipal government took 
was to put more effort into making Shenzhen a city of environmental friendliness and 
efficient urban functioning by building a large-scale cultural and urban landscape 
infrastructure, including eco-parks, libraries, cultural centers, concert halls, and 
theaters as well as high-rise office towers. Eco-environment balanced by cultural 
facilities in a combination of high technology and informational networks would be the 
urban sectors emphasized.
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Figure 8.5 Aerial photo of the Futian Central District in 1996  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 14).
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In 1996, an international urban design consultation for the Futian CBD core area was 
held. An international jury was set up, and four design firms, from America, France, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong, were invited to present their proposals. The concept of John 
Lee/Michael Timchula Architects, from the United States, was selected as the winning 
scheme. It featured a continuous, undulating central public park extending along the 
north-south axis and going through the major artery, Shennan Boulevard. The design 
distinctively interprets the significance of the natural environment by maintaining open 
space in the central axis and around Lianhua Mountain (Figure 8.5). Following this 
concept, the new city hall, one of the landmark buildings, was commissioned to John 
Lee/Michael Timchula Architects, with a 200,000 ft2 curved roof atop of the center 
that represents the “gate” image on the central axis. The symmetrical curved roof was 
inspired by the wings of an eagle, a symbol of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
(Figure 8.6).
(a) (b)
Figure 8.6 Shenzhen CBD Urban Design of 1996 
Source: (a) and (c) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19 and127), (b) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 127).
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(c)
Figure 8.6 Shenzhen CBD Urban Design of 1996 
Source: (a) and (c) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19 and127), (b) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 127).
Overall this scheme followed the arrangement of a traditional Chinese urban layout, 
such as Beijing’s Forbidden City, in combination with the grand attitude of the new 
Chinese socialist image. Symbolically, the orientation of the north-south axis from the 
highest point of Lianhua Mountain to Hong Kong was dedicated to a future connection 
to Hong Kong. High-rise buildings rose symmetrically alongside the north-south axis. 
The area was divided into the south area of Shennan Boulevard, an art and cultural 
center, and the north area for administrative functions.
The international consultation of 1996 provided the overall scheme of urban design, 
including further research on transportation and the subway; design of core areas, 
the commercial park, and cultural facilities; and the emerging study of urban renewal. 
Within this framework, design competitions in the fields of urban design, architecture, 
landscape, and urban regeneration were organized regularly by the Planning Bureau in 
Shenzhen.
In 1997, Kisho Kurokawa Architects, from Japan, was invited to plan the central axis 
public space system, the major public open space of the Futian CBD, and the greenbelt 
backbone. Kisho Kurokawa proposed his Eco-Media City Project Plan, which was 
based on his symbiosis theory and avant-garde ideas. He proposed a total area of 174 
hectares with an open space 3 km in length and the new city hall at its center. Two 
traversing layers constitute the central axis, with the upper layer composed of man-
made turf supporting a park. The facilities in the huge second layer of the city hall 
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would serve multiple functions, such as city offices, a business support center, an art 
gallery, a shopping mall, and so forth.
The concept is based on Confucius’s Analects, “Lun Yu252,” in traditional Chinese 
literature. Four parks followed the Confucian advocacy of “poetry” using the method of 
musical composition as an urban score (Tian Hao 2005: 115)
Kisho Kurokawa’s clear intention was to incorporate ancient Chinese philosophy into 
the modern urban structure and to use the axes as an incubator for the creation of an 
ecological environment. Some eco-technologies were incorporated into this park, such 
as a rainwater collection system on the huge roof of the main building, which would 
be used for toilets in nearby commercial and office spaces; purification of exhaust gas 
from parking lots; and the installation of solar and wind energy. Whether or not the 
Kisho Kurokawa’s main concept was drawn from the ancient Chinese philosophy of 
nature and landscape, the integration of ancient Chinese elements into the modern 
function of urban features was widely praised for its political appeal (Figure 8.7).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8.7 Central axis public space system of Futian Central District 1997 
Source: (a) and (b) Kisho Kurokawa Architects (Japan); (C) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 17).
The Shenzhen Cultural Center, consisting of a central library and a concert hall, 
was designed by the famous Japanese architect, Arata Isozaki, following the central 
axis scheme. These two buildings express Shenzhen’s modern cultural perspective. 
252 Lun Yu or Analects of Confucius (simplified Chinese: 论语; traditional Chinese: 論語).
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The Shenzhen Central Library is another one of the large modern cultural facilities 
looking towards the information era that has been invested in by Shenzhen municipal 
government. Covering an area of 2.96 hectares, with a total construction area of 
35,000 square meters, the scale and scope are enormous. The library will be able to 
serve 8,000 visiting readers at a time and circulate 50,000 volumes per day after it is 
completed.
In 1995 Shenzhen began to draft the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen 
Municipality, enacted in 1998. Based on the ordinance, Shenzhen introduced the 
Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze). It enhanced the role of urban design within 
the urban planning system. At the same time, problems arose; because in the original 
layout of the master plan consideration was not given to neighborhood scale, each 
block parcel was divided into a giant parcels, and the lack of existing detailed city design 
guidelines resulted in almost every building attempting to claim its own prominence 
and maximize commercial return. This suggested that urban design control of building 
scale in individual blocks was urgently needed (Figure 8.8)
(a) (b)
Figure 8.8 Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) (1999) 
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19).
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As a result, in 1998 a detailed urban design guideline for the large urban blocks 22 
and 23 were commissioned to Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (SOM) (Figure 8.9). 
By skillfully modifying existing blocks and streets, their design changed the urban 
landscape, added value to the land, and provided a feasible guideline for building, with 
proportional characteristics, on each block and for the townscape. The concept was 
fully implemented in later years and strongly influenced later decision control practices. 
At the end of 1988, six government projects in the Futian CBD began. It marked 
the beginning of the implementation phase of Futian CBD planning and design. In 
addition, research into urban renewal of Gangsha village (an urban village), the only 
original village remaining in the central district, was also undertaken.
Figure 8.9 Urban Design for Block No. 22 and 23 
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 18).
In the coming few years, organizing international consultation became one of the 
regular activities of the local planning department. In 1999, another international 
consultation for the urban design, traffic, and underground space of the entire Futian 
CBD was carried out. Furthermore, the German design consultant Obermeyer Planen 
+ Beraten produced a comprehensive master plan for the entire Futian CBD with a 
more detailed sub-division of every urban block. The philosophy of this study showed a 
shifting emphasis in which rigorous design requirements for individual buildings had 
to incorporate the urban image as a whole and maintain its integrity. The master plan 
was claimed to reflect the character of a traditional Chinese city. The key principles were 
to introduce two rows of high-rise buildings along the north-south axis and a row of 
high-rise buildings along the east-west axis. The design concept was the application of 
the traditional nine-compartment Chinese chessboard. North-south high street walls, 
on which the image of “Waves of Dancing Dragons” was applied, defined the height 
of buildings along the central axis. Residences, less than 100 m high, were situated 
in the four corners and formed the urban feature of an ancient Chinese community 
surrounded by a fortress (Figure 8.10).
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(a) (b)
Figure 8.10 Obermeyer’s Remodification of Futian Central District 1999 
Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 129); (b) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19).
In 2000, the major task was to speed up the construction of the Futian CBD by optimizing 
all the urban planning schemes that had accumulated over the years, including the 
underground shopping street study, the water system feasibility study, the central plaza 
and the south axis detailed design, and the design of the blocks flanking the Futian CBD’s 
south axis, among others. Within this framework, the site for the Shenzhen Conference 
and Exhibition Center was relocated to the south end of the Futian CBD in order to both 
stimulate a positive impact on the site development and commercial investment and to 
further formalize the layout of the central axis (Wang Peng 2002).
From 2002 onward, further refinements and implementation of the Futian CBD, including 
more detailed studies to improve the central squares and the pedestrian system, were 
carried out. The statutory graphic plan was updated and s detailed blueprint study was 
continued as specified. All projects in the new Futian CBD were required to be subject 
to design competition, including architectural design and landscape design. Shenzhen 
was becoming the experimental lab for new design concepts and architectural projects. 
Architecture and urban design quality has been seen by the Shenzhen government as 
complementary to rigidly controlled master plans, which quickly become outdated.
While the international consultation in 1996 emphasized design control of core 
areas and key public projects, refinements of the Futian CBD master plan particularly 
emphasized expansion of urban design control areas to private projects in individual 
blocks. Thus, the link between the realization of the statutory plans as a legal planning 
scheme and the adjustment required from the development of the individual projects 
underscored the importance of innovative urban management (Figure 8.11).
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Figure 8.11 The future schema of Futian Central District made in 2002 
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 27).
i
 366 Between Flexibility and Reliability
For example, research of the China Phoenix Building by Deng Zhaogua (2009) 
shows how the traditional rigid zoning mechanism can be improved by pre-planning 
negotiations and how frequently revising the statutory plans with certain procedures 
can improve its flexibility. In order to strengthen the city’s image, in June 2001 the 
government signed a land contract with Phoenix TV, an internationally known Chinese 
TV broadcasting company. The 22,000 m2 site is located in the east end of the Futian 
CBD, next to the new city hall, facing south on the busiest arterial road—Shennan 
Boulevard. Because the location is outside the original core area of the Futian CBD, the 
site was not included in the Futian CBD core area international consultation; thus, clear 
building guidelines were lacking. The land contract allowed building up to 48,700 m2, 
with a floor area ratio (FAR) of 2.2 and building height of 90 m, but no floor space was 
allowed to be used commercially (Figure 8.12).
(a) (b)
Figure 8.12 Urban design study for Block 26  
Source: (a) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 27); (b) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM. 
Note: (a) Location of Block 26 (26-3 and 26-4), and (b) Site of Phoenix TV.
The land contract contained general conditions such as the building setback, locations 
for tower and square, green ratio, and the requirement for a design competition. 
Additionally, as a potential contribution to the public, it required the broadcasting 
square to be open to the public. Under the negotiation, Phoenix TV was willing to 
change the land contract by increasing the FAR if additional commercial space could be 
developed. The planning bureau was willing to consent to this request; however, under 
the regulation of the statutory plan of Shenzhen, the change had to wait for a formal 
amendment to the statutory graphic plan.
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The new Master Plan of 1999, created by the German design consultant Obermeyer 
Planen + Beraten, provided a chance to amend the Statutory Graphic Standard 
(Fadingtuze), adjusting the development on the Phoenix TV site to the preferred form, 
which could legitimize the proposed consent from the planning bureau. In order to 
enhance the skill and knowledge of negotiation with the developer on land release and 
planning control, in 2002 the planning bureau commissioned the China Academy of 
Urban Planning and Design (Shenzhen branch) to carry out an urban design study on 
those quarters.
The principles and parameters of the study had to be in line with the Obermeyer master 
plan, with regard to the requirements brought forward by the developer and from 
liaising with the Planning Bureau. In this detailed master plan, a chessboard street 
structure is defined, with smaller blocks, street walls are regulated, and open spaces 
are provided among other items. However, another condition appeared because the 
change in the block parcel size needed the support of the surrounding traffic system; 
as a result, the developer agreed to comply with the new design parameters in order 
to allow the planning bureau to implement the proposed design plan. Under the 
agreement to increase the floor area to 80,000 m2, the developers’ requirement, 
the plot size for Phoenix TV would be reduced. To legitimate the above urban design 
study, following a formal procedure, the CBD Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) 
was amended. In 2002, a Land Use Planning Permit was issued according to the 
parameters in the land contract and the government regained the plot to the north 
of the site, and in return, the developer was allowed to increase the total floor area to 
80,000 m2 (Figure 8.13)
(a) (b)
Figure 8.13 Re-modification of Block 26 
Source: Deng Zhaohua (2009: 128 and 130). 
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Note: (a) The site in CBD Statutory Map 1998. The site is bounded by Shennan 
Boulevard to its south and two access roads to its east and north. (b) Urban Design 
Study for Block 26. The study sub-divides the two large blocks into seven smaller plots 
containing some eight individual buildings.
In March 2004, a design competition was held following the design conditions from 
the study in combination with the preferred layout of the developer. The site was 
proposed to be occupied by three buildings, each with a maximum height of 100 m. A 
semi-public space was created between the three buildings that also made the whole 
site more permeable. In April 2004, the developer submitted the scheme for approval. 
With some minor amendments to the floor plans, the project was finally granted a 
construction-planning permit in September 2005 (Figure 8.14).
(a)
Figure 8.14 Illustrated images of Phoenix TV 
Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 131); (b) and (c) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM. 
Note: (a) Ground floor plan of the winning scheme, by UDS Architects; (b) Central axis of open space and (c) 3D 
model of the site.
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(b) (c)
Figure 8.14 Illustrated images of Phoenix TV 
Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 131); (b) and (c) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM. 
Note: (a) Ground floor plan of the winning scheme, by UDS Architects; (b) Central axis of open space and (c) 3D 
model of the site.
Architectural landscape and planning and urban design should be regarded as an 
integrated entity. The development of the Shenzhen Futian CBD and the design control 
of individual plots provide a positive insight into the ability of urban planning control 
and urban design control within the statutory system of Shenzhen to be adjustable and 
reliable at the same time.
The role of the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute as a think tank, liaising 
with parties with differing interests in order to generate the acceptable outcome of 
practical solutions for development control, is a promising strategy. Giving priority to 
contracting out an urban design study enables the planning officers to deepen their 
understanding of the site; in this way, their knowledge can be transformed into a 
legitimate framework through strategic negotiation.
Political support from the city’s mayor and a powerful forward-looking and risk-taking 
Planning Bureau in Shenzhen are the crucial behind-the-scenes forces underpinning 
the pioneering evolutional urban planning in Shenzhen. Prior to 1996 there were 
no overall guidelines. In order to oversee the construction of the Futian CBD, a 
task force for development and construction, led by the mayor, was established in 
September 1996; namely, the Central District Office, which was directly responsible 
for land management, design guidelines, design review and approval, environmental 
inspection, and so on. In the case of Futian CBD development in particular, it reveals 
a progressive learning experience on urban design control from the perspective of the 
socialist aesthetic of the architecture of the grand square and boulevard, at the early 
stage, to the later control of spatial quality by using detailed urban design studies to 
address the quality of the public environment.
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From the planning point of view, the Shenzhen Futian CBD development is 
undeniably economically successful. From the socio-spatial point of view, it may 
provoke some criticism.
In general, Shenzhen’s urban design is in practice very much focused on building 
public spaces. Despite this, the preferred design style of the developer and government 
could be seen as questionable. The application of the super-scale urban structure 
of the Futian CBD might serve very well for the urban future image politically and 
commercially, yet one could argue that it does not take into account the human scale of 
open spaces demanded by its citizens253.
Shenzhen, as one of the first test sites for market reform, is now becoming an urban 
lab for new design concepts and an exposition of architecture. Building new projects 
through design competitions has given western star-architects and design firms 
worldwide the opportunity to participate. In the past few years, through design 
competitions, buildings designed by Arata Isozaki, Coop Himmelblau, Rem Koolhaas, 
Hans Hollein, Steven Holl, Chang Yungho, Massimiliano Fuksas, Norman Foster, Kisho 
Kurokawa, and Mecanoo have identified Shenzhen as the emerging showcase of who’s 
who in architecture. Shenzhen’s planning bureau has also encouraged the participation 
of emerging young architects254, fostering the development of new talent, whether local 
Chinese or from overseas. Audacious cosmopolitan sheen is rapidly becoming one of 
the most popular styles sprouting in the CBD district as well as in many other newly 
developed areas. It demonstrates a new trend in western architectural ethics: lining up 
to work for an autocratic regime, such as China, where socio-spatial meaning has been 
dangerously undermined in favor of the delusion of the aesthetic prowess of formality.
Nevertheless, the general urban structure based on the series of master plans is very 
much focused on building a livable and responsive environment such as the cluster 
structure in relation to the integration of the well-reserved green areas. While most 
Chinese cities suffer from rapid urban development, giving priority to economic 
development and promoting the generic urban image, Shenzhen’s planners are 
gradually seeking opportunities to improve the quality of the public realm. While the 
special statutory planning system has so profoundly increased the transparency of the 
decision-making process that the amendment of the statutory graphic plan is no longer 
253 However, in reality, since the Futian CBD is gradually shaping its urban feature, the liveable urban activities are 
gradually emerging in the central square as well. It is still too early to draw a finite judgmental conclusion at this 
moment. 
254 Such as URBANUS, NODE (Nansha Original DEsign) and Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute etc. 
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as easy as changing the detailed plan, the amendments to the statutory graphic plan 
allow, with a degree of certainty, flexible control. 
§ 8.3 OCT-Loft Creative Park
A city like Shenzhen, with its extreme speed of urban growth over a period of less 
than 20 years, its booming economy, and its urban expansion that took space for new 
urban development, stimulates the metabolism of urban functions within its own 
spatial structure. After the rapid urban development of Shenzhen and the advocacy 
of the reform and opening-up policy by Deng Xiaoping, the city transformed from a 
manufacturing city into a creative city. However, this transformation also brought 
uncertainty to the existing factory compounds, which stand not only as the earliest 
industrial buildings in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), but also as the first 
generation of buildings in Shenzhen. As time passed, the former factory compounds 
became vacant and industrial activities declined. OCT-Loft (Overseas Chinese Town-
Loft), an industrial area with warehouse lofts from the 1980s, is becoming an area of 
empty factory shells left behind.
Currently, the factories have a modest appearance in the midst of a mixture of both 
middle class residential areas, dormitories of the industrial workers and a Disneyland-
type entertainment zone. Inevitably, and soon, urban regeneration will emerge as an 
issue in a city with a history of less than 30 years, new opportunity for constant demand 
for land. The former outlying area is now becoming relatively central in the city. The 
normal strategy of urban planning would be to demolish old construction for new in 
order to maximize the value of the land. But this was not the decision of the Shenzhen 
urban planners, in awareness of the lacking of memory in this young city. A creative 
renewal area was born, since by then the collective decisions of visionary planners and 
open-minded investors, and the conceptual contributions of a few young Chinese 
architects and artists could not be ignored anymore.
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§ 8.3.1 OCT: The Overseas Chinese Town 
The Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), Huaqiao Cheng255, was built during the export-led 
industrial promotion period of the mid-1980s with the idea of attracting overseas 
Chinese to invest in China after the economic reform. In the early stage of reform, 
although Shenzhen planned to attract foreign investment, inadequate physical and 
legal infrastructure deterred many potential investors, and only three of the ten 
planned industrial districts were completed and ready to host industries in 1985 
(Wong 1985). Instead of attracting foreign investors fill the vacant sites and stimulate 
urban growth, strategically preferential policies were given to various ministries or 
provincial enterprises (or SOEs).
Extensive stretches of land were given to central ministries or their subsidiaries. With 
this background, under the auspices of China Travel, a travel company, the Central 
Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
government jointly commissioned a planning team headed by Meng Daqiang, from 
Singapore (born in Taiwan), and invited experts from America, England, and Australia 
to produce a concept plan for the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). In total, 4.8 km2 
of land was given to establish the OCT Economic Zone. Together with the land, the 
government also designated the development rights and planning approval authority 
to the OCT Group, which was established in 1986. Like most of the State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in China, the OCT Group is one of the governmental planning and 
development enterprises. Here it is responsible for land allotment within the Overseas 
Chinese Town (OCT), to all enterprises, for the city’s infrastructure construction and for 
real estate development.
The Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) Economic Zone is located in the Nanshen District, 
which used to belong to the Shahe Industrial Area, one of the Industrial zones of 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The area was divided into a south and a north 
district by east-west-running Shennan Boulevard and is bounded by Qiaoxiang North 
Road to the north, Qiaocheng East Road to the east, Shahe East Road to the west, and 
Shenzhen Bay to the south (Figure 8.15).
255 Huaqiao Cheng (simplified Chinese: 华侨城; traditional Chinese: 華僑城). 
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Figure 8.15 Aerial Photo of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) and the location of OCT-Loft  
Source: Google map (2012), constructed by author.
The general conceptual plan of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is based on the theory 
of the “large multi-function community”, with diverse projects financed by overseas 
investors in the initial stages. In 1986, the local government approved the master plan 
of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). Based on its principles, the planning scheme 
suggested an adaptive development intervention reacting to the local context and 
topography and a phasing strategy that allowed local developments to merge gradually 
into its final plan framework. On the other hand, the design concept was to promote 
the old Chinese philosophy of living in harmony with nature (Figure 8.16).
Figure 8.16 Master Plan of Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) 2005-2015.  
Source: OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd. OCT Group.
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Since the OCT Group is the only central enterprise that focused—and still focuses—on 
the cultural industry, promoting tourism became its initial strategy to stimulate the 
development of such a large area. In 1987, the OCT Group began building China’s 
first theme park—the Splendid China Miniature Scenery Park—using 28.6 hectares 
of hilly land to the south of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), bordering on Shenzhen 
Bay. Modeled on the terrain of China; the landscape consists of nine scenic groups 
placed according to their real locations in the country. The 74 scenes chosen for the 
first stage of the project are all well known national cultural sites. Some traditional 
residential houses were built around the northern site. The slogan was “Going back in 
History in One Step and Traveling across China in One Day”. Using the strategic model 
of Disneyland as a reference has proven successful and attracted an increasing number 
of visitors from China and abroad. Within a year and a half, the OCT Group had earned 
back its investment of more than 70 million RMB. The success of the theme park 
confirmed that the strategic direction of the development was correct and profitable
In the coming years, the OCT Group set up several other theme parks, including China 
Folk Cultural Village, Windows of the World, Wildlife Zoo, and Happy Valley, all of 
which have been among the most popular tourist sites of China, attracting 40 million 
visitors annually.
For example, adjacent to Splendid China, the China Folk Culture Village is an 
amusement park presenting China’s ethnic groups with their distinctive architectures 
and customs. The Windows of the World covers an area of 480,000 m2 on the west 
side of the Splendid China Miniature Scenery Park and the China Folk Culture Village. 
A total 118 of the world’s most famous monuments and scenic wonders were placed 
divided into nine areas. The success of the theme parks, which corresponded with 
promoting the policy of privatizing the State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a booming 
housing market provided a great opportunity for luxury real estate development 
(Figure 8.17). Luxurious apartment districts gradually appeared in the meticulously 
landscaped neighborhoods in the north district. Coexisting with this, two major 
industrial zones, belonging to Shahe Industrial Zone, to the east and west of the 
Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), were developed to facilitate the electronics industry, 
including warehouses and housing for workers.
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Figure 8.17 Variations in real estate developments and housing projects in Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). 
Source: Photos by author. 
Unlike traditional industrial zones, such as Sekou, the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) 
is a paradoxical “collage” of nostalgia and world architectural counterfeit; selling 
the illusions of the age of consumerism, centered in the amusement industry, and 
combined with exotic foreign styles of buildings such as Italian villas, Venetian hotels, 
Dutch windmills, Chinese-style restaurants and gardens. The result seems, ironically, 
to be in conflict with the OCT Group’s mission of promoting traditional Chinese culture 
as in the Splendid China and the China Folk Culture Village, and illustrated by the 
mission statement of the OCT Group:
Integrate the traditional Chinese culture, the Chinese folk culture with the 
World cultural essences, presenting a perfect combination of the natural 
landscape with humanistic landscape and adopting the modern scientific and 
technological expressive means of sound, light and electricity, etc., coupled 
with the opera and song performances in the oriental “Broadway”, highlighting 
the combination of the quiescent and dynamic exercises and a variety of new 
styles and patterns, thus causing a great attraction to the audiences.
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Despite the criticism of the lack of identity with regard to introducing the alienating 
images of international styles, for a young city with a lack of tradition and high 
concentration of migrants, forging its own identity would likely require conditional 
compromises. As Xiaodong Li (2000: 399) pointed out:
Here, the adopted eclecticism was not a tool with which to perform a critique, 
rather an attempt to impose a visionary utopia out of their fantasies.
Surprisingly, instead of facing post-industrial deterioration, combining the 
development of an amusement industry with its comprehensive development model 
resulted in the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT)’s great commercial success. The Overseas 
Chinese Town (OCT) has become one of the only two “national cultural industry 
model gardens” in China, a popular tourist attraction, and a high-end residential 
district in Shenzhen. In 1994 Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) industrial enterprises had 
developed into a corporation with 55 companies under its umbrella. In this regard, 
Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) shows the speed of industrial growth in Shenzhen 
(and China in general). These industries are now increasingly shifting from secondary 
industrial production to tertiary, service-based economies. In view of the industrial 
transformation, in 1995 the modification of the master plan had maintained the main 
concept of natural landscape with humanistic landscape and correspondingly reduced 
the industrial areas, increasing residential development instead.
Because of industrial restructuring, the early manufacturing facilities have since 
relocated inland, leaving a large residual space surrounded by residential areas. The 
government and the developer from the OCT Group soon confronted the question of 
how to deal with these post-industrial warehouses (Figure 8.18).
i
 377 The Production of Space beyond Planning
Figure 8.18 Images of Post-Industrial Warehouses in OCT 
Source: URBANUS 
§ 8.3.2 Grouping the Urban Fracture for Urban Creation 
In view of the success of the real estate development, OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd., under 
the OCT Group, submitted a master plan to the Shenzhen Planning Bureau in 2002, 
with a proposal to demolish ten warehouses in the Eastern Industrial Area of Overseas 
Chinese Town (OCT), the former industrial area, for a new housing development. 
During the interview, Chang Jian, the planner who was in charge of approving this 
project, recalled during an interview that in 2002, he had just come back from New 
York City and was impressed by the SOHO area; he suggested to OCT Real Estates Co. 
Ltd. that renewing the abandoned warehouses could be an alternative to demolishing 
them for new housing development. Surprisingly, his spontaneous feedback convinced 
the developer.
In Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), where land resources are scarce, this block 
of abandoned industrial buildings could certainly have been torn down for 
real-estate development or other commercial uses, however, we decided to 
transform it into a district much like New York’s SOHO, while preserving its 
original appearance.256 
256 Chen Jian, CEO of the OCT Real Estates CO. Ltd. Interviewed by author on . 
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In conjunction with this, the He Xiangning Art Museum257 was the first national gallery 
named after an individual and was also the second national museum of modern art258 
to be approved by the Chinese central government on May 13, 1995, to be located in 
Shenzhen. It opened in April 1997 in the south district of the Overseas Chinese Town 
(OCT) along Shennan Boulevard.
The opening of the He Xiangning Art Museum paved the way for the promotion of 
Shenzhen as the creative cultural center of south China to become a reality. The city’s 
cultural ambition was obvious and highly praised by the local government, developers, 
artists, and architects. However, by then the idea to renew the old warehouses for 
creative cultural activities was bold and there was no experience in how to do this in a 
young city like Shenzhen.
In 2003, the catalyst for the developer’s decision was the decision by the He Xiangning 
Art Museum to establish a contemporary art center called OCT Contemporary Art 
Terminal (OCAT) in one of the old warehouses. The core mission of OCAT is to attract 
global resources earmarked for contemporary Chinese art and to promote cultural 
exchanges and interactions between China and the world. It aims, through exhibitions, 
forums, and artist-in-residence programs; to construct an institution that is about 
Chinese art yet demonstrates international vision and professionalism. It set out to 
function as a hub—a supply center and a departure point for contemporary Chinese 
art—and the concept of being an “international terminal” for contemporary Chinese 
art was evidenced by its name (Figure 8.19).
257 Information about the He Xiangning Art Museum, available at http://www.hxnart.com/.
258 The first one is the National Art Gallery in Beijing. 
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Figure 8.19 Images of OCAT 
Source: Photos by author.
Such a decision coupled well with the developer’s idea to gradually transform this 
area into a trendy mixed-use district, with the construction of the art museum as the 
catalyst. Under the slogan “Shenzhen Huaqiaocheng Creativity and Cultural Park”, the 
OCT-Loft established a close cooperation with the He Xiangning Art Museum, and the 
derelict factories were converted into a creative cluster in two phases: by 2007, 55,456 
m2 of the southern area was redeveloped, and afterward, from 2007 to 2011, an 
additional 95,571 m2 in the northern area was added.
The plug-in of OCAT sets up an interesting paradigm in the beginning of the 
regeneration of the industrial areas. The master planning team’s intention is fill the 
buildings by adjusting them spatially to accommodate the new use with small-scale 
operations and improvements to the infrastructure. Beginning with the addition of 
programs to the existing structures to adapt to the function of the art center, the empty 
lots between them are intended to be filled with galleries, bookshops, cafes, bars, artist 
ateliers, and design shops, along with lofts and dormitories.
The renovation of the old loft area applied certain methods from the participatory 
design and planning process. However, OCT-Loft is a completely privately owned 
development. To the developer, instead of inviting jump-in foreign designers, the 
whole process demanded a more on-site, participatory design approach. OCT Real 
Estates Co. Ltd. had commissioned URBANUS, one of the leading forces among China’s 
young design firms based in Beijing and Shenzhen, to study the OCT-Loft renovation in 
the southern zone. URBANUS was founded in 1999 under the leadership of partners 
Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan, and Wang Hui, three Chinese-born and -educated young and 
talented architects who obtained their master’s degrees and initially practiced their 
design skills abroad. They represented exactly the generation that is experiencing 
Chinese urbanization and is able to participate in the broader context of globalization. 
The name of “Urbanus” derives from the Latin word of “urban”, and strongly reflects 
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the office’s design approach: reading architectural programs from the viewpoint of the 
urban environment in general, and the ever-changing urban situations specifically.
They promote the philosophy of “practice with critical thinking” and criticize the fact 
that contemporary architecture had already witnessed a shift from a critical notion 
of late modernism to a more neutral and non-critical relativism. According to them, 
architectural opportunities are turned into regrets, not only about the aesthetic 
dimensions but also about the content of urban life, under the pressure of the speed 
of development. Instead of being detached from reality, they regard themselves as 
critical practitioners. They advocate three principles of their critical practice: to restore 
urbanity within a climate of rapid and vast profit-driven development versus the 
spreading out and speeding up of irresponsible urbanism; to conduct an innovative and 
critical praxis with social responsibility versus performing a conventional service and 
repetitive practice; and to convert ordinary programs into active and interactive urban 
devices that can energize urban life versus making architecture, in a superficial way, 
into an art installation.
They tackle the urban issues from two approaches: “urban engagement” and “urban 
infill”. “Urban engagement” refers to the initiation of urban strategies with support 
from the urban planning institution and “urban infill” refers to the effort to discover 
opportunities of significance to the city in areas neglected by others. Their principles 
are, without a doubt, socially responsible. Their philosophy regarding urban practice 
has been authentically transformed into their works on the OCT-Loft renovation 
(Figure 8.20).
Figure 8.20 Images of warehouses after renovation 
Source: Photos by author.
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Figure 8.20 Images of warehouses after renovation 
Source: Photos by author.
Regarding the renovation of the OCAT, the warehouse shed was wrapped in metal 
mesh by URBANUS, an intensive and hands-on industrial product leaving the original 
exterior wall intact. The cavity between this wrapping and the existing wall contains all 
the mechanical systems.
Meng Yan (2007:92) noted: 
When we first saw the factory buildings, we were disappointed. They had no big 
chimneys or huge spaces, just simple roofs, nothing like the 798 art factory in 
Beijing. So, during the process of renovation, we decided to give the buildings a 
style, distinct from the 798 art factory in Beijing, by trying our best to preserve 
their original structure and workshops.
As URBANUS emphasized, “by this wrapping, the existing structure is returned and 
monumentalized to its archetypal form—a basic shed, but now one for art.”
With regard to the spatial intervention, according to URBANUS (2007), the empty 
warehouses can be gradually filled with galleries, artists’ studios and design shops, 
along with lofts and dormitories. The new additions fill the open spaces and set up 
new relationships between buildings by wrapping them and penetrating the existing 
urban fabric. They also create a second layer of interconnected urban spaces and public 
facilities. The goal is to transform the area into an open platform for creativity. The 
master planning does not intend to define a clear boundary or fixed new forms; instead, it 
tries to set up a dynamic, interactive and flexible framework adapting itself constantly to 
the new conditions posed by the vast changes in the city (Figure 8.21 and Figure 8.22).
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Figure 8.21 The concept of the OCT-Loft renovation in the southern zone 
Source: URBANUS 
Figure 8.22 Design concept of southern and north zone of OCT-Loft 
Source: URBANUS
The approach of spatial grouping and filling had to be supported simultaneously 
by a series of cultural events initiated and organized by the governmental planning 
department, the OCT Group, artists, and curators. Curators and artists worked 
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with the architect and the developer on a broader planning strategy for the whole 
site that aimed to simulate the organic growth of a city. The other warehouses are 
being appropriated and new buildings are added between them; creating the rich 
experimental spaces found lacking in standard developments.
The approach of URBANUS reflects exactly their ideas about how to produce social 
space through participatory spatial intervention; critically, not only as designers/
planners, but also as participants. To them, social-spatial production is the outcome 
of social participation. Spatial agents have to create their interventions in the spatial 
domain through participatory consensus and social criticism.
In 2005, the OCAT was officially opened. Its significance is that, under the umbrella of 
Shenzhen’s He Xiangning Art Museum, it is the first such professional institution in 
China to be established in association with, and administrated by, a state-owned art 
museum. It has become an ambitious project that attracts artists to meet, explore and 
discuss etc. This excellent museum complex exhibits works of international and local 
contemporary Chinese artists. The surrounding former communist-era warehouses 
have been converted into artists’ studios, hip cafes, and bars (Figure 8.23).
Figure 8.23 Images of exhibition, shops and café 
Source: Photos by author
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In 2005, F1 (now a leisure and cultural space amid galleries, bookshops, restaurants, 
and cafés) became the main venue of the first Shenzhen Biennale (Curator: Yung 
Ho Chang, Theme: City, Open Door!). In 2007 the second biennale, which was the 
Shenzhen & Hong Kong Biennale (SZHKB) (Curator: Ma Qingyun; Theme: City of 
Expiration and Regeneration), reselected factory buildings (B10, etc.) adjoining the 
venue of the first biennale, and they were transformed into OCT-Loft soon afterward. 
All the biennales were substantially supported by OCT Group, and as an urban cultural 
event with great support, the Shenzhen & Hong Kong Biennale (SZHKB) activated old 
industrial factory buildings and pushed forward the transformation and updating into a 
creative space.
In 2007, after two years of renovation with a total investment of more than 30 million 
yuan (US$ 3.9 million), the city’s new community art park, OCT-Loft, was inaugurated 
in Overseas Chinese Town (OCT).
For the city administration, developing the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is a key 
strategy for creating a local and global awareness of Shenzhen as a creative city. A 
subsequent step has been to join the UNESCO Creative Cities Network in 2010. This 
strategy is embedded in the governmental program “Study and plan on Shenzhen’s 
industrial distribution” from 2007 and incorporates the shift “from processed in 
Shenzhen to manufactured in Shenzhen and finally to created in Shenzhen”. Overseas 
Chinese Town (OCT) is a central vehicle for the last step (Zielke et al. 2012).
In 2007, the second stage of renovation was under preparation.
In the first phase of the regeneration, the renovation played a very important role in 
the revitalization of Shenzhen by suggesting a socially and economically sustainable 
model for both the developer and the city. It addressed the value of these industrial 
buildings and their extraordinary architectural quality, which provides flexibility for 
the coexistence of both industrial and creative occupants. In order to be a successful 
creative industrial park, the organizing entity was proposed to encourage the exchange 
of different types of institutions. It was a period of exploration based on experimental 
spirits.
Based on this perspective and the experience gained in the first stage, the second 
stage of the renovation aims to reposition the overall branding image, integrate 
different types of creative industries, and suggest a zoning strategy in order to upgrade 
the creative industrial park of the first stage from the perspective of building up a 
comprehensive plan for cultural programs and spatial intervention.
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Within this framework, an exhibition called “Upgrade strategy: International Invitation 
Exhibition on OCT-Loft Concept Design” opened in 2011. The exhibition is based on 
the five international design firms that had been invited to present their ideas for the 
second stage of renovation.
Curator Li Sha explains the context of the exhibition:
Since 2004, OCT started to upgrade the remaining East Industrial Zone to the 
Creative Cultural Park (named OCT-Loft). The upgrade of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone in Overseas Chinese Town to the Creative Culture Park (OCT-Loft) shows 
it only took 26 years to complete the transformation of a European industrial 
city that was projected to take 100 years. The exhibition invited Bernard 
Tschumi Architects (New York / Paris), Dominique Perrault Architecture 
(Paris), MVRDV (Rotterdam), URBANUS Architecture and Design (Shenzhen /
Beijing) and Sou Fujimoto Architects (Tokyo) to offer thoughts on the OCT-
Loft conceptual plan and the renovation of B10 into the OCT Contemporary 
Art Museum, exploring the strategy for the active protection of the industrial 
building.259
The proposals from the five design firms are extremely diverse and independent 
of the extent to which the OCT-Loft will be transformed in the next stage. I would 
like to emphasize a new type of think tank, such as URBANUS, plays a crucial role in 
contemporary urban development, particularly who have their strong commitments to 
involve in the local development and participate in the local discussion and debate. In 
the new millennium, this type of emerging group is gathered from the new generation 
of Chinese architects, who can now participate in building contemporary China and 
bring in their creative and critical insights. With regard to their critical reflections, they 
are now acting like pioneers or mediums and no longer like imitators and followers.
(Re)inhabiting former industrial areas as art districts is common throughout Western 
cities, but they are still a relatively new phenomenon in China. Within this framework of 
cultural industries and creative economy—by turning strategic urban space into an art 
district and offering a contemporary cultural space previously lacking in the city—the 
regeneration of OCT-Loft is not one of the foremost pioneering projects in China with 
regard to its scope and scale. Hip areas with art galleries and design industries emerged 
in Shanghai, such as along Suzhou Creek, Monganshan Lu, Xintiandi, Bridge 8 and 
several others within the French Concession, and have gradually captured the attention 
259 Available at http://flolo.blogspot.sg/2011/07/international-invitational-exhibition.html.
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of government since 1990s (Liauw 2012). Other creative clusters had emerged in 
peripheral villages of Beijing. Among them, the defunct Mao-period factory known as 
“798” has been receiving the most media attention. The approaches that have been 
applied in each individual case are diverse and unique for the location.
I would argue, the specialty of learning from OCT-Loft is from the very beginning that 
the development strategy involved different parties: the developer, art museum, artists, 
curators, architects, and planners. The planning strategy was to stimulate the natural 
growth of the city, starting from the new additions to the existing warehouses that would 
accommodate the new art center—genuinely an art community, which is missing in 798. 
Although from the beginning both projects of 798 in Beijing and OCT-Loft in Shenzhen had 
emphasized the grass-roots efforts, the development of the 798 is now entirely under the 
control of officials and the district’s growth is no longer organic$1. Similar to Xintiandi in 
Shanghai, OCT-Loft was a private-owned and private-developed asset. However, OCT-Loft 
applied a participatory approach by allowing initiatives of grassroots innovation more than 
considering it as a real estate development like Xintiandi. OCT-Loft has been successfully 
regenerated through a bottom-up small-scale development process; allowing the creative 
cluster as a form of production reflecting a grassroots lifestyle—an expression of individual 
freedom, which had been neglected in Xintiandi.
As Hong Kong’s Kenneth Ko, who established his career in the OCT-Loft in 2004, 
remarks, “The OCT-Loft is like a dry sponge, which can absorb anything you put into it.” 
(Huo, Shenzhen Daily 2007). Metaphorically, this remark can also describe Shenzhen 
society: Living and acting on daily challenges like a sponge, urban planners, developers, 
artists and ordinary citizens are now collectively creating and recreating the urban 
socio-spatial structure through the continual evolution of individual participation—
thereby promoting the sense of belonging. This continual evolution scaled up into the 
environment when the city itself became a product of creative production and in such a 
creative city—a spatial sponge—anything put into it is possible.
The prevalent urban fact shown in the next thematic project vividly reflects this 
statement. An emerging phenomenon that is not limited to a bounded area or a limited 
time span or by a rationally planned intervention; it is a bypass product that resulted 
from the process of urbanization, but was not recognized in the beginning of the rural-
urban development.
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§ 8.4 Urban Villages—Village amidst the City
Land reform is key to economic reformation in contemporary China. Urbanization 
is a historic transformation process by which the means of production and 
people’s lifestyles evolved from the country to the city. Urbanization taking place in 
contemporary China is based on multiple driving forces and has diverse features.
The economical background for urbanization is a massive rural population that no 
longer engages in the primary sector of industry (agriculture), leaves the rural area, 
and floods into cities to engage in a secondary or tertiary sector of industry. In China, 
urbanization focuses on the development of the urban economy and corresponds to 
the relaxation of migration; besides it combines an economic impetus and utilizes 
surplus labor forces from rural areas to develop non-agricultural production focusing 
on the development of a rural economy, such as the introduced system of Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVEs)260. These two impetuses of urbanization illustrate the 
aforementioned statement that urbanization means not only the statistical change 
of migration from rural to urban areas, it also means the overall change in living 
conditions shifted from rural-agricultural livelihoods to non-agricultural urban welfare.
Land reform allows a city newly built through land requisition to transform agricultural 
land into urban construction land. From 1980 to 2005, the Shenzhen city territory 
expanded from its previous 327.5 km2 to 2,020 km2. With more than 20 years of 
development after reform and opening-up, urban construction developed at a very 
high speed, and in the process villages have been eclipsed by cities, so called “urban 
villages” that now have been brought into the city’s scope while at the same time 
diminishing the area of agricultural land.
Against the backdrop of speedy urbanization, urban construction and constant 
expansion of urban land, the phenomenon of “urban villages” accompanied by fast 
industrialization and urbanization gradually aroused broader attention. In 2005, 
Shenzhen’s mayor enunciated “four difficulties” facing the city: limited land, shortage 
of energy and water, demographic pressure, and environmental contamination. The 
foremost difficulty is the limited land for urban development. The former urban villages 
have interactively transitioned from the process of urbanization to participation in 
urban regeneration. The accumulated lands that once were reserved for the residential 
260 See Chapter 5.1 and Chapter 5.4 
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function of the villages are now seen as valuable to economic accumulation for inward 
urban transformation (Ma hang 2006; Liu Xiaoming 2011; Pu Hao 2012). 
§ 8.4.1 The Emerged Urban Villages: The Push and Pull Effect 
In 1978, the percentage of non-agricultural land (mainly in towns in Shenzhen) was 
2.29. This grew to 23.84 percent by 1990, and by 2000 it had reached 31.72 percent. 
At the same time, the amount of cultivated land dropped from 23.95 percent in 1978 
to 6.03 percent in 1990; in 2000 it had dwindled to a mere 3.3 percent261. One simple 
fact emerging from this process is that rural land is gradually being taken over by urban 
construction. The former agricultural entity under the collective ownership of farmers 
(villagers) is now forced to participate in the urban economy directly or indirectly 
through land requisition and transfer. Depending on the economic forces of the 
cities or regions, the scenario of speedy urban expansion results in the phenomenon 
of “urban siege on the village,” later called “Urban Villages” or Chongzhongcun in 
Chinese262.
Before Shenzhen city was built, different villages were situated across the whole area. 
Most “villages” in Shenzhen are social groups formed by marital and consanguine 
relations. The clannish establishment is crucial for the survival of the villages while 
they face the challenges of natural and human environments. In order to survive, 
members in a clan normally should share the same values, individual psychology, and 
behavior identified based on the principle of benefitting the clan. With this tradition, 
clan properties are the common material foundation of maintaining basic living safety, 
confronting outside threats, and strengthening the clan’s political and economical 
power263 (Ma Hang 2006).
261 The statistics are from China Statistical Yearbooks (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990–2000). 
262 Chongzhongcun or Urban Villages, Village in the City, Village amidst the City (Chinese: 城中村). 
263 However, the relationships among the clans are complicated, and inward conflicts of interest exist. The whole 
clan consists of many independent core families that are also relatively economically independent units where 
strong coherence and centripetal forces exist among family members at the same time. 
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There are 320 villages in Shenzhen, and 91 villages are located in the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone (SSEZ)264. In 2004, the total area of villages is 93.5 km2, equivalent to 
13.3% of the built-up land area and 50.3% of the residential land (Table 8.1). In the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), it is more than 8 km2 and takes up 5 percent 
of the urban construction area. The villages are composed of approximately 350,000 
buildings, with a total floor area of 106 million m2 (Pu Hao 2012: 18). Most of the 
urban villages are located in strategic areas of the city; most of them are concentrated 
in the commercial areas, district centers, and adjacent to the two major checkpoints to 























Luohu 35 2.36 125 648 1.2 5.2 53% 2.75
Futian 15 1.96 107 669 0.9 6.2 55% 3.42
Nanshan 29 2.91 157 721 1.7 4.6 54% 2.47
Yantian 12 0.78 35 101 0.4 2.9 45% 1.30
Baoan 138 44.28 1476 4311 16.5 2.9 33% 0.97
Longgang 91 41.21 1371 4112 14.1 3.0 33% 1.00
Total 320 93.49 3272 10562 34.9 3.2 35% 1.13
Table 8.1 Statistics of the physical characteristic of Urban Villages in Shenzhen, 2004 
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau
264 Based on the statistic of urban villages in Shenzhen 2004 (Data source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau). 
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Figure 8.24 Distribution of Urban Villages in Shenzhen 2005 
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau
To accommodate investment and development, the government relies on urban 
development to convert periphery urban rural land into urban use. In this process, 
the government tends to requisition farmland rather than settlement components 
of the rural villages to avoid costly and time-consuming programs requiring the 
compensation and relocation of indigenous villagers (Pu Hao 2012: 34). Consequently, 
the settlement components of villages remain while their surrounding environment 
dramatically changes—rural land was requisitioned and native farmers were given 
urban status and land sites on which to build their houses. Under the dual track 
of the administrative system, the governance of urban villages fell under the rural 
administrative system in which their administration was left to joint-stock companies 
formed from the original village committees and as such the design and construction of 
building in the urban villages are not constrained by the procedures that are applicable 
in the rest of the urban area. As the city grows, indigenous villagers are maximizing 
their profits by constructing extra floor space in the form of sub-standard housing 
units, which helps alleviate the burden for the government to provide rooms for 
migrants and to generate extra income for landless peasants. As a result, the problem 
of the urban villages is becoming a double-edged sword. As these villages were beyond 
the scope of management by the municipal government, they gradually formed 
isolated socio-spatial entities that were interspersed among modern urban areas 
(Figure 8.25).
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Figure 8.25 Images of Urban Village surrounded by high-rise Buildings 
Source: Photos by author.
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In short, urban villages are special by-products of the rapid urbanization process and 
the complicated dual-track land ownership system in China. In the case of Shenzhen, 
there are roughly three stages of development265.
From 1982 to 1992: The emergence of “Urban Villages”
According to the dual-track land ownership system, there are two types of land 
ownership: urban land is the property of the state and rural land is collectively owned 
by villagers. In principle, farmlands formerly cultivated by villages were compulsorily 
purchased and turned into urban land by the government. Based on the Interim 
Regulations of Building Land of Villages in Cooperative in Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone, which was promulgated in 1982, after the acquisition of farmers’ land the 
original villagers were allowed to preserve their habitation onsite in order to prevent the 
high social and economic costs of relocation. The regulation allowed each household 
could build its residential dwelling on a land area no bigger than 80 m2, with a total 
floor area of 150 m2 and average height of 2 to 3 floors. In general, those villages 
retained the architectural forms of 2 to 3 floors buildings with a layout incorporating a 
courtyard as communal space. Because during this period the rental housing market 
was still weak, most of the newly built residential dwellings were used by the villages as 
their own houses.
However, after 1984, due to the speedy economic development, there was a large 
influx of immigrants into the city, and urban villages pushed upward and increased 
in density—at a rate even greater than the city’s expansion—because they became 
the key providers of cheap housing for immigrants and the poor. Buildings were 
increasingly built to 3 and 5 floors, although in 1986, stricter control of village housing 
was enforced at 40 m2 per person. During this period, the government could not 
provide the full promised compensation to the villages while their farmlands had been 
expropriated; therefore measures to restrict illegal construction were vague and the 
power to exert control over the collective farmers’ land was weakened.
In 1989, the government promulgated the Provisions of Land Expropriation in the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). In this framework, in addition to keeping 
intact a percentage of lands for the use of law-protected villagers’ residential lots, 
called “Housing Based Land (HBL)266”, the government agreed to return a certain 
percentage of the total requisitioned lands to the villages in order to compensate 
265  Available at: http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0704/11/5628579_131381304.shtml#. 
266 Zhaijidi or Housing Based Land (HBL) (Chinese: 宅基地).
i
 393 The Production of Space beyond Planning
them for their loss of agricultural land. Those lands could be used for commercial and 
industrial development, which was called “Land for Collective Development (LCD)”. 
The residential lots would be divided into smaller plots; a grid plan of 10 m x 10 m was 
the most common plan for the new Housing Based Land (HBL) areas, with a narrow 
alley in between. These areas were redistributed to villages for building their own 
dwellings based on the individual household, and the returned Land for Collective 
Development (LCD) would remain under the collective ownership of the villages and be 
run by the village’s leaders groups or committees. While the demand for urban land for 
commercial or industrial development was increasing, Land for Collective Development 
(LCD) would be rented out in order to lessen the city’s insufficient land supply. The 
collective business buildings on the Land for Collective Development (LCD), however, 
were used by villagers to run retail establishments in order to supply commodities for 
their own use. During this process, those original farmer groups re-formed into new 
corporations (Table 8.2).
During this period, the government applied the clearance-deportation model, which 
was simply to clear the area and deport migrants from outside the urban villages 
while maintaining indigenous villages and their housing on site. However, soon after 
the deportations, migrants returned, and sometimes brought along their family and 
friends, making the urban villages even more densely populated. Based on the division 
of Housing Based Land (HBL) and Land for Collective Development (LCD), the spatial 
layout of urban villages was formulated in Shenzhen (Pu Hao 2012: 24). 
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permanent House Based Land 
(HBL) land use right as long as 
they remain villagers; House 
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can be transferred between 








Village collective land that pro-






After the government acquired 
the farmland from the village, 8 
to 15% of the taken land is given 
back to the village for collective 
development. 
Table 8.2 Mechanisms of Urban Villages  
Source: Berlage Institute Research Report (2005: 52-53 and 76-77). Edited by author. 
From 1992 to 2003: Unrestrained development 
From 1990 onward, Shenzhen maintained a high speed of urban growth. Urban 
growth had stimulated the booming housing market, particularly in the rental-housing 
sector. Consequently, land became the main source of profit for real estate companies, 
villages, individual farmers, and all levels of government. The combination of a 
rental-housing market and a massive floating population provided the villagers the 
opportunity to rent out their spare rooms—their only alternative, since, because of the 
farmers’ dwelling policy restriction, they did not have the right to sell their property. 
With a result that higher-density buildings were extruded vertically in the urban 
villages when the villagers became rich and needed more living space or wanted to rent 
out the flats to the floating population and 7- to 8-story dwellings were often seen. 
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The average FAR and construction density of urban villages in Shenzhen were 1.13 and 
35 percent in 2004, respectively; both of which were higher than the average of the 
entire built-up area of the city267.
Gradually, due to the uncontrolled development and ignorance on the part of urban 
villages in the city, many of the urban villages spawned problem neighborhoods. 
Environmental problems emerged, such as heavily populated living environment, lack 
of urban utilities, overdevelopment with extreme plot density, and lack of open space 
and infrastructure. Aesthetically, they came to be seen as a scar on the city; socially, 
there were always problems because of loose management; and politically, they were 
regarded as a sort of time bomb due to social conflicts often happening in these areas.
While Shenzhen’s modern image has gradually been established, the areas of 
the urban villages have become a seemingly unsolvable problem challenging the 
centralized urban planning.
In the booming real estate market since the 1990s, the clearance-deportation model 
was replaced by a demolition-redevelopment model. In this model, urban villages 
are designated as urban renewal districts, which would be gradually rehabilitated 
through a series of initiatives. In 1992 the government claimed that all the land 
within the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) belonged to urban land owned 
by the government in order to include urban villages into the system of urban land 
management. However, this announcement was completely; in reality, it did not have 
the power to regulate the illegal construction of villages as long as the rental-housing 
market was in such strong demand268.
In 1992, the government issued the “Bylaws of Housing Rental in the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone” and “Bylaws of Registration of Real Estate in the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone” in order to combat and restrict illegally rented houses, those without 
real estate registration were not allowed to enter the rental-housing market. However, 
the effect was very limited.
267 See table 9.1.
268 Before 1992, the government red-circled villages in order to define their boundaries and to prevent illegal land 
occupancy by the villages outside the red circles. However, there was no legal framework to regulate the building 
forms within the Housing Based Land (HBL) and Land for Collective Development (LCD).
i
 396 Between Flexibility and Reliability
The reason for this is a practical fact: in the face of the massive amount of migrants who 
are excluded from the formal urban housing market, urban villages become popular 
migrant enclaves as they provide them with affordable and accessible housing units. 
According to research by the Shenzhen Branch of the China Academy of Urban Planning 
and Design, the cost of rental housing in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 
was around 1,200–1,500 RMB per 100 m2 per month, and rental housing of the same 
size in the commercial housing area was around 1,800 to 2,200 RMB. Rental housing 
in the urban villages took up 70 percent of the total rental-housing sector, while almost 
50 percent of the total temporary residential population are living in urban villages. 
During this period, the major problem of the urban villages was that the villagers 
continually built unauthorized housing units in a high 3-dimensional density, largely 
because the supply of rental-housing from the formal urban housing market was still 
insufficient, and on the other hand because there was no incentive for the villagers 
to register their real estate. Once again, the government had been forced to relax its 
restrictions on housing in the urban village areas, and to allow increasing floor area by 
constructing new floors.
For those areas enjoying a strategic location in the city, this even resulted in single 
buildings rising to 12 to 15 floors and with a built-in elevator. The space between 
buildings on the 10x10 m grid is sometimes reduced to less than one meter; these 
“handshaking” buildings are everywhere. In 1999, Decisions on Prohibition Against 
Illegal Construction by the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen People’s Representatives 
Meeting showed the government’s decision to regulate the registration of unauthorized 
housing, and in 2002, the government issued its Decision on Management of Illegal 
Private Houses Left Behind by History in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and 
Provisions on Management of Illegal Construction of Production Operations Left Behind 
by History in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The government’s attempt to 
solve the risks presented by the urban villages inevitably resulted; however, urban villages 
were becoming disconnected urban fragments.
Politically, the dilemma is between social justice and urban development. 
Economically, urban villages are a main contributor to value accumulation that 
the government is not able to tackle—it helps to accommodate the economic 
development of the city unofficially. Socio-spatially, however, urban villages present an 
extraordinary vitality in their physical and spatial configuration, their local amenities 
and cheap shops, as well as the spontaneous creation of a very enthusiastic grassroots 
participatory urban movement.
These circumstances have forced the government, instead of enforcing regulatory 
measures, to reconsider applying urban regeneration, and invent creative urban 
renewal methods, which means, as with any urban renewal process, that an individual 
and locally adaptive approach is required.
i
 397 The Production of Space beyond Planning
From 2003 to present: Regeneration of urban villages
In 2005, the municipal government released the special Comprehensive Planning 
Guidelines for Urban Villages Redevelopment 2005–2010. (Table 8.3) These 
guidelines present four reasons to redevelop urban villages. First, as land is becoming 
scarce, the land covered by urban villages can be considered potential land stock via 
redevelopment. Second, illegal construction, chaotic land use, and social problems 
such as crime make urban villages the most prominent, complicated, and concentrated 
locations of urban problems. Third, urban villages are perceived to suppress the land 
value of their surrounding parcels; therefore, they limit the progress of the city’s 
improvements to urban structure and efficiency. Fourth, urban villages are to some 
extent outside formal urban administration. Their house-rental business threatens 
that of competitors, and their land and housing market threatens municipal control 
and profit from the land and property market (Pu Hao 2012).
Luohu Futian Nanshan Yantian Baoan Longgang Total 
1.Demolish Land 
Area
30 40 80 30 410 300 890
2.Demolish 
 construction Area
80 130 200 40 400 300 1150
3.Reconstruction 
Area












30 30 35 15 100 75 285
4. Integrated 
 Construction Area 570 540 520 60 860 820 3370
Table 8.3 2005-2010 Urban Village redevelopment area control (10,000 m2) 
Source: Liu Xiaoming (2011, Table 1). 
Within this framework, the municipal government declared that 8.9 km2 of urban 
village land, an area covered by buildings with 11.5 million m2 of floor area in housing 
units, would be cleared between 2005 and 2010 in order to provide space for new 
buildings of at least 25.9 million m2 of floor area (Pu Hao 2012: 27). The plan 
prioritized urban villages for redevelopment by emphasizing certain zones, such as 
ecological zones, commercial and industrial centers, and areas near to existing and 
future metro lines—as well as to emphasize the application of multiple redevelopment 
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models, of which, in general, there are three (Liu Xiaoming 2011). The first model is 
self-reconstruction, either with the support of the government or by the village joint 
venture enterprise (VJVE) set up by the former villagers with collective funds and with 
ex-villagers become shareholders269. The second model is based on the corporation 
between a village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) and a real estate company, and in the 
third model the redevelopment is completely initiated by a real estate company. The 
application of the redevelopment model can vary depending on the situation. Urban 
renewal is still very much driven by economic incentive and governmental guidance270 
(Table 8.4).
Models Definition Methods
Model 1 Self-reconstruction Un-marketization All by Government 
By Village Joint Venture 
Enterprise (supported by 
government). 
Model 2 Cooperation Semi-marketization Government supervised, 
 developer operated and 
 Village Joint Venture 
 Enterprise participated.
Cooperation between Village 
Joint Venture Enterprise and 
real estate company.
Model 3 Real-estate Development Complete Marketization The real estate company 
developed by itself
Table 8.4 The different models for the renewal of Urban Villages 
Source: Liu Xiaoming (2011: 16). Revised by author.
From the planning point of view, because of Shenzhen municipal government efforts, 
urban villages were included in the standard urban renewal process, meaning that 
urban villages were included in the urban land system and villagers became urban 
citizens. The government can thus include the collective land of urban villages into the 
urban land system through urban renewal.
269 This kind of model is compensated either by the government or relies on the decisions made by the village 
owners. Therefore the renewal process did not participate in the real estate market, unlike the renewal processes 
by the private developer. 
270 See more in: Research on Different Models and Ownerships questions for the Urban Villages Renewal (in 
Chinese). Available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/wskt/flfg/201109/t20110906_938685.htm. 
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However, from the socio-spatial point of view, the opponents’ view is that the 
majority of those who rely on low-rent residences are then excluded from their former 
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, a gentrification process is likely to happen in those areas 
(Pu Hao et al. 2011). When urban villages are replaced by commercial housing units, 
the living density of these areas will significantly decline in comparison with the former 
urban villages. Better-off residents who can afford to do so will replace the former low-
income tenants. It would lead to immediate and significant housing stress in certain 
areas while many urban villages are critical sub-markets of urban housing, providing 
a realistic and effective affordable housing solution for migrants. In general, with 
an emphasis on improvement of the built-up environment, infrastructures, and the 
livelihood of indigenous villagers, there is no consideration for the tenants, and they do 
not receive any compensation271.
The pull-and-push effect that has emerged in different periods of urban village 
development demonstrates how deep and complex an urban objective confronts the 
planning authority.
§ 8.4.2 From Urban Fringe to Urban Indispensability
Following government policy, overall reconstruction seems to be the easier solution 
for redevelopment as long as the real estate company and the village can come to 
an agreement and cooperate. However, the disadvantages include enormous cost 
and reinvestment, and in order to satisfy the requirements of both ex-villagers and 
developers, the floor area has to be intensified with the result being that the existing 
urban context and city life of urban villages is wiped out once and for all.
Alternative types of reconstruction can also be found that can lessen density by 
removing partial poor-quality houses and buildings in order to accommodate green 
space, widening the streets and alleys for admitting more sunlight and ventilation, and 
utilizing non-constructed lands available inside “villages” to relocate villagers who 
are being removed, or minimizing demolition when remote villages have less floating 
population and less conflicting with their surroundings. This type of village usually 
271 During the interview with the planner from the former Shenzhen Planning Bureau, it was indicated that the 
municipal government is now focusing on transforming the former industrial-base Shenzhen into a high-tech 
metropolis, in which, naturally the low-income labor forces have been reduced since the city is focusing on 
attracting skilled talents. 
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possesses historical cultural value and other values that do not qualify the village for 
overall transformation. The intervention focuses on transforming illegal buildings 
and preserving most buildings in villages, repairing and unifying the overall external 
appearance and decorating the interiors (Ma Hang 2006). 
Besides, the socio-spatial issue that emerged in urban villages is more complicated and 
not solved by providing a solution of physical redevelopment. The question remains: 
while the ex-villagers are expecting their unlawful and low-quality properties to 
become legitimate ones and for the value of their property to double (or triple) instantly 
once transfer of their properties into the commercial real estate market is allowed, is 
this distribution of wealth fair and in the urban public’s interest? The answer to this 
question is complicated and varied in individual cases and within different contextual 
backgrounds as is illustrated by the following cases.
Regarding the location and status of redevelopment, three villages, namely Yunong 
village, Gangxia village and Dafeng village272 are selected to illustrate the diverse 
approaches of renewal of the urban villages (Figure 8.26).
272 Yunong village (simplified Chinese: 渔农村; traditional Chinese:漁農村), Gangxia village (simplified Chinese: 岗厦
村; traditional Chinese:崗廈村), and Dafeng village (Chinese: 大芬村). 
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Figure 8.26 The location of Yunong village, Gangxia village and Dafeng village in Shenzhen 
Source: Google Map (2012). Edited by author.
In 1999 the Futian authority issued a policy statement that clearly spelled out a 
prohibition on leasing properties to non-villagers, together with an equally unequivocal 
intent to clear all illegal structures273. Instead of complying with this policy, Yunong 
villages, under the leadership of the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE), adopted the 
usual attitude of “policy from above and resistance from below” by replacing the current 
52 low-rise buildings with 37 taller buildings. Their expectation was that if the authorities 
were serious about clearing the site, compensation would be increased because of 
the now much larger built-up floor area. Infuriated by this open defiance, and fearing 
273 Within the framework of the demolition-redevelopment model. 
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the loss of authority that might jeopardize other redevelopment plans, the Futian 
government took the unusually hard-lined approach of sending the police force to block 
the construction site and cutting water and electricity supplies to these new structures 
(Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011). However, the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) did not 
back down, mainly because of the expectation that the final compensation was going to 
be directly linked to the built-up area, legal or illegal. The ex-villagers did indeed convince 
the authorities that the urban villages were no longer an insignificant urban fringe. To the 
city and the government, their redevelopment was now an overwhelming fact of urban 
indispensability and could not be ignored no longer.
The stand taken by the ex-villagers forced the Futian government to lessen its 
reliance on power and to move towards the more collaborative approach of forging 
a partnership with the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE). At the same time, the 
government also learned the lesson that guidance regarding the urban villages, within 
the overall planning scheme, was crucial.
In this context, corresponding to the Comprehensive Planning Guidelines for Urban 
Villages Redevelopment 2005–2010, in 2004 a private-sector actor was enlisted 
to join the coalition. A tri-partner collaboration agreement was initially reached. An 
attractive addition to the relocation plan was the promise by the private developer 
and the authorities to return a new flat to each of the affected households in the new 
project. The Futian government also stationed staff members inside the village to deal 
with the issue and, in particular, to work closely with the village joint venture enterprise 
(VJVE). By the end of March 2005, all households involved agreed on the relocation and 
compensation arrangements, and this was followed in May by the so-called Number 
One Blast of China, the massive clearing of the site using dynamite (Figure 8.27).
Figure 8.27 Demolition of Yunong Village  
Source: News Guangdong.
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In comparison with the success in Yunong, from the viewpoint of the planning authority, 
Gangxia village demonstrated opposition and confrontation in its coalition working 
towards redevelopment. Gangxia village, located in the middle of the Futian central area, 
has an area of about 151,600 m2 and a population of nearly 100,000. Unlike Yunong 
village, Gangxia village has a deeply rooted internal social history as all villagers have 
the same family name of “Wen”. This clan is larger than the local Wens and includes the 
oversea Wens, headed by the Hong Kong chapter. The clan division played a very crucial 
role in the decision of the coalition (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011: 429).
Due to its strategic location, it was the first village targeted for redevelopment by the 
Futian government. Compared to the Yunong village, with a land area of 20,000 m2 
and a population of 9,000, Gangxia is a much bigger and denser area. The strategic 
location of Gangxia village enabled it to become one of the most desirable areas in 
the rental-housing market. For example, in 2003, the gross income of Gangxia village 
joint venture enterprise (VJVE) was 14.88 million, of which 96 percent came from 
property leasing and only 4 percent from other village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) 
investments.274 
The success of the coalition in the Yunong partnership boosted the confidence of the 
Futian government. They tried to duplicate the same model in Gangxia by bringing in 
the same private-sector partner. A joint venture was formed with the private-sector 
partner and the Futian government, with the deputy party secretary of the Futian 
government as team leader. Unlike Yunong village, in Gangxia there had been a long-
term political infighting between the villagers and the village joint venture enterprise 
(VJVE) leadership as well as among villagers themselves; thus, the coalition that was 
formed between the private developer and the government did not include the Gangxia 
village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) at this stage.
In 2006, a more cooperative chairman of the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) was 
elected with the support of the Futian authority, which led to the signing of the initial 
redevelopment guidelines agreement by the three partners; namely, the government, 
the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE), and the developer. Yet some villagers 
suggested that the authority-supported election was unfair and activated the overseas 
network of the clans and soon appealed their new concerns on compensation, the 
plan, and relocation. They regarded their site as having a prime location, and given the 
generous package offered in Yunong, they wanted more (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011). 
274 Futian Urban Renewal Office (FURO), 2005, book 2: 79. 
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The internal conflict between the elected village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) and the 
villagers resulted in the denouncement of the signed guidelines agreement.
During the same period, a case had, coincidently, happened in a neighboring village. 
The owners of a “nail house”275 had requested to be compensated by the developer for 
their 6-story house, which was built in 1997 for 1.2 million RMB, based on the market 
value of the surrounding real estate. In 2007, they successfully received 12 million 
RMB from the developer. This was the highest-ever compensation for a nail house in 
China at the time. This case had a big impact on the negotiations in Gangxia village; 
with the expectation of increasing the compensation that the developers would be 
willing to hand out in the process of redevelopment, the support for the agreement 
by the villagers of Gangxia dropped from 85 percent to less than half. Along with this, 
the stagnating negotiations were also frustrating the developer. At this point, another 
deadlock kicked in and no real progress was made.
In 2008, because of the decline in the global economy, a majority of villagers was 
now in favor of the redevelopment plan; suddenly, the original “unfair” compensation 
package suggested by the authority seemed very appealing. The divided villagers finally 
signed the compensation agreement one by one. By 2009, 56 percent of legal property 
owners in Gangxia, involving 275 buildings, had signed the contract, and by the 2009 
deadline, the percentage was just over 91 percent. The whole process took more 
than 11 years (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011) (Figure 8.28). The final redevelopment of 
Gangxia village had created many millionaires and billionaires in one night, and this 
phenomenon was described as “Hundreds of old buildings go down and hundreds of 
super-rich stand up”276.
275 A nail house is a Chinese neologism for homes belonging to people (sometimes called “stubborn nails”) who 
refuse to make room for development.
276 According to the developer, the compensation (in cash) is estimated 23,800 RMB per m2 for commercial units 
and 12,800 RMB per m2 for residential units. 
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Figure 8.28 Images of the western section (Heyuan) of Gangxia village before (2009) and after (2011) demolition 
Source: Pu Hao (2012: 26).
The differences between the cases’ evolutional processes can yield many scenarios, 
but one principle shared by the developers, villagers, and authority is never changed: to 
pursue and to maximize the accumulation of land value.
The pull-and-push effect of property-based economic activities between factors 
that are caused by the insatiable demand of land for urban development and by 
the incompetent rental-housing provision of the authorities is recognized in the 
development histories of the urban village—in particular in the redevelopment of 
Gangxia village. Its strategic location allowed Gangxia villagers to negotiate with the 
government and the developer in a much stronger position than in Yunong village, 
resulting a much higher financial and political cost. However, to the private developers 
and the villagers, the ultimate goal was definitely set on economic outcomes while for 
the authorities removing urban villages and converting rural land into state land will 
certainly also bring in financial benefits in terms of land revenue as well as economic 
return from a regenerated and better-planned new district. 
On the other side of advocacy a warning is in order that the crisis beneath the simplified 
large-scale transformation could have negative long-term effects. In a city with a large 
floating population, houses in the rental market become the basic need of most of the 
floating population, and 63 percent of the population relies on housing by leasehold. 
Rental markets in Shenzhen can be divided into three categories: revolving housing 
provided by the government, commercial housing in the market, and rental housing 
in “villages”. Statistics shows the revolving housing directly provided to the floating 
population by the government accounts for only 0.8 percent in the rental-market sector 
while this category of housing is reserved for civil servants and registered populations. 
The shortage of affordable rental housing is a constraint that was foreseen after 
the redevelopment of the urban villages. This has built up an undesirable result for 
those who have been completely excluded from the redevelopment of urban villages, 
such as ordinary urban citizens and tenants. While the developers paid exceptional 
compensation during the redevelopment process, all these costs would be transferred 
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to the commercial products that would be built and sold; in this case, the negative 
consequence of costs of production being passed along to consumers, the private 
home owners.
From different perspectives, a soft approach to achieving the rehabilitation has been 
the study and concern of designers and scholars. URBANUS advocated rehabilitation 
using an alternative method277. In interviews, many planning bureau officials shared 
the same view of considering the potential value for the city. Compared to those 
“well-designed” cities that are driven by urbanization and globalization, these villages 
represent an extraordinary vitality in their physical and spatial configuration. They are 
not only places to live; they are also a basic workplace for the inhabitants. Residents 
can live and start small businesses in the same location—a situation that, under 
normal conditions, commercial areas cannot provide. And, as the inevitable outcome 
of the process of urbanization in China, urban villages are regarded as one of the basic 
housing types in the contemporary city.
One example of the relative success of renovation under the “soft” approach of 
regeneration is Dafeng village. Unlike the two aforementioned cases, Dafeng village 
is located just outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). With less market 
advantage in real estate development, Dafeng village seems to evolve itself in another 
direction.
Shenzhen was previously a beleaguered city located between the first and second 
frontier. Customs and checkpoints on both frontiers were passageways, connecting the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) to hinterland China and Hong Kong, around 
which a series of open or secret “economic zones” involving border trade gradually 
emerged278 (Jiang Jun 2011: 9). With regard to the rural development, the Chinese 
government promoted the pattern of “one brand in one village279” which is driven by 
the market, guided by the government, and corresponding to land reform in rural areas. 
The seemingly unlimited supply of rural surplus labor liberated from new rural policies 
combined with cheap land and foreign investment formed the dynamic model of 
China’s industrialization and urbanization in the first few decades of reformation and 
opening up. On this common ground, Dafeng village is nothing more than an emerged 
277 See URBANUS, Village/City: City/Village (Beijing: CEPP Press, 2006). 
278 For two decades, in the 80s and 90s, after the creation of SSEZ, people from the hinterland needed to hold a 
“border permit” to enter SSEZ; they passed through the “second frontier” checkpoint guarded by the army. 
279 “One brand in one village” (Chinese: 一村一品). 
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representative of China’s rural industries, which is composed of many variously 
specialized industrial villages. However, one of the main successful factors of Dafeng 
regeneration is its geographic location. 
Dafeng village, located at the foot of the mountains along the line of the second frontier 
just beyond the outskirts of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It covers 
an area of 0.4 km2 with approximately 300 native born villagers. During the late 80s, 
thanks to its position nearby the second frontier, Dafeng benefits from both Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen, and has become a foreign capital investment target in the backyard of a 
global market, since it is located outside of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), it is able 
to import labor resources from hinterland very conveniently.
In 1989, Huang Jiang, an art dealer from Hong Kong came to Dafeng, employed a 
few students to help with the fulfillment of an order for a series of oil painting and 
later brought the special industry of “oil painting reproduction” to Dafeng280. The 
increasing profits and orders attracted more and more workers. Similar to other 
township industries, after training the peasant workers into competent, artistically 
skilled workers, Dafeng integrated cheap labor from the hinterland and cheap rent in 
the urban villages, and pored out a vast amount of low-priced oil painting products 
entering the global market through convenient trade corridors (Zhou Hongmei 2011).
Dafeng village is situated at the interface between external capital and internal labor 
force, creating the conditions to establish “informal special zones” from the bottom up 
(Jiang Jun 2011). It was gradually transformed from countryside to industrial village 
and then to urban village. At the time, it was a totally spontaneous market behavior 
without establishing a systematic industrial cluster or industrial chain, relying mainly 
on traditional manufacturing industry. The per capita income was fairly low (Zhou 
Hongmei 2011: 21).
280 Huang Jiang moved in, taking about thirty apprentices with him. They specialized in producing copy 
paintings. Clients supplied the image and painters reproduced them by hand, often in large quantities. To 
increase efficiency, ensure uniformity and raise quality, Huang Jiang applied the principle of division of labor 
in the production process – apprentices were assigned and trained to paint specific parts of a painting. The 
production-line model became highly successful and orders poured in from America and Europe through 
intermediaries in Hong Kong. In 1992, Huang Jiang established his own company and employed over 2,000 
workers. Many of his apprentices soon started their own galleries and shops in Dafeng, recruiting migrants from 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei and China’s inner provinces that flooded into Guangdong in search of work. Art Radar Asia 
2012, available at http://artradarjournal.com/2012/02/29/dafen-art-village-part-i-from-copy-to-creative-
in-shenzen/.
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While the significance of the coastal Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was 
gradually weakened when its experimental experience was promoted throughout the 
country, Shenzhen had to search for a more sustainable development model beyond 
its glorious “border economy.” Shenzhen was eager to reorient itself into a “cultural 
industry base” as the prototype for policy support281. In Dafeng, the oil painting 
industry was also challenged by relentlessly rising rents. The Shenzhen government 
realized that guiding the village appropriately was a key factor for Dafeng’s future 
and that it was necessary to improve the oil painting industry chain and enhance the 
originality of the local industry. With these two considerations, the municipality of 
Shenzhen put in some investment, activated the urban space, restored the aged houses 
and improve the infrastructures etc. The “Dafeng model”, which is “driven by the 
market and led by the government”, was appropriately set up (Zhou Hongmei 2010: 
22) (Figure 8.29).
Figure 8.29 Images of Dafeng Village  
Source: Photos by author. 
281 In 2003, THE Shenzhen municipal government put forward the strategy of “building a culture-based city”, 
aiming to make the cultural industry the fourth-pillar industry. 
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Figure 8.29 Images of Dafeng Village  
Source: Photos by author. 
As the development of Dafeng village continued, in 2007, the Dafeng Art Museum 
invested was established and invested in by the government, as a symbolic “strong 
heart” for Dafeng village. This assignment was designed and implemented by 
URBANUS.282 Their strategy was to create a hybrid mix of different programs, including 
museum, shops, galleries, and other venues, with the intention to stimulate the 
interactive connections between the existing urban village and the new function of the 
museum. The main purpose was to create a breeding ground for contemporary art and 
also take on the more challenging role of blending the museum with the surrounding 
urban fabric in terms of spatial connections (Figure 8.30 and Figure 8.31).
282 For more about the design concept and details, see URBANUS (2006). 
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Figure 8.30 Site map of Dafeng Art Museum
Source: URBANUS
Figure 8.31 Connections between the Dafeng village and the newly developed housing project 
Source: URBANUS
With more than 800 galleries and 10,000 artists in Dafeng, 60 percent of the paintings 
are sold overseas and 40 percent in China. Dafeng village has become part of the 
Chinese export machine that makes Shenzhen one of the richest cities in China, and it 
is now recognized as a creative industry powerhouse.
What can be learned from Dafeng village is the force of informal, self-taught urbanism 
in urban villages, which was produced by a grassroots development that in turn seem 
to produce a whole—a community full of vitality. Diverse elements have contributed 
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to the “Dafeng model”: the self-stimulated transformation and upgrading of a creative 
industry, the appropriation of government involvement, and the introduction of a new 
community revitalization mode by including the participation of the villagers as well 
as the migrants. In addition, coming from outside Dafeng village,art dealers, buyers, 
and suppliers have all been participating in creating Dafeng’s informal urbanism and 
determining how this village is used and built, how it has made itself culturally unique 
and a place growing out of creation.
Dafeng was chosen as Shenzhen’s exhibition theme in the Urban Best Practice Area 
at World Expo 2010 Shanghai. It took two years for Shenzhen to obtain the chance 
to participate in World Expo 2010 after going through four rounds of planning 
and application. It tried to invoke the bottom-up narrative of the Chinese multi-
dimensional social transformation process. Shenzhen, over the past thirty years, 
and Dafeng, over twenty years, have embodied the repetition and fragmentation to 
compose their own original images. The transformation of the city and its image, 
through, produces a driving force in the cultural transformation of people and socio-
spatial productions.
As Liauw Wei Wu (2010:14) remarks, “the question of how original is Shenzhen 
or Dafeng therefore become less important than understanding how creative are 
the processes of change and transformation”. The simple fact is that the informal, 
unstable, flexible, absorptive process of urbanization can only be sustained through 
constantly changing what comes in and what comes out of the city in which the original 
pioneering spirit of Chinese urban planning culture can be sustainably carried on.
§ 8.5 A few Points for Reflection
Learning from the evolutionary process of developing and planning the CBD district 
of Shenzhen in the socio-spatial domain, some may argue that in the socio-spatial 
domain the production of space in the contemporary era manifests neoliberal 
tendencies. At first glance, the changes to China’s economy and society since 1979 
indeed seem to suggest a neoliberal trajectory—although its ethical status has not 
been demonstrated to be moving towards the kind applied in capitalist countries—
but the important is that socio-spatial mode of the CBD in Shenzhen is rooted in very 
different soil in comparison with the Maoist period.
As Wu Fulong (2007: 9) argues, Chinese cities have been integrated into global 
commodity production. It is this tight association with global production circuits 
that has laid down political and economic conditions similar to those at the core of 
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Western economics. The production of urban space is part of the new use of space 
as a medium to expand value accumulation. As a result, the shifting accumulation 
strategy is intensifying the competition for space. Because the city or its CBD is at 
the center of accumulation, the outcome is a severe economic competition between 
cities and within the city. The government and its planning department are now 
becoming the local “entrepreneurial agents” facilitating the realization of the shift in 
accumulation. Therefore, the new use of space as a medium to expand accumulation 
profoundly changes how the space is produced as well as the meaning of space. From 
state-led industrialization to urban-based accumulation, the city is used as a “fix” to 
absorb capital.
In addition, Chinese cities are now the testing ground for a new urbanism; whatever 
can be found in the world can almost all be found in Chinese cities also. Such a sense 
of ever-present newness is vividly illustrated by a senior planner in Shenzhen, talking 
about his attitude toward “foreign expertise” in urban design: “If foreigners want to 
come here to exchange their views, that’s fine. If they want to teach us how to do urban 
design, I don’t buy it. Here in Shenzhen we have done all the fanciest stuff that is just 
being talked of in the West.” (Wu Fulong 2007: 17).
The message clearly claims that, underneath the façade of the freedom to test foreign 
concepts in contemporary Chinese urban planning practice, urbanism is still under the 
authority of local implementation in which the invisible hand, in the form of planning 
control, depends not necessarily on the capital of a laissez-faire market alone but is 
certainly still under political control. In addition, despite criticisms that arose regarding 
the production of space in contemporary China, the appearance of the Generic City, as 
in many other cities in China, may not be a completely blind mistake of the planning 
authority, promoting the grandeur of socialist China without political awareness. 
Rather, it is often the authority’s allowance of leeway that determines the checks and 
balances of market-led versus politically led interventions.
OCT-Loft provides another insight into how the production of social space can be 
alternatively created in a context of innovation within the same socio-political system.
The success of the first phase of the OCT-Loft renovation has to be credited to diverse 
actors, new concepts, and a creative design approach. The originality of OCT-Loft was a 
unique phenomenon; a innovative creation based on the conjecture and spontaneous 
decisions of the developers and planners in combination with critical impetus 
from anyone participating in the process of building and using the space. Artists, 
designers, owners of shops, and citizens, whether staying for a long or short time, 
enjoy the ambiance of OCT-Loft. They come to appropriate the space in their own way 
and continue to reshape it. Contrary to the Futian CBD, OCT-Loft shows to a certain 
degree how spatial appropriation can be realized based on a collective participatory 
approach of urban development. In addition, the multi-functional program and the 
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human-scale spatial composition in combination with the promotion of the creative 
industry contributed to the rich and diverse spatial qualities of a new type of urbanity in 
Shenzhen—a city so far lacking of cultural accumulation. 
If the Futian CBD and OCT-Loft have shown how urban planning and design can be 
manageable to mediate the expectation from two planning forces with different 
intentions: intervention based on the top-down planned-interest, and flexible planning 
based on the ability to adjust to the bottom-up forces. The arising phenomena of urban 
villages—created as the by-products of Chinese rapid urban development—show a 
much wider scope in their social-spatial trajectories. The destiny of urban villages is 
closely connected to the greater transformation of China: the birth of the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), land reform, rural industrialization, rural migration 
and urbanization etc. Their (re)development reveals truly the complexity and hybridity 
of the contemporary urban questions, which have been left behind by the planning 
authorities in the earlier stages of speedy urban development.
The urban evolution of Shenzhen, to a certain degree, represents the alignment of the 
contemporary urban evolution based on China’s self-exploration of modernization; 
it helps us to indicate almost all the key concepts emerging during the great 
transformation from planned-economy rural China into an market-oriented urban 
one: experimental economic zones, rural-urban land reform, real-estate development, 
industrialization and rural-urban migration, emergence of the new phenomenon of 
the urban village, administrative decentralization etc., are continually challenging the 
overall legitimacy of the special Chinese political mechanism.
To maintain the political ideal of centralization and allowing the emerging urban 
culture to develop from an agricultural economy into a multi-functional economy, 
can contemporary China continue surpass beyond its own limits? It is a critical 
confrontation in reality, formed step-by-step through progressive reform. The theory 
of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” as practiced in China has to confront 
a fundamental issue of balance—for the economy in general and urban physical 
construction in particular—whether maintained by central planning or market 
mechanisms, and consequently the relationship between the state and the market, 
between the political authorities and the civilians; at this moment the definite picture 
cannot as yet be drawn. It shows conflicts with ideological inclinations as well as 
practical solutions.
To pursue progression beyond the economic success, the circumstances of socio-
spatial interaction are becoming much critical than ever in Chinese society. To retrieve 
the socio-spatial meaning for the people, in my opinion, is a much more powerful 
force to achieve the goal of political stability in a long-term perspective. The planning 
intervention confronts, in three projects, inevitably process of negotiation and 
compromising with involved actors. This learning process of socio-spatial interaction 
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is giving benefit not only to the planners who are now having more opportunities to 
realize and explore planning methods and approaches for building modern Chinese 
society, but also to civilians who are now playing important roles in shaping space and 
place that new social meaning can be retrieved. This social-spatial interaction shall 
be able to evolved in a relative stable political-economic framework in order to give 
the society enough space and time to reflect on what is the true meaningful space and 
place for modern China. This reflection shall be based on the review of the traditional 
value and access them in a systematic manner. The special historical evolution 
of Chinese civilization with the break of continuity shall be recovered by cultural 
resurrection and the gaps occurred by the historical matters shall be sutured by the 
awakening of people and by pursuing ethical value in Chinese tradition. Only by doing 
so, Chinese culture can become revival in the sense of being an entity of convergence 
and no longer a eclectic bricologe of Man han quan xi (a Chinese banquet)283. 
283 See Chapter 4.2.3. 
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9 Conclusions 
This chapter comprises three parts. The first part is to answer the research questions 
based on the findings from the investigations and analyses. The second part is to 
elaborate further the research findings in relation to the three entrances of the 
theoretical review. Both parts together bring the research conclusions about the 
Chinese planning characteristics between flexibility and reliability and provide an 
outline for the planning culture of the contemporary Chinese urban development.
§ 9.1 Answering the Research Questions 
Following the main research question, “How does urban planning in contemporary 
China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution under the (internal) initial 
conditions and within the (external) global society?” sub questions are proposed in 
relation to the research hypotheses, which reflect three research entrances of the 
transformation of the society, the transformation of the planning system and the 
implementation of the planning system in practice. In the following, they are answered 
and elaborated according to their respective order. 
§ 9.1.1 The Transformation of the Society: Critical Modernization 
Sub-hypothesis 1: The transformation of the Chinese society under the conditions of 
urbanization and globalization triggers the emergence of a new societal culture. This 
transformation cannot break off the evolution of modernization in relation to the 
historical roots, traditional norms and value systems of Chinese society.
Sub-question 1: What is the characteristic of the recent “cultural turn” of contemporary 
China? 
Whatever the factors involved, the urban structural changes needed to 
be validated by some instrument of authority if they were to achieve 
institutionalized performance. Whatever decision is made on the city, it is 
“ultimately political” even if it may be called economic (Heng 1999: 208).
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Despite other criteria that had contributed equivalently to speeding up the process of 
reform, political transcendence under the regime of Chinese communist leadership 
was one of the foremost crucial accelerators that triggered contemporary urban 
transformation—defined in this research as the “cultural turn” of Chinese society. 
In general, the transformation of contemporary China cannot be separated from 
the continuous evolution of Chinese modernization, which is situated within the 
broader context of the global society. Neither can it be disconnected from the root 
of Chinese tradition and history over the long course of its evolution. More precisely, 
this accelerated evolution formulates a critical284 modernization within contemporary 
China, which is a product of Chinese tradition as well as an alternative to Western 
paradigms. In comparison to other modernization movements that have taken place in 
Chinese modern history, the critical modernization of its current evolution has derived 
various meanings.
Firstly, all initiatives of the modernization movements—at the stage of the first 
modernization of Westernization; during the second stage of the Reform Movement 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century as well as during the May 4th Cultural 
Movement at the beginning of the twentieth century—were commonly triggered by 
the stance on European modernity285 (Golden 2006: 8) and by the forces of foreign 
invasion that had provoked a painful experience as a result of Chinese colonialism286. 
The critical modernization of contemporary China refers to the current period in which 
the seed of modernity can be bred under a relatively stable socio-political environment. 
Although globalization worldwide and the urbanization of China are bringing China 
both challenges and opportunities in relation to general modernization, its relative 
political stability has also allowed Chinese modernity to evolve its own course without 
being dramatically traumatized by other arbitrary forces. Moreover, for the first time, 
it has provided Chinese society an opportunity for the movement of modernization to 
evolve its natural course, based on self-initiative of the people, although it is confined 
within a more complex global society.
284 Lefaivre Liane and Tzonis Alexander (2003) Critical Regionalism. New York: Prestel Verlag
285 Modernity in the Western context is a product of the historical and cultural forces that produces the 
enlightenment, forces of European histories and cultures that were different from those of China. Investigations 
of Chapter 3.1.2 illustrate the differences of recognition of subjectivity and objectivity between the Chinese and 
Western tradition. 
286 See more about Chinese modernization movements in Chapter 4.1.1. 
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Secondly, under the circumstances of a transitional evolution, resistance to 
accepting the paradigm of European modernity as being “universal” is also one of 
the consequences of the critical modernization within contemporary China. A debate 
emerged about “Asian values” or “Chinese values” that has become a flourishing 
component of the current discourse. The reason for this development is that a very 
large portion of the world’s population is not willing to consider values that have 
been inherited from the European discourse as universally applicable, as many 
have suffered from the consequences of imperialism and (post-)colonialism. In this 
sense, the specific historical evolution stands in relation to the challenges of China’s 
current position. It has reinforced a critical modernization to evolve in an inevitable 
process of self-exploration in order to bridge the break in the cultural evolution and to 
simultaneously revamp the traditional values. This self-exploration, which tries to find 
a new position of cultural equivalence within the global society, while being confronted 
with forces of internal and external circumstances, is similar in countries such as China 
that were influenced by post-colonial conditions in their urban developments.
Thirdly, the critical modernization of contemporary China has great impact on the 
shifting interests in political decision-making, social critique and the people’s value 
systems. The last four decades allowed China to evolve its critical modernization in a 
relatively stable socio-political environment. This has changed the general positions 
and insights of the people towards the predominantly Western-centered value system 
as well as traditional Chinese norms and self-awareness. While being aware of and 
learning from its very own history of modernization, China has learned to sustain the 
evolution of modernity. China is following is a gradual reformation based on various 
stages of liberalization step by step as shown in Chapter 5. This way it avoids past 
mistakes and a potentially abrupt collapse of political institutions as well as the sudden 
demise of the entire system. This gradual reformation allows the market-oriented 
economy to be much slower and cautious than elsewhere in the post-communist 
world. As a result, based on the political accountability achieved by new modes of 
enhancing political guidance and public participation, a fusion of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics is gradually unfolded, although its essential meaning has not 
yet been interpreted comprehensively in the discourse.
Fourthly, for a country like China which has experienced numerous societal set-backs, 
the provision of social stability seems to be convincing the majority of the Chinese people 
that a political system with only one ruling party could be maintained for a long time. 
However, one can already detect the challenges of this system. Although the Communist 
Party conveys the people its sincerity in pushing forward diverse reformation policies$1, 
a fundamental understanding regarding questions in relation to the Western concept of 
democracy are still vague and weak in current Chinese society. Nevertheless, cautiously 
the reciprocal relationship between social progression and political legitimacy is a 
consensus among the current Chinese leaders, which had been ignored by former feudal 
regimes as well as under the Maoist advocacy of class struggle. 
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Sub-question 2: How is it related to the specific development of Chinese society? 
Despite the abovementioned derivations, similar to any other transitional period in 
Chinese modern history, critical modernization has a fundamental characteristic of 
being transitive and culturally inalienable. This means that the current situation of 
critical modernization is embedded within a similar formation as in the past stages of 
modernization. This transitive characteristic like any other early stage of modernization 
movement is identified in the following as a Chinese specificity.
Firstly, although the current Chinese society seems to become more open to the global 
society and to its people, the remaining political and ethical spirit of contemporary 
China is not much different from the situation that these regimes have shared 
commonly, striving to survive potential forfeiture of their legitimate right—in order to 
maintain the “routinization of charisma” (Weber 1947), which has been elaborated in 
Chapter 3.2.1.
Secondly, throughout the consistent institutional reformations that are guided by the 
Communist Party, the self-initiated political reformation proves to be able to generate 
for the overall majority of the people—at least in general terms on a countrywide 
level—economic benefits. On the one hand, the importance of this political effort 
apparently shows that the Chinese government has played a very pro-active role as 
initiator in the framework of institutional reform since 1978287. On the other hand, 
following the track of reformation, China, by political enunciation, re-entered the 
world-system in 1972 from a relatively stronger economic and political strength. These 
actions were not taken without deliberate steps by the collective leadership of the 
Communist Party, as Perry Anderson (2010: 77) argued: 
At the gateway to their reforms, perhaps the most decisive of all the differences 
between Russia and China lay in the character of their political leadership. 
In command of the PRC was not an isolated, inexperienced functionary, 
surrounded by aids and publicists infused with a naïve Schwärmerei for all that 
was Western, but battle-hardened veterans of the original Revolution, leaders 
who had been Mao’s colleagues, and had suffered under him, but had lost 
none of their strategic skills or self-confidence (…) Collectively, they were in 
a strong position, enjoying not only the prestige of their roles in the Civil War 
and building of the nation, but the popularity of having brought the Cultural 
Revolution to an end, which was met with a surge of relief in the cities.
287 This has been shown in Chapter 4.3.
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From the perspective of the ruling classes, this collective leadership of the Party-state led 
by Deng Xiaoping and reformists had crucially learned its lessons from Chinese history 
of modernization: in order to secure their political legitimacy, it is crucial to sustain the 
national economy, and for the people to overcome a miserable state of poverty which 
stemmed from a crucial failure that the former regimes had been unable to avoid.
From a public perspective, only a small minority of marginalized academics have 
publicly spoken about democratic regime changes through the introduction of a 
multi-party system. The majority of intellectuals, however, discuss political reforms 
within the framework of a single party system (Golden 2006). Similar ethical values 
towards politics can be recognized from the majority of intellectuals in the second 
modernization288. It provides a cogent illustration of the Chinese philosophical root: 
the inherent right of authority based on Tian-Ming (the Mandate of Heaven), which 
has been elaborated in Chapter 3.1.2. This means that in Chinese tradition it is only 
allowed to overthrow the reigning monarch by replacement if a regime fails to fulfill its 
duty, thus the forfeiture implies the “legitimate” right to rebel against the sovereign. 
This also confirms the legitimacy of its ruling status; the communist leadership has 
to fulfill the overall responsibility by aiming at the common prosperity of all people, 
continuously raising the material and cultural living standards of the people.
From a philosophical standpoint, based on Confucius’ advocacy of the social order and 
moral and ethical value, in Chinese tradition, the ethical spirit emphasizes the value of 
communalism more than that of individualism. Individualism and liberalism are two 
important elements of Western civilization. The concept of freedom can be described 
as one of the main ideological pillars of Western society. On the contrary, the Chinese 
ideal of liberalism is more a unity of social morality, which is underpinned by proper 
social relationships—social manner, responsibility and status—between the different 
social classes to build up a social order in which a society is based on the unity of Ren 
(benevolence) and Li (propriety), which has been elaborated in Chapter 3.1.2.
Although the critical modernization of contemporary China has produced various 
new meanings for the Chinese people, in general, the fundamental ethical spirit of 
Confucianism has deeply influenced the structures of their mentalities and thus has 
become and still is a sort of collective sub-consciousness. In that sense, the pattern 
of political ethics among the current Party-state Communists is similar to that of the 
288 The belief in top-down reform through the authority and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy can be 
found among the bourgeois reformists in the second modernization movement See Chapter 4.1.1, Tan Sitong 
(1865-1898) called for the breaking off of the feudal trammels. Nonetheless, neither Yan Fu nor Tan Sitong did 
call for the abrogation of monarchism, still believing in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. 
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Maoist period and feudalism. In fact, the political formation has been a fusion between 
dynamic influences of internal and external factors over time. Yet the transition within 
a critical modernization in the context of the particular political and administrative 
formation under the current structure of Party-state Communism is still exhibited and 
bound up with a special Chinese value system, which never really disappeared.
The pattern of political ethics implies that the Confucian ethical spirit regarding the social 
order and the legitimate right of the ruling classes inherent from Tian-Ming (the Mandate 
of Heaven) is still strongly influencing today’s political ethics and public consensus. The 
current communist regime regards its legitimacy as being empowered by the Li (propriety) 
as long as it can fulfill its legitimate role by providing Ren (benevolence) to the people. 
In this sense, the application of reform to improve the country’s overall economy and 
people’s living conditions are regarded as the political approach of Ren (benevolence).
Hence, the cultural transition dealing equally with modernization and tradition can be 
described as one coin with two opposing sides.
Tradition is not an unchangeable matter, but rather a living existence that is continually 
reinterpreted in the evolution of civilization, also in China. Tradition illustrates that the 
cultural continuity that extends into the evolution of a civilization is a valuable entity 
far beyond the way a temporary political break could ever really cause traumatization. 
As we interpret the meaning of modernization in contemporary China and try to 
compare it with the discourse of Western modernity, the overriding importance of 
culture and tradition should be fundamentally taken into account.
Modernity is originally referred to as a break in Western history that occurred during 
the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation when science began to flourish in 
contrast to religion and superstition as an alternative system of knowledge. Hubert-Jan 
Henket (2202:6) argued that, 
(…) continuity and tradition, the two strongholds which had thus far guided 
communal and individual life, were increasingly pushed aside by progress, 
dynamic change and transitoriness; a fleeting state of being with enormous 
consequences for politics, economics, the sciences, the arts, religion and 
morality.
The current situation of the influence of critical modernization in contemporary China 
may be compared to the Tang-Song transition and other transitional periods in Chinese 
history. To respect the transitive and inalienable characteristic of the critical modernization 
of contemporary China is how the “cultural turn” is defined in this research. The “cultural 
turn” implies that the cultural and traditional continuity is evolving from the past to 
the present on the one hand, and refers to its transitive and impulsive characteristics of 
transformation that is mediating towards the future development on the other. 
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Foremost, the special characteristic of the “cultural turn” have to mediate change 
from past to future and to confront traditions with liberal ideas, resulting in the critical 
modernization of contemporary China containing several contradicting values.
Different traditions, and different patterns of modernization can result in social 
processes that are varied distinctively in individual societies. In general, however, 
modernization has certain universal value standards. Shang Zhiying (1997: 51) 
has listed: 
1) Knowledge: rational methods, sciences and the spirit of science; 2) politics: 
democracy and rule by law; 3) economy: competition, standardization and 
specialization of production, revolution of sciences and techniques are the 
major agents of economic development; 4) society: urbanization, bureaucratic 
administration, contractual association; and 5) mind: the full development of 
individuality, a spirit of self-realization, awareness of competition.
In contrast to these standards, negative aspects can be recognized in the Confucian 
ethical spirit. In order to smooth the transitional process of the critical modernization 
of contemporary China and avoid contradicting values, inevitably, Chinese tradition 
must begin a dialogue with modernization and carry out a dialectic interrelation. 
Within this process a new ethical spirit, outlook on values, and moral norms can arise.
China’s political, social and cultural formation is still under development. Therefore, 
different scenarios are advocated by those who plead for either liberalism or anti-
Westernism and nationalistic standpoints. Among Chinese intellectuals both remain 
respectable values. I am convinced that the enrichment of a dialectic approach is 
one of the core mechanisms of the current critical modernization that could ease the 
overwhelming cultural turn of contemporary China.
It is the first time in Chinese history of modernization that such spirit does not 
necessarily fall into the side of contradictions between a distinct rightness and 
wrongness but transcends the recognition based on the evolution of self-exploration 
and self-awareness. In contrast, it opens a channel for possible dialogue and creative 
transformation countrywide and worldwide, between tradition and modernization. It is 
in such a dialectic spirit of critical modernization and the correspondent cultural turn 
that planning culture of the contemporary China is nurtured. 
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§ 9.1.2 The Transformation of the Planning System: Establishing the Law-and 
Plan-based System
Sub-hypothesis 2: The transformation of the Chinese society—defined as the “cultural 
turn”—is an on-going process that is leading the country towards a society in which 
urban development and spatial planning are confronted with the increasing tension 
between the public and private claims.
Sub-question 3: Which changes and challenges have the “cultural turn” generated for 
Chinese urban development and planning? 
Almost immediately, an overwhelming reformation was taking after the late 1970s 
in many dimensions. Chapter 5 provides extensive descriptions of how based on the 
changing political, economic and social circumstances, urban development is guided 
by step-by-step political intervention and supervision.
First of all, the dualistic land system between the urban and rural developments is now 
becoming a topic of political concern with regard to the socio-spatial integration. In 
particular, in the process of Chinese urbanization urban-rural land reform inevitably 
has to seek the balance between the increasing demands for future urban development 
and the living circumstances and property rights of the rural inhabitants.
Economic reform based on the early stages of promotion of foreign direct investment 
and the opening-up of the Chinese economy to the world market, generated a 
particularly drastic impact on the Chinese political and economic decision-making 
process. This further increased after China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 2001289. While foreign competition has provided a powerful force 
in reducing bureaucracy and inertia within Chinese economic institutions, it 
also triggered an institutional reform of the economy such as the reformation of 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by increasing efficiency through privatization and 
decentralization in correspondence with economic reality. In parallel, however, firms 
that fail to compete are forced to find ways to downsize, reorganize or adopt new 
technologies and new ways of management in order to survive (see Chapter 5.3). 
Nationwide, further pressure arises from outside as various states are asking China to 
adapt its legal and economic system. These requests are mostly in relation to lowering 
import-tariffs and providing legitimate investment mechanisms in order to permit 
289 See Chapter 5.3.2 for more details.
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foreign firms to sell directly on the Chinese market. It has also given reasons for the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
On the other hand, the economic transformation impacts socio-spatial aspects as well. 
In combination with sequential effects and impacts from external and internal forces 
as well as local initiatives, it has consequently created a cultural fusion of hybridity 
in contemporary Chinese society, thereby changing the life-styles of people and the 
way in which spatial environments are perceived. Socially, the Hukou system reform 
had resulted in massive rural-to-urban migration (see Chapter 5.4) and emerged 
urban villages (see Chapter 8.3.) Spatially, the emergence of urban agglomerations 
has produced new economic poly-centralities as new emerging urban conditions (see 
Chapter 5.5) and the application of the CBD concept for economic accumulation (see 
Chapter 8.1) as well as the promotion of cultural industry and creative districts for city 
branding like the OCT-Loft in Shenzhen (Chapter 8.2).
In the earlier stage of reform, domestic sources of investment were the main means that 
were urged into the market economy. Within this framework, State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) played an important role. However, there is a double meaning behind this 
development.
Firstly, even though the path of self-exploration of the economic formation based on the 
advocacy of Deng Xiaoping was defined, relatively new mechanisms still needed to be built 
up. Further, to what extent the new market-oriented economy can be realized within this 
fusion with the existing planned economy system is still uncertain. Therefore, activating the 
former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pilot the testing market was a less risky approach.
Secondly, from an outsider’s perspective on China, there were still high doubts about 
its silent reforms as China began opening up its markets. It shows that an important 
factor that has a decisive influence on the reform lies in the political accountability 
under which the role of the government can be transformed from controllers 
and regulators to market-oriented constructors. Under socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, as part of the changing role of the government, reform and privatization 
of the former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) system have demonstrated the political 
determination for economic reform, which has become one of most crucial initiatives 
in the process of marketization, although large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) still 
remain under the management of the central government290.
290 See Chapter 5.3.3. Zhua Da Fang Xiao (Chinese: 抓大放小). Large enterprises include natural monopoly 
industries such as telecommunications and railroad transportation and governmental monopoly industries 
such as airlines, banks, electricity, oils and petrochemicals.
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Furthermore, in rural and urban land reforms that have been illustrated in Chapter 5.1 
in general, and in Chapter 7.1 with the Shenzhen experimental approach in particular, 
one group of participants that experienced strongly the effects of market reformation 
were the rural residents and peasants. Both the land tenure system of the rural area 
and the transfer of land as a commodity into the market in urban areas had great 
impact on the land expropriation and distribution system. Urban villages, as shown 
in Chapter 8.3, prove to be a representative evidence of such push and pull effects 
between the urban and rural development. Being aware that the rural reform is critical 
for the long-term evolution of Chinese urbanization, the obstacles and challenges will 
most likely not be less than the with reform in the urban areas.
In addition, housing reform had a big impact on the former housing distribution 
system. In the first stage of policy-oriented housing reform, the government had to deal 
with the interrelationship between the state, worker’s unions and individuals and their 
respective interests. In the second stage, when housing became a genuine commodity, 
workers were able to afford market housing of their choice based on increased wages. 
Today, this has reached the stage of a matured market economy in which private 
investors and developers have largely taken over the provision of housing. Certainly, 
learning from the three selected case studies, both constraints and progressions are 
recognized. For example, large-scale housing construction does not substantially 
reduce the housing shortage in urban China. The rapid increase of housing prices and 
speculation in the housing market can possibly lead to the development of a housing 
bubble with detrimental effects.
Real estate investment and trading is becoming a speculator’s game that is played 
by the state, other government levels, citizens, investors, developers and planners. 
Nevertheless, China is a large country with substantial differences that exist between 
cities regarding social and economic development. A specific policy can be very 
successful in some cities and yet fail in others. In the case of housing reform, for 
example, if the housing policy at the national level is stipulated in detail, it might 
turn out to be impractical at local levels. In order to confront the diverse groups 
of participants who are involved in the planning process, great efforts carried out 
by the local government can be recognized in the case of Shenzhen. Chapter 7.2 
“Planning Shenzhen in Practice” shows that during the past forty years abundant 
local ordinances, regulations and plans were drafted, prepared and issued by the local 
government in order to bridge the gap between the theoretical plans of the central 
government and actual local practices. Many bold and creative instruments of planning 
application, which were developed first based on the Shenzhen experience were later 
introduced on a national scale.
Being embedded in the context of critical modernization of contemporary China, the 
role of planning gained its new meaning and is no longer merely an instrument to 
serve the planned economy but is rather becoming a new discourse of knowledge. In 
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general, political interests imply that planning policy still serves to provide an executive 
framework for the economy, including allocation of resources, regulations and laws, 
yet the current economy is no longer the closed system it used to be during the period 
of the planned-economy. Instead, the market economy requires a multi-dimensional 
approach and guidance. Under these circumstances, planning has to cope with 
multiple dynamic factors as well.
In addition, regarding decentralization the market economy allows planning professions 
to spread their influence throughout the socio-spatial domain more than ever. The 
wider-range of public participation in the planning domain asks for a system of openness, 
fairness, justice, legalization, rationalization and sensibility. This has challenged the 
former planning system to become more transparent and regenerative. In other words, 
urban planning is becoming a part of the socio-spatial activities of a society in which the 
aforementioned continual process of critical modernization is evolving.
In order to serve public policies and to evolve as a part of its social activities, the new 
planning discourse has to reflect and articulate Chinese conditions and challenges. 
It must relate to a fusion of the complex characteristics of contemporary China in 
particular and the global society in general.
Planning decisions, as an influential mechanism of directing socio-spatial results, 
often have to be made based on a reflexive capacity in mediating between “desirable” 
and “undesirable” interests, traditional and newly emerging values and norms, as well 
as internal and external influences and public and private demands. Therefore, very 
often the driving forces behind planning implementation lead to many incoherent 
prescriptions. This requires the current premature state of the Chinese planning 
discourse to be reconstructed and permanently adjusted based on considering 
compromises between the alternatives. This spirit of a reflexive evolvement 
with possible contradicting characteristics is often recognized in Chinese urban 
development as well as in planning approaches.
Sub-question 4: How has the planning system been adapted to the new situation? 
(What kind of planning institutions has been installed? What are the responsibilities 
and tasks? What kind of plans has been developed?)
As Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are taking these questions into account from the central and 
local scope respectively, hereby they are elaborated in a rather more reflexive manner.
In general, political reform is the key initiative for an opening-up policy. Chapter 5.2 
Political Reformation and Chapter 6.1.3 Hierarchical Structure of Governance provide 
extensive illustrations of the major methods that China has adapted to confront these 
new situations. On a political level, the central policy applied to the overall reformation 
i
 427 Conclusions 
is based on a “gradualism” and “learning by doing” strategy. However, it is important 
to specify its essence of spirit, as it is not as simple as it appears to be. It is neither a 
conventional approach nor is it a “laissez-faire” attitude. On the contrary, it is a very 
bold progression with highly reflexive control mechanisms within the Party-state led 
government.
For example, in relation to the steps, which were taken by the Party-state led 
government during the typical Five-Year Plans (FYPs) (see Chapter 6.2.3 System of 
Plans) it shows how permanent adjustments were applied in policies. Reflexively, the 
key emphasis was given to testing each step in particular projects before they could 
be implemented throughout the country. Although mistakes and problems had been 
made and recognized, this experimental approach and the strong synchronization 
between policy-adaption and a careful monitoring of social development contributed 
to the reduction of high failure risks. Currently, the power of control on a macro-scale 
is still in the hands of the Party-state government. Nevertheless, the efficiency and the 
result might either be positive or negative, as phrased in Deng Xiaoping’s own words 
that “a certain degree of leeway is unavoidable”.
Among all of the reforms, one of the main evidences that reflect such political spirit is 
the revision of the Constitution. Seen as the “mother of all laws” in China, the Chinese 
Constitution sets the framework for legal developments. Since its adoption in 1982, 
it has in total been revised four times.291 With each amendment, a breakthrough in 
the setting of the amendment has been significant for the further development of the 
country292.
For example, amendments adopted in 1988, 1993 and 1999 reflect a continuing 
conceptual evolution of socialism in China. The 1999 amendments prove the existence 
of a consensus among the Communist Party of China leadership on the nature of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which provides further legal protection to 
“capitalist” economic practices. Then the revision of 2004 indicates a certain distinct 
confidence of the Chinese leadership in pursuing its own vision of socialism. It shows 
that the revision of the Chinese Constitution highly reflects the demands of the 
situation. It carries a strong political message that can be revised based on providing 
the overall framework for the legal development and status when it is necessary, 
and this “immediate call for reversion” can be recognized in Chapter 5. 2 Political 
Reformation.
291 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004.
292 See more information about the amendment of Chinese Constitution, Chen Jianfu (2004).
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Based on the significance of the Chinese political situation and particularly after the 
phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” advocated by Deng Xiaoping, the 
interrelation between the function of planning and its political status has even been 
better defined. Planning approaches and the adjustment of planning methods respond 
to the new confrontations in the spirit of “gradualism”, “learning by doing” strategy 
and an “experimental” approach. Based on this foundation, new planning approaches 
and methods are created and practiced.
In general, the new establishment of institutions and plans can be summarized in two 
categories and within two hierarchies: 
The two categories are the law- and the plan-based system with each its responsible 
institutions. These two established categories are embedded within the hierarchical 
structure of the central administrative and the local administrative systems.
 Due to the evolution of the market-oriented economy, a law-based planning system 
is becoming more and more important. Illustrations of the planning system in Chapter 
6.2 show that China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented 
economy has necessitated the development of a legal system capable of fostering 
and protecting economic headway. Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, 
its legal system has undergone an unprecedented expansion with the promulgation 
of a multitude of commercial and civil laws at a national and local scale. In the early 
stage of reformation, largely because of a shifting distribution of authority among 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), the State Council and sub-national people’s 
congresses, the legislative arena was populated by actors with self-interests and uneasy 
power relationships who were engaged in institutional wars at virtually every stage 
of the law making process. Faced with the possibility of legislative disorder derailing 
modernization, in the early 1990s, China’s leadership gradually began to consider 
a law on law making to set out a clearly defined and uniform legal hierarchy. This 
includes three levels: 1) the Chinese Constitution and all laws that are based on it; 2) 
the administrative ordinances declared by the State Council; 3) the local ordinances 
declared by the local people’s congress, the local regulations issued by the local 
government and the sectional regulations issued by the ministries and committees of 
the State Council (see Chapter 6.2.2).
Following the same law-based spirit, in the planning domain two major milestones 
of planning legislation were defined: the Land Management Law and the Urban 
Planning Law (Urban and Rural Planning Law). Within this framework, Chapter 6.2.2 
Legal System and Administrative System of Planning, shows how the legal system 
of urban planning is divided into a vertical and horizontal structure. It also shows 
how the relative authorities and their responsibilities are defined based on the 
legislative system.
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Chapter 6.2.3 System of Plans shows three major components of plans that are related 
to China’s spatial policies. Clearly defined from the macro- to the micro-economic 
scale, the main priority of spatial policy is to strengthen the integration of land use 
planning in urban and rural areas. This policy also reflects the reformation of the 
administrative system in relation to spatial planning. Corresponding to the vertical 
hierarchical administrative system from the national to the local level, the structure of 
statutory plans is defined.
Furthermore, the implementation of urban planning also is regulated by the law-
based framework as well. Three steps of implementation including “Proposal for 
site-choosing”, “Land-use Planning Permit” and “Construction-project Planning 
Permit” are installed in order to compensate for the lack of supervision power among 
the local government in the market-oriented planning system. Newly installed systems 
to monitor and evaluate the planning procedures and implementation underline the 
importance of public participation. This can only be sustained by addressing the law 
and protecting it in the Constitution.
All the efforts are aiming to leading Chinese society towards a “democratic centralism”, 
science and legalization. The process of planning formulation, decision, administration 
and supervision is based on the same principle.
§ 9.1.3 The Implementation of the Planning System in Practice: The Conception of a 
New Urbanism
Sub hypothesis 3: The implementation of planning in practice in China now is facing 
the challenge to keep a balance between political and societal demands in relation to 
the planning outcome.
Sub-question 5: Which new challenges have the implementation of the planning system 
confronted on the level of local execution? 
The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) demonstrates to other countries 
that the market-oriented economy has been practiced under “democratic centralism” 
China. In comparison to the former Maoist period, the most rigid change among all 
other factors is to allow new user groups participation in the urban development 
process. However, the real boost of the market upheaval took place after Deng 
Xiaoping’s “south tour” in 1992. It reveals the important breakthrough of Deng 
Xiaoping’s advocacy on the definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. 
By recalling his renowned phrase “the practice of using a planned economy is not 
equivalent to socialism because there is also planning under capitalism; but the 
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practice of using a market economy is not equivalent to capitalism because there are 
also markets under socialism”293, it becomes clear how much he had broken through 
the shackles of all political confusions at that time in relation to the debate on which 
direction was supposed to be followed as this had been uncertain among the group of 
leaders in the earlier stages of reform.
Being embedded in “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, since the first day of 
the establishment, urban planning in Shenzhen has always been about “trying by 
doing”. On the one hand, it has to fulfill the mission of being the testing ground for 
market economy in China, at the same time it is asked to follow the overall economic 
framework of the planned economy. On the other hand, the role of Shenzhen as 
an experimental base is to spontaneously adapt to the local conditions of market 
demands, yet it still has to be controlled by the central government. Very often, 
decision-making and planning formation have to bridge the conflicts between these 
two demands, either by compromising or with creative innovation and ideas.
Accordingly, since the first day of its establishment up until today, the build up of 
an experimental spirit, based on an efficient administrative planning system, has 
become the main challenge for the Shenzhen municipal government and its planners. 
Frequent administrative reforms, analyzed in Chapter 7.2.1 Planning Administration 
and Management” show that planning practice in reality cannot solely count on rigid 
and descriptive policies. Instead, a bold and open-minded learning by allowing for 
bottom up initiatives is weighted as equally important. Plans and regulations had to 
be prepared and adjusted consistently in order to meet the radical urban development 
and growth.
The establishment of the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) System and the 
Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) as a legal organization for planning 
approval and review is a crucial step to transfer statutory technical planning regulations 
to the actual execution of spatial construction. In particular, it that recognized in the 
planning procedures and decision-making processes, varied participants, including 
officials, developers, experts and citizens have to be included. However, this bold 
urban planning jurisdiction is constrained by the specific Chinese political system, 
which reflects again the contradictions between the aforementioned planned and 
market system294.
293 See Chapter 7.1.1
294 See Chapter 7.2.3. 
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The spirit of the Shenzhen approach has been revealed both in Shenzhen’s planning 
system and the planning implementation, which were built up based on local initiatives 
in order to confront emerging conflicts within the daily planning practice.
Unlike the planning system on the central level, planning system and planning 
implementation on the local level of execution has to deal with the emerged demands 
between the public and private realms on a daily basis, while it also has a direct 
influence to shape the social spaces and to confront the individual actors who are now 
allowed to participate in the process of urban development. In the case of Shenzhen 
and in the political framework of China, we can conclude that planning organizations 
on the municipal level play an important role to mediate the spatial demands of the 
collective actions of the “individuation” and “communalism” from the bottom up.
However, no matter if the approaches could be described as a trial and error process, 
the current situation is characterized by a more informal, unstable, flexible and 
absorbing process of urbanization that can only be sustained through continuous 
changes. To a certain degree, these changes relate to the uncertainty of what comes in 
and out of the city and are the foremost challenges for Chinese urban development, in 
particular for the local execution in planning practice.
Sub-question 6: How does the planning intervention contribute to the reshaping of the 
socio-spatial urban development between different spatial demands of actors? 
Based on the analyses of the three projects that are selected for socio-spatial inquiries, 
the development of these three projects illustrates how the flexible planning approach 
can contribute to shaping the urban development in a completely different way.
In the case of the Central District of Futian, the scale is far bigger than in the other 
two cases. The force of the planning intervention is very much based on the top-down 
approach—a clear political and economic vision—in a span of more than 20 years 
and from a regional down to a detailed plan scale as well as building construction 
implementation. In the different stages, planning concepts and planning methods 
were used in order to boost the site development from scratch. Clearly, the long-
term future vision was given in the master plan, which was made in 1986. However, 
the different moments where international consultants were involved as well as the 
introduction of urban design can be regarded as the most decisive elements that have 
made the project a real breakthrough.
What the planners and investors have learned is that under such planning control, 
reality does not always follow the blue print. The case of Phoenix Service shows that 
planning intervention does not need to be implemented in a hard way. On the contrary, 
negotiation skills sometimes can result in a better solution. The art of negotiation and 
compromise is becoming a crucial instrument of urban planning and urban design 
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practice, and now is recognized as such by Chinese planners, designers and investors. 
It is a new learning experience for the Chinese planners, in particular compared to the 
generation who had obtained a planning education and experience in practice that 
was still based on the political ethics of the Maoist planned-economy. Throughout 
the process of planning intervention, social concerns in the spatial domains gradually 
became the core subject of urban planning and urban design. 
The case of OCT-Loft has many interesting elements of how a creative project is born. 
The creativity has been expressed not only in its spatial quality but also in the process 
of its production. Urban regeneration and urban renewal are among, the important 
subjects in contemporary urban development. However, in Chinese experience, very 
often these have been misunderstood as conservation. This makes the OCT-Loft project 
a special case. Within a young city like Shenzhen, which permanently tends to pursue 
the newest developments, nobody expected that such a creative project based on the 
local history could be realized. It shows from the very beginning that the development 
strategy of OCT-Loft involved all parties: the developer, the art museum, artists, 
curators, architects, planners and inhabitants. The success of the OCT-Loft renovation 
has to be accredited to a diversity of actors, new concepts and a creative design 
approach in general. For example, the commissioned architectural firm URBANUS 
proposed an appropriate design concept which enabled the preservation of the old 
warehouse buildings while transforming the area into a recreation center for Shenzhen. 
This open-minded approach appears to have been presented among all the parties 
involved and in charge at that time. It reveals further evidence of how a participatory 
planning mechanism is developed among the diverse actors. A dynamic participation 
of different actors under a flexible mechanism of the planning intervention enabled the 
originality of the OCT-Loft project. And within this evolution, planning has to be able to 
give space to unexpected creativity and synergies. Creativity only has effect, if creative 
ideas also can be realized. That means city also has to offer space for implementation. 
This space first of all has to be affordable, in particular space for new and small 
enterprise, where start-ups of creative industry can grow. It represents perhaps the 
epitome of how a city could or should evolve that the availability of public space for 
encounter, communication, exchange, but also for exhibitions, presentations and all 
kinds of the diverse activities that people can create and develop. 
The third case of the urban village has the most radical characteristics and unique 
constellation. The cases that have been shown in Shenzhen are not representative 
for other regions in China. Furthermore, different processes and results have been 
distinctive among the villages in one city. One should be aware that each is an 
individual development, even though the source of the cause is similar to many others.
Urban villages are the by-products of urban development in general. Normally, this 
type of by-product is the most challenging for the planning discipline. The main issues 
that urban villages have provoked are far beyond what local planning interventions 
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are able to solve. It involves entire national policies regarding the rural and urban 
development. As a result, the socio-spatial complexity, which emerged in the evolution 
of the urban villages, asks for far more than just physical redevelopment. Furthermore, 
in comparison with other cases, the problems that emerge in the urban villages are the 
most critical issues that the Chinese government must urgently respond to. It reveals a 
critical issue in which the central leadership is apparently still awaiting a manual that 
can be followed similar to that of Deng’s bold statement in 1992. The question of how 
to deal with social justice is still a very sensitive issue in China, especially because it 
involves massive numbers of farmers and their collective land rights.
In the case of Shenzhen, the extremely dynamic adjustments required within the 
planning interventions are obvious. In the early stages, the government had to 
compromise the restrictions on housing in the areas of the urban villages due to 
the fact that low-cost housing was in such extreme demand on the rental market. 
Consequently, urban villages are continually becoming disconnected urban fragments. 
When the Comprehensive Planning Guidelines for Urban Villages Redevelopment 
2005-2010 was released in 2005, it showed a clear political determination to react 
to circumstances in practice for the first time. Based on this guideline and taking 
into account the practical problems of everyday life, the government is reconsidering 
the application of urban regeneration and creative urban renewal methods instead 
of referring to further enforcement of regulatory measures. This means that in any 
urban renewal process an individual and adaptive approach is required. This individual 
adaptive approach can be recognized in the three selected urban villages.
From the three selected projects, one can recognize that a decisive trend is gradually 
emerging in the process of planning and design evolution. The negotiation skill and urban 
design that have been applied in the Central District of Futian, or the dynamic participation 
in the flexible planning interventions of OCT-Loft, and the locally specific fine-tuning 
approach of the regeneration of the urban villages, together reveal that participatory 
planning is becoming part of the formal planning mechanism. It also confirms that planning 
embodiments (method, ideology, aims and instruments) must be understood and used 
not only as instruments for a top-down political intervention, but also as spatial agents, 
confronting the changing socio–spatial demands embedded in the cultural domain.
In many cases, the result of the fast urbanization has been the demolition of existing, 
most often, historical urban structures and buildings. To retrieve the meaning of 
tradition within urban transformation and to appreciate the concept of historical 
continuity has been neglected under the name of the “Modern Movement”. With 
regard to the long-term evolution of the critical modernization, efforts relating to a 
new urbanism have to be made to avoid the memory crisis and to evaluate historical 
continuity. As Henco Bekkering (2007: 44) pointed out, “in each human being there is 
an accumulation of knowledge and information within a given cultural context that he 
or she cannot deny” and that is part of his/her identity.
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 The retrieval of urban meaning is exactly one of the most crucial values that the critical 
modernization of contemporary China should acknowledge within the planning and 
design evolution. In particular, China has to avoid making the same mistakes, as made 
during the modern architectural and urban movement of in Western industrialized 
countries decades earlier. 
The planning discourse of contemporary China does not have its own voice yet, even 
though efforts have been made under political initiatives in an unprecedented way. 
Thus, the transformation of planning from top-down initiatives (elaborated in chapter 
6) corresponding to the emergence of the planning implementation with the demands 
of compromises and negotiations (elaborated in Chapter 8) are often recognized in 
many situations. It has proven to be the current challenge that Chinese planning 
culture still has to overcome.
Nevertheless, the on-going evolutionary process and dynamic initiatives of reformation 
are demonstrating that it is possible in China for a new urbanism to emerge in a non-
Western oriented planning culture. Planning professions must deal with characteristics 
of a critical modernization and the contextual background of a cultural turn within 
contemporary China. The new urbanism of contemporary China including the 
application of urban planning and urban design has to fulfill the demands of mediating 
both the hard way and soft way the impacts in both the political-economic and the 
socio-spatial domains. This has to be realized by taking a hybrid problematic and 
layered historical Chinese context into account.
To build up the mechanism of a new urbanism is indeed one of the major challenges 
that has emerged in the transitional moment of the cultural turn. Within this process 
the idea of a new planning culture begins to be recognized. 
§ 9.2 The Planning Culture of the Chinese Contemporary Urban Development 
Global forces corresponding to the emergence of the world society as defined by 
Beck (1992) might prove to be one of the momentums that influenced the Chinese 
reformists to launch an open door policy. However, the direct distinct connection 
is not as strong as it was thought to be in the outside world. The evidence shows 
that the reformation of the Chinese political system during the 1980s has been 
effectively disguised as an internal impetus of picking up the unfinished modernization 
movement that had been traumatized by many “undesirable” historical events prior to 
the 1980s. The characteristic of the cultural turn in the 1980s is not a process whereby 
the state intends to serve a newly emerging middle class in China, but rather one 
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whereby it tries to maintain its own legitimacy. This fundamental issue to “consolidate 
the state’s position” has a decisive power over any path of reform that the country is 
taking. It is also the major reason why the special path of so-called “gradualism” that 
China’s reform has successfully applied could make the reform result in something very 
different from the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and Central Europe, because 
this self-initiated “gradualism” approach can avoid any sudden collapse of the regime.
Within this framework, the application of a market re-orientation is a means to 
underpin the Party-state’s legitimacy serving as a societal modernization project rather 
than an intended future goal. The advocacy of Deng Xiaoping’s phrase is a decisive 
confirmation to clarify the confusion that emerged among the leading group of the 
Party by integrating after the 1990s the two extreme positions into one. One could 
say that the application of the market re-orientation in the 1980s under “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” is not much different from the 1950s. In other words, 
by developing socialism with Chinese characteristics based on Marxist and Leninist 
principals, both market re-orientation and Marxism-Leninism are practiced in China 
as a societal modernization project. This is therefore consistent with the Chinese 
Communist Party’s effort to modernize China and to consolidate its position in the 
state.
Any individual and dynamic modernization project of a society that has been installed 
by following a specific political consideration such as market re-orientation and 
Marxism-Leninism cannot inhibit that society to follow its natural path of evolution. 
In this sense, a modernization movement is a continual socio-political movement, no 
matter whether its flag is flapping in red or blue, whether it is self-initiated or based 
on mutual integration or whether it is undertaken by others or by the society itself. 
Collectively, the coaction between the consensus of intra-society evolution and the 
global-political entity triggers the emergence of a cultural turn, which is a crucial part 
of the cultural evolution of a society.
Within the planning domain, planning has to serve public policy and evolve in social 
activities. Compared to the essence of the ethical spirit, a dialectic spirit was not 
emphasized in Chinese tradition. In each transitional period of the modernization 
movement, opposition between the ruling class and incoherent public interests 
intensified the socio-political dialectic spirit which either is provided by a legal 
enforcement or comes out of resistant forces in a peaceful formation of negotiation and 
participatory approach or in a radical formation of revolutionary protest, such as in the 
first and second modernization movement. Throughout the modernization movement, 
the dialectic spirit between the two impetuses—that most of the time is in conflict 
with each other—has been gradually accepted by Chinese culture, particularly in the 
transitional periods of cultural turn.
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To a certain degree, this argument also confirms Mannheim’s (1935) advocacy of the 
two parameters in his four types of propositions regarding the planning decision-making 
processes. Even though it is difficult to quantify the characteristics of the two parameters 
“participation” and “centralization” in any political formation precisely, nevertheless, by 
comparing the Maoist period of the planned-economy with Deng’s reformist period of 
market-economy, one can recognize that there is a tendency to integrate centralization 
and participation dynamically. For example, one can see the consensus of public 
participation in the urban development after the reformation is increasingly profound. 
However, it does not undermine the central power of control. On the contrary, the political 
control has been transformed into a smart web of dynamic soft mechanisms including 
judicial, plan-based and market systems, which have been illustrated in the case of the 
Shenzhen planning system as well as by the three selected cases. This intelligent web of 
dynamic and soft mechanisms officially, to a certain degree, “allows” the public debate 
and participation to sometimes appear as a result of strong political compromise.
 On the other hand, political preference may appear as a dominant force that triggers 
the turn. It is the society that accommodates the cultural continuity and allows for 
the cultural turn to be evolved. Even if people everywhere may be subject to the same 
political mode, this is no guarantee that they will react the same way or are able to 
express their preferences without the resources needed to command them. To smooth 
the confrontation between the political and societal embodiment is necessary for a 
society to enrich its cultural continuity. 
One could say to a certain degree that Mannheim’s “democratically planned society” 
against the “either-or” dualism definition between the top–down approach of the 
fascist dictatorship and the “laissez-faire” attitude of the liberal market economy 
finds a relevant match in Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 
by arguing to take into account the cultural formation of a society instead of only 
considering the political formation in relation to the planning system. It provides a 
better interpretation than imposing neoliberalism to the current Chinese situation, 
even though the changes to China’s economy and society since 1970 seem to suggest a 
neoliberal trajectory.
The role of planning in the socio-spatial domain has been redefined within the new 
planning culture that is emerging in contemporary China. Planning as a political tool is 
now strongly linked to serve political purposes and influence the socio-spatial structure 
more than ever. The role of planning, as redefined, has gained new meanings that 
enhance the transformation from a political intervention instrument to a dynamic 
socio-spatial mechanism.
From the studies of the three selected cases, links between planning interventions and 
spatial implementation illustrate the fact that the emerged spatial articulation has 
been made possible through the diversification of planning approaches. In this sense, 
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the planning system has the role of a socio-political medium in order to fulfill not only 
the political functions but also to provide balance and preserve for social stability. This 
process of social-spatial evolution is not developing in one direction only. In other 
words, reversely, a socio-spatial emergence can also enforce political readjustments 
through the medium of the planning mechanism by transacting the by-product of 
this cycle: the production of space. (Social) space is becoming a substance for socio-
political negotiation, such as the informal space that emerged in the urban villages and 
several times after planning adjustments in the Central District of Futian. This spatiality 
is simultaneously the medium and outcome that is incorporated as it is socialized and 
transforms both physical and psychological spaces. In this sense, it proves that both 
the political and societal embodiment contribute to the formulation of the planning 
culture within the domain of socio–spatiality.
The interactions between the involved actors who are participating in the evolution of 
the abovementioned dialectical process is what I define in this research as “the new 
application of the idea of planning culture”, which means that the idea of planning 
culture is not only an analytical framework for pursuing the understanding of the 
planning discourse. Rather it is a microcosm of dialectic political, social and spatial 
evolution processes that have emerged in a specific transitional society. Particularly, 
in the case of the Chinese modernization evolution, being embedded in the particular 
Chinese political formation, planning as a legitimate political tool indeed helps us to 
“decode the myth of China’s exceptionalism”295 (Wu Fulong 2010: 620).
In the 1980s, not only was Chinese society confronting a national reformation with 
regard to the necessity of economic and political survival, but it also received external 
influences from the global society.
Within this framework, the emergence of the new “cultural turn” in contemporary 
China had to respond to the confrontation by combining both building modernization 
upon traditional culture and by paying more attention to building up a civilization 
based on a modern spirit as well as developing its material counterpart. This 
meant that a civilization that had faced a long period of colonialism, fascism and 
totalitarianism as well as class discrimination had to be liberated based on the 
confluence of diverse criteria of liberal openness. Hence, progress here must be seen as 
a long historical process, which requires continuous and vigorous efforts.
295 Wu Fulong used different references, such as according to David Harvey (2006: 34), for example, China is an 
outcome of a “particular kind of neo-liberalism interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control”, or—
paraphrasing Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”—“neoliberalization with 
Chinese characteristics”. 
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Learning from this research, to define the status of an open society in Chinese tradition may 
not be simply the application of Western standards. Like the two sides of a coin, effects of 
risk and opportunity can be found simultaneously. Especially for China, as an agricultural 
country with a less developed economy and historically self-imposed isolation, the 
revolution of modernization, e.g., science-technology, democracy and industrial revolution 
cannot be created homogeneously but has to be imported heterogeneously.
Without a doubt, after years of practices in a better and more stable environment, 
Chinese modernization has taken a turn towards progression in many aspects. Practice 
in contemporary urban development in China shows that the reform can provide 
a thriving vitality to society, such as importing advanced technology and science, 
establishing experimental special economic zones, and importing foreign capital, that 
together indicate the new perspective of the openness. It is important to highlight that 
beyond the core efforts of urban development and planning intervention a positive 
and reflexive civil society based on the advocacy of a citizen’s city is gradually emerging 
in the urban planning domain. Despite the dominance of the political-ethical values 
under the guidance of the Party, the modernization of thoughts and ideas slowly is 
sprouting among the people, resulting in a Chinese version of the civil society.
 At this moment, for the first time, Chinese civilization can evolve its modernization 
based on a self-initiated exploration. It is a perspective of some sort of “Renaissance” 
that had never grown maturely before and it is now possible to lift such an age-old 
civilization to a completely new level.
However, no matter to what extent the further course of China is set, for an agricultural 
country composed largely of small family-farms, the realization of democracy is a long 
process and faces a lot of obstacles. Furthermore, without a fundamental improvement 
of the backward-oriented agriculture and taking care of the small family farmers, who 
represent the majority of the people, it is impossible to realize democracy thoroughly. 
To a certain degree, all these factors have to be supported in parallel by the willingness 
of undertaking bold political reform of the current Party-led Communist government. 
At this very crucial transitional moment, the traditional values of this age-old 
civilization need to be revitalized and a smooth transitional process for the current 
development is critically needed. It can lead the country a step further towards a more 
open society, but there is also the risk of failure.
Therefore, an open society in Chinese terms should not be limited and defined by the 
breadth of political action or by the planning implementation of interventional parameters, 
nor by the economic indication of growth or by a glamorized spatial appearance. Instead, 
beyond all of these criteria, it is an on-going collective social programme to civilize the 
people, to regain its self-awareness, to be able to continue the evolution of humanity 
emphasized in Chinese tradition and to rebuild the self-consciousness as well as to enrich 
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efforts of natural and technological science. Above all, it should be a goal to respect the 
tradition. After all, “tradition means to pass on the fire, not to worship the ash.”296
§ 9.3 Paddling between “Flexibility” and “Reliability
“Every cloud has a silver lining” is an old saying of Chinese philosophical thinking297. 
It means that while there are risks, there are new opportunities as well. With all the 
before mentioned aspects, China is yet in transition. From the internal eagerness of 
accumulating wealth to the external strength of investment interests, both pressures 
are interacting enormously with each other in the evolution of Chinese critical 
modernization. Driven by the confluence of these two forces, the situation of the current 
and foreseen challenges of contemporary China can be metaphorically compared to the 
condition of mixture elements that has created a phenomenon of fusion. 
Water is the softest thing, yet it can penetrate mountains and earth. This shows clearly 
the principle of “softness overcoming hardness” in the famous philosophical thinking 
of Lao Tzu. He emphasized the power of water in its softness overcoming hardness, 
which could help to explain what we have witnessed in the past forty years in how the 
rural-urban development has been progressing countrywide in China.
Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the way to lead the country through the mist of 
confusion in his time is very much based on the same idea of Lao Tzu about the 
characteristic of water. His phrase “cross the river by groping the stones” is very 
different from the “class struggle” spirit that Mao promoted, although they mandate 
the same communist regime. In the sense of maintaining the legitimate power of the 
regime from different angles, Mao’s advocacy is a “hard” way while Deng Xiaoping’s 
approach has a “soft” core. This fundamentally different spirit can be recognized 
through the whole planning reform if we compare the top-down blue print of the 
Maoist period with that of Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
and the varied stages of other reforms that have followed.
296 Austrian composer Gustav Mahler says in the German version: “Tradition ist die Weitergabe des Feuers, nicht 
die Anbetung der Asche.”
297 Lu You (1125-1209 A.D.) A Visit to a Village West of the Mountains. This proverb is usually said as every bad 
situation has some good aspect to it.
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In addition, if we decode the “socialism” within the framework of “Chinese 
characteristics”, we can immediately link them to the Chinese philosophical root 
of social order, in which a society is based on the Li (principle) which is very much 
emphasizing how to maintain social stability by defining the individual’s social 
function, obligation and status. In this sense, the current group of communist leaders 
regards its superior authoritarianism as the sole mandate of the country, and as such is 
very similar to feudalism. 
The leadership from generation to generation is passed on through a party merit 
system. The leadership among the group of Chinese leaders of different generations 
is not empowered by one person’s mandate as was the case in feudalism, but the 
decision-making structure is based on a limited number of people in a small political 
circle and in which the political striving still remains in the spirit of the Chinese political 
realm. It is now only hidden smartly in the depth of its own camouflage of reformation.
Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” can explain how planning 
culture in contemporary China is moving dynamically by paddling between “flexibility” 
and “reliability”, keeping a dynamic balance. This softness overcoming hardness, 
emphasized in Chinese philosophy by Lao Tzu, has led the reformation of the country to 
an unprecedented progression, probably because it is close to the Chinese tradition of 
humanity, particularly for Chinese people after having lived for decades a miserable life 
of national hardship.
Reliability means to ensure the progression of the country. It is an overall demand 
on a countrywide scope. This cannot be achieved without a long-term framework of 
guidance and vision; yet, action has to be taken by local empowerment. Flexibility 
means, in the planning domain of city making, giving space to almost unforeseen 
challenges on a daily basis, and is becoming a crucial urban condition of the local 
empowerment. As Hsia Chu-joe (2009: 76) emphasized: “To pursue the livable city, 
the sustainable city, the feminist city, the fascinating city and even to defeat the effects 
of social exclusion (…) The potential grass-roots empowerment of a citizen’s city (…) is 
the necessary historical power for urban reform.” 
It remains unclear to what extent the grass-roots empowerment of a citizen’s city can 
be bred in the context of Chinese culture, nevertheless, as a convincing alternative 
—a principle of hope—for the further urbanization in China (and in Asia), Jürgen 
Rosemann (2012: 19) further emphasized, “(…) a citizen’s city is not first of all a 
commodity for economic development and entrepreneurship (…) it becomes a place of 
permanency and sustainability, in which local culture can be protected and revitalized 
in their meaning”. Although the social movements are an important historical power 
for urban reform, urban and regional development cannot be limited to the grass-
roots dimension. It is necessary to find a bridge between the contradictory aims, and 
to connect the local conditions with the global demands and to retrieve the balance 
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between flexibility and reliability. In other words, the citizen’s city neither is a museum 
for cultural conservation, nor a niche for grass-roots communities.
In view of the increasing competition on an international level, good governance and a 
strong government on a local and regional level is necessary. To serve that perspective, 
the understanding of the new planning culture can be a medium and a useful 
framework to fulfill contradictory demands. Based on the Chinese experience, the use 
value of urban space and the innovative value of planning culture would support the 
function of a node for the milieu of innovation for other learning regions in the world as 
well.
However, “while there are risks, there are new opportunities” is not an irreversible 
term. The water that carries the boat is the same that swallows it. Risks and failures are 
both recognized. Paddling between “flexibility” and “reliability”, the current transition 
of contemporary China should evolve by following the spirit in the sense of Mannheim’s 
(2001: 194) own words, 
The ideal subject enacts a world, which changes both him and the world 
within which he acts. But at the same time, he perceives both himself and 
the world within which he acts as an object, thus creating a distance (…) the 
claim that destination can be turned from being a (malign) destiny into being 
an enactment that leaves the agent capable of further enactments at a higher 
level of self-control is the central argument of the sociological project.
Finally, the prospective group of the fifth generation Chinese leaders inherits their 
predecessors’ path; yet forty years later, the young generation has no reason to carry 
the burden of their parents who were born or grew up in the post “cultural revolution” 
period. The new group of Chinese leaders will definitely have to confront their “people” 
of the new generation and to make sure that the next critical modernization will be 
continued, hopefully, in a more civilized and reflexive dialectical path between the 
contradictory interests and demands. For its survival, a critical modernization is 
recognized and the challenges in relation to it shall be overcome, —in the words of 
Beck (1986)—a reflexive modernization is necessary, i.e. a self-transformation of the 
modern society that continuously reflects on its own conditions—originally, to retrieve 
the essential Chinese philosophical thinking of paddling like the moving water—the 
highest excellence defined by Lao Tzu298. 
298 Lao Tzu (Chinese: 老子) (ca. 600 B.C.), Tao Te Ching (simplifies Chinese: 道德经; Traditional Chinese: 道德經), 
Chapter 8 “Shang Shan Ruo Shui” (Chinese: 上善若水).
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10 An Unfinished Project and the 
Way Forward
Over the course of the last 40 years, urban development in contemporary China has 
gradually disassociated itself from the dominant Western-centered discourse on the 
urban model. Scholars and professionals have been busy defining new urban meanings 
for modern Asian cities through the exploration of different tools, research methods, 
theories, and practices. The results are abundant but have not yet been reviewed 
in a systematic manner. In the hope of demystifying this contemporary Chinese 
reformation and the evolution of its planning culture, one of the goals of this research 
is to collect refined materials and assessing their scale and scope. It aims to alleviate 
some of the weightiness of the Chinese planning discourse in the context of the 
national and international exchange of ideas.
Because the research materials are confined mainly to the planning domain, in-depth 
social and spatial factors have been less analyzed. In addition, with regard to the 
acquisition of material, there are a few more practical limitations that were imposed 
in particular by private developers and governmental institutions. URBANUS has 
generously given their support for this research by providing their abundant drawing 
material. However, in the case of OCT Loft, the interviewees were not allowed to release 
plans and drawings to the public without an official permission from the company. 
Another constraint was that once an official interview was arranged through personal 
connections in Shenzhen, the challenge remained of how to distinguish between a tale 
of opinion, propaganda and scientific fact. In China, as a rule, an official interview is 
regarded as highly suspicious by the interviewee, very often resulting in the conveying 
of only safe, standardized, and less critical information. Fortunately in the case of 
Shenzhen, the help of some rather critically minded officials, institutional researchers, 
architects, and pubic citizens allowed that some useful information could still be dug 
out of the mud.
The confined course of urban planning evolution allowed the researcher to pass over a 
certain amount of literature and studies that had no direct relevance. However, a few 
inquiries and studies have helped to keep this research on the main track. Even though 
they had no direct association with the research, they provided a fruitful, contextual 
underpinning that paved the way, and in many cases allowed the researcher to bypass 
abundant material on cases that had already been explored. If the outlining of planning 
culture in this research provided the main structure for building up the debate on 
planning discourse that is based on and part of Chinese critical modernization, 
then these inquires and studies should be regarded as fresh material that led the 
way forward and provided the means to overcome the inadequacy of an unfinished 
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project on urban studies in China. In particular, theses inquiries and studies raised 
questions that are a response to the new urban demands of Chinese society after the 
reformation, and many of them by Chinese scholars. They provide unique insights in 
comparison to those studies that have been conducted by foreign scholars because 
of the advantage of access to original, local archives and because of their different 
angles of interpretation. I found that they were valuable and crucial and deserved to be 
highlighted and mentioned.
The first of these components is in the field of top-down, urban policy implementation 
such as urban governance and management, and planning organization and 
instruments.
The second component emerges based on the interest in bottom-up phenomena; it 
focuses on inquiries into the new phenomena of urban socio-spatiality, urban culture, 
and urban history.
These clusters either address the essential course of foreseen challenges within 
the existing planning system or comprise reflections on the emerging socio-spatial 
challenges and problems that are of concern within and outside the country. They are 
regarded as important research subjects that will need more attention in the form of 
debate and dedicated research in the future.
Urban Governance and Urban Management
The changing role of the government in relation to new planning challenges is one of 
the foremost reforms in contemporary China.
In the blueprint era, the government played its role as a planner, operator, and investor, 
and monopolized national planning resources, including land distribution and land 
ownership. Master plans were created as tools to legalize the restructuring of the land. 
In the post-blueprint period, the government is no longer the almighty controller, and 
with its limited economic resources, the making of planning decisions is more and 
more becoming a process of negotiation and collaboration with other actors. Spatial 
restructuring now depends on the demands of the market and the contributions of 
different parties. The former top-down planning approach that was formulated by 
the strong, hierarchical, and bureaucratic system during the Maoist regime has been 
challenged by the emergence of the new, divergent collective interests of the different 
players involved. The planning skills and attitudes of the government changed and 
had to adapt to the new demands of society. Within the context of the progress of 
the reform of the market economy system, the problem of governmental functioning 
has come to the fore as the government seeks to implement its new role of managing 
“economic regulation, market supervision, social administration, and public service” 
(Gao Sujun 2009). In addition, the changing role of the government needs to be 
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supported by an advanced administrative reform and the reflexive establishment of 
law, based on the adaptive mechanisms of implementation299 (Chou Baoxing 2005; 
Feng Xianxue 2006; Peng Kuntao 2007; Mao Qizhi 2008; Li Guangbin 2010).
Subsequently, the demands on multi-level governance have become increasingly 
important because of the tendency toward polycentric development (Yang Chun 2008; 
Hall 2009; Xu Jiang and Yeh 2009). It suggests a development of a reasonable division 
of authority in a vertical structure, including solidifying the relationships between state, 
province, and city planning departments and simultaneously straightening out the 
administrative system in a horizontal structure, including building the relationships 
between planning departments in different fields 
Urban Planning Instruments and Urban Planning Organization
Invalidation of the master plans and outdated planning methods 
Since the 1990s, discussions have arisen focusing on the validity and sufficiency of 
the master plan (Pei Xinheng 2007; Wang Guangtao 2008). In the traditional urban 
planning approach, city scale was defined by two criteria: planned growth of the 
population and the proportion of built-up areas in relation to the expected population. 
In order to claim more land for urban expansion and future use, local governments 
have exaggerated the expected population growth in their master plans, resulting in 
inefficient land use and huge overhead costs as a result of investment not only in land, 
but also in public facilities when the “expected” result did not take place or the market 
did not perform according to expectation.
Evidence has supported the invalidation of the master plan in multiple dimensions. 
This has occurred primarily in those regions and cities with an unexpected rate of 
accelerated development where the estimate of population growth in the master plan 
is much lower than in reality. That is to say, the master plan is not able to cope with 
the speed and demands of real development. This has brought enormous pressures 
on planners who are confronted with a continuous change in circumstances that was 
a new and unknown experience for them compared to the Maoist regime. Advocates 
have emphasized the need to introduce and enhance a more scientific indexing 
system of urban master planning that incorporates scientific compilation techniques 
and monitoring as objective requirements. In order to build a well-off society in an 
all-around way and establish socialist harmony, the government has adopted remote 
299 See elaboration on the legal framework of the newly established law-based planning system in Chapter 6.2.2. 
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sensing and GIS technologies for use in urban planning and management (Chen 
Shupeng et al. 2000) and has included the environmental index of the eco-city and the 
low-carbon concept in city development (Baeumler et al. 2012). In order to integrate 
these diverse applications into the process of urban development, it is important to 
encourage adequate initial studies on the revision of the urban master plan, planning 
methods, and tools in order to overcome unhealthy tendencies in urban planning and 
construction (Chou Baoxing 2005; Wang Guangtao 2008).
New planning organization and planning process
Socio-economic development and the establishment of a market economy 
have significantly influenced Chinese urban planning administration. Planning 
administrators are faced with new situations and problems, and many measures that 
were applied in the past are no longer effective. Problems of a different dimension 
are recognized. For example, a complete spatial planning system has not yet been 
established and its functions are distributed over several divided departments with 
overlapping responsibilities under disjointed and inconsistent laws and regulations. 
Comparable problems also come up as a result of the incoherent territorial division 
between urban and rural areas, each with its own rules and regulations (Gao 
Zhonggang 2008). 
New urban phenomena have also triggered the reformation of planning organization 
and planning approaches. For example, in 1993, the Shenzhen Master Plan (1996-
2010) was followed by the Regional Plan for the Pearl River Delta in 1995. Seven years 
later, in the year 2000, the State Council finally approved it. In order to bridge the gap 
caused by the long procedure of approval, the local government had to adapt reflexively 
to local demands. During this period, a new system of scrutiny was introduced and for 
the first time the public’s general opinion was integrated300. Furthermore, the Urban 
Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was set up301, and its members included both 
city officials and—for the very first time in China—stakeholders who represented local 
business interests.
300 The draft of the Third Master Plan was scrutinized for a 30-day period by the general public. Cadres and scholars 
from neighboring cities were invited to comment on the draft. 
301 See more on the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen in Chapter 7.2.3. The assigned role of the Urban Planning 
Board of Shenzhen was to reconcile district level plans with the municipal Master Plan. 
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Although, by then, many Shenzhen planners considered the Urban Planning Board of 
Shenzhen (UPBSZ) a nuisance, deeming this attempt at enlisting the participation of 
a limited number of private stakeholders in the planning process as “too advanced” 
for China. As a result of this experience, an efficient and more transparent planning 
process is becoming a more critical criterion for evaluating the planning evolution of 
Chinese urban development. Regarding actualizing this long-term progression, Chinese 
urban planning still has limited effective control in land applications, and its due role 
has yet to be fulfilled (Friedmann 2005; Gao Zhonggang 2008; He Zizhang 2009).
Demands of integral urban planning
It is generally accepted by Chinese society that the reformation of urban planning, 
policy, and law should be carried out. The need for integral urban planning is accepted 
by the government, professionals, and scholars. Many types of suggestions have been 
made, including establishing an urban planning administrative framework with a 
separation between decision-making and execution; clarifying the governments’ role 
of “economic regulation, market supervision, social administration and public service” 
to build “limited government” as well as “positive government” (Feng Xianxue 2006: 
79), and providing institutional guarantees for administration by law. (Gao Zhonggang 
2008; Geng Huizhi 2008; Li Kanzhen 2008).
Building up an integral urban planning system involves not only the reform of 
planning institutes and organizations and the readjustment of governmental roles and 
management. It also involves the development of a reflexive urban concept and urban 
philosophy—a new urbanism. This fundamental urban philosophy has to be embedded 
in China’s urban society and its cultural context to support the contemporary urban 
evolution. Yet, currently this embodiment of knowledge is still being established, 
following its own path of dynamic development. It has to be supported by enormous 
efforts of collective research and studies to reveal the essential course for the future. 
Fortunately, researchers are now contributing to building up the discourse on urban 
socio-spatial development within the Chinese context, and such research is receiving 
more attention from scholars.
Urban Paradigms and Urban Socio-Spatiality
Urban development and urban evolution
Over the last few decades, governmental planners, professionals, and scholars have 
devoted themselves to studies of the Chinese urban paradigm. Particularly useful 
for the further development—and for this research—are contributions from Chinese 
scholars and those whose subjects are related to socio-spatial study. Debating the 
Asian urban paradigm is becoming critical. It has been established that the diversity 
of Asian urban development cannot be understood from the Western-based urban 
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discourse due to the completely different urban and historical contexts (Ginsburg et al. 
1991; Lin 2002; Perera 2003, 2007a). About the urban political-economic paradigm, 
T. G. McGee (1991: 5) argues:
The Western paradigm of the urban transition, which draws its rationale from 
the historical experience of urbanization as it has occurred in Western Europe 
and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is clearly not 
nearly transferable to the developing countries’ urbanization process. The 
uneven incorporation of these Asian countries into a world economic system 
from the fifteenth century onward created divergent patterns of urbanization, 
which reflect the different interactions between Asian countries and the world 
system.
 “Desakota” (city–country)302 and “extended metropolitan regions” are terms that 
refer to regions that comprise an intense mixture of agricultural and nonagricultural 
activities that often stretch along corridors between large city cores. Aspects of this 
uniqueness have begun to be identified in many Asian countries (Ginsburg et al. 1991).
Similarly, George Lin’s (2002) research elucidated the on-going process and 
evolving patterns of Urban-Rural Integration (Chengxiang Yitihua)303 in the extended 
metropolitan regions of China that have demonstrated a complex relationship between 
agriculture, industrialization, and urbanization in different political economies. He has 
questioned the adequacy of the widely accepted urban-rural dichotomy. Lin (2002: 
383) argued, “the intrusion of global forces has not homogenized local particularities. 
Global capitalism had to seek shelter from locally specific conditions in order to take 
root in socialist soil.” A similar advocacy can be found in the research of Nihal Perera 
(2007b), who emphasized that even though Asian urbanization is following Western 
models, fitting well within a large West-centered urban structure, the social and spatial 
transformation in these cities seems to go in varied directions. The local people are not 
passive recipients of global and dominant forces, but create and negotiate spaces for 
their social and cultural practices.304 
302 An Indonesian term that was coined from the words kota (town) and desa (village). See more about the 
characteristics of Desakota in Norton et al. (1991: 17). 
303 Chengxiang Yitihua or Urban-Rural Integration (simplified Chinese: 城乡一体化; traditional Chinese: 城鄉一體化)
304 Nihal Perera (2007a) argues that the social transformations of Asia are indeed paralleled by spatial 
transformations. The social and spatial transformations are not isomorphic or isotemporal, but take their 
own forms. The transformation of the Asian city is far more complex than the hegemonic discourses of 
modernization and globalization suggest.
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Urban model and urban form 
One of the most important tasks for planners is to determine what urban forms 
are achievable and sustainable in the future (Jenks et al., 2000). Urban growth and 
urban form have been main subjects of interest for urban planners, geographers, and 
economists for decades. One cluster of research focused on the interrelation between 
the reform of administrative systems and the modes of establishing cities and towns 
(Gu Chaolin and Pu Shanxi 2008).
The second cluster of research focused on the urban model. The debate between 
centralists and de-centralist has been going on for years. Currently, the centralists have 
the upper hand because space consumption by urban sprawl and the over-dependence 
on automobiles have become a major concern all over the world. The concept of 
sustainable development has become increasingly significant as a means for creating 
a better future for the world economically, socially, and environmentally. There is a 
widespread belief that compact urban development is a more sustainable model than 
urban sprawl (Jiang Xiaolei, 2009). Due to the emerged definition of mega-regions 
and the measuring of polycentricity, the concepts of the city region and polycentric 
development are also becoming very popular subjects. The study of inter-city relations 
and city networks based on spaces of flow is becoming a significant field involving the 
probing of urban and regional spatial evolvement305 (Castells 1996). Along with the 
deepening of regional unbalances caused by globalization, polycentricity is becoming 
a major goal most cities and regions aim for in the process of pursuing a balanced 
development (Hall and Pain 2006; Xiong Guoping 2006). The evidence shows that the 
works of regional and thematic focus are concentrated in the core areas of the coastal 
regions306 or in the globalizing urban regions of China. These regional preferences are 
due to their advantages in accessibility, data availability, local collaborations and geo-
political emphases (Yeung and Lin 2003; Luo Zhendong 2008, 2009).
The third cluster has been newly established in recent years. Such as studies combining 
the application of remote sensing, spatial metrics, and urban models to analyze urban 
form. Urban growth provides indications of the aggregate size of cities and the rate at 
which other land, such as agricultural land, is converted into urban uses. To predict 
305 Castells put forward the theory that in an informational economy, the rise of network organization causes the 
emergent “space of flows” to dominate established politico-territorial spaces that are defined by jurisdictional 
and administrative boundaries. Whereas systems of governance remain strongly attached to territorially 
bounded places, new urban economy related to the process of production is shaped by transcontinental, 
networked, spaces of flows. 
306 The most recognized regions in China are Greater Beijing, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta. 
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future urban morphologies and to compare the spatial patterns of urbanization, 
simulation methods are needed. On the other hand, landscape ecology, focusing on 
the interactions between spatial patterns and ecological processes, has brought about 
a number of new methods that can be conveniently used for studying urban areas. 
Similar research methods have been applied to address the question of urban transport 
and land use models (Herold et al. 2003; Deng 2004; Zhao Jiang 2010). 
New Urban Phenomena and Urban Culture
Urban reservation and urban renewal
In addition to the studies of urban development in term of spatial forms, the soft 
parts of urban phenomena and urban culture have become an all-around concern. 
Under the circumstances of rapid urban development, urban deconstruction should 
be one of the main concerns for Chinese cities. The emphasis on the revival of urban 
culture by Wu Liangyong (1999) in his design of the former courtyard settlement 
“Juer Hutong” in Beijing has demonstrated his idea of integrating cultural values into 
urban development, which is becoming a critical and crucial strategy for Chinese urban 
development. In a related area, gradual housing renewal and the reform of China’s 
former housing system has drawn the attention of the government and scholars as well 
(Zhou Jiang 2007; Lu Junhua and Shao Lei 2007; Hui Xiaoxi 2012).
Urban renewal and urban regeneration have been taken into account as an important 
index of the master plan. In addition, new urban phenomena like “urban villages” 
have triggered the enhancement of civil participation, and emphasize a human and 
just planning process, which have finally gained a position in the main stream of urban 
studies and have gradually been integrated in Chinese urban policy and urban planning 
(Him Chung 2004; He Zizhang 2009).
The Way Forward
The abovementioned investigations regarding diverse urban subjects and urban 
challenges are only a few examples of what is taking place. They can only present pieces 
of the whole picture, which cannot yet be portrayed fully. Within only a few decades, 
the accumulation of the many investigations and built up documentations show the 
hybridity of Chinese urban characteristics and are also a relevant epitome of Asian 
urban development. This is in agreement with the theory and presupposition that 
Chinese contemporary urban planning and development still have a long way to go and 
this can only be achieved through “learning by doing”, maintaining a balance between 
flexibility and reliability, and can only be realized based on collective efforts of exploring 
in an open dialectical spirit.
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The research supports very much the advocacy of an integral, self-exploring approach 
based on a dialectical spirit within an open global debating context. Never in human 
history have we been faced with a comparable global effect on such a large scale. In 
recent years, China’s development has been closely interlinked with the rest of the 
world in an overwhelming way. In actual spatial construction, the results impact more 
than one billion people. Norton Ginsburg (1972: 128), writing about Asia, described 
what planning could contribute to this overwhelming transitional process.
Planning for the future of the Asian city is planning for change (…) that is 
planning not only for the cities as they are, but for the cities as they seem to 
be becoming (…) that it is planning not only at the scale of the city and its’ 
parts, but also at regional and national scales, where the functions and the 
benefits and cost of urbanization assume quite different proportions (…) that 
it is planning not only for the physical city, but, more important, for the kinds 
of people who will be residing in it (…) that it is planning for modernization, for 
development, and for urban forms which need not duplicate those of the West 
and which indeed may vary significantly from country to country within the 
region. Even as they are, cities are the centers for change in Asia. The challenge 
and the opportunity lie in molding that change for the benefit of two-thirds of 
mankind.
In view of this very special moment, the same spirit of devoting oneself to the open 
ocean of the unknown and to changes should continue to evolve through the human 
exploration of urban culture and in many other un-explored urban territories. In a 
broader scope, the survival of our urban planet requires dedicating oneself to the 
courage to explore the beyond, and importantly, to retrieve the meaning of balance 
and harmony—as simple as a fundamental principal of any existence, and we are no 
exceptional to that. To respect this fundamental principal in general, and to fulfill our 
discipline in particular, is an unfinished project that needs to be continually carried 
on—with a great responsibility—and fortunately we are one of those who have the 
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